Dr. Carson is a frequent contributor to THE FREEMAN and other journals and the author of several books, his latest being The War on the Poor (Arlington House, ¹969). He is Chairman of the Social Science Department at Okaloosa-Walton College in Florida.
Government throttled the railroads in three ways mainly. In the first place, restrictive regulation took away crucial managerial authority from the railroads and vested it in the Interstate Commerce Commission. This was supplemented, in turn, by various legislative inhibitions of general application. In the second place, government subsidized and otherwise privileged competitive means of transport. In the third place, government fostered the organization of railway unions and aided them in various ways in circumscribing and hamstringing the use of rail facilities. The first two of these interventions have already been covered. It is time now to examine the grip of the labor unions on the railroads.
Labor unions, in general, are organized to get higher wages and improve the working conditions of their members. To do this, they attempt to take the determination of these conditions out of the market place and have them determined by negotiation with the employer who negotiates under the threat that he will be denied access to any workers if he does not comply with their demands. The economic impact of this intervention extends outward to effect with varying degrees four distinct groupings of people.
Effects of Labor Union Activity on People
Those who are apt to be most directly affected by labor union activity are other potential workers for an employer. They are most likely to be the ones against whom threats and violence are used if there is a strike—and if the employer attempts to operate the struck facility. Other workers are the ones, also, who are denied the opportunity for jobs which they might have if unions did not prevent them from being employed. More broadly, if unions succeed in getting higher wages and better conditions than they would otherwise have got, they do so by reducing the number who can be employed in that undertaking, as a rule. The general impact is either to reduce the number who can be employed or reduce the wages and working conditions of some of those employed, or both.
Less directly, labor union activity is aimed at employers (though union rhetoric suggests that they are the primary target). Employers are not usually the victims of threats and violence, but this does not mean that they may not suffer. They may and do suffer during a strike by sabotage, by additional charges incurred in attempting to protect and maintain facilities, by having to go to the trouble and expense of training new employees, or by being unable to operate their facilities and provide goods and services with all the train of disadvantages that may follow from that.
Labor union activity may, in the third instance, have effects which reach through to all of us as consumers. This is so, obviously, when a prolonged strike cuts off goods and services which we could otherwise have had. It is so, too, when labor costs are raised so that goods and services are made more expensive. In this case, the consumer may shift to substitutes or reduce his consumption of the goods or services involved. The fourth effect is rarely, if ever, discussed and has not, to my knowledge, had any careful empirical studies made which would tend to verify it. Yet it is an effect which can be reasonably adduced and which much evidence that is common knowledge tends to support. The effect I have in mind is on those who work in and use the facilities of employers whose employees are extensively organized into unions. Those facilities are likely to show the effects of the tampering with the market which produces an imbalance in capital outlay. If an employer has to pay higher wages for shorter hours, if his workers attain various perquisites which hamper their use, if he must still compete with others in providing the goods and services, if he must compete for money with other users, then something has to give if he is to operate successfully. That something will quite often be the appearance, style, and quality of his facilities.
I noted in an earlier chapter that railroad facilities are frequently rundown, that freight and passenger stations are often decrepit and in poor state of repair, that passenger cars are old and dirty, and that facilities in general are below the standard in other fields. Railroads have obviously skimped in expenses for facilities in order to meet other outlays. This, in turn, has had a rather predictable effect on employee morale, and helps to account for surly and desultory service. In one direction, at least, the union quest for better working conditions has resulted in worsening working conditions.
Growth of Railway Unions
The railway unions were among the earliest trade unions organized on any scale within the United States. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers was organized in 1863. The remainder of the Big Four of the Brotherhoods were organized within the next twenty years. In addition, two other major union developments occurred in the nineteenth century involving railway employees. The Knights of Labor gained considerable following among them, and even brought off a successful strike against the Gould System in 1884-85. In the 1890′s, Eugene Debs organized the American Railway Union which brought off, temporarily, a sympathy strike for Pullman workers. However, the Knights of Labor and the American Railway Union were short-lived organizations, while the Brotherhoods had much greater permanency.
