


AMERICAN RIGHTS
VS. TREATY LAW

Frank E. Holman

The Red Army's Bid for Power

Pierre Faillant

Articles and Book Reviews by Frank H. Knight, Eudocio Ravines,
Countess Waldeck, J. Donald Adams, Frank L. Howley,
Max Eastman, Serge Fliegers, Edward Davison



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SERVING INDUSTRY . . . WHICH SERVES MANKIND

THE Freeman

A Fortnightly
For
Individualists

Editor HENRY HAZLITT
Managing Editor FLORENCE NORTON

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FRANK L. HOWLEY, Brigadier General Retired of the U. S. Army, is Vice Chancellor of New York University and author of the recently published *Your War for Peace*.

EDWARD DAVISON, poet, critic, and professor, has just been named director of the Hunter College School for General Studies in New York.

Among Ourselves

This past exceptionally hot and humid week has been brightened for us by the arrival of three manuscripts from Europe: one on Germany's political and strategic situation by our currently roving contributor, William Henry Chamberlin; another on West Germany's economy by Wilhelm Röpke; and from the Swiss journalist Peter Schmid a report on North Africa. These will appear in early issues of the FREEMAN. Meantime we wish all our readers, wherever they may be, a pleasant vacation.

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
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THE Freeman

MONDAY, AUGUST 10, 1953

The Fortnight

And now that, at long last, we have our truce in Korea, what have we gained by it? How much is it worth to us? The first answer will be that at least we have gained an end to, or a suspension of, the blood-letting and the slaughter. American boys are no longer under fire, and American parents can breathe easier. All this is true; and yet the satisfaction that we can take in this truth is considerably blunted when we recall that we could have had all this simply by not blundering into a land war in Korea in the first place.

The question must be put differently. What have we gained as the result of more than three years of war, of the expenditure of billions, of 140,000 American casualties? And to this the answer must be doubtful. We "halted" this particular aggression, in the sense that we threw it back to approximately its point of origin. We inflicted on the enemy, so far as we are able to calculate, considerably more casualties than we and the South Koreans received—if that is much consolation to American parents, wives, and children. But we cannot say that we achieved our original objectives in getting into the war. Would Americans today, if they had it to do over again, make the fateful decision that President Truman made when he threw our army into ground action in Korea—only to bring about a situation no better than the one we have now achieved? The question answers itself.

We certainly did *not* "halt Communist aggression." That aggression goes on today in Indo-China; it may still break out almost anywhere—including Korea. We did not unify Korea. We did not even relieve the daily threat of new attack under which South Korea must live. We did not insist that the Chinese Communist army must vacate North Korea; we are now permitting it to rest, reform, entrench itself more firmly and get ready, if it wishes, to launch new attacks. When the President of South Korea calls attention to all this, we treat him as if he, and not the Chinese Communists, were the real enemy.

Neither the United States nor the United Nations have come out of the Korean war with increased prestige. On the contrary, both have lost prestige. The United Nations, whose very frown was going to halt an aggressor, was not able (or willing?) with its armed might to halt the armies of a supposedly second-rate and backward foe. It was the United States and the United Nations that were put in the position of suing for a truce. Certainly it was not our own tactics that were chiefly responsible for dragging out the truce negotiations for more than two years and 158 meetings by the top truce teams. If the Chinese Communists had had a sincere desire for a truce, they could have got it in one day and in one meeting. It was we who, over these two years, allowed ourselves to be accused and insulted daily and kept yielding one point after another. On the battlefield itself, the best we won was a stalemate; and we turned even this into the appearance of defeat by accepting a screening of our prisoners by a "neutral" commission of five nations including, in addition to India, the two Communist satellites, Poland and Czechoslovakia. That this shameful concession was not necessary was proved when the Communists accepted a truce notwithstanding the action of President Rhee in liberating 27,000 anti-Communist North Koreans.

The present truce, in short, will be worth having only if we are able to use it for a thorough rethinking and remaking of our whole foreign policy.

We publish in this issue an article by Frank E. Holman, a past president of the American Bar Association, in support of the proposed Bricker Amendment to the Constitution, which would assure that no provision of a treaty in conflict with the Constitution shall be of any force or effect. Nothing has more clearly demonstrated the necessity for the Bricker Amendment than the arguments and tactics of President Eisenhower and some of his supporters in their efforts to emasculate or defeat it. In the first place, it is not clear under just what interpretation of his constitutional province or powers the President has got into this controversy at all. The Constitution assigns to the President—

and by deliberate intention—no vote, no veto, and in fact no role whatever in the process of constitutional amendment.

In the second place, both the arguments that Mr. Eisenhower uses against the Bricker Amendment, and the proposed “administration” modifications of it, prove the need for the amendment as it stands. Mr. Eisenhower implies that the Bricker Amendment would “deprive the President of the capacity necessary to carry on negotiations with foreign governments.” Unless the President wants the power to violate the Constitution in these negotiations, this claim is nonsense. He implies that the Bricker Amendment would “hamper the President in his constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs.” This again is utterly without support. The amendment would merely *confine* him within his constitutional authority, which is part of its explicit purpose.

Opponents of the Bricker Amendment profess to be concerned about the “which clause.” This reads: “A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty.” Opponents propose to substitute: “A treaty shall become effective as internal law only through enactment of appropriate legislation by Congress.” But unless the Administration is deliberately planning to use the treaty process as a left-handed way of amending the Constitution and of *stretching* its present constitutional powers, and the powers of Congress and the federal government, beyond what the Constitution at present assigns to them, what possible excuse is there for opposing the so-called “which clause”? This seems to be a clear case of which-hunting.

Even if the Bricker Amendment has been buried for this session, we are glad that Senator Bricker is not accepting any compromise which would emasculate or otherwise cripple it. The very purpose of the amendment is to clarify beyond dispute the supremacy of the Constitution to any treaty. We neither need nor want any “compromise” that would continue to leave everything ambiguous.

The New York Times unfortunately seems to have abandoned the great ideal of Adolph Ochs—objectivity in the news columns. This can now be illustrated by almost any issue taken at random. The issue of Sunday, July 19, contained two outstanding examples. One was a report by Gladwin Hill concerning the action of the Los Angeles Board of Education in rejecting a grant of \$335,000 from the Ford Foundation. Here is the impartial way in which his story started out: “A rankling fear of internationalism long manifested by a small but vociferous minority of Los Angeles’ 2,000,000 citizens welled

up this week to cause the abrupt rejection . . .” etc. Though the reporter seemed able to find none but invidious adjectives for those who had voted to reject the grant—they were all, it appears, “ultra-conservatives”—he had only honorific adjectives—“educators” of “national repute”—for those who favored it. Just how a “small minority,” no matter how “vociferous,” was able to reverse a previous vote of the board, and get the proffered gift declined by a vote of 5 to 1, the *Times* story did not explain.

Another news report in the July 19 *Times* was about the J. B. Matthews case. In its articles on this case the *Times* has followed pretty consistently the practice of quoting from Mr. Matthews’ *American Mercury* article, “Reds and Our Churches,” the single sentence: “The largest single group supporting the Communist apparatus in the United States today is composed of Protestant clergymen.” It has in nearly all cases omitted entirely his sentence: “It hardly needs to be said that the vast majority of American Protestant clergymen are loyal to the free institutions of this country, as well as loyal to their solemn trust as ministers of the Gospel.” But while the *Times* has used clearly biased selection and omission, it has usually stopped short of outright misrepresentation. In the *Times* of July 19, however, its reporter John D. Morris wrote from Washington: “Mr. Matthews provoked a storm by his article ‘Reds in Our Churches,’ in the July issue of the *American Mercury* magazine, calling the Protestant clergy ‘the largest single group supporting the Communist apparatus in the United States.’ ” [Our italics.] Mr. Morris can hardly be so slovenly a reporter as not to recognize the tremendous difference in the meaning of these two statements—Mr. Matthews’ original, and his own gratuitous “paraphrase.” Mr. Matthews’ sentence accused *some* Protestant clergymen; Mr. Morris’ translation implies that he accused *all* of them.

Mr. Matthews did say in the course of his article that “some seven thousand Protestant clergymen have been drawn during the past seventeen years into the network of the Kremlin’s conspiracy.” This is a large number and a serious accusation; we do not pretend to know, in advance of further investigation, to what extent it may or may not be justified. But it is still not a charge against “the” Protestant clergy. As David Lawrence has pointed out, 7,000 ministers would in fact constitute only some 3 per cent of the whole American Protestant clergy. What Mr. Morris’ report in effect said is that a charge against 3 per cent of the clergy was a charge against a majority, or against 100 per cent. This is neither accurate, careful, nor objective reporting.

The Imperial Ice-Cap Cracks

Nineteen fifty-three may well be remembered in history as the year when the ice of the cold war began to crack. Six months ago the fronts in this war, the coalitions headed on one side by the United States, on the other by the Soviet Union, seemed to be frozen so hard and solid that change seemed unlikely except as the consequence of a great war.

Now the situation has become much more fluid. The coalitions are beginning to waver. Things which would have seemed impossible in the recent past have occurred and are likely to occur in the future. In this change there are, for the free nations outside the Iron Curtain, elements of danger and elements of opportunity. It is still wise to look on the cold war as a long-term proposition, a marathon race rather than a sprint.

But important political battles may replace passive stalemate sooner than most observers would have considered probable or even possible. The purging of Beria, the reunion of Germany, the liberation of eastern Europe, the dissolution or serious weakening of the Atlantic coalition, the realization or bankruptcy of plans for closer unification of western Europe; the tempo of all these possible developments, favorable and unfavorable, has been speeded up. Victory is likely to go to the side that shows the steadiest nerves and the firmest will longest.

Consider the cracks and the fissions in the ice on the Soviet side. The Soviet peace offensive is partly a matter of design, partly a matter of necessity. A maneuver of this kind was foreshadowed during Stalin's lifetime, at the Congress of the Communist Party in October. The wily Soviet dictator then expressed the opinion that future wars would break out between non-Communist countries and intimated that Soviet diplomacy should aim to exploit and aggravate every difference that might arise between these countries.

What Stalin probably had in mind was the making of a few cheap pacific gestures which would cost the Soviet regime nothing in real power or imperialist spoils and would be bait for the gullible and the faint-hearted in Western countries. This was probably also the original basic design of Stalin's heirs.

But the situation seems to have got out of hand in the Kremlin, and for two reasons. First, Beria had to be purged. Although Malenkov technically took over Stalin's office as Premier, it is pretty clear that no one inherited Stalin's tremendous concentration of personal power. With Beria now out of the way, Malenkov, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Mikoyan all remain as possible contenders for one-man power. They

are now eyeing each other with all the mutual confidence of a group of Chicago gangsters engaged in a big racketeering deal.

And all these men, besides suspecting each other, are profoundly suspicious of the Red Army. The Soviet leaders know their revolutionary history. They realize that they are now in the position of the Directory which ruled France for a few years after the fall of Robespierre. They remember that Bonaparte swept the Directory into oblivion. And they know that a Soviet Bonaparte, with Stalin's example before him, would probably not only relegate them to political oblivion, but kill them into the bargain. Hence a Soviet desire to avoid any intense international crises, even at the price of some concessions, is perhaps genuine enough for the time being.

There is a second factor in the situation. The exploitation of the satellite countries has been driven to a point where it is yielding diminishing political returns. Everywhere behind the Iron Curtain the pattern has been the same—ruthless destruction of the middle class and complete sacrifice of the interests of the consumer to schemes of high-speed industrialization and militarization.

In the Soviet Union this method worked. But it is showing distinct signs of backfiring in the satellite countries of eastern Europe. The Soviet imperialist chain cracked most loudly and visibly in its weakest link, East Germany, where more contact with the West had been preserved and where desire for national reunion intensified hatred for the Russian oppressors and contempt for their German stooges. There have been disturbances in Czechoslovakia. There has been a remarkable about-face, in words at least, in Hungary. Reports of disturbances in Poland may be exaggerated and premature. But it is hard to believe that the Poles, a recklessly brave people with a long record of taking to the barricades against Russian oppression, will not be affected by the example of their neighbors, the Germans and the Czechs.

A tyranny in retreat is most vulnerable, because, on the one hand, it cannot give real freedom to its oppressed subjects and, on the other hand, it has lost the spell of absolute and consistent terror. Soviet policy in the satellite area since Stalin's death has been confused and vacillating, offering concessions here, intensifying repression there. This kind of wavering, unsure policy has often been the prelude to serious disturbances, even to collapse.

At the same time there are weaknesses on our side. Soviet pacific gestures have unloosed latent forces of appeasement in Great Britain and France.

Almost all Germans agree in wanting national reunion under conditions of freedom; but not all Germans are as firm and clear-sighted as Chancellor Adenauer in recognizing that the danger from the vast Communist Empire is still there, and that security for Germany and for western Europe can only be found in close political, economic, and military integration of these free countries. Of course Adenauer's efforts for European cooperation and reconciliation are not made any easier by the weakness and disunity in France and the persistence there of an obsolete fear of the non-existent danger of German aggression, which blinds some non-Communist Frenchmen to the real and present danger of Communist aggression.

In the United States itself there are symptoms of the weariness and impatience with the negative sides of foreign affairs that recall the Midwestern senator who once said: "To hell with Europe and all the rest of those countries." An understandable attitude, in view of the perverse slowness of Europeans in organizing their own defense. But not a reasonable attitude in terms of American security, which, whether we like it or not, is bound up with the often difficult and sometimes downright unreasonable attitude of faraway peoples in Europe and Asia.

In view of the signs of cracking in the Soviet imperial ice-cap, Americans should turn a deaf ear to siren songs of compromise and appeasement, and press by all non-military means for the speedy and complete Soviet evacuation of satellite countries which are showing signs of becoming political liabilities, not assets, to the Kremlin.

But Aggression Continues

A favorite consolation theme, harped on by spokesmen for the United Nations and by advocates of the Truman-Acheson line in foreign policy, is that the war in Korea has been worth while because it stopped aggression. But examination of the historical record shows that this is about as realistic as the attitude of La Fontaine's fox who said the grapes he could not get were sour.

The North Korean objective of overrunning the whole of the country was, to be sure, thwarted for the time being. But the second conspicuous act of international aggression, officially if reluctantly stigmatized in these terms by the United Nations early in 1951—the mass Chinese invasion of Korea—was not stopped or adequately punished.

On the contrary, Mao Tse-tung and his associates have every right to feel that they won a big victory—a fact which is not likely to make for peace and stability in East Asia in the future. The front is some two hundred miles farther south than it was when the Chinese swarmed

over the Yalu and attacked in force in November 1950. And not a bomb has fallen in anger on Chinese air bases in nearby Manchuria or on military and industrial targets in China proper. A good many Chinese soldiers have been killed, to be sure; but a Communist regime, especially in an overpopulated country, takes a consideration like that in stride, as the callous and costly attacks after the terms of the armistice had been agreed on show.

It is also inaccurate to assert that it was never the intention or objective of the United States to unify Korea by force. If this assertion were true, the crossing of the 38th Parallel would have been an act of aggression. But General MacArthur crossed the Parallel with the sanction and authority of a United Nations resolution behind him. And the United Nations had long gone on record as favoring the unification of Korea.

Thanks to the craven attitude which the United Nations displayed after the Chinese invasion and to the influence of this attitude on American military strategy, Red China and its Moscow sponsor can feel that a substantial victory has been won not only militarily but politically. There must be special gratification in Peiping and Moscow with the rift which has opened up between the United Nations Command and the South Korean government, on behalf of which the whole war was fought.

