Dr. Carson has written and taught extensively, specializing In American intellectual history. His recent series, World In the Grip of an Idea, is now available as a book.
It is no accident that the American economy has followed a pattern set earlier by England, that the dollar has declined in value and been devalued in foreign exchange as the pound has been, that the United States is suffering trade imbalances as the English were doing well before now, that welfare programs are increasingly burdensome in America as they have long been in England, that production is on the wane here as in England. These parallels, I say, are not accidental. The decline of the British pound was an effect of the same cause that has successively weakened the dollar. In like fashion, many other developments in the United States have a similar cause to those in England. But the relationship between what has happened in England and what is happening in the United States is closer and more direct than the above may convey. It is not simply that like causes produce like effects in both England and the United States, though they do. It is more than that. The United States has followed in the path toward socialism that was first trod by England. The United States has imitated England. We have borrowed and imitated tactics devised in England. We have followed in England’s footsteps in concentrating and exercising political power. We have even aped many of the legislative acts of England. Small wonder, then, that the same consequence should befall US. It is not my point, however, that all the socialist influences on the United States came from England. In the broadest sense, the imitation of England was the imitation of much of Europe, as socialist influences from the continent were important as well as those from England. Nor is it my point that the American bent to socialism was a foreign import entirely. American thinkers did not originate socialism, but they did much to acclimate it to American circumstances. It is rather that the particular variety of socialism that has had greatest influence on the United States originated in England, that most developments occurred in England before they did in the United States, and that the imitation of England was the most pronounced feature of the American thrust to socialism. For these reasons, what has befallen England is most relevant to the American situation. The Fabian Approach Socialism has been introduced in the United States piecemeal and gradually. This tactic was most trenchantly set forth by the English Fabians whom Americans imitated. The Fabian Society was organized in England in 1884 and, because it drew into its ranks and orbit such talented writers as George Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, Sidney and Beatrice (Potter) Webb, and Graham Wallas, was not long in beginning to have an impact. By the 1890s, a periodical was being published in the United States called The American Fabian, and Fabian ideas were being introduced politically by way of the Populist Party. The rise of Fabians signaled the emergence of evolutionary socialism as a distinct idea, though it would be several years before Eduard Bern-stein spelled out the concept. Most socialists prior to this time had been dogmatists who advanced some particular panacea for curing the world’s ills. There were anarchists, syndicalists, revolutionaries, single taxers, land redistributionists, communitarians, and so on. Karl Marx caught much of this in his theory of revolutionary socialism, but for him “the revolution” became the panacea. By contrast, the Fabians had no one particular panacea. Unlike the anarchists, they believed in the use of government power. Unlike the Marxists, they believed in working within the existing framework of institutions. Unlike the syndicalists, they launched their appeal to the society at large. They saw the task as much broader than something that could be accomplished by a single tax or inflation or land redistribution, although any one of these efforts, or all of them, might find place among their proposals. The Fabians were gradualists. More, they were eclectic. There was no one particular way to socialism for them; any act that brought government control over anything was a step in that direction. They were statists, who proposed to arrive at socialism democratically. How to Come to Power The central problem of socialists in the latter part of the nineteenth century, aside from their difficulty in coming to agreement with one another, was how to come to power. It was a large problem indeed. Everywhere, they were a small minority of the population—tiny might be more accurate—consisting usually of dogmatic and quarrelsome intellectuals. Generally, they lived on the fringes of society, were held in low esteem, and were often harassed by the police. How could they gain respect? How could they gain influence? How could they come to power? The Fabians proposed to solve this problem by what they called “permeation.” An historian of the Fabians describes the tactic this way: ‘tin its most general sense, it meant that Fabians should join all organizations where useful Socialist work could be done, and influence them . . . . Taking a broad interpretation of the meaning of Socialism and having an optimistic belief in the powers of persuasion, the Fabians thought that most organizations would be willing to accept at least a grain or two of Socialism. It was mainly a matter of addressing them reasonably, with a strong emphasis on facts, diplomatically, with an eye to the amount of Socialism they were prepared to receive, and in a conciliatory spirit.”[1] George Bernard Shaw, a leading Fabian spokesman, described the tactic of permeation in more detail:
We urged our members to join the Liberal and Radical Associations of their districts, or, if they preferred it, the Conservative Associations. We told them to become members of the nearest Radical Club and Co-operative Store, and to get delegated to the Metropolitan Radical Federation and the Liberal and Radical Union if possible. On these bodies we made speeches and moved resolutions, or, better still, got the Parliamentary candidate for the constituency to move them, and secured reports and encouraging little articles for him in the Star. We permeated the party organizations and pulled all the wires we could lay our hands on with our utmost adroitness and energy; and we succeeded so far that in 1888 we gained the solid advantage of a Progressive majority, full of ideas that would never have come into their heads had not the Fabians put them there, on the first London County Council.[2]
Bending Existing Organizations to Socialist Purposes
To appreciate fully the tactic of permeation it needs to be viewed in the broad context of socialism generally. Most socialists looked askance at existing organizations. Anarchists and revolutionists believed that they would have to be destroyed. Those of a more peaceful bent usually thought in terms of establishing their own communities and organizations. Land redistributionists have been inclined to think in terms of breaking up large farms and parceling them out to those who would tend them. Socialists of a political bent favored forming their own political parties, and the usual result was a proliferation of parties, each pushing its particular panacea and very particular doctrines.
