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SECTION TWO

## **Prelude to Disaster**

***The Dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur***

**By GEORGE E. SOKOLSKY**

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# Prelude to Disaster

## *The Dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur*

By GEORGE E. SOKOLSKY

*It is now almost a year since General MacArthur was summarily removed from all his commands because he disagreed with Washington's policy of war without victory in Korea. Among other things, the General's offer of a cease-fire, with its warning to the enemy of the UN's reserve strength, had irritated and been repudiated by the Administration—which a few months later hastened to sue for a cease-fire at the suggestion of the Soviet Union. The cease-fire negotiations have dragged on for half a year while the enemy has built up strength in Korea and the United States has piled up casualties.*

*In view of the fact that the policy-making clique in Washington remains essentially the same (for though General Marshall has retired his influence lingers on), we have decided to publish that part of Mr. Sokolsky's excerpts from the Hearings on the situation in the Far East which bears on the alleged reasons for General MacArthur's dismissal. These excerpts reveal, "out of their own mouths," the mental processes of those men whose policy of fear has led from "war without victory" for the UN to the present grave danger of ultimate victory for the aggressor.*

THE EDITORS

**R**ARELY has it occurred that a General and Pro-Consul of the stature of Douglas MacArthur has been summarily dismissed from all his posts simultaneously and ignominiously. At the moment of his dismissal, General MacArthur held the following positions and titles: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP); United Nations Commander in Korea; Commander-in-Chief of the United States Forces in the Far East; Military Governor of the Ryukyu Islands.<sup>1</sup> Before the Korean War, he had had no jurisdiction whatsoever over Korea. The State Department was in charge. Although there was a military mission there of about 500 officers and men, it reported to the Ambassador—a State Department official.

General MacArthur made that clear in the following:

"SENATOR MORSE. One reads occasionally, at least I have in the past, that the responsibility for training the South Korean Army was your responsibility as commander in the Pacific and as commander of SCAP. . . .

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. Not in the slightest, Senator. I didn't have an ounce of responsibility in Korea after it became a republic except to make the domiciliary arrangements for the mission and to evacuate in case of emergency the American nationals in South Korea."<sup>2</sup>

The American people rejected the humiliation of dismissal and gave the General such a reception as no conquering hero, not even Admiral George

Dewey or Charles Lindbergh, had received. It became politically unsound to refuse General MacArthur his day in court. He appeared before a joint session of Congress where he delivered his magnificent "Old Soldiers Never Die" speech.

But that was not enough. The Senate placed the task of investigation before two committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, which met jointly under the Chairmanship of Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia. The joint committees consisted of 26 Senators, among them some of the ablest men in our government. The hearings were remarkably well conducted, particularly as Senator Russell adopted a judicial attitude from which he never once retreated.

In a previous *Freeman* supplement (September 24) I excerpted from the 2,000,000 words of testimony those passages which most clearly indicated the development of United States policy toward China, Manchuria, and Korea. The following excerpts bear upon the causes and nature of the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur.

### HOW NOT TO FIRE A GENERAL

General MacArthur testified that he never knew and did not then know why he had been dismissed.

"SENATOR BRIDGES. How did you first receive word of your recall?

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. I received it from my wife. One of my aides had heard the broadcast and instantly told her, and she informed me.

"SENATOR BRIDGES. You received it via the radio before you had any official notice?

<sup>1</sup> Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 82nd Congress, p. 36  
<sup>2</sup> Hearings, p. 230

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. . . .

"SENATOR BRIDGES. You were recalled with the action to take effect summarily, immediately?

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. The order relieved me of the command upon receipt.

"SENATOR BRIDGES. Is that a customary procedure?

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. I have never known it in the American Army, and I know of no precedence any place. Being summarily relieved in that way made it impossible to carry out directives that I was working on at that moment. I had to turn them over to my successor, an admirable officer in every respect, General Ridgway, who was 350 miles away on the Korean front.

"I don't think there is any question that the interest of the United States was jeopardized in such a summary mode of turning over great responsibilities which involve the security of the country. . . .<sup>3</sup>

"SENATOR WILEY. General, when you were recalled when the message came through, were there any reasons assigned to your recall?

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. The only reasons were contained in the order that I received and the reason that was given was that it was felt that I could not give my complete support to the policies of the United States and of the United Nations.

"That reason seems to be to me—there was no necessity to give any reason."<sup>4</sup>

No matter what efforts Senators made to get MacArthur to say why he was recalled, he reasserted that he did not know. In a colloquy with Senator Wayne Morse, he stated the matter with emphatic finality:

"SENATOR MORSE. Let me put the question this way. Is it your understanding that one of the reasons why you did not get authorization to broaden the Korean War was because it was felt that such action at this time might bring Russia into the war?

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. It is quite possible.

"SENATOR MORSE. Have you heard it said, General, that that was one of the reasons for your recall?

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. Senator, I do not know why I was recalled. The only statement that I have seen on it is the order for my recall.

"SENATOR MORSE. Well, what I said is, was it your understanding that that was one of the reasons?

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. That statement was of a nature which expressed the President's belief that I could not give wholehearted support to the policies of the United States and of the United Nations in the Far East.

"So far as I know, I have completely implemented, to the best of my ability, every directive, every policy that was given to me. . . .