Behind this rift lies much more than the vanity or obstinacy of an old man. President Syngman Rhee, whom Americans may well respect for the enemies he has made (the list includes every Communist, every fellow-traveler, every apologist for the Far Eastern policy of Truman, Acheson, and Marshall) finds his country faced with the prospect of an extremely dangerous and precarious situation after three years of war and devastation.

The threat hanging over the independence of Korea is greater than ever. A huge Chinese army is installed in the northern part of the country. There is the possibility of a letdown of national morale if, after all the sacrifices of the war, nothing is gained but the old unnatural and uneconomic line of partition.

The dilemma is difficult. It is impossible to accept the proposition that America's war aims should be set by an ally. Yet Americans have no reason to feel proud or happy about a situation in which a devoted ally has been pushed to the verge of breach. In the matter of unconditionally releasing the anti-Communist war prisoners Rhee was 100 per cent right. The only reason for regret is that it was impossible to release the Chinese at the same time.

As one looks back on the tangled Korean story and forward into the dark and uncertain prospect in the Far East one feels that there is a very strong case for General MacArthur's crisp

epigram: "There is no substitute for victory"—at least when one is fighting against barbarians. The wrong turn was taken when the United States, under the pressure of timid and wavering so-called allies, failed to respond to the challenge of the Chinese Communist attack by hitting back at every proper military target in Manchuria and China proper with all the air power at our command. If the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of October 7, 1950, that "all appropriate steps be taken to insure conditions of stability throughout Korea" had been taken seriously as a war aim, the present painful difficulties would not have arisen.

Psychology of E. P. T.

"Decisions as to the usefulness of an excess profits tax . . . can be made only with additional considerations of expediency and of the effect of the tax on public opinion." "This idea of 'excess' gives rise to the belief that even confiscation of that portion of profit would not injure business nor harm its initiative."

What is the portent of these two sentences by Professor Marion Hamilton Gillim, taken from the book *The Incidence of Excess Profits Taxation*? First of all, they remind us that this type of taxation has been imposed to a considerable extent to meet the supposed prejudices of the public. The doctrine has become imbedded in our ideology that no government can dare get rid of an E.P.T., however much harm it may be doing, if it cannot at the same time reduce other taxes even more sharply.

How did we fall into this curious state of affairs, so that we are unable to get rid of an excess profits tax even at the most propitious moment, that of its automatic lapsing?

One answer to this can be found in our more recent history. In 1949 T. V. Smith, now professor of government at Syracuse University, wrote an essay entitled "The New Deal as a Cultural Phenomenon." "Mr. Roosevelt," he concluded, "set the nation on at least two tracks that may have far-reaching cultural results. . . It is a serious resultant that he made governmental policy so responsive to public reaction that it could not longer be responsible to *settled* opinion . . . It is no service to reasonableness to make public actors trigger-happy to opinion which needs to be restricted in order that it may become stable enough to support a policy in its name."

Unfortunately, their insistence on renewal of the excess profits tax gives reason to suspect that some of President Eisenhower's advisers are still spellbound by Mr. Roosevelt's mental habit of veering policy not only to popular reaction but also to purely fictitious popular resentments.

Twilight of European Aid

There has been an unusually strong "Once more and no more" atmosphere about congressional voting on European aid this year. Midwestern Republicans have always been inclined to skepticism on this question. But now the revolt against underwriting European deficits to the amount of billions of dollars a year has spread to Democrats who are customarily referred to as internationalists.

Senator Walter George, of Georgia, has announced that his last vote has been given for aid programs of previous dimensions. Democratic Senator Mike Mansfield, of Montana, put his finger on a weak spot in the philosophy of buying friendship and security when he said recently:

It is a mistake to ignore the fact that one-way assistance over too long a period tends to separate rather than bring together the giver and the receiver. Despite outward expressions of gratitude from the recipient and professions of magnanimity from us, there is bound to be an underlying note of resentment—on our part for having to give away our resources seemingly without end, and on theirs for having no alternative to continued dependence on us except to turn eastward to trade and tyranny.

A unanimous vote of the Senate has set a series of terminal dates: 1955 for the liquidation of the Mutual Security Agency which administers foreign aid programs, 1956 for economic aid, 1957 for military aid. Straight economic handouts have already been reduced to a point where they are a negligible charge on the American budget. Germany, which received altogether \$1,412,800,000, is in such flourishing condition that the only planned appropriation for next year is some \$15,000,000 for West Berlin.

Great Britain, which received over \$3,579,000,000 in MSA program allotments from April 1948 to June 1953, is supposed to receive in the fiscal year beginning July 1953 \$200,000,000, of which half is for American orders for British munitions. Italy, with subsidies of \$1,577,000,000 in the same period, is down for \$57,500,000.

Two financial weak sisters, Austria and Greece (Austria has received over \$726,000,000 and Greece almost \$774,000,000), are now down to \$20,000,000 apiece. Belgium, Norway, and the Netherlands are off altogether what Winston Churchill once called the American dole.

According to a recent estimate of the Tax Foundation, the United States from July 1941 to June 30, 1953, gave away \$92,100,000,000 in lend-lease wartime aid, UNRRA, and other forms of relief and Marshall Plan economic and subsequent military aid. Returns were \$11,800,000,000, so that U.S. taxpayers were out of pocket \$80,300,000,000.

Considered merely as an economic effort, this was magnificent and has never been remotely equalled by any country or combination of countries in the world. But was it the last word in political and economic wisdom? Many Europeans say privately

that America was much too soft in not requiring as an equivalent for its lavish subsidies more effective political, economic, and military integration of the recipient countries.

No doubt American dollars did pump some red corpuscles into the anemic bloodstream of postwar Europe. And yet when one sees how well Finland got on, paying substantial reparations to the Soviet Union, and without American aid, when one sees how the German economic recovery moves ahead, regardless of the virtual suspension of American aid, one is warranted in wondering whether all this spending was necessary.

There can be no doubt that economic subsidization of Europe appealed on general principles to the quack school of economists who believe that American wealth increases in proportion to how much it spends and how deeply it goes into debt. A national revulsion against this philosophy was registered in the election of 1952. From every standpoint—moral, political, and economic—it is a good thing that economic subsidization has pretty well tapered off, and that future spending will be governed by more hardheaded consideration of America's own interests.

The Controlist Mania

A recent weekly broadcast by Elmo Roper was devoted to France. The two problems causing difficulty to French families, he said, are the high cost of living and housing.

Mr. Roper continued: "Economists have concluded that the only way the inflation in France can be checked . . . is to institute strong government controls." He said controls would have to begin with agricultural prices.

Roper has many times given evidence that he thinks "stronger controls" are the primary solution to any economic problem. In the case of France, he attributes his own opinion to "economists," implying virtually complete agreement among them. The truth, however, is something quite different. Nearly all the authorities who, by the test of present hindsight, have proved that they have understanding and foresight, have urged France to follow the example of Germany, which has made the most sensational progress in Europe by giving up most of its government controls.

To strengthen government controls of agriculture is to do what the Communists have done to East Germany: convert food surpluses into food shortages. The desperate housing situation in France is in large part due to government controls. Paris is "a city of ratholes" precisely because rent control has been in effect since 1914. The policy of near-confiscation of landlords' property may have seemed helpful for a short period to tenants, but practiced for over forty years it

has been deadly. In the long run, people get better and cheaper housing only if new construction is stimulated, not discouraged. And what stimulates construction is what stimulates output in any line—profit incentives and a free economy.

The cure for the French inflation is not price controls; it is to stop printing paper money.

Let's Look at the Record

"Mrs. Roosevelt reported after her nationwide travels last year that the young people who are just coming up and see what is happening begin to be afraid to think and afraid to act, for fear that something they may say or do now will be dug up and thrown at them twenty years later and ruin their careers." So writes Elmer Davis in *Harpers* for July. "A republic," he concludes, "whose young people are in that state of mind is on its way downhill."

We think that such a republic may be at last recovering from a strange disease and be on its way uphill again.

The young people talking to Mrs. Roosevelt are thoroughly justified in losing confidence in their former opinions. They swallowed the collectivist teachings of Mrs. Roosevelt and Elmer Davis, and now they are disturbed, as they ought to be.

And why shouldn't those who presume to teach and lead youth have their views of ten or twenty years ago checked to see whether they were half as sagacious and foresighted as they now claim to have been?

When a corporation offers its stock to the public, the Securities and Exchange Commission requires the company's past to be told honestly and fully to prospective investors, with personal liability by the directors for any vital information that is missing.

When a man applies for an executive post, he must expose his past. A wise employer will make a painstaking investigation.

When a businessman applies for a loan, the bank asks for a Dun and Bradstreet report that may go back as far as thirty years to show every bankruptcy, insolvency, and bad payment period on the applicant's record, as well as the confidential opinion of firms who have given him credit.

When an anti-New Dealer runs for an important office, the P.A.C., the Friends of Democracy, the Americans for Democratic Action, and other left-wing organizations put investigators to work digging up every damaging statement that can be found, no matter how long ago. Some left-wing organizations have gone so far as to put spies in his office to ransack his files.

So it sums up to this: Why should left-wingers alone be exempt from Al Smith's test: "Let's look at the record"?

American Rights vs. "Treaty Law"

By FRANK E. HOLMAN

A Past President of the American Bar Association states the case for the adoption of the Bricker Amendment to safeguard our constitutional rights.

On June 4, 1953, the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended to the Senate for adoption the following revised text of S. J. Res. 1 (the Bricker Constitutional Amendment) relating to treaties and executive agreements:

Section 1. A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.

Section 2. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty.

Section 3. Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and other agreements with any foreign power or international organization. All such agreements shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties by this article.

The vote in the Senate Judiciary Committee was nine for and five against the amendment—with five Republicans and four Democrats voting favorably and three Democrats and two Republicans negatively. Senator Langer, although voting "negatively," did not join in either the majority or minority report. Senator Dirksen, who strongly supported the amendment, was absent from the United States on a government mission when the committee voted. Had he been available to vote, it is known that the committee vote would have been ten for the amendment and five against—with six Republicans and four Democrats voting for it and two Republicans and three Democrats against. This clearly attests the nonpartisan character of the proposal. It is uncertain whether the amendment will come to a vote in the Senate at the present session of the Congress.

The amendment is designed to write *clearly* into the Constitution the simple proposition that treaties and executive agreements shall not make domestic law for the people of this country except by congressional legislation within the constitutional powers of the Congress. Then no State Department, now or in the future, would be able, by an international agreement, to authorize or permit the representatives of other nations to have a voice in our domestic affairs and initiate changes in our basic rights as protected by our own Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

It is being asserted, even by some persons in high places, that the "Bricker" Amendment would interfere with the normal and proper conduct of our foreign affairs, and would prejudice our coopera-

tion with other countries in this time of great international crisis. This is not so. Neither of these fears is well founded. The fears result from a failure to read carefully the text of the amendment in the light of basic principles of constitutional and international law.

The amendment is in no sense designed and will in no way interfere with the free negotiation of treaties by the President and the State Department and their ratification by the Senate; nor will the amendment interfere with the immediate effect of treaties as international agreements. This is clearly established by the preponderance of the testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee. It is also the conclusion of the committee majority.

A Discredited Argument

The main argument advanced by the opposition is that no amendment is necessary because the Supreme Court has indicated in certain early cases that any treaty which conflicts with the Constitution will be held invalid.

This argument was originally advanced by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York but was completely discredited in the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee. It was based on the inaccurate statement that the Supreme Court "has heretofore *held* that any treaty which is inconsistent with the 'Constitution' will be held invalid." This statement in turn was based upon certain judicial expressions or dicta (not definite holdings) in early Supreme Court cases such as *The Cherokee Tobacco* (1870) 11 Wall. 616, 620-1; *Holden v. Jay* (1872) 17 Wall. 243; *Geofroy v. Riggs* (1889) 133 U.S. 258, 267; *Doe v. Braden* (1853) 16 How. 635, 657. It is true that in these early cases the Supreme Court, as mere dicta, used expressions to the following effect: that a treaty cannot violate the Constitution, nor authorize what the Constitution forbids, nor change the nature of the government of the United States or the relation between the states and the United States.

But, as has for some years been shown in the reports of the Committee on Peace and Law of the American Bar Association, those lawyers who have intensively studied this question have long ago had to give up on those otherwise satisfying old dicta of the Supreme Court. They soon had to recognize, just as the late Chief Justice Hughes recognized in

1929, and as all those who have given the subject more than a quick look recognize, that *Missouri v. Holland* (1920) 252 U.S. 416, changed the whole course of the earlier judicial stream by indicating that there may be no limit on what can be done in treaties made "under the authority of the United States" (which is the only present constitutional requirement), and by thus repudiating the view of Jefferson and the Founding Fathers that treaties should not deal with our domestic affairs. Under the doctrine of *Missouri v. Holland*, Congress can now acquire legislative power under treaties that it does not otherwise have under the Constitution—a doctrine which, for lack of a better epithet, might be called the "bootstrap doctrine" of federal power.

Pertinent Opinions

Before the American Society of International Law in 1929, the distinguished late Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes said that there is in the Constitution "no explicit limitation" on the treaty power, and that he would "not care to voice an opinion as to an implied limitation on the treaty-making power; the Supreme Court has expressed a doubt whether there could be any such." The late Chief Justice's reference was to the expression of doubt in *Missouri v. Holland*.

A strong doubt is also expressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in *United States v. Reid* (1934) 73 F. (2d) 153. This doubt has been further increased by *U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation* (1936) 299 U.S. 304, declaring that the treaty power does not depend on a grant in the Constitution but is an *inherent* power of the federal government, and indicating that the treaty power is unlimited.

So the dicta of the old cases which are so rapidly discovered, and so confidently proclaimed, by quick-look lawyers can no longer be relied on at all.

Missouri v. Holland, in the minds of federal expansionists, has given rise to two remarkable doctrines: (1) the doctrine that the treaty power is unlimited, capable even of overriding the Constitution and the Bill of Rights; and (2) the "bootstrap doctrine" of federal power, namely, that by its own voluntary act of making a treaty with another nation, the federal government can, apparently without limit, increase its legislative power at the expense of the states. Carried to its logical end, *Missouri v. Holland* means that, under Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter, dealing with the entire gamut of human activity in the civil, political, social, economic, and cultural fields, *the federal government is now one of unlimited powers*. Thus, as matters now stand, any administration in power, could—by the device of first making a treaty—then make laws for the people of this country affecting their life, liberty, and property without paying any attention to provisions of

the Constitution and the Bill of Rights which were designed to protect our basic rights and freedoms.

As indicated, the *Missouri v. Holland* doctrine is founded upon the thesis that the President and the Senate, acting as the treaty-making power, have broader legislative power over the people of the United States than the Congress itself, in which the people, by express grant in the first part of the Constitution, vested "all legislative power." This doctrine flies in the face of Jefferson's concept in his Manual of Parliamentary Practice:

By the general power to make treaties, the Constitution must have intended to comprehend only those objects which are usually regulated by treaties, and cannot be otherwise regulated. *It must have meant to except out all those rights reserved to the states; for surely the President and the Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole government is interdicted from doing in any way* [Italics added].

Jefferson's view and the dicta of the older cases have clearly been overruled and nullified by *Missouri v. Holland*.

Mr. John Foster Dulles, less than a year before he became Secretary of State, fully recognized our present predicament and himself presented one of the most cogent arguments in support of the need for a Constitutional Amendment. His statement and public opinion delivered at Louisville, Kentucky, last year in the course of his address before the Regional Meeting of the American Bar Association completely discredits the views of the opponents:

The treaty-making power is an extraordinary power liable to abuse. Treaties make international law and also they make domestic law. Under our Constitution treaties become the supreme law of the land. They are indeed more supreme than ordinary laws, for congressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to the Constitution, whereas treaty laws can override the Constitution. Treaties, for example, can take powers away from the Congress and give them to the President; they can take powers from the state and give them to the federal government or to some international body and they can cut across the rights given the people by the constitutional Bill of Rights [Italics added].