By contrast, the Fabians accepted the existing system of organizations. They accepted the government, the political parties, the businesses, the educational institutions, the churches, the newspapers, and so on. That is not to say that they did not want to make changes in them, for that they did, but what they envisioned was subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, alterations, not abolition, destruction, or replacement. They wanted to permeate them, influence them, and eventually control the course of their development.
The Fabian Society had only a few members at its inception. Eventually, there would be several thousand members, but it never became a mass organization. It would not have been to their purpose if they could have had one. (Convinced and determined socialists constitute only a small minority of the population in any land.) What they sought may be best conceived as intellectual leverage. That is the underlying meaning of permeation.
Intellectual Leverage
Intellectual leverage does not require quantity; it needs quality instead. Organizations concentrate decision making power: in cabinets, boards, committees, and ultimately in individuals. All that is necessary to alter their course is to influence the decision makers. One man can play a pivotal role on a board, committee, commission, or cabinet simply by adroitly advancing his ideas. The commitment of the Labour Party to socialism at the end of World War I required only the permeation of its leadership.
Intellectual leverage has a broader impact than may be suggested by influence within particular organizations. Ultimate intellectual leverage is achieved by the creation and domination of the intellectual climate. This, too, the Fabians eventually achieved in England. They made socialism respectable, at least that variety they propounded. Indeed, for a time—particularly in the 1940s—they made it about the only respectable outlook. Their eclecticism made the task much easier than it would otherwise have been. They could draw into their framework reformers, interventionists, welfarists, nationalizers, and what have you. After all, an inflationist was a socialist, too, even despite himself, for Fabians were inflationists, and they were socialists.
Permeation was a most useful tactic in dominating the intellectual climate. One does not have to own a newspaper in order to determine what books get good reviews. For that, one needs only to be the book review editor, and, sometimes, only the reviewer. Careers are made and unmade in such fashion, and an intellectual climate is shaped. When that has been accomplished, mere politicians tend to be but reflexes of the prevailing ideas.
The American Pattern
In a general way, it is clear that Americans used tactics similar to those advanced by the English Fabians. Americans have certainly moved gradually, and episodically, toward socialism. They did not, for example, rush out and take over the railroads in one fell swoop (except briefly during World War I). Instead, they passed mild regulation at the first, in the late nineteenth century. Then, over the years they tightened the regulation until the Interstate Commerce Commission had a virtual stranglehold on them. Then, the government began to encourage the consolidation of competing lines. In the course of time, the federal government has taken over providing some of the rail services and some railroads. Control over the money supply was not achieved all at once. It was done step by step and gradually over the better part of the century. It was not complete until the final steps were taken in making it outright fiat money in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
It is equally clear that Americans would use government to move toward socialism, just as the Fabians had proposed in England. Existing organizations were neither abandoned, abolished, nor destroyed. Instead, they have generally been penetrated by government power and, where possible, instrumented to the purposes of those who govern. Existing political institutions have been preserved, such as those of state and local government, but they have been increasingly drawn into dependence upon the federal government and serve as instruments to do its will. The framework of popular government has been preserved and extended, but the significance of elections has shifted more and more toward ideological considerations.
