In Case of Difference

Mr. Lewis is a retired minister living in Dur­ham, New Hampshire.

I’ve never had a sudden burst of illumination which revealed The Truth to me completely, once and for all. But after consultin^g many contributions made to the world’s store of knowledge and wisdom by more gifted minds than mine, I have tried to figure out some fundamental and correlative truths in certain areas, with the result that I have embraced a set of con­victions which I call my own. I have sought to eliminate error, insofar as possible, by ironing the inconsistencies out of my beliefs and squaring them with the facts. For I conceive that truthfulness consists in two sorts of relationships: internally, my beliefs should harmonize one with the other; and externally, my beliefs should harmonize with the relevant por­tions of reality. Any bundle of propositions which meets these tests may join the set of convic­tions which I have made mine, and this is equivalent to saying that I reject as error whatever I regard as contrary to my convic­tions. All of which seems simple and self-evident.

Every so often I get into a dis­cussion on various matters and naturally I advance arguments on behalf of my convictions. The crit­ical rejoinder is sometimes made, "You think that everybody who disagrees with you is wrong." But, of course! Why shouldn’t I? This is a gross and innocuous ad homi­nem. If I thought that adverse views were right, I would endorse them! But if I believe that the earth is round, how can I hold to my belief without deeming to be in error "everybody" who con­tends that it is flat?

In argument, I expect any sin­cere opponent, initially, to think that I am wrong.

With respect to issues upon which one has no firm conviction, he may say, "I feel this way about the matter; but those who have views to the contrary, may be right." But when one has reached a careful and considered judgment in a matter, it is only logical that he should think conclusions to the contrary to be wrong. I believe that 2 and 2 make 4. If anyone would say that 2 and 2 make 3, or 7, he would be in disagreement with me, and I would think that he is wrong. There are certain other matters about which, after careful thought and study, I have come to hold equally strong convictions. Should I be considered some kind of miscreant or malefactor for thinking those who disagree with me are wrong?

A person who thinks that those who disagree with him upon a certain matter are wrong, is a person of strong convictions. In his conclusions, he may be right or he may be wrong. If I can show that his conclusions are based upon false premises or result from faulty reasoning, I may undertake to do so. But I shall not condemn or censure him for holding to his honest convictions. And I shall not criticize him for thinking that everybody who disagrees with him is wrong.