Mr. Dulles' statement clearly shows the need for a constitutional amendment to regulate the treaty power unless the treaty-making power is now to become a legal way for bypassing our normal legislative processes and the open road to changing American rights (both state and individual), and the easy way for changing the originally intended balance of powers, and thus the easy way and legal way for changing our form of government from a constitutional republic to an executive oligarchy.

Why does the treaty-making power, under constitutional provisions which have not been changed since 1789, now give rise to such dangerous possibilities of change in our laws and form of government, and so make a constitutional amendment necessary? There are three main reasons:

1. In what is otherwise a government of limited and delegated powers under the Constitution no express limitation exists on the treaty power, and the existence of any implied limitations is shrouded in doubt.

2. A basic change of viewpoint is being carried into effect with respect to the function and purpose of treaties. A veritable avalanche of new treaties is being sponsored by the United Nations and its affiliated organizations in the social, economic, cultural, civil, and political fields—any number of which would seriously and adversely affect or alter American rights and even our American form of government. Any or all of these treaties can, as admitted by Mr. Dulles and others, effect fundamental changes in our domestic law and in our form of government.

3. Persistent efforts have been made during the last few years to find additional basis for expansion of the powers of the federal government, and the treaty power has been suggested as a conveniently available vehicle for such expansion. (Mr. Truman's Civil Rights Commission suggested that instead of continuing to try to get so-called "civil rights" legislation through the Congress the whole program could be more easily achieved through "treaty," and thus also any doubt of its constitutionality avoided.)

The foregoing considerations clearly show the need for a constitutional amendment to protect American rights and the American form of government against the dangers of "treaty law."

Two Ideologies

The basic issue dividing the proponents and the opponents of a constitutional amendment is, in the last analysis, the simple question of the kind of government the American people want to live under. During recent years two opposing schools of thought or ideologies with respect to government have developed in the United States. Prior to that time, except for leftist groups representing radicalism in one form or another—principally the I.W.W.'s in earlier years, and in later years the Communists—practically all Americans believed in the Constitution and the form of government it established, and hence in a government of law and of appropriate constitutional restraints instead of a government of men and unrestrained executive power.

As a result of two world wars and the enormous increase of executive bureaus and the natural ambition of men in power to act on their own judgments or even whims, a certain number of Americans now seem to believe, like Mr. Attlee, that a government of constitutional restraints is outmoded and that the President and the State Department should not be "handicapped" by any constitutional or even congressional limitations.

This type of thinking was well illustrated and

more or less reached its peak when President Truman plunged us into the Korean war without any consultation with the Congress, and later undertook to seize the properties of the steel companies without any authority under the Constitution or under any law of Congress; and the Chief Justice of the United States and two other Justices approved this action.

The Chief Justice took the position that when the United Nations Charter was adopted this country thereby accepted "in full measure its responsibility in the world community" and an obligation "for the suppression of acts of aggression," and that consequently, when the United Nations called upon its members "to render every assistance" to repel aggression in Korea the President was thereupon authorized to take every action to render that assistance. The Chief Justice stated:

Our treaties represent not merely legal obligations but show congressional recognition that mutual security for the free world is the best security against the threat of aggression on a global scale.

In other words, acting under the Charter and other international commitments and implementing legislation based on "treaties," the President has powers *not* granted to him by the Constitution but even denied to him by the Constitution. For, among other things, under Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, the *Congress* has the sole power "to declare war" and "to raise and support armies" and "to provide and maintain a navy"; and under the Fifth Amendment no person is to be "deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor is private property to be taken for public use without just compensation."

Much more might be said with respect to this ideological conflict of the omnipotence of executive power versus constitutional government, but enough has been said to indicate that it exists, and that the arguments pro and con with respect to a constitutional amendment on treaties and executive agreements reflect the thinking of these two differing schools of thought. Those who support the proposal for a constitutional amendment believe in a government of law and of appropriate constitutional restraints. Those who oppose the amendment believe in a government of men and a government of so-called "unhandicapped" executive power, particularly in the field of foreign relations. In considering the arguments both for and against the amendment it should be kept in mind that this is the basic line of demarcation. To repeat the argument on somewhat broader ground, this proposal for a constitutional amendment on treaties involves the fundamental question of whether the American people want a government of law or a government of men.

Jefferson answered that question when he said: "In questions of power, let no more be said of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution."

Perón, Would-Be "Liberator"

By EUDOCIO RAVINES

Having failed to accomplish his real mission in Chile, Argentina's dictator seeks a way out of his economic dilemma by wooing other neighbors.

Juan Perón can derive little satisfaction from the signing of the ten-point treaty of Argentine-Chilean economic unity on July 8. So far as accomplishing what he had set his hopes on when he began negotiations with Chile's President last February, he has got practically nowhere. On all counts his five-months' venture into diplomacy, beginning with the grand flourish of a visit to Chile, has been a failure.

It is true that an Argentine-Chilean Economic Union was established by the signing of the treaty. But its function seems to be little more than the setting up of a commission to study methods whereby the economies of the two countries can be complemented. "Studying" is a far different thing from doing.

Furthermore, Perón's effort contained goals not apparent on the surface. It is herein that his real failure lies. To understand that failure, we must go back to February 21—when Perón first proclaimed from Santiago the union of the two countries. His proclamation was aimed directly at his own people and offered them as a palliative for the crisis then developing which is now in full swing in Argentina. The internal situation had become serious. Perón had to have a spectacular victory or at least to show some success somewhere in order to bolster up his own regime. As there was no chance of doing so at home, he could only try abroad.

He sought this triumph by the road to Chile which the great liberator-revolutionist José de San Martín had followed with his armies 120 years before. Perón took that road not because he considered it the easiest, but because it seemed to him the best. The Argentine people and South American opinion would have considered a victory in Bolivia under the patronage of Paz Estensoro, former guest of Perón, of little importance. The same would have been true of Peru with the wavering support of General Odría. Chile, however, with its government by law and not by force, is the brightest star in the continent. Chile's democracy may be considered as advanced as any in the world.

On the other hand, Chile is urgently in need of foodstuffs. Its budget is barely balanced, its currency has depreciated, inflation is mounting. The Chilean people work hard, and the country exports coal, copper, nitrates, iron, and other metals—all indispensable to the over-ambitious five-year in-

dustrialization plans of Perón. Throughout his negotiations for an Argentine-Chilean economic union, Perón has hoped to win over his neighbors through the stomach rather than through the heart or head.

Besides, Perón relied very strongly upon the intimate friendship, the cooperation, and the gratitude of General Carlos Ibañez del Campo, the newly-elected President of Chile. Perón had considered Ibañez the candidate of Peronism in Chile. To the Argentine dictator, Ibañism was the duplication of Peronism; it was "justicialism" come alive again, with Perón as prophet, and with a mystique embodied in the ardent words of the Chilean senator, the Ibañist María de la Cruz: "The message of Christ, after two thousand years of betrayals, has begun to be put into practice with the advent of Juan Domingo Perón and with the strength of justicialism." [María de la Cruz and her role in Chile's political life were described in an article by Peter Schmid, "Dark Eyes, Red Hearts," in the *FREEMAN* of July 13.]

Finally, Perón relied upon the cooperation of Chilean Communism. He expected from the Communists of Chile, under the leadership of the poet Pablo Neruda and Galo González, a collaboration similar to that Peronism received under various disguises in Argentina from the Communists led by the M.V.D. agent Vittorio Codovila and by his brain-truster Rodolfo Ghioldi.

A Farce to the Chileans

All these calculations miscarried when Perón reached Chile.

For one thing, after crossing the frontier he evaluated the situation and acted in Chile exactly as he had in Argentina. He shouted, railed at, and flattered the crowd until he grew hoarse. He ordered the distribution of enormous quantities of trinkets; he shed real tears which ran down his cheeks; he communicated to the Chileans his discovery that "everything is subject to the principle of the solar system." In short, he made himself ridiculous to the sophisticated Chilean populace, to whom his clumsy eloquence was a farce. The illustrious visitor did not realize that compared with Chile his own country is in its political infancy.

Throughout the past half century the people of

Argentina have been much more interested in business than in politics. Almost continuously from 1916 to 1931, under the influence of the politically indifferent immigrant anxious only to "make a success in America," the Argentinian lived happily under the hegemony of the Radical Civic Union and the patriarchal guardianship of its gloomy, silent, and diffident chief, Hipólito Irigoyen. The Chilean, on the other hand, because of the entirely indigenous character of the population and the fact that it is racially and spiritually homogeneous, devoted himself passionately to his domestic policy and at the same time kept informed on what was going on in the rest of the world.

In politics, the Chilean is guided more by reason than by emotion, while the Argentinian is still guided by emotions close to the surface. A Chilean has to be convinced, the Argentinian has merely to be aroused. For the Chilean, with considerable experience behind him, politics has attained a harsh and logical meaning. To the "shirtless" follower of Perón, who is a novice in politics, everything is reduced to grandiloquence, gestures, tiring marches, clamor, and staged outbursts. The Chilean accepts politics as a mission, while the Peronist "shirtless one" looks upon it as an adventure.

In dealing with the Chileans, Perón blundered not only in his grasp of the situation, but also in the methods he used. This latter mistake, too, had its influence upon his ultimate failure.

During the last few years one of the most frequently repeated slogans of Peronists in Chile has been that of the "Free Cordillera." That slogan, which stands for the free passage, without customs control, of goods across the Andes, has both partisans and opponents in Chile. Its partisans are the uncertain sympathizers with Peronism, and their group includes primarily merchants and miners. Its opponents are the cattle and grain dealers, the agriculturalists, the manufacturers—those who direct and form the basis of Chile's domestic economy. They believe that if Chile adopted the "Free Cordillera" plan, she would be selling her birthright for a mess of pottage.

Shortly before his trip to Santiago, Perón gave a special interview to José Dolores Vasquez, the editor of *La Nación*, official daily published in the Chilean capital. During that interview, as reported by Vasquez, he said that in his opinion the problem was not only to bring about a spiritual rapprochement or an economic or cultural understanding between Argentina and Chile, but a broad and complete political unity. He insisted that such unity would not only convert the "new country" into a world power, but that it would also constitute the nucleus of unity among Latin-American countries.

When this statement was published in Santiago, the reaction was so profound both within and outside of Chile that upon his arrival Perón had to

issue a denial. The upshot of it all was that Vasquez had to resign. Nevertheless, there were few who did not believe that the Argentine dictator made the statement published in *La Nación*.

The leading organ of the conservative Traditionalist Party, *El Diario Ilustrado*, expressed the hope that "President Perón will correct his statements, seeing that they have not made a favorable impression upon considerable sections of public opinion."

Reaction in Congress and in the ranks of the political parties was more vehement. A group of representatives asked for a public debate in the Chamber on the purpose and aims of Perón's proposals. Indeed, they pushed so hard for such a debate that President Ibañez closed the sessions of Congress to a debate which would have become a strong manifestation of Chilean anti-Peronism on the very eve of the distinguished visitor's arrival. At the same time the formation of an anti-Peronist front "in defense of Chile's independence" was announced, which included conservative elements of both wings, outstanding liberals and radicals, along with conspicuous figures among the followers of Ibañez.

Chile's Communists Did Not Help

To a certain extent Perón was banking for his success in Chile upon the cooperation of its Communist movement, similar to that he gets in Argentina. In spite of the activities of the Communists in Guatemala and the importance they have achieved in Brazil, Chile remains the great Communist hope in Latin America. Moscow does not forget that Chile's Communist Party was the only one in Latin America to attain power legitimately and honorably, having had three members in the first cabinet of Gonzalez Videla.

Perón arrived in Chile at a time when his relations with Moscow were excellent. The Argentine Ambassador Leopoldo Bravo had just been admitted to the inner circles of the Kremlin. At the same time Perón sent two emissaries to Moscow to arrange a commercial treaty between Argentina and the U.S.S.R. As a further sign of friendship the Moscow radio began to transmit regularly in Russian translation editorials from the Argentine daily *Democracia*, which is the semi-official organ of Peronism.

There were reasons why Perón trusted unduly in the cooperation of Chile's Communists. He did not understand that the golden age of Chilean Communism had gone forever. Not only because the party lacks bold and able leaders, but mainly because Communism in Chile has not escaped the common phenomenon of the West: moral bankruptcy. It has lost its prestige with the masses; it has lost the power to make converts and the ability to lead and to be obeyed. The Chilean public realizes more and more that the Communists do

not constitute a political party but a fifth column at the service of a foreign imperialist power.

The Chilean Communists have also lost their influence upon the trade union movement, once their domain. Soon after Perón's visit, the Confederation of the Workers of Latin America held its last convention in Santiago under the chairmanship of Vicente Lombardo Toledano, the most conspicuous Communist leader of Mexico and one of the most determined agents of Moscow in this hemisphere. The *Confederación Unica* of Chilean Workers refused to have any part in the Communist affair. Lombardo went home disappointed.

In addition, Chile's Communists are, more than any other in Latin America, imbued with nationalism. Among them there has always been a strong taint of potential Titoism. This nationalist sentiment was undoubtedly at work at the time of Perón's visit. The leaders were ready to cooperate, but the rank-and-file Communists resisted because they felt that the country's dignity was compromised. This was one more of the imponderables which contributed to the failure of the Argentine dictator's visit to Chile.

Perón returned to Buenos Aires with no more than a promise that a treaty would be concluded within four months. That was all Ibañez, for all his old personal friendship, could offer.

Moscow Methods in Buenos Aires

Perón was no sooner back in Argentina than the failure of his mission to Chile was demonstrated to him. The storm he had been trying to forestall broke out in full fury. Demagoguery was followed by hysteria; the well-known *mestizo* Latin-American methods were followed by the cruel Soviet methods. It is in this atmosphere that Perón's Argentina is living today.

In March price rises reached a level hitherto unknown in the country. The price index, 100 in 1943, went beyond 600. Political corruption continues to wax high.

The Executive Committee of the General Confederation of Workers, presided over by Emilio Vuletich, came forward to "press a dagger against the chest of Perón," as the latter put it later in a speech. And when the dictator began to respond to this pressure, he was visited again by Vuletich; but this time Vuletich was accompanied by General Sosa Molina, Minister of Defense, in order to demand the termination of the wave of graft which enveloped the government. Specifically, these representatives of the two strongest factors in Argentina today, the Confederation of Labor and the Army, charged that Juan Duarte, brother of Evita Perón, was "the biggest grafter of the Republic" and "the world's richest bachelor," although barely seven years ago he had been earning a humble livelihood as a soap salesman. As a result of these interviews, Perón's police had to

stop Juan Duarte from flying to Spain, as he had planned; many dignitaries of the Perón regime, including Duarte himself, had to resign their posts; and finally Duarte was assassinated, an incident Perón ordered disguised as suicide.

In spite of these setbacks Perón's dictatorship still feels itself strong and aggressive. Its political methods show more and more of the Soviet spirit, so to speak, a fact due on the one hand to its own weakening, and on the other to the high hopes Perón has put in the more and more undisguised endorsement Moscow is beginning to give him. He has, of course, been considerably bucked up by the final signing of the treaty with Chile, however little he may expect from it either economically or politically.

Perón Seeks Expansion Elsewhere

The expansionist tendency of the Perón regime is becoming more and more outspoken as the depression he has caused within his country heightens his predicament. The agreement with Chile included an invitation to all the other countries of Latin America to join the economic union thereby established. In view of the closing of the American news services in Argentina and the new campaign against the United States, it appears obvious that the first purpose of this invitation has political implications.