"I can only interpret that order that the Admin-

istration, knowing the views I held, was going to act in a very contrary way, and believed it was advisable not to place any strain upon my loyalty, if you might put it that way, and relieved me of the command."<sup>5</sup>

General Bradley, however, gave the precise reasons for General MacArthur's dismissal:

"That by his public statements and by his official communications to us, he had indicated that he was not in sympathy with the decision to try to limit the conflict to Korea. This would make it difficult for him to carry out Joint Chiefs of Staff directives. Since we had decided to try to confine the conflict to Korea and avoid a third world war, it was necessary to have a commander more responsive to control from Washington.

"The second reason advanced by the Chiefs was that General MacArthur had failed to comply with the Presidential directive to clear statements on policy before making such statements public. He had also taken independent action in proposing to negotiate directly with the enemy field commander for an armistice and had made that statement public despite the fact that he knew the President had such a proposal under consideration from a governmental level.

"The third reason advanced by the Chiefs was that—

they, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have felt and feel now that the military must be controlled by civilian authority in this country.

"They have always adhered to this principle and they felt that General MacArthur's actions were continuing to jeopardize the civilian control over the military authorities. These reasons were given by the Chiefs to General Marshall on Sunday afternoon.<sup>6</sup>

General MacArthur, in his address before the Massachusetts Legislature, July 25, 1951, said:

I hesitate to refer to my own relief from the Far Eastern Commands as I have never questioned the legal authority underlying such action. But the three sole reasons publicly stated by the highest authority clearly demonstrate the arbitrary nature of the decision.

The first reason given was that, contrary to existing policy, I warned of the strategic relationship of Formosa to American security and the dangers inherent in this area's falling under Communist control. Yet this viewpoint has since been declared by the Secretary of State, under oath before Congressional Committees, to have been and to be the invincible and long standing policy of the United States.

The second reason given was that I communicated my readiness to meet the enemy commander at any time to discuss acceptable terms of a ceasefire arrangement. Yet, for this proposal, I was relieved of my command by the same authorities who

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<sup>3</sup> Hearings, p. 26

<sup>4</sup> Hearings, p. 30

<sup>5</sup> Hearings, p. 282

<sup>6</sup> Hearings, pp. 878-879

since have received so enthusiastically the identical proposal when made by the Soviet Government.

The third and final reason advanced was my relying to a Congressman's request for information on a public subject then under open consideration by the Congress. Yet both Houses of Congress promptly passed a law confirming my action, which . . . had been entirely in accordance with a long existing and well recognized though unwritten policy.

This law states that no member of the Armed Forces shall be restricted or prevented from communicating directly or indirectly with any member or members of Congress concerning any subject unless such communication is in violation of law or the security and safety of the United States. And this formal enactment of basic public policy was approved without the slightest dissent by the President.

### The Acheson School of Falsification

General MacArthur had had difficulties with the authorities in Washington, it is true. For instance, his reports to the United Nations had been censored. This is his testimony on the subject:

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. Senator, my connection with the United Nations was largely nominal. There were provisions made that the entire control of my command and everything I did came from our own Chiefs of Staff and my channel of communication was defined as the Army Chief of Staff.

"Even the reports which were normally made by me to the United Nations were subject to censorship by our State and Defense Departments. I had no direct connection with the United Nations whatsoever. The controls over me were exactly the same as though the forces under me were all American. All of my communications were to the American high command here.

"THE CHAIRMAN (Senator Russell). Were any of your communications to the United Nations that went through that chain of command actually censored?

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. Yes, sir. The reports that I made, comments and suggestions—suggestions came back to me as to whether I would accept the changes. Many of these changes I accepted. There were at least in one case changes which I would not accept, changes which seemed to me to place a political slant upon a military officer's report which were not warrantable.

"In that it created a degree of discussion between the State and Defense Departments.

"The Defense Department supported my point of view, and maintained that nothing should go in over my signature that I did not approve. . . ."

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. The general gist of it was as I said, that it seemed to introduce a political slant which the State Department believed would be advantageous in its handling of the various nations of the United Nations at Lake Success. It did not agree with my own military concepts, and the reports I put in were intended to be entirely factual—the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, as far as I saw it. . . ."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Hearings, pp. 10, 11

<sup>8</sup> Hearings, p. 11

## FIVE DATES THAT CHANGED HISTORY

Because of the diverse and discursive testimony, the question and answer method which involves jumping from one subject to another, the thread of salient data has to be selected in relationship to five telling dates.

The first, December 6, 1950, was the date of the President's order directing field commanders to clear public statements with Washington.

The second, January 12, 1951, was the date of the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposing among other things substantially the same military measures against the Chinese Communists which they later condemned General MacArthur for proposing. These proposals are of crucial importance; to this day they remain the basis of the Administration's smear of MacArthur as a "warmonger." No witness could be brought to state just what happened to the "tentative agreement" (as General Bradley preferred to call it) in which the Joint Chiefs embodied those proposed measures.

The third date, March 20, 1951, was that on which the Joint Chiefs informed General MacArthur that the State Department was planning a Presidential announcement that the United Nations were prepared to discuss conditions of a settlement in Korea.

The fourth date, March 24, 1951, was that of General MacArthur's public offer to discuss a cease-fire agreement with the enemy; a statement in which he stressed the reserve strength which the United Nations could bring to bear upon the enemy if he insisted upon continuing the war.

The fifth date, April 5, 1951, was that of the meeting called by President Truman to consider dismissing General MacArthur.

Only by selecting testimony pertinent to these dates does it become clear why General MacArthur was dismissed and who was responsible for his dismissal.

### December 6, 1950. Hush, Hush about Formosa

"SENATOR JOHNSON. Would you care to give the committee some details of what led to the issuance of the December 6 directive?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. I will be glad to, sir.