Union membership grew in the early twentieth century and had a great surge during World War I after the government took over the railroads. Since that time, the unions have remained strong and, though they have rarely struck, it is generally conceded that they could shut down the railroads rather effectively if and when they did. Many of the unions have remained independent, but some of them are affiliated with the American Federation of Labor or with the Teamsters.
The Government and the Unions
The relationship between the government and the railway unions needs to be made clear at this point. To do this is no easy task. Not only has the nature of this relationship usually been mired in controversy involving the legitimacy of union activities but also the relationship itself has been complex and confusing. Presidents, governors, and government officials have frequently attempted either to be or appear to be neutral in the contests between unions and railroad companies. They could not be, though this fact has frequently been kept from public attention. They could not be, most basically, because union tactics would not permit them to be. Government must be either for or against labor unions as they have been constituted and operated. There is no middle ground.
The reason for this can be made clear by a little examination into the nature of labor unions. According to union rhetoric, labor is not a commodity. The import of this is that wages should not be determined in the market but should be determined elsewhere. Again, according to the rhetoric, wages should be set as a result of negotiation. Not, however, by negotiation between the employer and the individual employee; according to widely held notions, that became impracticable due to the development of large companies and corporations.
The notion that wages are, or ever have been, determined to any significant degree by negotiations is a red herring used to throw the inquirer off the scent. It is true that occasionally negotiations may occur between a prospective employer and someone who has a much needed skill, ability, or reputation, and when the prospective employee has several prospects. But this is the exception to the rule by which wages are determined. There is usually a going wage in the market at any given time for a particular job, a wage rate resulting from competition among employers for workers and among workers for jobs—that is, from the supply of workers and the demand for their produce. Any negotiations that would occur would be on the fringes of the question of wages and working conditions.
Can a Union Negotiate?
How, then, could a union induce an employer to negotiate with its leaders for workers? To put it another way, if a company could hire workers at a wage its managers were willing to pay, why would those managers negotiate the matter with labor union leaders? The answer, it is clear both in theory and in history, is that they would not do so willingly. This means that for the union to be brought in, some compelling reason must exist.
In order to be able to negotiate as an equal with an employer, a union must corner the market of workers available to him. This can be done in one of two ways when the task is stripped to its essentials. A union might, in theory, corner the market by placing available workers under contract to it and paying them the wages and providing the working conditions it demanded from any other employer. This would be a market operation, and the union would be going into the market to bid for workers. Negotiations could then take place between prospective employers and the union for workers by negotiating to buy the contracts. In fact, no such operation has ever been undertaken by a union, nor is it likely to be. Unless a union had unlimited funds employers would only have to hold out for some period of time to bankrupt and break the union.
Unions do attempt to corner the market, but they do not use market methods to do so. They attempt to deny the employer access to workers and the constructive use of his facilities until he comes to terms. They do this, if he attempts to operate, by intimidation—by strikes, by driving prospective employees away from the facilities, by sabotage, and by threats. They have no recognizable good or service to sell; they have no workers under a work contract for a period of time which could be transferred to an employer. All they have to offer is an agreement to refrain from their tactics of intimidation for a period of time in return for certain wage scales and working conditions to prevail for those who work for an employer.
Government cannot, I say, be neutral toward the use of such tactics. It must either prohibit and inhibit intimidation or it must condone it. It must either enforce contracts arrived at by coercion or it must negate them. Government must either monopolize the use of intimidation or concur in the use of it by others. There is no middle ground.