This new symptom of expansionism only confirms what Perón himself explained during his stay in Santiago. Manuel Seoane, Number Two leader of the A.P.R.A. (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*), which is outlawed in Peru as a political organization, visited Perón to ask his support in regaining the power the A.P.R.A. once held in the country of the Incas. Perón accepted Seoane's collaboration and officially offered his support to this political movement which is openly directed against the military regime now in control in Peru. There are rumors that the Perón regime is ready to offer strong financial support to A.P.R.A. in Peru, should Perón's projected economic mission to Lima not be heeded.

Perón has adopted a similar attitude toward the exiled representatives of the *Acción Democrática* of Venezuela, the party headed by Romulo Betancourt, which, like the Peruvian *aprismo* was outlawed in its own country after a military coup.

Thus he tries to appear to the people of Latin America as an adversary of their dictators, as an enemy of government based on force, and as a defender of the liberties desired by many Latin American peoples whose present governments have made a mockery of all democratic institutions. In his critical hour Perón is posing as a liberator. A "liberation" of this kind would be a legitimate offspring of that other "liberation" practiced by Soviet imperialism in the countries subjugated by the Kremlin dictatorship.

The Fallacies in the "Single Tax"

By FRANK H. KNIGHT

Special taxation on land value, as advocated by Henry George's followers, would work injustices and retard rather than help production, says a University of Chicago professor of economics.

Should land value be subject to special taxation? The question will recall Henry George and his "single tax," which for a time created quite a furor. I shall not say much about either George's flamboyant propaganda, or the matter of singleness. He did not originate the idea; and the question whether ground-rent would suffice to replace other taxation, more or less, is not pertinent to the policy issue. In essence, that issue lies in the relation of "land" to other property, to "capital goods." George himself emphatically opposed socialism, insisting on private property in farms and all improved real estate. This would merely be subjected to a "tax" appropriating the pure ground-rent, as distinguished from the yield of capital, specifically that invested in improvements on the land.

The theory of confiscatory taxation of land value is quite simple, if one accepts the premises. It is based on the economic theory of David Ricardo and his followers, the English Classical Economists, including John Stuart Mill; and it is indubitably a logical inference from their views. Ricardo defined rent as "that portion of the produce of the earth which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil." Thus rent was all but explicitly held to be socially created, as Henry George contended. It had been and currently continued to be built up as the growth of a nation in population and wealth made it necessary to use poorer and poorer land, with more intensive cultivation of the better land first used.

The labor-plus-capital employed were said to receive a remuneration fixed by the total yield at the "margin of cultivation"; and the excess produce of the same labor-and-capital on the better land accrued to the landlord, who made no sacrifice and conferred no benefit on society. The rent, it was held, had nothing to do with the price of the produce, which was determined by the labor-and-capital cost of the final, most costly unit. On this reasoning, it would indeed be hard to find any objection to the principle of simply taking the rent for social use.

To the principle, be it noted. If "society" means all mankind, treated equally, we must assume an all-wise, all-powerful, and completely benevolent world government. But such "practical" difficulties

are a small matter to a reformer "hipped" on a panacea for the world's ills. However, our main task is to look critically at the theory, in the light of facts known to everyone.

Ricardo is notorious for bad writing; and it is a detail hardly worth noting that rent is not actually "paid" in the case of a man farming (or otherwise using) his own land, but it would be "there" just the same. More important, the amount paid or "imputed" in any case would be only an approximation to the theoretically correct figure. And for the same reasons, if it were to be appropriated by the government, some official, some "bureaucrat" with power, would have to appraise it—subject to error, prejudice, and acute disagreement. Moreover, the levy would evidently have to be the estimated real value of the land for use in the most economical way. To collect such rent, the government would in practice have to compel the owner actually to use the land in the best way, hence to prescribe its use in some detail. Thus we already see that the advantage of taxation over socialization of management has practically disappeared.

Land Values Are Always Paid For

For the crucial error in the theory, however, we have to look further. The way anyone becomes a landlord and comes into possession of the "surplus" or the "unearned increment" of sale value which is its capitalized worth, is to buy it from a previous owner. He will, of course, have to pay a price which includes any expected future increase in the capitalized yield. Land has "always," practically speaking, been private property, freely exchanged against other wealth—including human beings when these could be owned. Possession through inheritance also involves no distinction and need not be considered. (In fact other advantages besides property are inherited, and raise the same ethical problem.) Thus the value alleged to be socially created is always paid for before it is received—as far as the parties most interested are able to predict its arising.

Following this sequence back through time, we come to the conditions of original exploration and settlement. The allegation that our pioneers got the land for nothing, robbing future generations

of their rightful heritage, should not have to be met by argument. The whole doctrine was invented by city men living in comfort, not by men in contact with the facts as owners or renters. How many preachers of single-tax doctrine would care to live their lives and bring up their families under the conditions of the frontier, fight off the savages and other enemies, and occasionally be massacred, suffer the hardships, overcome the difficulties or succumb to them, do without the amenities of civilization, including medical attention for their families—for what the average pioneer got out of it? The question answers itself. Their heirs, near or remote, often got unearned wealth, but again that is not a sequel peculiar to land. Consequently, if society were later to confiscate the land value, allowing retention only of "improvements" or their value, it would ignore the costs in bitter sacrifice and would arbitrarily discriminate between one set of property owners and another set, where there is no difference to justify the action.

How to Force Socialism

As a matter of fact, general reasoning indicates and statistics fairly well prove that the actual outlay cost of the land, the investment of labor and capital, with interest while "waiting" for the increase, and the taxes paid, add up to the actual value, over any representative sample, without counting the subjective costs not measurable in money. Of course there is a large element of luck in all exploration and development activities. Some did make very high returns on their outlay; others lost their all, and often health or life itself besides. If society proposes to confiscate the gains of the winners it must compensate the losers—or not only work arbitrary injustice but set a precedent that would warn anyone against undertaking risky ventures. This would at once force establishment of outright socialism or put a stop to all forward-looking activity.

Men do hold land "speculatively" for an expected increase in value. This is a social service, tending to put ownership in the hands of those who know best how to handle the land so that the value will increase. And the familiar psychology of gambling makes speculation in general a losing business to the whole body of those who engage in it. They obviously do not need to keep it idle to get the increase, and do not, if there is a clear opening for remunerative use.

In an "old" country, as in western Europe, the historical beginnings of private property in land are of course different. There is no need or possibility of going here into the history of feudalism and its abolition. Undoubtedly then and now there have been chicanery and even skuldugery in the acquisition of real estate. Again, that is not peculiar to transactions in the land. And it is at least as characteristic of the "politics" which

reformers propose to substitute for "business" as it is of business itself. The issue between socialism and private property in general is not our subject here.

What has been said really disposes of the question. There is no socially-created unearned increment in the possession of landowners. The government would lose by taking over their holdings on fair or expedient terms—unless it can foresee future conditions and manage production better than competitively selected individuals can do (which only Socialists believe).

The "Slavery" Argument

But there are specific "arguments" for the social appropriation of ground rent which it may be interesting to consider briefly. The case is often represented as parallel to that of slavery. Since slavery was always "wrong," no one could ever get a just title to slave property, hence summary liberation was just. This is invalid on both counts, economically and ethically. On the one hand, slave-owning and the capture and marketing of slaves were carried on under open competition. It is improbable that the individuals concerned ever made appreciably more out of the business than they could have had by using their labor and capital in ways that have continued to be treated as legitimate. And ethically, the society which established and sanctioned slavery was "to blame." By rights it should have borne—*i. e.*, distributed—the loss to individuals when it changed its mind and condemned and abolished the institution.

So, with respect to land, it is said that every human being has an absolute right to access to the earth, by which he must live. But everyone actually has this right, subject to competitive conditions, *i. e.*, that he pay for it what it is worth (which is less than it has cost). The alternative would be that he get the permission from some political agent of government. And the simplest economic analysis shows that if the government wants to use its resources most productively, it would have to charge the users of land precisely the rent which tends to be fixed by market competition among private owners. Any attempt to give every person an unconditional right to access to the soil would establish anarchy, the war of all against all—and is of course not approximated by a confiscation and distribution of "rent" or its employment for "social ends."

It is true again that many economists have called land a monopoly, and held that a monopolist charges all that the buyer can be forced to pay. But such ideas are nonsense, by whomsoever expressed.

I have mentioned the practical question of *what* "society" would have the right to take the land-value from private holders. The only answer that is the least defensible in terms of natural-rights

premises is "mankind," "the world." And that is what the single-tax propagandists say. Since this is clearly and absurdly impossible, one can only guess at their actual meaning. If a superhuman agency were to confiscate any type of wealth and distribute it equally among all living human beings, it would be immediately dissipated and lost, with demoralization of organized society everywhere. This fact is enough to destroy all reasoning from abstract rights and to make any sensible person realize that practical problems have to be solved in terms of expediency, the requirements for civilized living, and some hope of progress.

A favorite, supposedly very practical argument is that a tax on land value will force idle land into use. It will not—unless unused land is taxed more than what is used, in relation to its potential value; and it does not so operate where the expedient has been tried. If land having value for use is not used by an owner it is because of uncertainty as to how it should be used, and waiting for the situation to clear up or develop. An owner naturally does not wish to make a heavy investment in fitting a plot for a use which does not promise amortization before some new situation may require a different plan. A society owning its land and trying to manage production intelligently will confront the same choices, and will make the same decisions—except, always, as its agents, or the dominant powers, have better or worse foresight or more or less managerial competence, than private owners have. The case of land is in practice no different from that of other wealth, or the productive capacities of human beings.

The Government Would Lose

John Stuart Mill, and many followers and others, have argued that while it would be wrong to take land-value from innocent holders without compensation, society should appropriate the *future* increase in value after publication of such a law. This curious reasoning, like the whole Ricardian theory, is significant as showing how superior minds often work in matters affected by some interest, personal or sentimental. It is arithmetically obvious that the mere inauguration of this policy would destroy that part of the present value of any parcel which at its last changing of hands represented the expected increase. It is also certain, in view of the human tendency to overvalue speculative chances, that if the government took the gains and paid for the losses it would lose substantially. And the action would disorganize the market for land, necessary to rational direction of its use and for all orderly economic life.

In concluding this discussion, I should like to make a few brief topical observations. The heart of the matter is that the rental value of land, when not a payment for personal service or a return on investment, is a *profit* like any other,

a speculative gain due to an unanalyzable mixture of superior foresight and "luck." The value of agricultural land is accounted for largely by qualities that are not "indestructible," but have to be maintained at a cost to keep the land productive. Its original and indestructible qualities hardly enter into its value, after a short period of use, in which the primitive fertility is "mined out"; during that time, it is like depletable mineral deposits, which present special problems in the field of profit, but have nothing to do with the land-value of the Single Taxers.

If a government owned any wealth, it could of course distribute the yield in any way it saw fit, or use it for any purpose. Modern views of the ethics of taxation call for differentiation chiefly on the basis of the size of income, with possibly some allowance for security and supposed "subjective cost." But "property" income is only the excess of gross rental value after provision for maintenance and replacement, while in a free society personal earning power is not ordinarily so "capitalized." This more or less offsets the "double taxation" of savings—as income during accumulation and then on the yield after investment.

The Ideal Property Tax

The primitive and religious prejudice against wealth prevents exemption of savings from taxation, but in a free society there is no way to make taxes fall on consumption alone. The theoretically ideal way to tax momentarily unproductive land, or other property, would be a levy on interest at the going rate on its market value, as income. This would make the government neutral as to use or disuse and mode of use. The same rule should apply to any property having a higher yield for temporary reasons.

Finally, situation value is peculiarly "available" for taxation by local units, especially municipalities. They obviously do not create this value, and special taxation will more or less distort land use. Exemption of improvements will not "spread the city out," but rather the opposite; people will build and improve more intensively rather than extensively. But if such a tax is moderately and wisely used, it need not produce much more injustice or economic damage than may result from any tax that can be administered.

We must recognize that no law can be "just"—in any of the widely diverse definitions of justice that have some validity. There is no "solution" to most of our problems—only a better or a worse. One of the hardest of our problems is the relation between different governmental units. On the supreme problem of a world organization, its functions and needs or how to determine these and make provision, it is impossible to say anything very realistic, in the actual state of the realities.

The Red Army's Bid for Power

By PIERRE FAILLANT

Is the Red Army preparing a coup? Experts on Soviet affairs were scouting this puzzler when the electrifying news broke that Lavrenti Beria was the first loser in the struggle for power among Stalin's heirs. Beria's demise, whatever other long-range effects it may have, has weakened one of the three wellsprings of power in the U.S.S.R.—the dreaded secret police. Conversely, the other two, the army and the Communist Party, have been strengthened.

The Soviet armed forces on July 16 pledged full support of the government and the party in the action taken against Beria. But military revolt against civilian rule would be nothing new in Russia. Tsarist officers back from the Napoleonic Wars, fired by the ideas of the American and French Revolutions, organized secret societies and staged an unsuccessful uprising in December 1825. A dissatisfied army again played a key role in the epochal events of 1917. One of the bloodiest uprisings in the U.S.S.R. was a sailors' mutiny in Kronstadt in 1921, four years after the Bolsheviks had seized power. In the same year Red Army soldiers refused to fire on peasants rebelling against grain requisitions during a famine. And only a few weeks ago it was reported that eighteen Red Army soldiers were shot for refusing to fire on German workers demonstrating against their Communist regime.

Any military force the size of the Red Army (best estimate: 3,400,000 men) can be a serious threat as well as a strong prop for the regime. Stalin knew that. He cut the army down to size in the great purges fifteen years ago, and after World War Two he moved the more popular military leaders into positions that would keep them out of the public eye.

Experts on Soviet affairs first began to notice a change in the Red Army's fortunes in 1951. Marshal Georgi Zhukov, acclaimed as the victor of Stalingrad, the savior of Moscow, and the captor of Berlin, had been relegated to the command of the North Urals Army district in 1948. This post was probably not one of disgrace. From it he commanded strategically important polar bases which would be used in any across-the-Arctic offensive against North America. But in 1951 he was brought back to the Ministry of War in Moscow and later was admitted to the Central Committee. At the same time Marshals Vasilevsky and Sokolovsky began a significant consolidation of the numerous Soviet military districts into seven large army regions.

Under the old system political commissars kept

a close check on the district commanders' every decision, no matter how minor it might be. With the reorganization the political commissars' power over the army—which meant the party's power—diminished. Regional commanders were given a relatively large measure of freedom in running their units. The "sudden" death, early this year, of L. Mekhlis, former chief of all political commissars in the army, was another step in the same direction. The Red Army leaders are now more powerful than at any time since 1941-42. Beria's arrest was apparently backed by Nikolai A. Bulganin's Red Army tanks and troops, which appeared suddenly in small numbers around some Moscow government buildings on June 27.

Postwar Army Comeback

In his last work, *The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, Stalin seemed to indicate that the party no longer need be considered a hard and uncompromising core regimenting Soviet society. The question arises: Were the numerous appointments of army men to high positions in the governing organisms of the party and state concrete proof of such a sentiment? In any case, the Red Army was clearly making a postwar comeback. In the absence of fuller evidence, foreign observers could not overlook a striking contradiction. In the preparatory meetings and at the Congress, Nikita S. Khrushchev, Malenkov's successor as first secretary of the Communist Party, warned of the need for new purges and for the recasting of the Central Committee, contrary to the "softening-up" line implied in Stalin's last writings. In 1952 Voroshilov, Bulganin, Zhukov, and other high military figures were seen near Stalin at official ceremonies.

Theoretically Bulganin, a first deputy premier and minister of war, is now number five man on the Kremlin totem pole. But his position and power are enhanced by the fact that Premier Malenkov has a long, bloody road to travel before he reaches the state of quasi-deity achieved by Stalin, and he will have to rely on his collaborators until he gets strong enough to eat them, if they don't devour him first.