"The first matter that was called to our attention was last summer, on the VFW [Veterans of Foreign Wars] statement. However, that was merely taken cognizance of, because the President made the decision to direct him to withdraw it without referring it to us.

"Then, there was a statement in the *New York Times*, December 1, and another one December 2, which indicated that General MacArthur had given certain interviews, discussing policy, and those were of concern to the Chiefs.

"That led to the sending out on December 6 of the directive from the President, directing field commanders to clear statements.

"SENATOR JOHNSON. Then as early as last fall the Joint Chiefs were discussing the desirability or un-

desirability of certain of General MacArthur's statements?" . . .

"GENERAL BRADLEY. No; I don't think that you can say that General MacArthur was relieved for having different opinions from those of us here in Washington. I think you must realize that the basis for his relief—the Joint Chiefs of Staff from a military point of view—was that he carried this to the public, not that he had different views.

"We all have different views and we settle them without carrying them to the public. I think the big point here is that he carried them to the public. And before our country and before our allies and before the United Nations we found ourselves speaking with two voices—that of the Government in Washington and that of General MacArthur in Tokyo."<sup>10</sup>

In a colloquy between Senator Smith and General Collins, this matter was made somewhat clearer:

"SENATOR SMITH. From all of the evidence that we have had, I gather that the documents which would support this reason advanced by the Chiefs were, first, the Veterans of Foreign Wars speech, the March 24 armistice negotiations; and, third, the Martin letter.<sup>11</sup> The President recently stated that the Martin letter was not particularly important, it was just accumulation. The President particularly objected to the Veterans of Foreign Wars speech, and he said from the time that that was issued and got into the press he had planned in his mind probably to remove General MacArthur.

"I want to ask this question of you: What was there in the Veterans of Foreign Wars speech not in complete accord with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then with regard to Formosa? For that is all it contained—just the Formosa strategic value. I am wondering in what respect the Joint Chiefs differed with that statement of MacArthur's.

"GENERAL COLLINS. I do not believe we actually differed at all, Senator, but my recollection of it was that the thing that did disturb us about that was the sort of imputation contained in the letter that we wanted Formosa as a military base.

"SENATOR SMITH. Well, I have read that three or four times.

"GENERAL COLLINS. That could be read into the letter, into that letter, and that the Joint Chiefs did not support it; but there was nothing, no clear-cut differences between the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those expressed by General MacArthur in this particular paper, or letter.

"SENATOR SMITH. I always understood General MacArthur's position, and I talked to him about that as far back as when I was out there in 1949. He never wanted Formosa as a base for us, he simply didn't want it in hostile hands, because of its threat to our islands groups, Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and so forth.

"GENERAL COLLINS. Yes.

"SENATOR SMITH. That was his position, and all that the VFW letter, it seems to me, says is that if they get that, it would be a base from which they could operate against us; and he never—it seems to me but I may be mistaken—he never suggested that we should take Formosa as a base to operate against the Chinese mainland."<sup>12</sup>

The directive of December 6, 1950 reads:

*Memo from the President December 5, 1950*<sup>13</sup>  
The memo to all Cabinet Members and to the Chairman NSRB, Administrator ECA, Directors CIA, Administrator ECA and Director Selective Service.

In the light of the present critical international situation and until further written notice from me, I wish that each one of you would take immediate steps to reduce the number of public speeches pertaining to foreign or military policy made by officials of the Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch. This applies to officials in the field as well as those in Washington.

No speech, press release, or other public statement concerning military policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State.

No speech, press release, or other public statement concerning military policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of Defense.

In addition to the copies submitted to Departments of State or Defense for clearance, advance copies of speeches and press releases concerning foreign policy or military policy should be submitted to the White House for information.

The purpose of this memo is not to curtail the flow of information to the American people but rather to insure the policies of the United States Government.

To the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense:

In addition to the policy expressed in my memo of this date to the heads of Departments concerning the clearance of speeches and statements, I wish the following steps to be taken:

Officials overseas, including military commanders and diplomatic representatives, should be ordered to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their Departments and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines or other publicity media in the U. S.

### **January 12, 1951. The Joint Chiefs Agree with MacArthur**

The war in Korea had two phases:

1. A civil war between North and South Korea in which the United Nations intervened in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. General Douglas MacArthur represented the United Nations; the American forces were under United Nations authority.

This phase of the war started on June 25, 1950 and ended on November 6, 1950 with the defeat of the North Koreans.

<sup>9</sup> Hearings, p. 880

<sup>10</sup> Hearings, p. 1024

<sup>11</sup> There were also objections to a message addressed to Henry Hazlitt of the *Freeman*.

<sup>12</sup> Hearings, p. 1217

<sup>13</sup> I could not find the entire directive in the reports, I have obtained this copy, dated December 5, 1950, which General MacArthur received in Tokyo—G.E.S.

2. Then Soviet China intervened with a huge force, larger than the United Nations forces. General MacArthur regarded Manchuria as a sanctuary for these Chinese Communist armies. He wanted to bomb these forces before they reached Korea.

The issue was laid down in the following colloquy:

"THE CHAIRMAN: Do you recall at what period during the operations that you first formally suggested to the Defense Establishment that you be permitted to carry on air operations over Manchuria or to blockade the China coast? I do not mean the exact date, General; I mean relative to events. Was it just after the Chinese intervened or about the time that you issued your statement that it was an entirely new war?

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. It was after the Chinese intervened, and it was definitely established that they were making war on our forces in Korea.