Political Strategy
The tactic of permeation has been much used by American intellectuals. Indeed, no new political party emerged to gain major following in the United States in the twentieth century, as did the Labour Party in England. Instead, intellectuals of a reformist, welfarist, and, ultimately, socialist bent penetrated and permeated the Democratic and Republican Parties. In the 1920s, however, many of those of that persuasion became Progressives and never returned to the Republican fold. Instead, from the 1930s onward the Democratic Party became the main instrument of the thrust toward socialism. In many ways, it became the American equivalent of the British Labour Party, relying heavily on labor unions, their financial contributions and the votes of their members.
Intellectual leverage, perhaps the single most important of Fabian contributions to evolutionary socialism, became as important in America as England. The Fabians did not have movies, radio, or television when they began to move to gain intellectual leverage. At first, they relied on tracts, pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, and books. The later inventions made possible a degree of leverage difficult to imagine earlier. A few men located at pivotal positions in the three American networks can decide what gets shown, what interpretation is made of it, who is allowed to speak, and in what way. Above all, it is the power to determine what are issues worth considering that makes so much difference.
There were, of course, major differences between England and the United States. One difference that impressed beth British and Americans was that the United States has a written constitution. Ramsay MacDonald, British Fabian and eventual Prime Minister, put it this way in 1898: “The great bar to progress is the written constitutions, Federal and State, which give ultimate power to a law court.”[3]
Constitutional Issues
The American Fabian, an American publication begun in 1895 in conscious imitation of the British, described the difficulty more fully: “England’s Constitution readily admits of constant though gradual modification. Our American Constitution does not readily admit of such change. England can thus move into Socialism almost imperceptibly. Our Constitution being largely individualistic must be changed to admit of Socialism, and each change necessitates a political crisis. This means the raising of great new issues . . . .”[4] American intellectuals did, of course, eventually devise ways to move toward socialism with few written constitutional changes, but that was owing to American ingenuity mainly, not to British.
Another difference was that Americans generally have never bought socialism when it was packaged that way. No party with the avowed intent of establishing socialism has ever come close to getting an electoral majority nationally. This difference, however, made British Fabianism more important to Americans with a socialistic bent, not less. The Fabians were avowedly and explicitly socialists. Most American intellectuals of their stripe were not, after the early twentieth century. Yet to go anywhere requires that the destination be conceived somehow. By imitating the British, Americans could be assured, or at least believe, that they were headed in the direction of socialism.
Common Influences in Britain and America
The influence of British socialism on American intellectuals has been continual over the years. Not only do Americans share a common language with the British but also a common heritage and intellectual framework. Twice in the twentieth century the United States has gone to war allied with the British, and in these wars their relations have been particularly close. The influence sometimes surfaces as when American intellectuals propose that the British system of government is in certain ways superior to our own—requiring a new election, or a new government, when the leadership suffers an adverse vote on a major measure in the House of Commons, for example, or having effective party discipline.
Olden, however, it was much more direct than this might suggest. Here is an example. Graham Wallas, one of the first members of the English Fabian Society, came to Harvard to lecture in 1910. There he met and became close friends with Walter Lippmann, a student there at the time and active in socialist circles. A few years later when Lippmann published Drift and Mastery, a subtle gradualist work, he dedicated it to Wallas. Wallas replied in kind with his new work, The Great Society, a phrase that would crop up again years later as President Lyndon Johnson’s program for the United States. “The British Fabians H. G. Wells and Graham Wallas,” says one historian, “visited the Harvard campus and, as Englishmen, made economic heresy respectable. Lippmann was later convinced that even William James had been converted to socialism by the dynamic Wells.”[5] Walter Lippmann became, of course, one of the most adept at maintaining intellectual leverage by way of journalism.
The Impact of Keynes on Economic Theory
Perhaps the best known example of British influence is that of John Maynard Keynes. It is not certain that Keynes was a member of the Fabian Society during the years of his greatest prestige, but he was closely associated with many Fabians, and rendered signal service to their cause. Keynes did not, as some may suppose, invent the notion of manipulating the money supply to achieve social ends. There were inflationists around before he was born. Nor did he invent national planning and government control over the economy. He did provide a ponderous gloss in justification of these activities with his General Theory. Almost singlehandedly, he made macro- economics respectable, if not comprehensible. He carved out a niche for intellectual leverage over the economies of nations, including the United States.