The strength of Bulganin, a one-time accountant who entered the services of the Cheka in 1923, is that he has always known how to get along with the military. His choice of Zhukov and Vassilevsky as deputies after his appointment as Minister of War won't make him "undesirable" to the commanders of the U.S.S.R.'s seven military regions.

It is quite possible that certain civilian leaders are worried about the new influence the army has assumed. The nine men on the Presidium of the Central Committee—the inside inside group—need time to consolidate their power and popularity. They are not yet sure enough of themselves to challenge directly the army's authority. Certain actions have been taken, though. On March 15 the

THIS IS WHAT HE SAID

The following quotations are from the Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt

Navy Ministry was "decapitated" with the mysterious disappearance of Admiral Kuznetsov, whose functions were assumed by the Ministry of National Defense under Bulganin. The navy's general staff remained, but hundreds of high-ranking officers were transferred. It is interesting to note that Kuznetsov and his deputy were alleged to have been threatened by the so-called "doctors' plot." One of the recently cleared doctors has just been appointed to a new post in the Ministry of Health.

On the other hand, in the ground forces, Marshal Timoshenko was called from his headquarters in Minsk to preside over a special new military commission which wasted no time in issuing directives canceling those taken for the 1953 military program. Finally, the Soviet Military Academy was submitted to a series of purges beginning on March 22. The majority of the victims were in juridical and administrative posts. Were the purgees suspected of setting up a coup, or was it just that they belonged to circles headed by men now in disgrace?

Satellite Forces Built Up

In troubled eastern Europe General Shtemenko, chief of staff of the Red Army until his replacement by Marshal Sokolovsky, was organizing, under the supervision of Soviet officers, loyal cadres in the forces of the various satellite states. A secret conference was held in Prague in the summer of 1952 at the same time as the East German contingents already under arms were being reinforced. This conference was presided over by Marshal Bulganin, who was seconded by Marshals Koniev, Rokossovsky, Panchevsky, and Shtemenko. It was then decided to set up a big intersatellite general headquarters in or near Karlovy-Vary in Czechoslovakia.

It is important to note that the strength of the Red Army has not been decreased in any way since Stalin's death. The bulk of the army has been unaffected, so far as outsiders can judge, by the struggle at the top. Some reports of Red Army "mutinies" in the Eastern zone of Germany at the time of the riots have proved to be fallacious.

More than four months after the death of Stalin reliable informants report that the Red Army High Command is slated to undergo a new shake-up and purge. Observers are wondering what role Bulganin will play in this. They point out that the Presidium must go easy on any moves that would weaken the army and hence the Soviet position vis-à-vis the West. But the party hierarchy also seems worried about the "chauvinism" denounced daily, that may well come from army circles.

It is too early to tell who will win the complicated struggle for power in the Soviet empire. But any internecine strife weakens the whole Soviet structure and offers matchless opportunities to the West, if we are wise enough to seize them.

The plan is to reduce the cost of current federal government operations by 25 per cent.

October 16, 1932

When we have restored the price level, we shall seek to establish and maintain a dollar which will not change its purchasing and debt-paying power during the succeeding generation.

October 22, 1933

We should plan to have a definitely balanced budget for the third year of recovery and from that time on seek a continuing reduction of the national debt.

January 3, 1934

I say to you most earnestly once more that the people of America and the government of those people intend and expect to remain at peace with all the world.

October 2, 1935

We have built up new instruments of public power. In the hands of a people's government, this power is wholesome and proper.

January 3, 1936

The Treasury is all right and we are balancing the budget—you needn't worry.

October 3, 1937

It has taken courage for the federal government to go into the "red". . . But it has been worth it.

July 8, 1938

The first President of the United States warned us against entangling foreign alliances. The present President of the United States subscribes to and follows that precept.

January 3, 1940

When the war is won, the powers under which I act will automatically revert to the people—to whom they belong.

September 7, 1942

I believe he [Stalin] is truly representative of the heart and soul of Russia; and I believe that we are going to get along very well with him and the Russian people—very well indeed.

December 24, 1943

The Freeman invites contributions to this column, and will pay \$2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They cannot be returned or acknowledged.

THE EDITORS

Letter from Paris

By R. G. WALDECK

France finally has a Cabinet to fill the governmental void. Her Premier, Joseph Laniel, has in the eyes of his compatriots two great advantages over former incumbents. The first is his personal wealth—he does not need to exploit his high office. Secondly, he has had little occasion in his previous career to step on other politicians' toes. That is why he got the premiership and Antoine Pinay did not; Pinay had made too many enemies.

In a way Laniel, though an old parliamentarian, is a "new" man. Moreover, six of the twelve ministers he has appointed have never before held cabinet rank. This is quite a feat, considering that there have been nineteen governments since the Liberation; it would seem rather difficult for a politician of any importance to have stayed out of them. But actually cabinet seats in France rotate endlessly within a small circle of men who have what Chateaubriand called the *odeur de portefeuille* which inevitably brings them back into office. Among the old hands Georges Bidault is again in charge of foreign affairs and René Pleven of defense. On the surface this would appear to mean that the continuity of French foreign policy is to be preserved and her relations within the Western defense community are to remain unchanged.

However, this appearance of continuity may be deceptive. While up to now foreign policy has been treated by each successive cabinet as sacrosanct, during the last governmental crisis it was for the first time dragged into the discussion. In fact, foreign policy was the very heart of that crisis. What happened was that certain doubts concerning French commitments abroad—which had become increasingly articulate in the course of the past two years—had to be finally acknowledged on the level of official politics.

It was Mendès-France, one of the recent governmental hopefuls, who started it all. The intense emotion he aroused in the Chamber of Deputies by his bold declaration concerning restrictions on military expenditures and on peace in Indo-China did away with the fiction that only the Communists thought of revising French foreign policy. It was even more significant that Mendès-France succeeded in mustering 300 of the 314 votes he would have needed to become premier and so set about implementing his downright revolutionary program. It looks as though in the immediate future France's political life is likely to hinge on this question of a revision of her foreign policy.

This development has come about as a result of France's very real financial difficulties, caused to a large extent by her war in Indo-China. It is also connected with the hopes aroused in the "common

Frenchman" by the latest Russian peace overtures—hopes which are of course cleverly orchestrated by Communist propaganda, valiantly supported by the neutralists, and intensively pointed up by the various groups and individuals who claim to believe that the United States will drag the whole world into a war, partly because she "needs" a war, and partly because she shies away from diplomatic discussions with Russia and thus makes war unavoidable. These Frenchmen seem still to have a devout faith in the diplomatic dialogue.

In all this, genuine antagonism to the United States plays a comparatively small part, though it exists, as was evidenced by the reaction here to the Rosenberg case. This was, of course, Communist-paced, but all the Communists had to do was to focus the current Americanophobia on the Rosenbergs. For a while it was impossible to go anywhere without being quizzed on "Julius and Ethel." I was questioned by the shampoo girl at Antoine's, by salesladies along the Avenue Matignon, by great ladies of the Faubourg St. Germain, and by any number of prelates of the Gallic Church. Most of them thought the Rosenbergs innocent; some said they should be pardoned even though they might be guilty. I was also frequently asked about "*ce pauvre Monsieur 'iss*," who, I was assured, was an American Dreyfus.

What surprised me throughout the whole affair was the absence in the French press of any presentation of the American side of the case—in other words, the facts. I could not help wondering what the American Information Service was doing, and why it seemed unable to get a word in edgewise. However, when everything was over, *Le Monde* opened its column "*Libres Opinions*" to one Jesse R. Pitts, who wrote an excellent piece on the *affaire Rosenberg*, which not only made its points well, but made them in a way attuned to French ways of feeling and thinking. I do not know Mr. Pitts. I do not even know what he is doing over here, but I have a hunch that he gets no share of the millions the United States spends on the "Voice" and Information Service.

I shall deal more fully with our propaganda in Europe in another letter. For the moment, suffice it to say that the only effective picture of the American way of life given here is through the French edition of the *Reader's Digest*. This is doing a good job for America, yet nobody gets excited about it, possibly because it does not cost the American taxpayer a cent! Perhaps the *Reader's Digest* is so effective in France because its editors do not think in terms of propaganda, but simply of selling as many copies of the magazine as possible. To this end they give the French what they like to read, but what French publishers cannot supply because of lack of money. It might be a good idea for the "Voice" to try this formula for a while.

What Americans Need to Know

By J. DONALD ADAMS

To travel through our own country with open eyes, ears, and mind will dispel the myth that America is standardized, says an eminent literary critic.

When I was twenty-one and just out of college, I made my first trip West. Like many other native New Yorkers, I had never been beyond the west bank of the Hudson. So for me the journey was a great adventure. It proved to be something else as well—the beginning of another kind of education. During my stay in the Northwest I got my first real lessons in understanding my own country.

They began soon after I reached Seattle; they would probably have begun sooner had I not chosen to go out by way of Canada. The trip had nearly exhausted my funds, and I had to get a job. By chance I found one on a government survey crew which needed a replacement, but to join the party, which was already in the field and working in the foothills of Mt. Rainier, I had to have an outfit. Nothing elaborate—just a few important items without which I would have been handicapped.

Chief of these was a pair of high hobnailed boots. Without them I would have had serious trouble carrying a rod through that heavily timbered country. But the boots alone cost twelve dollars, and I hadn't that much money left. When I told this to the proprietor of the outfitting store, he smiled and said, "Why, that's all right, son. Take 'em along, and when you come out at the end of the season, come in and see me."

It was a fine thing to have happen to you—this ready trust, especially to a kid fresh from the eastern seaboard, where I knew it could scarcely have come about in that same casual way. No amount of reading about what the West was like, and how it differed from the East, could have had the same impact. I began to look for other differences, and to find them.

Since that time I have made numerous trips to the West and to the South, some of them of long duration. I have been in all the states but two—Alabama and Mississippi. And each time I come back to my home in the East I feel more strongly than ever that one of our most cherished and widely accepted myths is that we are a standardized country. So we are to the casual eye which lacks either the time or the inclination to probe beneath the surface. So we are to the theorist who sits at home or abroad and spins a fancy web about what we are like and how much alike we are.

It is true there are many hundreds of Main Streets in this country scarcely distinguishable

one from the other. The chain store and the filling station and the movie house have only emphasized a family likeness that was already there before they began to multiply. It is likewise true that the approach to most American towns, whether by rail or by highway, is uniformly ugly and depressing. It is true that newspapers, the country over, have lost much of their individuality, and that except for local news, readers from coast to coast are fed much the same fare.

Yet there are regional differences which are just as important and just as significant as the surface similarities. It is my belief that in spite of the fact that so many of us have come from some other place than that in which we live, in spite of the fact that we are a nation on wheels, forever flitting from one region to another, we are not made sufficiently aware of these differences. I think also that without a fuller understanding of ourselves and of the ways in which our attitudes differ, we can hardly hope to act successfully in the new role of world leadership that has devolved upon us. One of the reasons, it seems to me, why we are so often and so much misunderstood abroad lies in our failure to interpret ourselves to other peoples—a failure due in part to our insufficient understanding of one another here at home.

I think our restless touring about the country has done little to strengthen this understanding because most of it is too hurried for that, and too little exposed to the life of the region that is removed from the highway. Too many tourists arrive at the day's destination in the state of the man who spoke to me on the porch of a lodge overlooking one of the loveliest lakes in Glacier Park, a couple of summers ago.

"I can't say much for this," he muttered. Looking at his face, tired and drawn, I asked him, "How far did you drive today?" "Oh, I did 550 miles," he said. When I remarked that he'd probably see things differently after a good night's sleep, he growled that he meant to push on first thing in the morning.

How few of us travel about our own country with open eyes and ears, not to speak of an open mind!

As Thomas Hart Benton has observed in his autobiography: "Experience has convinced me that the prime necessity for those who would go places

and not bring back simply what they took with them is to be rid of all opinions before starting. If you can't be rid of opinions, then the next necessity is to learn to keep your mouth shut about them, for you will otherwise find yourself in the hot waters of dispute and get in those messes of words which, among men in any stratum of life, operate to confuse understanding."

The daily press, I think, could do a great deal more than it does in bridging the gaps in the knowledge which East and West, North and South, have of one another. It is a function in which the great papers of the big cities, of whom it might be expected, have been laggard. They have, beginning with the First World War, enormously expanded their coverage of foreign news, and while that has been a welcome and necessary development, it has been achieved, I believe, at the expense of a comparably thorough and interpretive coverage of what goes on in the United States.

When there is a flood or a great fire in one part of the country, a big strike or a flareup of crime, the other parts hear about it. But the day-to-day reporting of what goes on in this country of ours, aside from items of purely local interest, and such national news as issues from Washington, is pretty much confined to such happenings as I have just mentioned. Our foreign correspondents keep their fingers on the pulse of the people among whom they are living; but at home that kind of interpretive reporting gets into the papers only during a Presidential campaign, and then is concerned only with which way the cat seems likely to jump.

Yet the reaction to domestic and international issues varies from region to region in the United States. New England, the Middle West, the Northwest, the Pacific Coast, the Southwest, the deep South—they do not always see eye to eye, and each has its own community of interests. I would like to see every newspaper big enough to afford it, assign a roving correspondent to each of the great regional divisions. His job would be to move about, to take the pulse of his region, to explain its interests, to register its attitude toward those questions uppermost in the news.

The American daily press has made this country much more aware of the rest of the world and of our identification with it. It could do a similarly constructive job in making us more fully aware of ourselves—of our differences and of what we have in common.

Castaway

There is an island where a man alone,
Alive beyond the selfishness of living,
Knows the whole sea around him as his own,
Without resenting and without forgiving.

WITTER BYNNER

The Gory Road

By HELEN WOODWARD

There was consternation one night at Bernard Baruch's island estate. President Roosevelt had arrived that afternoon, and there wasn't a mystery story in the house. The President had to have a fresh whodunit every night when he went to bed. Fortunately there was telephone service to Charleston, and fleet heralds came bearing the anodyne that would help the President to sleep.

I can understand the tension and the relief, because I, too, am a whodunit habituée. I have written a couple of mysteries (not among the best). And years ago I was an evangel of the mystery story when I wrote advertising campaigns which notified the world that Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt just doted on whodunits. The grapevine now says that President Eisenhower likes them, too. Who could expect to be President if he didn't?

If statistics are on the level, practically everybody reads whodunits. The liking for a good puzzler is not new. What is new is the huge number of them published and consumed today. Consumed is the right word, for we users do not really read them; we gulp them down. And for years the sales have climbed wildly, though the publishers now reluctantly admit a decline in sales of the better puzzlers.

In 1945, according to *Publishers' Weekly*, 36,000,000 copies of twenty-five-cent reprints were issued. By 1952 this figure had climbed to 270,000,000. Of these some were reprints of good fiction and non-fiction; the bulk was made up of thrillers and whodunits. About a third were sold for thirty-five cents. (To avoid confusion I include these with the twenty-five-centers.) These figures do not include the hard-cover book sales. Considering that each of the reprints is read by from five to ten people and that many are sold second-hand, it's easy to see how "supercolossal" the business has become. In addition, many are read abroad, and the mystery addict sometimes hurries through the same one again, not realizing until page 103 that he has read it before.

Many devotees of popular novels show a certain snobbery toward the whodunit. But take a novel like *Rebecca* by Daphne Du Maurier. Except for its undertones of *Jane Eyre*, it follows the pattern of a whodunit. The publisher has said that if *Rebecca* had been issued as a regular mystery story, it would have received a few inches of review, would have sold about 10,000 copies and been rushed into a reprint. Instead, put out as an important novel with psychiatric trimmings, it got first-page billing, passed into the stratosphere of sales, brought much larger royalties to its author and profits to its publisher. On the other hand, consider *The Case of*

the Journeying Boy by Michael Innes, a mystery of charm and distinction. If it had been issued as a novel, it would have established Mr. Innes as an author of elegance and style. But as a mystery it had only a fair, though enthusiastic sale.