"There were various recommendations put in immediately thereafter—after it was determined that China was warring against us, Red China, I put in the application for the use of—that the wraps be taken off the forces in Formosa. There were other recommendations that went in at various times, but I would not—I could not at this stage—I will say that there were a number of visits by the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, at which those points were discussed in detail, and our position was set forth. However, the decisions were made in Washington, and were complied with completely and absolutely.

"THE CHAIRMAN. So after the Chinese Communists came in and immediately after it was evident that they were in large numbers attacking your forces, you did recommend that the naval blockade be enforced and that what you have very graphically described as a sanctuary in Manchuria be subject to air attack, and that the Chinese Nationalist troops be employed?

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. I very definitely recommended that the Chinese Nationalist troops be employed. Whether there was any definite written form in the other things, I do not recall.

"In my discussions with General Collins I pointed out how extraordinarily necessary it was to lift those inhibitions."<sup>14</sup>

General MacArthur testified that he had been in agreement on matters of policy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that he took no steps without their authority and approval. This raised the issue of the recommendations that had been made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 12, 1951, which were as follows:

That we were to continue and intensify now an economic blockade of trade with China.

That we were to prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon circumstances then obtaining.

Remove now the restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.

Remove now the restrictions on operations of the Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistical support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists.<sup>15</sup>

These were four of the 16 points of the memorandum of January 12. MacArthur was in full agreement with these recommendations which had been made to the Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall. But nothing came of them and MacArthur says that he does not know what happened to them. He was never instructed to put them into effect or not to put them into effect. In a word, a program having been devised, the field commander did not know whether it was accepted or rejected. He was left in the dark.

### How Not to Fight a War—The Strategy of Fear

Not only was General MacArthur not authorized to bomb the Manchurian sanctuary but he was limited in Northern Korea to avoid bombing Racine, 35 miles from the Soviet frontier, a place which is connected, for transportation purposes, with the Russian port of Vladivostok.

General MacArthur testified:

"I was very anxious to destroy [Racine]. Its usefulness to the enemy was self-evident. Great accumulations, depot accumulations, were made there. It was a great distributing center. That could run—the Soviets could run stuff from Vladivostok right down there.

"We asked to bomb that, and we were forbidden.

"THE CHAIRMAN. You mean that was within North Korea?

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. That is in North Korea, sir, 35 miles this side of the Soviet border. I made the last request along that line—General Stratemeyer, a very magnificent air commander, insisted that that place should be taken out. It was vital. It was forbidden in some original directives. Other things were forbidden, which were within Korea."

The following colloquy on this subject is important because it clarifies MacArthur's views on bombing:

"THE CHAIRMAN. Going back to this place of Racine, General, was it possible to bomb that objective without crossing the Soviet frontier?

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. Oh, yes, sir. No one would have been more opposed to doing any bombing in Siberia than I would.

"THE CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean bombing—I mean on your approach and after delivery of the bombs.

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. No, sir; there was no possibility of crossing the border. It was well within the area, and had we bombed, we would have been solicitous to do so in clear weather so there could have been no mistake. I had the most definite assurances from the Air that there could be no possibility of error.

"THE CHAIRMAN. Have you ever formally submitted a request to bomb that objective until this request just prior to your return to the States?

<sup>14</sup> Hearings, p. 12

<sup>15</sup> Hearings, p. 13

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. Yes, sir; that was formally submitted. I submitted in a radio the entire recommendation of General Stratemeyer and asked, in view of changed conditions, if we could not proceed to bomb.

"There was no explanation given and whether that decision was made in the Defense Department or the State Department is a matter of conjecture on my part."<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, MacArthur insisted that he took no steps, made no decisions, without the authorization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was brought out several times in the testimony, but never more clearly than in the following:

"SENATOR MCMAHON. Was there any difference in opinion between you and the Joint Chiefs relative to how far you would go toward the Yalu in that advance?

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. The movements, all tactical and strategic movements that I made, had the prior knowledge and approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"SENATOR MCMAHON. Was there any recommendation by the Joint Chiefs that it would have been wise in their opinion to stop about 5 miles this side of the Yalu on a defensible ridge?

"GENERAL MACARTHUR. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that it would be probably advisable, based upon the considerations at that time, to occupy the north of Korea with South Korean forces. They were adverse to having other nationals there. But the tactical conditions were such that South Koreans were not able to do so."<sup>17</sup>

### Who Vetoed "Hot Pursuit"?

General Marshall, in his testimony concerning the program for a "hot pursuit" of enemy planes into the Manchurian sanctuary, said that it was favored by the President, the Secretary of State, and the Defense Department, but was rejected by the 13 United Nations countries involved in the Korean affair. In spite of the fact that the United States supplied 90 per cent of the personnel and 100 per cent of the supplies for our side in the Korean War, the matter was dropped. Thereafter, General MacArthur was unable to prevent the building up of the Chinese forces and supplies against which he had to fight.

"SENATOR GEORGE. At that time General MacArthur's forces or a great part of his forces were in North Korea?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

"SENATOR GEORGE. And they were moving toward the northern boundary?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. That is correct.

"SENATOR GEORGE. And motion was in that direction. And he proposed hot pursuit. Now we understood that the General Staff approved of the hot pursuit.

"GENERAL BRADLEY. We did. The State Depart-

ment approved it and the President approved it.

"SENATOR GEORGE. But the 13 nations or some number of other nations vetoed it?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Yes. Certain other nations who had troops in Korea—

"SENATOR GEORGE. How many troops did they have there at that time? In the actual battleline, how many troops did they have up in North Korea fighting?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Approximately, I would estimate around 30,000 ground force and navy and air forces supporting."<sup>18</sup> . . .