The dependence of Americans on British socialism is suggested in this description of his activities by Robert Hunter who was for years a leader in the Intercollegiate Society of Socialists but who later renounced socialism:
When I was a resident at Hull House in Chicago, at Toynbee Hall in London, and at the University settlement in New York, I was drawn by some bond of sympathy into close association with labor and socialist leaders of the three great cities. For many years at home and abroad, I passed from one group to another in a world little known at the time—a world almost exclusively occupied with social problems and their solutions. The groups in America were small and without influence, but in Europe the leaders were in Parliament, and lines were forming for the class conflicts which followed the World War.[6]
The significance of British influence on American intellectuals lies, of course, in the eventual influence of these last on America. For that, we turn now to some particulars of the imitation of England.
It has been noted already that those advancing socialist measures in the United States had constitutional problems. Although they were not so forbidding, so did the British. The British had a separation of powers in their government, one which became the model for many other governments in the nineteenth century. They had an hereditary monarch who had long been head of state and chief executive. They had an hereditary House of Lords which served, in effect, not only as a legislative body but as a supreme court which was the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution. The House of Commons was, of course, the seat of popular government in the realm.
Concentration of Power
In the early twentieth century, virtually all governmental power was concentrated in the House of Commons. Part of the concentration had come about gradually and by attrition. The monarch had been losing power for the better part of a century. George III (1760- 1820) was the last monarch to assert himself over the government. The two kings who followed were weak and irresolute men who lacked the will and determination to be anything much but figureheads. Queen Victoria (1837-1901) was respected and beloved, but not because of any actual control she exerted over the government. As one historian notes, between “1874 and 1914 while the person of the monarch may even have gained importance as a figurehead, it steadily lost power as a factor in government.”[7]
How low monarchy had sunk was well illustrated in 1910. The Liberals in the House, with a large majority behind them, were determined to break the power of the Lords. They were afraid, however, that the Lords might reject the legislation by which it would have to be accomplished. H. H. Asquith, the Prime Minister, went to King George V to ask him that if it became necessary would he appoint enough new Peers—“pack the House of Lords”-to get the legislation through. The King assented, though, as it turned out, it was unnecessary.[8]
The House of Lords was shorn of its effective veto powers over legislation in 1911. In the case of money bills, if they were not passed without amendment by the Lords within two months of being sent to them they became law without the assent of the Peers of the realm. Other types of legislation could be delayed much longer, but if Commons persisted they could become law without the approval of the Lords. There was no longer any effective constitutional restraint on the House of Commons. There should be no doubt, either, that this constitutional change was made to facilitate a socialistic bent in the legislation from the House of Commons. The Lords had refused to accept a budget bill which steeply taxed inheritances, income, and land. The concentration of power was rounded out in World War I when great powers of decision were vested in the prime minister and that portion of his cabinet which dealt with the conduct of the war.
Reserving the Safeguards
There was not only a separation of powers in the United States but also a dispersion of powers between the federal and state governments. The written constitutions which socialists saw as an obstacle to their programs were, then, augmented by separations exceedingly difficult to overcome. The United States does not have party government in the formal sense; hence, intellectual leverage is difficult to achieve.
The first major step was achieved in reducing the dispersal of powers by the passage of the 17th Amendment in 1913. This provided for the direct election of Senators by the voters rather than by the state legislatures. This shifted the Senate away from representation of the states toward nationalization. No longer could Senators be held to account by state governments for the manner in which they defended the powers of the states.
The second major change was in the direction of developing presidential government. This may be seen most directly in the development of programs by presidential candi dates, programs with names and directions. This development surfaced into plain view for the first time in the election of 1912. Theodore Roosevelt presented his program as the New Nationalism, and Woodrow Wilson as the New Freedom. Franklin D. Roosevelt carried it considerably farther with his New Deal, and his successors advanced such programs as the Fair Deal, New Frontier, and Great Society.
The second Roosevelt moved most swiftly, deftly, and directly toward presidential government. In the early days of the New Deal, legislation was drawn up in the executive branch and swiftly passed by the Congress. Much of this legislation was drawn by what was called a “Brain Trust,” which gave great leverage to intellectuals over the government. Roosevelt attempted to concentrate power even more by campaigning in primaries against members of his own party who had aroused his disapproval and in his ill-fated “court packing” proposal. This last was reminiscent of the notion of packing the House of Lords.