Fans of the intellectual sort like the idea that whodunits are merely an expression of sadism. We are all hard-boiled at bottom, they say, and if we couldn't read or write this stuff, we might go out and kill someone—or anyway beat him up. Much less pleasing to an upper brow is another explanation: that the average mystery story satisfies the hunger for a happy ending. In this exasperating world where little comes out right, we turn with relief to the whodunit, certain that on the last page the wicked will meet their comeuppance and the decent will be rewarded.

On the Trail of Cash

The mystery writer usually gets cash for his labor—sometimes a little, sometimes a good deal. On the hard-cover sale the royalty is, as usual, from 10 to 15 per cent. An average sale would be 5,000 copies, but could reach 15,000 for an established writer—a return of from \$1,250 to \$5,000. This figure is topped by Erle Stanley Gardner, who is far and away the biggest seller in hard covers and who, because of a huge backlog and many new titles, is the best money-maker in the field.

But the lesser known mystery writer can hardly buy milk for the children out of his hard-cover sales. One such writer told me that to make a living he had to turn out six full-length books a year under three different pseudonyms. Other outlets may pull the author out of the hole. If he is one of the few who can sell serials to big-circulation magazines, he (more often she) gets from \$15,000 to \$35,000. The women's magazines have sweetened mysteries so that they are often cluttered up with antique furniture and coy with love, usually frustrated. But the payment is not at all frustrating. Then there are the movies (which, however, buy very few), radio, and television.

The best secondary source of revenue is the twenty-five-center. This pays a royalty of from one to one-and-a-half cents a copy, which is split between author and publisher. But the sales are large. Nowadays many thrillers (usually poor stuff) are not issued in hard covers at all, but go directly into paper bindings. This paper-cover sale has cut into the circulating library business, which used to be considerable.

Women mystery writers usually have some standards of taste and morality, though Craig Rice seems to admire sluts, drunkards, and crooks. British writers are turning out literate whodunits, often witty, though they have a tendency to show off erudition. But it is a boiling stream of sadism, necrophilia, and blood lust which has in recent years boomed the newsstand sales. Millions of people who

never bought a book before buy these crude twenty-five-centers from even cruder cover illustrations. There are first-class books among the newsstand reprints, but plot doesn't count with the average buyer, as long as there is plenty of sex and gore. The barroom and the brothel are in practically every chapter, and the detective imbibes so much alcohol that one wonders if the writer ever took a drink.

The New Violence

The big man in this mess is a phenomenon named Mickey Spillane, who has become such a symbol that his type of stuff is called a spillane with no capital letter. The first printing of his latest was 2,500,000. His ridiculous hair-on-the-chest sleuth, "That Hammer Guy," loves to kill. In one of the spillanes he sets the beautiful girl criminal on fire and watches her go up in flames.

All this violence has caused a drop in the sales of what the trade calls the puzzler. Such sales have fallen off about 10 per cent in the last year. But the writing of genuine puzzlers gets harder all the time. Plots have grown thin and sleazy with use. The game of guessing the criminal, which was the lure for most of us in the beginning, has gone flat.

The earlier dealers in mystery wrote of a world of candles and lamplight. Imagine turning a powerful floodlight on that graveyard in *The Woman in White*, or *The Turn of the Screw* under neons. Picture the dim kitchen in *Wuthering Heights* lit with hundred-watt bulbs. It takes a lot of rough stuff to compete with a shadow thrown by a candle on the wall as you climb a dark old staircase.

But the modern writer has some compensations. He has got a lift from Freud, and planes skitter across the world. There have been some attempts to write "proletarian" mysteries, but they have all failed. Readers seem to want more glamor. A few years ago the pro-Communist author Howard Fast wrote a beauty under a pseudonym. In this the heroine is a half-Mexican prostitute and the hero a Mexican thief. The Americans are all weaklings and murderers. Clerks in some bookstores tried to push this insult to both countries, but it fell flat.

The Second World War gave us a number of good spy thrillers. Naturally they were all anti-Nazi. Today the best fresh material is in the search for Soviet secret agents. But what they do with them! In one mystery the agent in this country has a shaggy beard and a thick accent. Some of these apparently anti-Soviet thrillers suspend the plot for several pages to declare that we must not witch-hunt. None the less, there are some very good ones, and plenty of first-rate material is still to be found in the chase for the Kremlin's agents.

It is true that front-page news is stranger than fiction. But a lot of people are funny; they will believe it as fiction when they won't believe it as news.



Science for Science's Sake

By MAX EASTMAN

Knowledge is a very exciting thing, and if more people recognized it life would be a lot more fun. Arthur Brisbane knew how much plain people, and maybe American people especially, love information for its own sake. He became the most famous editorial writer in the United States largely by poring over encyclopedias, dictionaries, and odd informative volumes, picking up stray facts, and dragging them by analogical reasoning, the only kind of reasoning he was capable of, into his discussion of topics of the day. One of his bits of information I remember because it didn't happen to be true, was that all great men have blue eyes. Can you guess what color Brisbane's eyes were?

Sometimes it's a good thing for a writer—at least it's a pleasant thing—just to let his thoughts travel along for a while without any cerebral planning commission telling them where to go. That's what I did in the preceding paragraph, and now I'll take control and tell you that my subject is Waldemar Kaempffert's *Explorations in Science* (296 pp., The Viking Press, \$3.50). Here is another man who knows that information is inherently exciting, and knows how to let it be so. He is not impeded by either form of the highbrow's inferiority complex: a feeling of the need to doll up the scientific facts with romantic emotions (slightly exemplified, I think—though this may seem heresy—in *The Sea Around Us*) and a feeling, well nigh universal in Germany and widespread among textbook writers everywhere, that knowledge in order to be valid has to be dull. This book contains nothing but factual information, and it is as absorbing as a novel from beginning to end.

Instead of a novel, I should say a volume of short stories, of adventure stories. For Kaempffert's knowledge spreads out over twenty different fields—he is "science editor" of the *New York Times*, which means, etymologically and in some other ways, that he is the man on the *Times* who knows something—and he takes us on a little sortie into each of these fields, discovering for us fact after fact that we never dreamed of before. He not only discovers exciting facts, but relations between them that are still more exciting.

In 1931 the little ball of one roulette table at Monte Carlo dropped into a black pocket twenty-six times in succession. . . The odds against black's appearing twenty-six times in succession are 67

million to one. No man in his senses would bet that a run of twenty-six blacks would ever occur in centuries if the wheel were spun every two minutes in an eight hour working day. Yet there was this fabulous run at Monte Carlo.

To me that is interesting enough and something to occupy my mind for quite a while. But whose mind would arrive without skilled guidance at the thought that the odds against his own existence were far more fabulous? "There was only about one in a hundred million chances of your being born exactly what you are. The reason is that out of a hundred million human spermatozoa only one fertilizes an egg. If a particular spermatozoon had been deflected by just a fraction of an inch you would not be here." And whose mind would travel still farther, and realize that the existence of a habitable planet and of life on it is, or rather was, immeasurably less probable than that?

"What a piece of luck," for example, that on earth "the day is not a year long, as it is on Mercury. There would be scorching heat on one side, bitter cold on the other. You could never live under those conditions." And this piece of luck as to "living conditions" could be multiplied almost indefinitely, as it was forty years ago in a remarkable book called *The Fitness of the Environment*. The author, Lawrence Joseph Henderson, a skeptic as I remember of Darwinism, showed what an intricate coincidence of materials and conditions was necessary to make life itself, to say nothing of its evolution, possible on this planet. To these improbable coincidences, Kaempffert adds what would seem the rarest piece of luck on record, that which gave rise to the first protein molecule "capable of splitting to make more of its kind and evolving."

The late Professor Charles-Eugene Guye, a brilliant Swiss mathematician, calculated the chances of forming a single molecule of some simple proteinlike substance and also the amount of material that would have to be shaken together to bring about enough bumps among atoms. The odds are 100 multiplied by itself 160 times against the successful creation of such a molecule.

If the theory of probabilities is valid—and life insurance companies bank on it—the odds are so enormous against the appearance of living protein . . . that you ought to rub your eyes in wonder every time you see a meal on your table, a fly on the wall, a dog in the street, another human being. . . Breaking the bank at Monte Carlo, holding a royal flush in poker or thirteen spades in bridge

—what are they compared with your luck, the luck of being on this earth, of playing baseball or voting for a President?

I quote these sentences from the chapter on "Luck" merely because the book opened there when I took it up to look for illustrations of its deeply grounded charm. With few exceptions any chapter would have served as well: "Atomic Bombs," "Building an Artificial Satellite in Space," "Doing Something about the Weather," "Machine Hearts and Lungs," "Can Science Create Life?", "The Cyclopean Eye of Palomar," "Power from the Sun," "The Newer Concepts of Man and His Body," "The Enigma of Cancer," "The Lure of Sunken Treasure," "Evangelist of Utopia." The last named chapter is a vigorous brief essay in defense and in praise of H. G. Wells. Kaempffert calls him—justly, in my opinion—"the foremost public teacher of his time," which is about what Plato said of Homer.

The author expresses in a preface the hope "that he has succeeded in letting fact dominate romantic speculation," except where the great scientists themselves are indulging in romantic speculation, as on the basis of mathematical physics they are very prone to. I think he has succeeded. I might quote one passage, however, in which his emotions seem to break out of all rational control. He is talking about the invention of the atomic bomb:

In a letter to Cesare Borgia the astute Machiavelli wrote of artillery: "The cannon is a new weapon. . . a decisive instrument of war. . . Bombardment with cannon will reduce the enemy's cities to rubble, disperse his forces, strike terror into the hearts of the populace, and win cheap and quick victory." The physicists who developed both the A-bomb and the H-bomb knew that they had conferred enormous military power on the United States, and so did the General Staff and the President and his advisers. But there was no Machiavelian pleasure, no thought of rushing into a war and winning a "cheap and quick victory." Instead a shudder ran through the western world.

Is it not the fact that the General Staff and the President and his advisers rushed into a war *which they had already won*—in which the enemy had already made overtures for peace—and without the decency of an adequate warning reduced two of his cities to rubble, and struck, not terror, but the most agonizing death into the hearts of their populations—several hundred thousands of them at a stroke? Did Machiavelli, the cool, the rational, the goal-pursuing, ever contemplate such a wanton and exuberant employment of crime?

In objective knowledge mankind is traveling upward to dizzying heights, and this book vibrates with the adventure of it. But in knowledge of how to behave himself, of where to be hard and heroic, where merciful and magnanimous, he is descending very low.

The Defense of Liberty

The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana, by Russell Kirk. 458 pp. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. \$6.50

This is, in the trite phrase, a timely book—but it is a timely book that began to be written when Edmund Burke set down his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* and crossed the floor of the House of Commons to sit with William Pitt. Since then it has been the growing work of many hands. Mr. Kirk would be the first to admit that this "prolonged study in definition" owes most of its value—and it is valuable indeed—to his collaborators. It is they who have supplied him with the philosophical arguments that make *The Conservative Mind* an arsenal of conservative weapons; it is they who have exposed in all its pitiful nakedness the irrational sentimentality of the self-styled liberals who have drifted or rushed into the quicksands of collectivism.

The thinkers and writers whose ideas Mr. Kirk presents to us are men cast from many molds. Some were radicals before they were conservatives, some never achieved integration of thought; they are often at odds among themselves on points of doctrine. Nevertheless their ways of thinking and their beliefs, taken together, may fairly be called the Conservative Mind. It is the history of this mind that Mr. Kirk has written, and in the writing of it he necessarily has a good deal to do with its antithesis—shall we call it the "liberal imagination"?—nourished on Bentham's principle of human benevolence. These principles have, as a radio commentator might say, proved 85 per cent inaccurate, but they still underlie many "liberal" arguments and almost all sentimental social hopes. Mr. Kirk has given us not only history but drama; and it is complicated drama, for both the forces of conservatism and the forces of liberalism suffer shocks and defeats, the former fighting delaying actions while the latter, infiltrated by totalitarian commissars, finds itself robbed of its flags and shibboleths by the "collectivist humanitarians."

Mr. Kirk concludes his book with an evaluation of the present conservative position, and suggests a program for future conservative action. He speaks of a "recrudescence" of conservatism (a choice of words that must be lamented in one who usually writes so well), and declares that what conservatives have retained, since 1789, "in Britain and America, remains immensely greater than what they have forfeited." Some of us who agree with him politically may find him too sanguine. We may feel that where we stand at the moment is less fateful than the direction in which we seem to be headed. We may be unable to share his conviction that religious sanction, "the indispensable basis of any conservative order," remains "reasonably secure." We may be sure that, although "belief

in the dogma of original sin has been prominent in the system of every great conservative thinker," this dogma and certain other ancient bases of conservatism are less widely serviceable than they once were: that Mallock was right when he insisted on the need of "formulating a true scientific conservatism."

We may think that Saintsbury, that tough old Tory, set a realistic limit to our hopes when he said: "We can't always help things going to the Devil, but we can make them go slowly, and sometimes turn them out of the Diabolic way." But, whatever the future may hold, Mr. Kirk has written a book that merits the gratitude of all who cherish the conservative cause.

BEN RAY REDMAN

Unwilling Slaves

The Kremlin vs. the People, by Robert Magidoff.
288 pp. New York: Doubleday and Company.
\$3.50

A recent Soviet defector, weary of the way the West pyramids "last chance" upon "last chance" to test the "sincerity" of the U.S.S.R., told me in Paris: "When you in the West talk of maintaining the peace, you forget that the Bolshevik regime has been waging a war against its own people since 1917." It is a war which has claimed countless victims, millions of them starved to death in the famines sponsored by the state in the early thirties to break the peasants to the collectivization program, many other millions dead or now dying in slave labor camps which contain between 5 and 10 per cent of the total population.

In *The Kremlin vs. the People* Russian-born American correspondent Robert Magidoff, falsely accused of espionage and ordered out of the Soviet Union in 1948, attempts to analyze this struggle, which he calls the "cold civil war." Magidoff covered the Soviet Union from 1936 to 1948 for the Associated Press and the National Broadcasting Company. His book is important because it destroys the myth of totalitarian monolithism in that most absolute of history's dictatorships. There is no doubt that the straitjacket binding the Soviet empire is of rugged construction. But the myriad of hidden passions and tensions bottled up inside the Iron Curtain, fighting savagely, if silently, against one another and against the regime, are a continuous and major problem to the Soviet rulers, Magidoff believes that these problems, aggravated by the war, kept the Kremlin from seizing western Europe right after the lightning demobilization of the American military establishment in 1946-47.

The very existence of slave labor camps—which, though they have gradually become an integral part of the Soviet economy, were started primarily as a system for keeping nonconformists out of the way—is one proof of tensions. Others, which Magidoff

analyzes, are the battles on the religious, peasant, labor, anti-Semitic, patriotic, national minority, and bureaucratic fronts. But perhaps the most eloquent testimony of dissatisfaction was given during World War Two. In the inevitable loosening up of the war period, millions of Red Army soldiers deserted or let themselves be easily captured by the Nazis. The whole movement of Andrei Vlassov, Red Army lieutenant general captured by the Germans in 1942 after having been decorated by Stalin himself, proved that the deserting and captured soldiers were willing to ally themselves with the Nazi invaders in order to fight their own oppressive regime. An estimated million men adhered to Vlassov's program calling for the overthrow of the Stalin tyranny, a return to the liberties granted by the "people's" revolution of February 1917, immediate and honorable peace with Germany, and the creation of a new, free Russian state "without Bolsheviks and exploiters."