"SENATOR GEORGE. Well now, General, General Marshall stated to this committee that if he knew or if we knew, that the Soviets would not come into this fighting, if we should bomb the supply depots, concentration points in Manchuria, that we would take that action, is that right?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. I think that is correct. In other words, you would extend your bombing of a line of supply.

"SENATOR GEORGE. That is it exactly, General, exactly. I think it is quite correct to say that that is true. That means then that from a strictly military point, the request to bomb the supply depots and concentration points in Manchuria was correct?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. No, sir; I don't agree with that, sir.

"SENATOR GEORGE. From a strictly military point of view.

"GENERAL BRADLEY. No, sir; and I will tell you why I don't think so from a military point of view.

"SENATOR GEORGE. Yes, sir.

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Korea is a poor place to fight a war, and a lot of military implications are involved in extending the war.

"Now, if Russia should come into this war, it would be very difficult to supply the troops in Korea or to get them out, and so speaking entirely from a military point of view, we do not want to take that risk.

"SENATOR GEORGE. I understood, General, but I said if we knew Russia was not coming in, there would be nothing wrong in us striking back at the concentration points in Manchuria.

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Yes; but who can tell us they won't?"<sup>19</sup> . . .

"SENATOR BREWSTER. . . . In connection with the civilian aspect there is one other matter that I think should be clear in the record—that the overruling of the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of all the military and civilian authorities of this Government regarding hot pursuit was vetoed by 13 anonymous diplomats at Lake Success, presumably civilians. That is the case as far as you know, is it not?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Whether or not they consulted their military leaders, I don't know; because I think we would all admit that carrying the war in

<sup>16</sup> Hearings, pp. 17, 18  
<sup>17</sup> Hearings, p. 97

<sup>18</sup> Hearings, p. 888. Secretary Acheson, questioned on this matter, testified that his Department queried only six of the 13 nations. Under persistent questioning he was evasive about the reasons why the other seven were not consulted. pp. 1723-4, 2074-2080  
<sup>19</sup> Hearings, pp. 890-891

any form into Manchuria takes on political aspects as well as military.

"SENATOR BREWSTER. Yes.

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Now how many of those people consulted their military advisers and which ones didn't, I would have no way of knowing.

"SENATOR BREWSTER. But the final votes were cast by the diplomatic representatives there at Lake Success against our Government proceeding, although we were in charge of the operation?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Well, whether it was to the United Nations representative or to the State Department, I don't know, sir. The State Department handled it because it was primarily dealing with the foreign governments. That is always handled by the State Department and they handled it, and how they handled it I don't know.

"SENATOR BREWSTER. The State Department was the one that advised you that they did not approve.

"GENERAL BRADLEY. That the other nations did not approve.

"SENATOR BREWSTER. Yes; that the other nations did not approve.

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Yes."<sup>20</sup>

### The Joint Chiefs' Lost Proposals

The memorandum of January 12, 1951, proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staffs and quoted above, which was approved by General MacArthur, was never approved by the National Security Council and therefore was dropped, but most of the proposals had been put into effect, though not the four crucial proposals to "extend the war."

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Well, I will have to go back a little further than that [January 12] on the study, sir. I just want to bring out to start with that there are three things involved and I think there has been some confusion here because there was a directive dated the 12th which I don't think has been discussed much here, there was a study dated the 12th which has been discussed a great deal, and then there was the President's letter to General MacArthur on policy dated the 13th.

"CHAIRMAN RUSSELL. Well, I have had some of the confusion and that is the reason I have asked you to clarify them."<sup>21</sup>

There was not as much confusion, however, as General Bradley indicated. He just went about it a little differently than General Marshall had, giving some detail of how it was drawn up. This is a paraphrase by General Bradley of the January 12 directive, which differs from that read by General MacArthur:

We are forced to the conclusion, based upon all the factors known to us, including particularly those presented in your recent message, that it is infeasible under existing conditions, including sustained major effort by Communist China, to hold the position in Korea for a protracted period.

It would be to our national interests, however, and also to the interests of the UN, before you is-

sue firm instructions for initiation of evacuation of troops from Korea to gain some further time for essential military and diplomatic consultations with UN countries participating in Korean effort.

It is important also to the future of UN and NATO organizations, to the United States prestige world-wide, and to efforts to organize anti-Communist resistance in Asia, that maximum practical punishment be inflicted on Communist aggressors and that Korea not be evacuated unless actually forced by military considerations. In Washington it is not possible to evaluate present state of morale and combat efficiency of UN forces.

(Deleted.)

In your messages of 30 December 1950 and 4 January 1951, you had indicated it would not be necessary to make an anticipatory decision to evacuate until our forces had arrived at the old Pusan beachhead.

Including consideration of the factors outlined above, your estimate is desired as to timing and conditions under which you will have to issue instructions to evacuate Korea.

Directive contained in paragraph (c) of our message of 9 January meanwhile remains in effect."<sup>22</sup>

Now, according to Marshall, the document of January 12 was a recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but according to Bradley, it was a "study" which was personally carried to General MacArthur from Washington to Tokyo, by General Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army. However, the Joint Chiefs wanted the political part kept separate from the military part; then President Truman sent General MacArthur a letter on January 13.

"GENERAL BRADLEY. What we had in mind was a condition under which we would be forced to form one or more beachheads and hold either indefinitely or hold until we could evacuate, and 'stabilize' in military parlance normally means where the two forces have reached a position from which neither advances.