Downgrading the States
Presidential government did not in itself reduce the independence of the states. That has been accomplished mainly in two other ways. The most subtle assault on the independence of the states has been by the grant-in-aid. The English Fabians saw the possibilities of the grant-in-aid for nationalizing power in England from their early years. They called it “the middle way,” the middle way, that is, between centralization and local autonomy. “The middle way has,” says one of the Tracts, “for half a century, been found through that most advantageous of expedients, the grant in aid. We see this in its best form in the police grant . . . . A grant in aid of the cost of the local police was offered to the justices and town councilors—at first one quarter, and now one half, of their actual expenditure on this service, however large this may be.”[9] That increasing grants could be accompanied by increasing central control they did not point out, but that has certainly been the case in the United States.
Land grant colleges were first authorized in the nineteenth century, but the grant-in-aid really got underway on any scale in the United States with Federal aid in building highways. In the 1930s it was employed in such programs as welfare and unemployment compensation. Since the 1960s it has assumed gargantuan proportions as virtually every conceivable program, from education to police work, is partially subsidized from Washington. President Nixon pushed the idea of the federal government sharing its tax receipts with local governments. The idea, as he presented it, was that the federal system of government would be preserved by the pro gram. What has happened, of course, is that state and local government have become increasingly dependent upon these monies, and that the national bureaucracy uses the threat of withholding grants to force these governments to comply with their rules.
Changes by Court Interpretation
The other major means for subordinating the states has been by court interpretation. Since court interpretation has also been used to remove most of the substantive constitutional obstacles to socialism, the two may be discussed jointly. By the early twentieth century, American reformers with a socialist bent had figured out what had to be done and how it could be done gradually. Herbert Croly described the constitutional problems this way: “The regulation of commerce, the control of corporations, and the still more radical questions connected with the distribution of wealth and the prevention of poverty—questions of this kind should be left exclusively to the central government; or in case they are to any extent allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of the states, they should exercise such jurisdiction as the agents of the central government.”[10] But much of what he had in mind could be accomplished without amendment, he thought; “and in most respects it should be left to the ordinary process of gradual amendment by construction . . . .”[11] Walter Weyl, Croly’s colleague later at The New Republic, declared that the Supreme Court could “by a few progressive judicial decisions . . . democratize the Constitution.”[12]
Whether the Supreme Court has “democratized” the Constitution or not, it has certainly construed it so as to subordinate the states, concentrate power in the general government, and remove the obstacles to socialist type legislation. By 1960 the interstate commerce clause had been construed to be so inclusive in its grant of power that the states had only a remnant of power over commercial activity.
Court Initiated Reforms
The courts have long since taken to initiating changes and reforms, and it is widely accepted today that the Supreme Court is some sort of super legislative body, empowered to alter the Constitution to contemporary requirements. In this role, the courts have been aided and abetted by the media—the seats of intellectual leverage—by having many of their most radical decisions hailed as the “law of the land.”
Whether or not the United States Constitution has been “democratized,” it has certainly been “Britishized.” The early Fabians were right in their assertions about the basic difference between the British and American constitutions. While there are documents which constitute a portion of the British Constitution, it is not a written instrument. Nor does it require extraordinary procedures to alter it. Changes in custom and tradition, new precedents, court decisions, and acts of Parliament may and sometimes do alter the constitution. It consists of a complex of inherited institutions, of established procedures, of legal developments, and of legislative acts. It lends itself readily to gradual and incremental changes.
The United States Constitution is not like that. It is a written document; the procedures for amending it are specified, and amendments are extraordinary. Increasingly since the late 1930s, however, the Supreme Court has treated the Constitution as if it were a tradition only to be altered with changing conditions. In England, they revoked the veto power of the House of Lords to open the way for socialism. In the United States, the negative power of the courts was transformed into a positive power to alter and change. When the American colonists broke from England and founded their own political system they continued to use the common law inherited from England. Under the impetus to socialism the Constitution is now treated as if it were a part of the common law. That is how the United States Constitution has been “Britishized.”