Railway unions posed the dilemma very early in their operations for government of whether to side with or against them. They posed it more dramatically than most unions have done. They did so because of the nature and importance of the railroads. Trains are particularly vulnerable to the saboteur. A twisted rail, an incapacitated engineer, a rail wrongly set to take a train into a siding, strategically greased rails, can cause an amazing amount of mischief. Moreover, a station or switchyard shutdown can prevent the effective use of the extended facilities of a railroad. On the other hand, large portions of a wheat crop could be lost by the denial of rail service at a crucial time, and large cities would be hard put to survive. In consequence, those who governed have been confronted with the dilemma of either preventing the use of intimidation by unions or throwing the weight of government behind the unions so that rail companies will be forced to make sufficient concessions or comply with what is wanted and thus make the unions’ tactics unnecessary. In short, they have had to use force either on the companies or on the unions.
Government Sides with the Unions
Government—both Federal and state—took the side of the unions, at first tentatively, and then over the years much more thoroughly. They have done so in three ways, mainly. First, the Federal government threw its weight behind the mediation of disputes. This favored the unions because in the absence of intimidation there is no reason to suppose the companies would have wished to resort to mediation to settle disputes. (Of course, given the threat of intimidation, the companies might, and did sometimes, want mediation more than the unions did.) Second, both Federal and state governments prescribed such things as hours of work, compensation for overtime, and various sorts of work rules. Third, by supporting negotiated agreements, by requiring companies to adhere to them, and by other tacit aids governments encouraged the growth of unions.
The first national labor law of any sort was the Act of 1888 which was concerned exclusively with the railroads and the unions. It was the first tentative step toward government support for arbitration of disputes. This Act provided that if the parties to a dispute chose to do so they could submit it to a Board of Arbitration which would have the power to subpoena witnesses and get testimony. Compliance with the decision of the Board was to be voluntary. The Act also provided for a Presidential Commission to be appointed upon request, a commission which would be authorized to publicize its findings.1
This first Act was hardly used; in consequence, it was supplanted by the Erdman Act in 1898. This Act provided that once the dispute had been submitted for arbitration and a decision made, the decision was to be binding on both parties. The Erdman Act also contained rules which supported labor union organization. "It was made a misdemeanor for an employer to require the execution of an oral or written yellow dog contract from any employee as a condition of employment, to threaten or discriminate against any employee because of union membership…"² and so forth. This part of the Act, however, was shortly nullified by the Supreme Court, but it does indicate how far toward the support of unionism Congress was willing to go at this date. The Newlands Act passed in 1913 strengthened the mediation features of the Erdman Act.
Around World War I, the Federal government began to prescribe the length of work day for rail employees, or, more specifically, the terms of payment for time worked. "In 1916, under threat of an imminent railroad strike, Congress within four days passed the Adamson Act, giving trainmen the ‘basic’ eight-hour day without wage reduction. Overtime payment at ‘time and one-half’ was required for railroad workers in 1919."3
The Federal government took over and operated the railroads during World War I. The policy toward organized labor during that period, and its results, is described by one work in this way: "During federal control of the railways from 1917 to 1920, public policy encouraged organization by forbidding antiunion discrimination and by introducing nationwide agreements on hours, wages, and working conditions…. Like organized labor at large, the railway brotherhoods made great strides during the war years."4 Also, the government devised a whole series of job classifications which tended to rigidify the role of a given worker; in addition, seniority rules were set up and enforced.5
The Transportation Act of 1920
The Transportation Act of 1920 included extensive provisions that were supposed to lead to settlement of labor disputes. It declared that it was the duty of representatives of management and labor to arrive at a settlement. If they failed, the matter was then to go before a Labor Board. The Board was supposed to decide "all disputes with respect to the wages or salaries of employees…" not settled by negotiation. Not much came of this, however, because the unions wanted to deal with disputes nationally—that is, treat all railroads as belonging to a single system—while the companies insisted upon separate negotiations for each system.