"SENATOR MORSE. Then I am correct, if I understand your answer, that in the January 12 message the advice that you gave General MacArthur was that the proposals set forth in the study should be followed in carrying out either the evacuation, the retreat, or the holding of a defensive position in contrast to an offensive position?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Well that was part of it, Senator Morse. I think I have stated here before that whole series of studies was drawn up under conditions which were to meet a war, an all-out war either declared or not declared, with China, and I say that original directive was dropped out of the January 12 paper although it was a whole series of papers considered when we took later action on it or used it for further action, so I don't think you can say that the whole picture was one of stabilization or evacuation.

"It was that plus the fact that we might find ourselves at all-out war with China if we were unable to confine it to Korea, so all of those things were in consideration when we tentatively agreed to these objectives and lines of action."<sup>23</sup> . . .

<sup>20</sup> Hearings, pp. 998-999

<sup>21</sup> Hearings, p. 735

<sup>22</sup> Hearings, pp. 737-738

<sup>23</sup> Hearings, pp. 1122-1123



"SENATOR KNOWLAND. General, calling your attention to the statement of January 12 which has been called a tentative study, and in which four specific recommendations out of sixteen were mentioned by General MacArthur in his remarks to the combined Houses of Congress, and in which he indicated that he believed that his views were substantially the same as those of the Joint Chiefs, that did, as Senator Morse pointed out, provide it might be put into operation in case of two contingencies: Either in the event of evacuation or of stabilization, did it not?"

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Yes; but they were not recommendations, if I may correct your statement.

"SENATOR KNOWLAND. All right. What do you call them, General?"

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Tentative agreements.

"SENATOR KNOWLAND. Tentative agreements. Did you sign those tentative agreements, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?"

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Yes.

"SENATOR KNOWLAND. Did you send them to the Secretary of National Defense, Secretary Marshall?"

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

"SENATOR KNOWLAND. Did the Secretary of National Defense, Mr. Marshall, submit those to the National Security Council without comment subsequently?"

"GENERAL BRADLEY. I believe it was without comment. I know he did send them, forward them, on to the National Security Council Staff.

"SENATOR KNOWLAND. He did not disapprove some of them so far as you know?"

"GENERAL BRADLEY. No, sir; they were to be used in connection with the NSC study which was up at that time.

"SENATOR KNOWLAND. All right. Was General MacArthur ever notified that either the Joint Chiefs or the Secretary of National Defense or the National Security Council had taken a contrary view to these studies?"

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Not that I know of. As I have told you heretofore, General Collins discussed this paper with him and I assume told him what it was, but he is better qualified to testify to that than I am."<sup>24</sup>

The testimony of Generals Collins and Vandenberg and Admiral Sherman confirmed General Bradley's summation of the January 12 document.

### March 20, 1951. A Cryptic Message

We now have to go back to the question, already raised, of the March cease-fire statement of General MacArthur. According to General Marshall:

"On March 20 the Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched the following message to General MacArthur:

State planning a Presidential announcement shortly that with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggressors, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea. United Nations feeling exists that further diplomatic efforts

toward settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of the thirty-eighth parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop.

Recognizing that the parallel has no military significance, State has asked Joint Chiefs of Staff what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for United Nations forces and maintain contact with the enemy. Your recommendation desired.<sup>25</sup>

This message General MacArthur received, but no other.

### March 24, 1951. MacArthur Offers a Cease-fire

On March 24, General MacArthur delivered the following statement publicly to the enemy:

Within the area of my authority as military commander, I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander-in-chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the UN in Korea, to which no nation may take just exceptions, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.<sup>26</sup>

MacArthur maintained throughout that he had never received any message from anyone concerning such a plan and that therefore his cease-fire proposal was in no manner related to anything the President had in mind. General MacArthur had only met the President once in his life, on Wake Island. He contended that he did not know that the President had anything special in mind. Marshall, however, stated:

"At the time the foregoing statement was issued, the clearance of the proposed Presidential declaration with the other 13 nations having forces in Korea had very nearly been completed. In view of the serious impact of General MacArthur's statement on the negotiations with these nations, it became necessary to abandon the effort, thus losing whatever chance there may have been at that time to negotiate a settlement of the Korean conflict."<sup>27</sup>

MacArthur never saw the proposed Presidential declaration and knew nothing about it. As a matter of fact, when on July 30, General Ridgway, MacArthur's successor, arranged for a cease-fire in Korea, his procedure was identical with that used by MacArthur and his language was not very different. The distinction can be made, however, that Ridgway's statement was authorized while MacArthur's was not.

It may be remarked that had the United States and the United Nations been less afraid of the Kremlin, they must have realized that MacArthur's offer, based on a statement of the force which they could still unleash, was a prestige-making move; whereas the offer which General Ridgway was ordered to make, following as it did upon a suggestion by the arch-aggressor, Russia, had an appearance of eager appeasement and caused the United Nations to lose face throughout the world.

<sup>25</sup> Hearings, p. 343

<sup>26</sup> Facts on File, 1951, p. 97 D-E

<sup>27</sup> Hearings, p. 344

<sup>24</sup> Hearings, pp. 1129-1130

"SENATOR WILEY. Now, then, you do not think that as a military commander that he had any authority in relation to seeking an armistice or a cease-fire situation with the enemy?

"SECRETARY MARSHALL. I think under the instructions that he had received, that the President was in the midst of preparing for such a negotiatory effort and was clearing that with the nations involved with us in the fighting in Korea, that it should have been evident to him that that would very seriously complicate, if not terminate at that time, that particular effort by the executive agent of the United Nations.