The facts of the Vlassov movement refute the oft-repeated statement that the peoples of the U.S.S.R. don't know the meaning of freedom. Their political education is certainly one-sided and distorted; their ideas about the West are based on the grossest misinformation; but no amount of propaganda can fool them about the misery of their own existence or about the people who cause it—their Communist leaders. It may be difficult to convince a fellow-traveler in the West that a fourteen-hour day is the norm in the Soviet Union, that no one is safe from arrest without cause and condemnation without trial, but the smoothest propaganda line in the world cannot hide the everyday brutal facts of the Soviet tyranny from the people who suffer under it.

This distinction between the regime and its victims must be kept in mind in waging the cold war. We must make the Soviet people understand that we are against their regime and support their desire for freedom. Refugees from the U.S.S.R. and the satellite countries often find it strange that so little has been done to exploit the divisions and subdivisions in the Soviet world. The conflicts which the Kremlin is trying to exploit among the Western partners seem mere scratches on a venerated table by comparison.

Unfortunately, and rather inexplicably, Mr. Magidoff's conclusions don't measure up to his exposition of the facts. His argument trails off into advocacy of fighting Communism by raising the standard of living in the free world. He apparently accepts the policy of containment and winds up with an innocuous quotation from Adlai Stevenson.

Despite this major shortcoming, *The Kremlin vs. the People* is worthwhile reading for those who want to understand the tremendous weaknesses of the Soviet regime, weaknesses which a dynamic Western policy would exploit to the full, as the Soviets have exploited ours.

ROBERT DONLEVIN

Eighth Army in Defeat

The River and the Gauntlet, by S. L. A. Marshall.
385 pp. New York: William Morrow and Company. \$5.00

This is a factual report of the defeat of the United States Eighth Army in Korea. It is history written from the dying lips of GI's and lieutenants, rather than from the carefully edited memoirs of generals. Individuals, squads, platoons, and companies fought and died to escape through a defile of fire. There is too much carnage for pleasure but those who like the documentation of realism will be gratified.

General S. L. A. Marshall is by profession a newspaper reporter. His keenness of observation is reflected in such paragraphs as the following:

Pfc. Copeland was standing beside the tank, in the act of firing his carbine. The explosion blew his arm off and opened his side; he died within a few minutes. Lt. John J. Finnegan was hit in the back and jaw by the same bomb. A fragment hit Fuller under the chin and lifted him from the tank; he fell to earth groggy and blinded, like a boxer nailed on the button.

The deceptiveness of the Asiatic foe calls forth some of Marshall's best descriptions. The Orientals slip through United Nations lines in the guise of refugees, only to turn and attack positions from the rear. They make noises at night and at times act in a manner entirely irrational to the Western mind: "But not a shot was fired. The Chinese, as if struck by moon madness, sauntered around the burial mounds yelling derisively: 'Come on back, GI! Afraid, GI?' over and over." There is a fascinating scene that reminds one of Genghis Khan and his bag of tricks:

Came the piercing shrill of a whistle—two short blasts and a long one. Then from out the space short of the old position, three Chinese walked forward, moving boldly upright. They were spaced about 30 yards apart and they stopped perhaps 40 to 50 yards short of the rise where Rivet's line watched. The moon shone brightly; Sup noted that the men were unarmed but were carrying something that looked like a short stick. On halting, they raised the "sticks" to their lips and Rivet's men heard the clear trilling of flutes, playing sweet music. For at least five minutes, this terrible moonlight serenade continued. Rivet's men watched spellbound. Sup, lying between Rivet and another ROK soldier, heard the latter whisper: "I'd like to be home."

The flat just to the rear of the flutists was thickly boulder-strewn. Chinese arose from among the boulders, rotated forward around the flutists, then back to the rocks, and around and around again. There were three separate chains of men so moving, all perfectly silent except for the eerie music. It was like a scene from a nightmare—a lunatic's delight.

General Marshall has succeeded in keeping his story "low level," authentic, and factual. This is good for the record but is it good for morale? Was

defeat so full of automatic weapons that misfired, GI's who died while trying to run away, tactics which were blunders? Judged as a military record, *The River and the Gauntlet* provokes many questions. Why were these American troops so badly trained? Even a lieutenant, recently out of officer training school, knows that you cannot live through a defile unless the shoulders are held, or at least harassed.

Spots of heroism glimmer here and there in the defeat of the Eighth Army but more prevalent are tanks running away from infantry, and other signs of military ineptness. What, one may wonder, has happened to American fighting spirit such as that of the Marines raising the flag at Iwo Jima? Maybe we are putting too much emphasis on pants-pressing, PX rations, and the gentle art of making ambassadors-of-democracy out of fighters. Has the treason in high places, the double talk of the internationalists seeped down to destroy the GI's will to win?

We haven't much to be proud of when we see ourselves in *The River and the Gauntlet* but, then, this is a book of defeat—only softened by Marshall's last paragraph:

That was on December 1. By Christmas Day, 2nd Division was again a going concern, en route to a new battlefield. Its swift flight upward from its own ashes, even more than this story of struggle, bespeaks the character, courage, and faith of those who survived.

FRANK L. HOWLEY

For the Record

The Truth Is Our Weapon, by Edward W. Barrett.
355 pp. New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company. \$4.00

Since the beginning of the cold war almost any ignoramus, whether eminent or obscure, has felt equipped to express his opinions about the government's information services, especially the Voice of America. It is a relief, therefore, to hear from a professional propagandist who knows what he is talking about. Mr. Barrett served successively with the Office of Strategic Services, with the Office of War Information, and with General Eisenhower's psychological warfare branch in the Mediterranean. For two years (1950-52) he was Assistant Secretary of State in charge of all international information and educational exchange activities. Despite his own psychological commitment to the policies he was charged with executing, Mr. Barrett manages to write with a good deal of suavity and detachment so that his book provides the best comprehensive description that has yet appeared of our experience in the field of political warfare.

The answers to most of the questions that have been raised about the Voice and the other govern-

ment information services are to be found in the record; the problem has been to get anybody—especially congressional appropriations committees and other investigative bodies—to read it. For example, take the allegation, expressed frequently by newspapermen who haven't taken the trouble to check their data, that the Voice isn't listened to. The record shows that this tends to be true only of the free countries of western Europe, and especially when the Voice has ranted against the Soviet Union: French neutralists don't have to listen to VOA lectures, and don't, but for that matter they don't have to listen to Radio Moscow either, and only the Party hacks do. In the free world other methods of persuasion are likely to be more effective; in particular, the educational exchange service.

Back of the Iron Curtain, however, the situation is quite different. There the evidence of the Voice's effectiveness is overwhelming—whenever it is given effective action to publicize. For example, the Voice scored hard with the evidence of the N.K.V.D.'s responsibility for the Katyn Forest massacre, which the Madden Committee began to make public in 1950; much of this evidence was obtained by the Polish Red Cross in 1943 and handed on a platter to the State Department—which sat on it for seven years and muted the Voice whenever it would have liked to toss that still-potent political dynamite into Poland. The Voice scored again when it threw a monkey wrench into the "germ warfare" campaign by demanding that an international commission of doctors and sanitarians be given entry into the plague-stricken areas. Finally Peiping shouted that there weren't any such areas—and was promptly slapped down by Radio Moscow.

The best proof of the Voice's effectiveness is of course the fact that Moscow spends more money every year trying to jam VOA and other foreign broadcasts—more than the entire current budget of our information services, which has never amounted to more than a fraction of the Kremlin's huge propaganda expenditures.

Perhaps the worst fault in Mr. Barrett's book is its omissions, some of which are flagrant. For instance, we are told nothing about the unhappy role played by the Voice in implementing the Acheson directive to prepare the ground for the abandonment of Formosa.

Unless the cold war is over—and who believes that?—we shall continue to need a propaganda service manned by experienced professionals. It will pay us, therefore, not to dismantle it periodically, or at the drop of a congressional hat. To that end Mr. Barrett recommends the creation of a new congressional mechanism: a Joint Committee on International Information which, like the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, would employ a permanent professional staff, educate the public concerning the nature and need of this essential

service, and buffer it against the attacks of the ignorant and the irresponsible.

It is a good idea, but like other good ideas in the book—which, for whatever reason, were never put into practice under Mr. Barrett—its present chances of getting anywhere do not seem to be favorable.

JAMES RORTY

Prolific and Unhappy

Arnold Bennett: A Biography, by Reginald Pound.
385 pp. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. \$5.75

Arnold Bennett was nearing sixty-four when he died twenty-two years ago. With A. C. Benson and H. G. Wells (his closest friend) he must be one of the three or four most prolific writers of our century. He set himself an average stint of a thousand words a day. Once, in a single month, he produced 42,000 words of *Clayhanger*, and there were occasions when he exceeded 3,000 words at a morning's sitting. Few were the days in his mature life when he wrote nothing at all. Today his published works fill over eighty volumes, a profusion of novels, tales, plays (on the whole his weakest work), critical observations and opinions on a multitude of persons, topics, and happenings that interested him, the series of "how-to" books, and the *Journal*. This last stout volume is the merest sampling of a cool million words, most of which are still reposing in manuscript.

Mr. Reginald Pound, the first biographer to attempt a comprehensive account of Bennett's astonishing literary and social career, is no Alpine climber. But he does tackle that mountain with the thoroughness of a good mining engineer. He bores through the fictions of the Five Towns down to their heavy lodes of early autobiographical material. Some of his richest ore comes from the less obvious veins and pockets of the later writings. The bulk of what he brings to the surface is ultimately refined by a careful checking against the first-hand recollections of Bennett's surviving relations, friends, and acquaintances, his and their letters and notebooks and diaries.

But in spite of his plentitude of primary and secondary source material, in spite of Mr. Pound's considerable critical acumen and sympathy with his man, the Arnold Bennett who figures in this biography never quite comes into clear focus, at least not to this reviewer, who knew him in his prime. This may well be because Mr. Pound never encountered his subject in the flesh; if he did this book conceals the fact. For no description, though it be by Wells or Maugham or Walpole, each at the top of his powers, nor even Low's transfixing cartoon supported by the shrewdest captioning of Rebecca West in her most searching vein (both of which should have found a place in this biography), can

communicate a shadow of the effect of Bennett's physical and intellectual presence as it used to be. Mr. Pound has broken the ground for future biographers with great skill and patience. But it is a matter of regret that no one of the many well-equipped British men of letters who knew Bennett more or less intimately over a period of years has been attracted or persuaded to write his life.

There are, no doubt, cogent reasons for that apparent neglect. There is enormous room for a thorough, critical study of his work—which, when all is said and done, was the thing that most nearly filled his life. The will power that supported his desire to write about the world he knew was a phenomenal force. Neither the ragings of an intermittent and incurable neuralgia (possibly psychosomatic) nor the years of exhausting insomnia could break the Trollopian habits and disciplines which he so jauntily yet sincerely described in "The Truth About an Author." Writing with him may have been a business, but it was much more an art: it was also a pleasure (not without its pains), a self-imposed function of his being, day after day, whatever else he might be wanting to do.

The marvel is that almost everything he wrote, "literature" or not, is still readable, still interesting, perhaps because (unlike so many professional authors) he never wrote about anything in which he was not genuinely interested. The truth is, I think, that writing was a passion with him—the only genuine passion in his life—and never a duty or a chore. He may frequently have written somewhat "below" himself; but it was his saving grace that he had opinions about almost everything that interested him. And they were spontaneous, honest opinions; he did not have to think them up for the occasion. They bubbled from his ever active and prying mind. Moreover, he knew when he was not really interested, and why; which is another way of being interested and a rare gift in any writer.

But his other life—the life apart from writing—seems to have developed, once his reputation was established and he was well-to-do, into a somewhat sorry affair. He settled down as man-of-the-world-about-town, and most of his leisure was spent winning and dining and talking with the more or less fashionable and successful set of writers, theatrical folk, political journalists, and newspaper peers—mainly people who were on-top-of, rather than at the real center of that world which had really mattered to him (and still mattered when he was writing) in the books that were his masterpieces. It was all a far cry from *The Old Wives' Tale* and *Clayhanger* and *Riceyman Steps*. His marriage failed. His health worried him. I do not believe that he was happy in spite of all the glitter and tinsel and success and fame. Why else did he cry out to Dorothy Cheston Bennett on his deathbed: "Everything has gone wrong, my girl"? It *had* gone wrong. And he had known it for a long time. God rest his soul.

EDWARD DAVISON

Trade and Aid

Aid, Trade and the Tariff, by Howard S. Piquet. 358 pp. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. \$3.75

So much has been said about trade versus aid that it would seem nothing could be added to our store of knowledge on the subject. Yet a distinct and most valuable contribution has just been made by Howard S. Piquet, an able economist who has specialized in the tariff, first on the U. S. Tariff Commission and since then in the Legislative Reference Service as economic adviser to congressional committees dealing with tariffs and foreign trade.

His book is the outgrowth of an extensive study based on original sources buried in unpublished official documents. The study was undertaken in response to congressional inquiries as to what increase in imports could be expected if Congress were to suspend all duties and import quotas, as a temporary war measure, in order to overcome commodity scarcities caused by the war.

The book is a unique and most useful source of information hitherto largely unavailable to the public. After some eighty pages of general discussion, the author devotes about three-fourths of the book to statistical and technical information on individual items which play an important part in our import trade. The information includes figures on domestic production, imports (total, and from each important country of origin), tariff duties, and exports. This is followed by a succinct appraisal of the nature and historical background of the various industries, and an estimate of the extent to which imports might increase upon suspension of the tariff. These estimates are based on the experience and expert knowledge of specialists in the different commodities but, as the author frankly states, they are "informed guesses" rather than products of scientific precision.

Summing up the detailed estimates for hundreds of items, Dr. Piquet concludes that if the United States were to suspend all tariffs and import quotas "imports might increase by between \$1.2 and \$2.8 billion, while if tariffs alone were to be suspended (leaving import quotas in force), the estimated increase in imports might amount to between \$800,000,000 and \$1,800,000,000 [figures based on the 1951 trade data]." Thus, in neither case would increased imports be sufficient to fill the dollar gap of nearly five billion dollars. "Probably," says Dr. Piquet, "more than 40 per cent of the dutiable commodities that now enter the country would not be noticeably affected by tariff suspension."

The author refrains from taking sides between the trade and aid policies. Instead, he draws a clear picture of the consequences to our trade and economy of adopting one or the other, or some variation of the two.

N. I. STONE

Sax and His 'Phone

Unlike washing machines and ballpoint pens, musical instruments are rarely invented outright. They owe their origin to a variety of causes. The reed flute, for example, was created by Pan. According to Ovid, that amorous god cast his desire upon a beautiful but unwilling nymph named Syrinx. He pursued her all over the mythological landscape but, just as he was about to seize her, Syrinx's fellow nymphs intervened and turned her into a tuft of reeds. Somewhat frustrated, Pan exclaimed, "Still, you shall be mine . . .," plucked some of the reeds, joined them with beeswax, and thus made the first flute.

It is by a long and arduous evolution that Pan's flute developed into such orchestra mainstays as the bassoon, the oboe, and the clarinet. At the clarinet stage, evolution stopped and invention took over in the form of an enterprising Belgian musician and instrument-maker named Adolphe Sax. He arrived in Paris in 1842 to seek fame and fortune, but soon discovered he could achieve neither by selling woodwind instruments to a few impecunious musicians. Looking for bigger and better markets Sax found that the French—basking in the afterglow of the Napoleonic era—had a particular affection for their army bands. Forthwith, the young Belgian addressed a memorandum to *Maréchal* Soult, the Minister of War.