New methods were set up in the Railway Labor Act of 1926. "It places primary emphasis on direct collective bargaining and mediation, but also establishes voluntary arbitration and compulsory investigation." This Act was amended in 1934 by an act which established a National Railroad Adjustment Board. By this latter act, also, labor unions were effectively empowered by government. "The 1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act forbid company unions. The roads must negotiate in good faith with the authorized labor representatives certified by the Board, although agreement is, of course, not compelled. Carriers may not engage in a number of specified labor practices, such as promotion of company unions, yellow-dog contracts, and other hindrances to independent unions."6
The tendency of the Federal government’s special protection of railroad workers is also indicated by the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act passed in 1933. The Act authorized mergers and consolidations of rail facilities to be overseen by a Federal Coordinator. But workers were to be protected as follows:
The number of employees in the service of a carrier shall not be reduced by reason of any action taken pursuant to the authority of this title below the number as shown by the pay rolls of employees in service during the month of May, 1933… but not more in any one year than 5 per centum; nor shall any employee in such service be deprived of employment such as he had during said month of May or be in a worse position with respect to his compensation for such employment, by reason of any action taken pursuant to the authority conferred by this title.7
The above are examples rather than a full-fledged account of the way the Federal government aided in fastening the incubus of unionism on the railroads. Part of the effort was motivated by the desire to avoid ruinous strikes, but all of it has been undertaken with a politician’s eye to the vote of privileged union men. The railroads were the first to receive such government attention. The laws governing railroads, unions, and negotiations between them have been special acts. Other unions generally fall under general acts. The effects of this special status of railroad unions have been with us longer than the effects of the general legislation. The government has, on the one hand, empowered the unions to act as a monopoly; on the other, it has attempted to restrain them from taking full advantage of the position. The railroads have been caught between the Scylla of monopoly unions and the Charybdis of continual government intervention in negotiations.
States have also passed legislation along lines sought by unions. An example of this is the full-crew laws passed by a number of states. New York State passed such a law in 1913. The situation in 1960 was this:
In its present form, New York’s full crew law specifies a minimum number of operating employees on freight trains of more than twenty-five cars, on freights of fewer than twenty-five cars, on passenger trains of more than five cars, on light engines, on fuel-electric engines and on locomotives used in switching operations.
For the most part, the minimum crew specified is larger than crews required by existing contracts between the railroads and employee organizations. Thus trains entering New York from other states are frequently required to stop at border points to pick up extra crewmen.8
Other such rules have to do with distance to be traveled by a workman, and such like. Where states have not prescribed crew sizes, they are usually provided for in union contracts.
Stultifying Effects of Government Action
The economic effects of union action empowered by government and of government action supported by unions have been burdensome and stultifying on the railroads. They have hampered the use of personnel in economic ways by the railroads, have concentrated workmen in the least productive undertakings, have denied the railroads the benefits of technology, have fastened antique practices on the roads in perpetuity, and have contributed much to the decline of the railroads and to over-all railroad employment. Some examples will show how this has been done.
Railroads are hampered by rigid work rules in the employment of their personnel. For example, "Where yard service has been maintained road crews may not perform switching for their train, even though no yard crew is on duty at the time. Such a yard crew must be called to do the work; otherwise the road crew may claim an extra day’s pay at the yard rate for a few minutes’ work in switching, and the yard crew not called may similarly claim payment." Again, "On some roads a road crew may not double over in taking a train from a yard. Transfer crews may set cars on an industrial siding, but they may not spot them for loading or unloading. A switching crew must be brought up to do that. In most yards switching crews must be called at set hours. If called later, penalty payments accrue. Hence locomotives and crews, called at stated hours, stand idle until business flows in some time later, but during the same trick."9
Rail Labor Costs Excessive
Railroad costs for labor have frequently been proportionately higher than other modes of transportation, that is, have accounted for a higher proportion of operating costs. "In 1939 the percentage of pay-roll costs, with taxes and depreciation included in operating costs, was calculated for various types of transportation as follows:
Class I line-haul railways |
53.8 |
Air transportation |
40.7 |
Water carriers |
39.0 |
Motor truck transportation |
38.2 |
Motorbus transportation |
35.2 |
Pipe-line transportation |
31.710 |
There are several reasons for these higher costs. One is that railroad workmen frequently work much less than an 8-hour day to get credit for one or before overtime begins. One book estimates that the average crew under average conditions in the freight service could complete its work day in 6 1/4 hours and that a passenger crew could do so in 4 1/2 hours.¹¹ This is so because of work rules, and it obviously drives the cost of labor upward.