"Actually what happened was this matter had been cleared through most of the nations involved.

"SENATOR WILEY. What matter?

"SECRETARY MARSHALL. Of the question of the President's negotiatory effort to bring about a termination of the fighting in Korea, and General MacArthur had been notified that that was in process."<sup>28</sup>

Although nothing in the message of March 20 indicates what change was to be made in policy, General Marshall apparently assumed that the message estopped MacArthur from all comment, as indicated in this colloquy:

"SENATOR KNOWLAND. And you interpreted that at least, even if General MacArthur did not, as preventing him as a field commander to suggest to the opposing field commander of the Communists that he might enter into negotiations for a cease-fire on the field?

"SECRETARY MARSHALL. Yes; and also the fact that he had included reference to Formosa and entrance of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations and matters of that sort. Because he was advised there that this thing was going to happen, and this was the executive agent of the United Nations that was going to make the public approach, and that they were in the midst of the negotiations."<sup>29</sup>

It is clear from General Marshall's testimony that prior to March 20 there had been cease-fire negotiations among perhaps 10 of the 13 allies in Korea. There was a draft which was being passed about and which many saw. *It had never been sent to General MacArthur.*

General Omar Bradley cut across much of the discussion by stating the American military policy:

"The fundamental military issue that has arisen is whether to increase the risk of a global war by taking additional measures that are open to the United States and its allies. We now have a localized conflict in Korea. Some of the military measures under discussion might well place the United States in the position of responsibility for broadening the war and at the same time losing most if not all of our allies.

"General MacArthur has stated that there are certain additional measures which can and should be taken, and that by so doing no unacceptable in-

creased risk of global war will result. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that these same measures do increase the risk of global war and that such a risk should not be taken unnecessarily. . . ."<sup>30</sup>

### April 5, 1951. General Bradley's Amnesia

The President had called a meeting on April 5, consisting of Marshall, Harriman, Acheson and Bradley, to consider the dismissal of MacArthur. The next day, the same group met and it was suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be consulted. According to General Marshall, the Joint Chiefs and the members of the President's conference un-animously concurred in the dismissal at several meetings over several days, and another meeting, on April 10, was called to devise the form. The message was sent to Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, who was then in Korea, for delivery to MacArthur on April 11, but it had already leaked to the press.

The President's public statement was prepared, according to General Marshall, by the Department of Defense, the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Bradley could not remember who told him on April 5 that MacArthur was to be dismissed; yet he testified:

". . . When I received the information—I don't remember where from, but I think I received it from a telephone from someone—I called the Joint Chiefs of Staff together for about 30 minutes, from 5 to 5:30 in the afternoon, and told them that the President was concerned about some statements that had been made by General MacArthur, and that they should begin studying the military aspects of it. There was nothing more than that said about it."<sup>31</sup>

The Senators apparently found it difficult to credit General Bradley's forgetfulness. Senator Bridges asked him who made that call, and this colloquy occurred:

"GENERAL BRADLEY. I don't recall, Senator.

"SENATOR BRIDGES. Did it come from the White House or the Secretary of State?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. I don't know, sir, where it came from. It may have been from the White House, it may have been from the Secretary of Defense's office. I don't know, sir.

"I just got a warning that this thing was coming up because the President was concerned about it, and I frankly do not remember where it came from, and I am not too sure it came by telephone. My memory is that I got a call from someone.

"SENATOR BRIDGES. Well, that is important to know who originated the idea. It was not you that originated the idea of firing MacArthur then?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. No, sir.

"SENATOR BRIDGES. It was not the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. No, sir.

"SENATOR BRIDGES. But you did get it you think by telephone. It might have come from the White

<sup>28</sup> Hearings, p. 429  
<sup>29</sup> Hearings, p. 527

<sup>30</sup> Hearings, p. 730  
<sup>31</sup> Hearings, p. 739

House or it might have come from the Secretary of State or from the Secretary of Defense?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I don't remember where it came from. . . ."<sup>32</sup>

"SENATOR CAIN. . . . General Bradley. I understood you to say several days ago that you would check your telephone log to determine if possible who called you to notify you that the President was considering the removal of General MacArthur. Have you had an opportunity to do that?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. I believe I stated later I had checked it and it does not show. The point was made here then that that probably came over the White House phone, but I should make it clear that a lot of people use the White House phone. It isn't just the White House that uses it."<sup>33</sup>

### NO PEACE WITH MACARTHUR!

But it seemed that Admiral Sherman was not satisfied with the dismissal or the method of doing it. He proposed another method.

"SENATOR CAIN. . . . You actually suggested at that first meeting that there was in your mind a possible way of reconciling the differences that prevailed between General MacArthur and the supreme commander in the Far East and those in higher authority in Washington, and that if a five-star general was sent out to discuss the problem frankly and honestly with all the cards laid on the table, that there was in your opinion an opportunity to satisfy or liquidate these differences and maintain General Douglas MacArthur in his supreme command in the Far East; is that not so, sir?

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. That is true. That was one of the alternatives. The alternatives were either to be able to resolve the matter that way or at least to have determined that it was not possible to resolve it that way.

"SENATOR CAIN. Permit me to press just one minute, because to my way of thinking this is exceedingly germane and important to our whole consideration.

"What was the reaction of the other members of the JCS, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Deputy Army Chief of Staff, who was acting that afternoon for General Collins?

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. I do not recall the reactions of all of them, except that I remember that a comment was made that possibly a letter would handle the problem, and there was some general discussion; but I do not remember the rest of it well enough to attempt to recount it.