French army bands, Sax declared in his memorandum, were no good. Their music was not loud enough and, moreover, they sounded tinny. What they obviously needed was a full line of brasses and woodwinds from the *ateliers* of Adolphe Sax. Stung to the quick, the Minister of War summoned the impudent critic. To make disparaging remarks about his bands, the *Maréchal* thundered, was no small matter. It raised a point of honor that involved the entire French Army, nay, the whole nation. That point of honor could only be settled by a duel. And the *Maréchal* proposed what is undoubt-

edly the strangest duel in history. He would pit one of his bands against any group of musicians outfitted by Sax. The contest would take place in public, on the *Champ de Mars*, to be judged by the assembled spectators.

"And," concluded the *Maréchal* grimly, "may the best band win!"

Sax immediately began rehearsing a band equipped with numerous clarinets, two ophicleides, and a number of saxhorns—brass instruments of his own invention. But as the date of the strange duel drew near, Sax realized that he needed something more to win his battle. What he needed was a *pièce de résistance*, or, rather a *pièce de résonance*. So he sat down and invented a curved reed instrument made of brass. With typical lack of modesty, he named it after himself—the Saxophone. Needless to say that on the day of the duel—even though two of his musicians did not show up, and Sax had to double on the saxophone and a saxhorn—the Belgian carried off a resounding victory.

Yet Sax was never to taste the full fruit of his triumph. Although composers liked the mellow, vibrant tone of the saxophone (Bizet, Berlioz, Rossini, and Meyerbeer included it in their orchestrations), the musicians of Paris revolted against this new instrument that "looked like a waterpump and bleated like a calf." When Donizetti wrote a saxophone passage into his score of *Don Sebastian*, the musicians refused to play it.

After Sax died the saxophone lay more or less dormant until, toward the turn of the century, a wealthy lady in Boston developed an alarming cough. Her doctor advised her to take up playing a wind instrument in order to exercise her lungs, and the lady picked the saxophone. She was soon assaulting the ears of her Back Bay neighbors with strange and strident sounds, while she exhausted all the available repertoire. Then she decided to commission Claude Debussy to write a saxophone composition especially for her. The master agreed and began to work on a Rhapsody for Saxophone and Orchestra. But halfway through the piece he lost interest and turned to something else. Im-

patient for her rhapsody, the Boston lady packed a few clothes and her saxophone and booked passage for Paris. There, she proceeded immediately to the studio of Monsieur Debussy, whipped out her saxophone and—as a gentle reminder—began to serenade the composer. Her playing was so atrocious that Debussy took his unfinished rhapsody, wordlessly threw it into the trashcan, and stalked out of the house. The composition was rescued and later finished by a pupil.

Such an unfortunate contretemps might have sounded the deathknell for a less hardy instrument. But the saxophone merely went underground and began to lead a strange twilight existence. In bars along Bourbon Street, in Harlem nightclubs, and in Chicago dives, men who played an odd new kind of music took up the saxophone. Its mournful sound seemed to echo the neurosis of the twenties and, suddenly, the forgotten saxophone emerged as a symbol of the jazz-age.

Just at about that time a young man named Sigurd Rascher was embarking on a musical career. He had his heart set on playing the clarinet, but a friend dissuaded him: "As a clarinet-player, you'll starve. Take up the saxophone instead." Rascher did, and soon became so proficient on the instrument that, instead of the usual two and a half octaves, he could produce a full set of four octaves on any standard instrument. Having developed his new technique, Rascher became more than just a saxophone player. He became the foster-father of a new type of music. His latest long-playing record, "Sigurd Rascher: A Classical Recital on the Saxophone," issued by Concert Hall Society of New York (CHS 1156), features compositions by Pugnani, Handel, Gershwin, and Rascher. The record proves that the saxophone is in for a renaissance, and Rascher confirms this: "All over the country, young people are taking up the saxophone to play in their high-school band or the local orchestra. Some even use it in chamber groups." There is only one sad note about the record, sounded by Rascher: "I wish poor Monsieur Sax were alive; I think he'd love to hear it."

SERGE FLIEGERS

FROM OUR READERS

James Rorty's article, "The Facts About Fluoridation," in the FREEMAN of June 29 has aroused considerable controversy. Letters to the editor both for and against the article are, in general, so long that we can print only the main arguments from this correspondence. We have tried to strike a fair balance in presenting the views on both sides.

THE EDITOR

In Favor

Congratulations on your recent article "The Truth About Fluoridation" by James Rorty. . . . I have spent hundreds of hours on research on the background of fluoridation. . . . The difficulty arises in knowing where and how to put this knowledge to best use.

Right to determine what shall be done to one's own body is probably the most fundamental of those personal rights our Constitution was designed to protect. It cannot be denied except when its exercise presents a "clear and present danger" to the equally important rights of others. Such situations may conceivably arise in case of communicable disease—but tooth decay is not contagious. Everyone has a right to get water from his tap—not medicine, or soup.

The purpose of adding chlorine to the water supply is to destroy harmful impurities already present in the water. The purpose of fluoride, on the other hand, is to act on and alter the body of the person who drinks the water.

The drive to fluoridate water comes from a small group in the U. S. Public Health Service. In the past fifteen years they have spent thousands of hours and several million dollars of tax money on a long-range propaganda campaign aimed at putting fluoride in the water of every city which did not have too much naturally.

Almost without exception, where water is artificially fluoridated it has been done by the city council without the people's consent, and often without notice. Fluoride may be proved useful in controlled dosage; but when put in the water, it is just plain poison. Dosage is then tied to water-consumption, which is wholly unrelated to need for the drug. If some children get the right amount, others are bound to get far too much. . . .

The U.S. Dispensatory says, "Fluorides are violent poisons to all living tissue." Sodium fluoride is commonly used to poison rats and roaches. Cryolite, a much less deadly fluoride, is used as insecticide of fruit trees. The government sets rigid requirements for removal of spray residues from fruit. And all the time another branch of the same government is spending millions of tax dollars to put a more deadly form of the same poison in your drinking water.

Seattle, Wash. FREDERICK B. EXNER, M.D.

"The Truth About Fluoridation" is a finely composed, comprehensive, and truthful presentation of the subject by one who has given, obviously, much thought and research to this heavily touted process of "mass medication."

The conditioning of a public water supply is to render it free from bacteria which would otherwise cause disease and from tastes and odors that would make it unpalatable. . . . Fluoridation, on the other hand, is not water treatment but mass medication of the population with a poisonous substance. . . . the purpose being the reduction of dental cares in children during the formation of the permanent teeth. . . .

The vast majority of professional engineers charged with responsibility for the design of water treatment plants or for their operation are well informed as to biological processes, as incident to which they are not wholly uninformed as to the biological variation of the human species. From that knowledge flows a justifiable fear that all persons may not react with uniformity to the ingestion of water dosed with fluorine. They are aware that no control studies have been made on adult groups to satisfactorily resolve this skepticism. . . . They are also conscious of the great hazard to plant employees in the handling of the fluorides used in the procedure, the tendency of such employees to disregard the safeguards provided for their protection, such as inhalators, clothing, gloves, etc., familiarity breeding contempt for the risk of inhaling fluoride dust or of skin contact with the substance. . . .

As the practitioners of a profession dealing with the application of exact sciences, success in which activity depends upon a well-developed capacity for analysis, the designers and operators of water treatment plants are fearful, justifiably, that fluoridation presents a hazardous procedure for which they should not be required to assume responsibility in any degree. They are cognizant of the promotional efforts supporting the sale of the materials and injection equipment incident to the procedure. It is their hope that the other methods of medicating children with fluorine (well-known and effective) will prevail rather than one requiring the entire population, regardless of age, body metabolism, body chemistry, or physical condition, to submit to a common medication and all that such action may imply.

Maplewood, N.J. FREDERICK O. RUNYON

In Criticism

Mr. Rorty . . . deliberately builds up his case against fluoridation by quoting a handful of individuals who are opposed to this procedure and by painstakingly avoiding the overwhelming mass of scientific evidence showing the safety and effectiveness of fluoridation under properly controlled conditions. His implication that the American Dental Association and all the other major national health organizations which have endorsed fluoridation are

unaware of the real scientific evidence thereon is both maliciously and ridiculously untrue.

HAROLD HILLENBRAND, D.D.S.
Secretary, American
Dental Association

Chicago, Ill.

The article. . . selects portions of the scientific reports which, taken out of context, seem to support the opposition viewpoint. Thus Mr. Rorty quotes the report in the *Journal of the American Water Works Association* by George S. Bratton. . . . He fails to refer to an article in the same issue by W. Victor Weir . . . which provides all of the answers to the questions raised by Mr. Bratton. . . .

Mr. Rorty repeats the old charge that there has been little study of the various factors relating to the safety of fluoridation. . . . About 5,000 titles of scientific articles bearing on the physiological effects of fluorides appear in the list which was compiled at the Kettering Laboratory at the University of Cincinnati School of Medicine. . . . Nature herself demonstrated the safety of fluorides at the recommended level of approximately one part per million by providing a huge laboratory in numerous sections of the United States where several million persons have, for many years, used drinking waters which contain varying amounts of fluoride up to a level as high as 14 parts per million. In no instance has anyone demonstrated undesirable effects except with regard to mottled enamel in those areas where the fluoride concentration is distinctly higher than that recommended in controlled fluoridation.

The Rorty article uses the well-recognized propaganda trick of suggesting that fluoridation may cause a wide variety of ailments including "retardation of mental development," without asserting that such effects have actually been demonstrated. This is a method of insinuating apprehension and uncertainty into the minds of many individuals. One of the apparent causes of apprehension in the minds of uninformed individuals is the fact that large quantities of fluoride are toxic. Many individuals, without a background in pharmacology, will therefore infer that even in small amounts fluoride must also be toxic. It will perhaps allay the apprehension of many to know that a number of substances which are essential parts of our everyday diet are toxic when consumed in concentrated form, and in large, uncontrolled amounts. Thus toxicity is not a matter of what material is consumed but of how much is consumed. . . .

J. ROY DOTY, D.D.S.
Secretary, Council on Dental Therapeutics, American Dental Association
Chicago, Ill.

As a devoted reader of the FREEMAN I feel compelled to register a protest against the distortions of fact—or course unrecognized as such by you—which appear in "The Truth About

(Continued on p. 826)

FROM OUR READERS

(Continued from p. 825)

Fluoridation" by James Rorty. The author employs various devious means, including half-truths, insinuations, and "Truman statistics," in an all-out attempt to discredit fluoridation of communal drinking water. . . .

As an example of Mr. Rorty's technique, he cites the Grand Rapids "health statistics," which "despite all official discounting, seem to show an abnormal increase of heart and kidney disease since the initiation of the fluoridation program in that city." Nebraska's Congressman Miller originally presented these statistics. . . . He retracted his erroneous statement (*Congressional Record*, May 7, 1952, pg. a-2919). . . . Why do Mr. Rorty and his colleagues continue to use such material as evidence when they know that it has been proved to be false? . . .

FRANCIS V. HOWELL, D.D.S.
Head, Department of Oral Pathology,
University of Oregon Dental School
Portland, Ore.

. . . I hereby challenge Mr. Rorty to document with us his statement which reads: "Important units of the food processing industry have been obliged to use deep wells, or to defluoridate expensively the tap water used in cities that have adopted the program." We are making an earnest effort to find out if such cases exist. If Mr. Rorty has any facts, let him present them to us. We would be glad to investigate.

Mr. Rorty refers to "more than 3,000,000 people of all ages in about 600 cities and towns drinking fluoridated tap water." The facts are that 1,401 water systems in the U.S. have, for many years, distributed to more than 4,000,000 persons water which naturally contained fluorides in such concentration as to have a demonstrable effect upon tooth structure. In addition, as of May 15, 1953, 777 communities were using water treated with fluorides and served to 14,354,525 persons. . . .

The dental statistics in cities where fluorides have been added to the public water supply since 1945 show that the reduction in tooth decay among children has been substantial. . . .

Here are the words of Dr. A. E. Heustis, Commissioner of Health of Michigan: "Grand Rapids is an exceptionally fine and healthy community in which to live—and fluoridation, which is now in its ninth year, is progressing wonderfully well and the results exceed our original expectations."

In epitome Mr. Rorty's article should be titled "The Gossip About Fluoridation."

HARRY E. JORDAN
Secretary, American Water
Works Association, Inc.
New York City

[Mr. Jordan enclosed with his letter a copy of a letter of May 2, 1952, to Congressman A. L. Miller of Nebraska from Dr. W. B. Prothro, Health Director of Grand Rapids. This letter said in part: "Our check of the same statistics reveal that you have made an error in comparing 1948 figures for all of Kent County, which includes the City of Grand Rapids, with the 1944 figures for the City of Grand Rapids alone. . . . It would appear that our death rate from heart disease has remained about the same and there has been a decrease in the death rates due to nephritis and intracranial lesions. I would also point out that death rates for these specific diseases have been generally increasing throughout the nation.

It has also been implied that the fluoridation of water might cause a rise in the infant death rate. . . . Grand Rapids has consistently had a lower infant death rate than the state, and it has decreased since fluoride has been added to the city water supply. . . . Since the beginning of the previously mentioned experiment . . . there has been a reduction in the [tooth] decay rate of approximately 60 per cent in the younger age children, five through eight years, and 25 per cent in the older ages, through sixteen years."]


Mr. Rorty Replies

Concerning the experience of food processors with fluoridation, I suggest that Mr. Jordan write to the Beechnut Corporation and the H. J. Heinz Company and publish their replies in his journal. Concerning the Weir-Bratton articles in the *Journal*, no intelligent reader would conclude that Weir answers Bratton.

Regarding the Grand Rapids health statistics, I was of course acquainted with Congressman Miller's correspondence with Dr. Prothro, just as I am sure that Dr. Howell is aware that the health statistics for Grand Rapids show an increase in the incidence of heart disease much greater than the increase of population. Incidentally, it was not until last April, eight years after the first fluoridation pilot plants went into operation, that the U.S. Public Health Service announced that it had begun studies of the incidence of heart disease and nephritis in the cities that have adopted fluoridation.

As for Dr. Doty, I did not deal in "insinuations" or "propaganda." He does. I characterized the American Dental Association pamphlet, "Fluoridation Facts," for which he and his publicity man Herbert Bain are responsible, as "an amazing mixture of truth, distortion, and evasion." Apparently he is willing to let that stand as accurate. The shoe of irresponsibility is therefore on his foot, not mine, since he avoids taking issue with me on this and on the A.D.A.'s suppression and slander of lay and professional opponents of the program.

Flatbrookville, N.J. JAMES RORTY



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
Thinking starts early in America

Millions of American boys are fascinated with machines, what they do, how they do it. Like their elders, they want to know how to make these machines work better.

Such a lad is Dick Thomas of Evansville, Indiana. At the early age of ten Dick had a theory that he could improve the mechanical cotton picker's performance. He worked out his design for an "automatic air cotton picker" and sent it to International Harvester's Evansville Works. IH engineers, recognizing Dick's zeal and enthusiasm, invited him to the plant to discuss his ideas.

Dick's first invention wasn't completely practical any more than was Thomas Edison's *first* attempt. *However*, the point is that Dick studied the subject thoroughly and came up with some good, sound constructive thinking . . . the kind of thinking that will enable his generation to take over and keep America's future industrial progress and production know-how always out in front.

We don't mean to imply that America and free-enterprise have a corner on brains. But we are also convinced that brains have a better chance of working here . . . have a better chance of being recognized and rewarded for their creative ability. And the incentives giving us the position of leadership we enjoy today will remain protected and available to our youth of today and tomorrow.



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