An observer seeing a freight train pulling 125 cars on a long distance haul with only a few crewmen aboard might suppose that railroads were making money hand over fist. After all, this looks as if it would be a much more economical use of personnel than could be matched by any other means of transportation than perhaps barges or pipelines. But such an observer would only be seeing that part of railroad operations that keeps them going despite all else. In point of fact, a considerable portion of the labor costs of railroads is concentrated in the least productive and least remunerative operations. They are employed on freight locals where several men may handle only a few boxcars in the course of a day, on switching and siding operations, on passenger trains, in small stations which do little to no business but maintain an agent and sometimes other personnel, on commuter trains which operate only at certain hours, and so on.
Featherbedding Practices
When railroads introduce laborsaving technology they are frequently prevented from reducing labor costs significantly. Labor unions may not oppose the introduction of new equipment, but they do oppose the laying off of workmen, the shifting of them to less remunerative employments, or the reduction of work crews.
Some sorts of services have undoubtedly been priced out of the market by work rules. For example, "The height of absurdity in full crewing appears to have been reached upon a medium-sized railroad when a modified small auto delivery unit was placed on flanged wheels to perform passenger service on a branch line. When a crew of five men was required to man it, its utility for the purpose disappeared and the service was abandoned."¹2 I used to wonder why railroads did not widely use one-car self-propelled units to carry passengers on branch lines. They could bring long distance travelers to and from main line stations as well as provide service from villages and small towns to cities. The reason is now clear. Despite the fact that one man operating such a unit would not have as much to attend to as a city bus driver, the unions would insist that several men be employed in the undertaking.
Decline in Service
The grip of the unions on the railroads has produced a train of results of most doubtful desirability. This grip has contributed to the decline of passenger and freight service, to the removal of the railroads as competitors in the providing of many kinds of services and to certain areas, to the decline of railroad employees, to the cost to the consumer of his use of rail service, to the deterioration of morale of both employees and consumers, and to the decrepit state of many of the rail facilities.
There may be those who suppose that it was enlightened policy for government to maintain an uneasy peace in railroading by empowering unions, by fostering negotiation, and by substituting the intimidation of government for that of unions on occasion. There may be those who suppose that government established monopolies are desirable if the objects sought are in accord with their wishes. Yet it is proper to ask whether those who think in this fashion believe that it was desirable so to hamper, constrain, and limit the railroads that they could no longer effectively offer many of their services and could no longer attract customers in some areas. If this latter was not desirable then the former could not be enlightened either. The grip of the unions, the grip of government regulators, and the grip of privileged competitors—all under the auspices of government power—have combined to reduce the railroads to their present debilitated state.
Next: The Future of the Railroads.
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The Unplanned Society
Modern man prides himself that he has built [his] civilization as if in doing so he had carried out a plan which he had before formed in his mind. The fact is, of course, that if at any point of the past man had mapped out his future on the basis of the then-existing knowledge and then followed this plan, we would not be where we are. We would not only be much poorer, we would not only be less wise, but we would also be less gentle, less moral; in fact we would still have brutally to fight each other for our very lives. We owe the fact that not only our knowledge has grown, but also our morals have improved—and I think they have improved, and especially that the concern for our neighbor has increased—not to anybody planning for such a development, but to the fact that in an essentially free society certain trends have prevailed because they made for a peaceful, orderly, and progressive society.
F. A. HAYEK, from remarks in What’s Past Is Prologue