"SENATOR CAIN. Admiral Sherman, when General Bradley responded to your suggestion by indicating that he thought you had him in mind, and you responded by saying, 'No, I think it ought to be a five-star general, who outranks General MacArthur,' that could only have been the Secretary of Defense?

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

"SENATOR CAIN. What response was given to that

statement of yours in that meeting by anybody, sir?

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. Well, there was no opposition to it, and no general concurrence. We were, frankly, in a position of having been given a problem to think about, and of more or less speculating on it without reaching any conclusions, and no conclusion was reached. But the two possible procedures that were left in my mind were those two.

"Now my suggesting sending an officer, a senior officer, was because I happened to have seen that method employed once in the Navy, and it was so successful that I doubt if anyone knows who I am talking about; I hope they don't.

"SENATOR CAIN. No, sir. Admiral Sherman, you, as a member of the JCS, are official military advisers to the President of the United States.

"It seems to me that your recommendation to your fellow officers in the JCS that this matter could be resolved harmoniously without needing to remove the supreme commander in the Far East, was made against your desire to give your best advice in that official capacity, as one of the chief military advisers in this country; is this not so, sir?

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. That was my spontaneous reaction to the problem as it was presented to us at that meeting. That is really about all that I can recount of that meeting."<sup>34</sup> . . .

"SENATOR CAIN. . . . Admiral Sherman, I think you have told me this: that with reference to the two meetings on Sunday [April 8], one with the Chairman of the JCS and the other with the Secretary of Defense, no consideration of any kind was given to the method of relieving General MacArthur. All of the consideration was to the reasons that would support relieving him if higher authority wished to relieve him.

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. No. There was one other matter in connection with this particular problem that was discussed on Sunday and that was the personality of his relief—who could take his place. At least, to me, that was no problem. There was only one logical man.

"SENATOR CAIN. One last question. I think I have the time in this period.

"It seems to be a fact that in the three meetings involved, you, the Chief of Naval Operations and a member of the JCS, happen to be the only individual that suggested that the matter could be resolved in Tokyo and Korea short of relieving General Douglas MacArthur.

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. Yes, sir; and I did not press that after the first occasion. . . ."<sup>35</sup>

"CHAIRMAN RUSSELL. As a meeting of the minds at the conference held on Sunday the 8th?

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. Yes, sir. I might comment as to what actually occurred. Each man gave his opinion, gave his own reasons separately, so that in effect, General Bradley's memorandum is a summation of views expressed separately, which naturally did not overlap.

"As I testified this morning, I spoke last and

<sup>32</sup> Hearings, p. 746  
<sup>33</sup> Hearings, p. 1136

<sup>34</sup> Hearings, p. 1576  
<sup>35</sup> Hearings, p. 1577

addressed myself only to the future, because past events had been discussed by previous speakers.

"CHAIRMAN RUSSELL. I think that the method of the relief of General MacArthur has perhaps been more startling, we might say, to the American people than the fact that he was relieved, Admiral Sherman. That is only one individual's opinion.

"You say that you stated at the first meeting held on Thursday, the 5th, that your spontaneous suggestion was that some man who outranked General MacArthur—I believe there is only one alive who does—should go to Toyko and consult with him and see if there was any way to arrive at accommodation between the differences between the Joint Chiefs and General MacArthur.

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. Well, what I had in mind was not an accommodation but a bringing of him to the established position.

"CHAIRMAN RUSSELL. In other words, to send Secretary Marshall to Tokyo to bring him to agree completely with the policies enunciated by the Joint Chiefs and the President of the United States.

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

"CHAIRMAN RUSSELL. Did you renew that suggestion at the meeting on Sunday?

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. No, sir; I did not."<sup>36</sup> . . .

"SENATOR KEFAUVER. At that meeting [April 5]—I want to get this clear—you did not get the impression that a decision had already been made, but you were told that the matter was up for consideration and your views would be desired?

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

"SENATOR KEFAUVER. And on that basis you jointly recommended that he be relieved of his command?

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. No, sir. We discussed the matter, various comments were made, and then at a later time [April 8] we were asked individually by General Marshall for our military opinion as to whether or not he should be replaced in his com-

mand. We gave those opinions individually, we did not initiate a recommendation.

"SENATOR KEFAUVER. You gave your individual opinions?

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

"SENATOR KEFAUVER. Then subsequently, following that, he was relieved of his command.

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. Yes, sir.

"SENATOR KEFAUVER. Those individual opinions—were they opinions that were in the nature of recommendations that you felt that militarily he should be relieved?

"ADMIRAL SHERMAN. Yes, sir, just about that form."<sup>37</sup>

It is impossible from the vast amount of testimony on the subject that no one in the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew precisely why General MacArthur was dismissed at the particular time for the reasons given. Only President Truman, Secretary of Defense Marshall, Secretary of State Acheson and Averell Harriman have precise knowledge of the activities of the State Department some time about March 20, in negotiation with 13 allies, which MacArthur's statement of March 24 disturbed and which made President Truman very angry.

What it was has not been made available in any precise form. But this fact must stand:

"SENATOR GEORGE. Do you concur with General Marshall's statement that with respect to strictly military orders there had been no insubordination on the part of General MacArthur in that he failed to carry them out?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. I know of none.

"SENATOR GEORGE. You know of none?

"GENERAL BRADLEY. No."<sup>38</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Hearings, pp. 1581-1582

<sup>37</sup> Hearings, p. 1661

<sup>38</sup> Hearings, p. 893

## *Out of Their Own Mouths*

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