The Subtle Differences
Americans imitated the British gradualist approach to socialism. Like the British before them, they accepted and worked within existing organizations. They permeated them. Like the British, American intellectuals moved to vest power in government, to concentrate it, and to gain intellectual leverage over it. Both claimed to be democratic. The states were turned increasingly into instruments of the federal government, and the Constitution treated in the British manner as if it were flexible and alterable at will, not fixed by the language in which it is written.
The significance of the American imitation of England comes out most directly in the following ways. First, it helps to establish the fact that we are bent toward socialism. That has not been easy to do, because American programs have usually been advanced as measures to cure particular ills. By contrast, the British have often been explicit about their aim to achieve socialism. In so far as we are imitating the English, we are moving toward socialism, whether we will or not. Second, both in England and America the removal of many of the restraints on government power have been preludes to assaults on property and reductions of the control which the inhabitants have over their own affairs. Third, the British have gone farther down the path toward socialism, and they did so earlier. Hence, the conse quences of socialism are more visible there.
The Resulting Paralysis
First from the British, then from the American experience, we can conclude that the consequences of socialism are paralysis. It begins as partial paralysis, because of gradualist methods, but over the years it tends to extend into more and more areas. To the extent that the hope of gain motivates productive activity, the assault on profit making is an assault on productivity. The graduated income tax takes away much of the surplus for future investment. Inflation reduces the gain and fosters hoarding: of land, antiques, untaxed securities, and so forth. Redistribution of the wealth encourages consumption and discourages production. Economic planning by government makes it increasingly difficult for individuals to make plans. It shifts the power to act from the individual to the government, thus partially paralyzing—delaying, limiting, preventing—economic action.
The paralysis induced by gradualist socialism evinces itself as national decline, as social disintegration, and as nihilism at the individual level. Social disintegration occurs as the breakup of families, the loss of hold of institutions, decreasing vitality in voluntary organizations, and the breakdown of the power of social prescription. Individual nihilism shows itself as lawlessness, loss of self-respect, loss of respect for others, contempt for property, and the frantic pursuit of thrills. That much of this has been fostered and facilitated in the same intellectual atmosphere that has advanced socialism is demonstrable.
It is written that on a certain day there came to the attention of Jesus a man who had suffered an infirmity for 38 years. The man was lying on a bed beside a pool which, it was claimed, was a place where one might be cured if he could enter the waters immediately after they had been disturbed by an angel. Jesus asked the man if he would like to be made whole. Undoubtedly he would, but, he pointed out, he had no one to help him and when the time came someone else always got in ahead of him. Jesus said to him, “Rise, take up thy bed, and walk.” And he did. (John 5:5-9)
Whatever else may have ailed the man, he was almost certainly suffering from what we would call a dependency syndrome. He was lying beside the pool waiting for a miracle to happen. All he needed was someone to help him get into the waters at the right time. He must have been dependent on others for a long time to provide him with his necessities. If he was not at least partially paralyzed he might as well have been.
The people of the United States are suffering from a dependency syndrome, and we have been partially paralyzed for at least 38 years, if not longer. We have depended upon European ideas for intellectual sustenance. We have imitated England in adopting gradualist socialism. We have become dependent upon government for all sorts of aid and benefits. It is a paralyzing dependency. Many are lying by a pool, figuratively if not literally, expecting to be rescued by some miracle. We would get in the water, too, if we just had others to help us.
Jesus took the cold turkey approach to the dependency syndrome. “Rise, take up thy bed, and walk.” Stop lying around the pool expecting a miracle. Stop imitating all those others lying fiat on their backs. Stand on your own two feet. Take responsibility for yourself and your own. Manage your own affairs. Would it be that easy? No, but it would be at least that hard. Those who think it would be easy are still expecting miracles. Will it cure the ills of the world? Probably not, the cure is individual not collective. Collectivism is the ill. The belief that one is somehow responsible for curing the ills of the world is the disease. He who rises, takes up his own bed and walks is no longer a part of the problem but a part of the solution. []
1. A. M. McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 95-96.
3. Quoted in Rose L. Martin, Fabian Freeway (Chicago: Heritage Foundation, 1966), p.136.
5. Charles Forcey, The Crossroads of Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 95-96.
7. R. C. K. Ensor, England: 1870-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 31.
8. George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England (New York: Capricorn Books, 1961), p. 40.
10. Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (New York: Capricorn Books, 1964, originally published, 1909), p. 350.
12. Walter E. Weyl, The New Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1912), p. 317.