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# **FREEMAN**

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**PROTECTING THE SCHOOLS**

An Editorial

Editors: John Chamberlain • Henry Hazlitt • Suzanne La Follette

PUBLISHED FORTNIGHTLY

FIVE DOLLARS A YEAR

# the FREEMAN

with which is combined the magazine, PLAIN TALK

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## A WORD ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTORS

MARCH 24, 1952

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The Freeman is published fortnightly. Publication Office, Orange, Conn. Editorial and General Offices, 240 Madison Avenue, New York 16, N. Y. Copyrighted in the United States, 1952, by the Freeman Magazine, Inc. John Chamberlain, President; Henry Hazlitt, Vice President; Suzanne La Follette, Secretary; Alex L. Hillman, Treasurer.

Entered as second class matter at the Post Office at Orange, Conn. Rates: Twenty-five cents the copy; five dollars a year in the United States, nine dollars for two years; six dollars a year elsewhere.

The editors can not be responsible for manuscripts submitted but if return postage is enclosed they will endeavor to see that manuscripts rejected are promptly returned.

It is not to be understood that articles signed with a name, pseudonym, or initials necessarily represent the opinion of the editors, either as to substance or style. They are printed because, in the editors' judgment, they are intrinsically worth reading.



LAWRENCE R. BROWN, an engineer who lives in Philadelphia, was Assistant Director of the Chemical Bureau of the War Production Board during the war. In the *Freeman* of September 24, 1951, Mr. Brown discussed General Eisenhower's chances of election, and in this issue he weighs the General's candidacy against Senator Taft's in relation to the issue of foreign policy.

JOSEPH H. BALLEW is Secretary and Associate Counsel of the Southern States Industrial Council with headquarters in Nashville. Formerly he served as Speaker of the Senate in the Tennessee Legislature, and Adjutant General of his state.

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TOWNER PHELAN is Vice President of the St. Louis Union Trust Company.

EDWARD MURRAY CASE, who studied social and political theory at New York University's Graduate School, is Secretary-Treasurer of a New York manufacturing company. "I am in industry," he writes "because I believe the spectacle of a modern political theorist who has never personally participated in the business and industrial world is ludicrous. I am also in industry because I like the amenities of life." In his spare time Mr. Case is working on a verse play with a political theme.

LEWIS NOR DYKE, a Texas newspaperman, wrote "Baloney in Beef Controls" for the *Freeman* of February 25.

# the FREEMAN

NEW YORK, MONDAY, MARCH 24, 1952

## THE FORTNIGHT

Mr. Truman's message to Congress, and radio and television appeal for a \$7.9 billion additional foreign aid appropriation, were dominantly emotional, sophisticated, and partisan. The nation is entitled to be offered better reasons than a few more rhetorical slogans for giving away nearly \$8 billion more. Mr. Truman made no serious effort to supply these reasons. Instead he invented two extreme alternatives to his program and facetiously knocked them down. Man of Straw No. 1 was immediate "premeditated war" on Russia. No influential group in this country is asking for this. It is irresponsible of the President to talk as if there were one; such a pretense furnishes just the ammunition that Communist propaganda is looking for. Man of Straw No. 2 was "retreating to the Western Hemisphere." Mr. Truman made no attempt to refute, or even to state, any of the real alternatives to his proposed course—as, for example, retaining the Atlantic Treaty, and our heavy commitments under it, but at least having our allies (as in nearly every other peacetime alliance in history) pay for their own armament.

The whole case for an additional \$7 billion for defense aid is that the nations of Europe can not afford to pay for their own defense. No attempt has ever been made to prove this proposition, and no candid examination of the facts sustains it. The real danger is not that Congress will slash this budget too much, but that it will make merely a token cut of a billion or so and blithely appropriate the rest. Surely the time has come when the whole principle involved, as well as the basic facts, must be re-examined.

The State Department's Loyalty and Security Board has been notably lenient with Department employees under inquiry; so lenient, indeed, that it six times cleared John Stewart Service before his removal was finally ordered by the Loyalty Review Board. Now it develops, *mirabile dictu*, that the Department Board reported adversely in the case of Oliver Edmund Clubb, and that its

decision was reversed by Secretary Acheson, on the recommendation of Nathaniel P. Davis, former Minister to Hungary, whom Acheson had appointed to review the Boards' findings.

When this news at last came out, much was made of Mr. Davis's qualifications, the principal argument being that he had been instrumental in securing the release of Robert A. Vogeler by the Hungarian Government. The fact is that the Department—and Mr. Davis—permitted Mr. Vogeler to go through a framed-up trial and thereafter to spend seventeen months in a Budapest jail. Moreover, his release was obtained only after great pressure had been brought to bear on the Department, and then only at the price of humiliating concessions to the Communist Government of Hungary. This is not exactly a record of commendable firmness towards Communism. We think Congress should insist upon knowing a great deal more about Mr. Davis's, and Secretary Acheson's, action in the case of Mr. Clubb.

To match the refined tastes Mr. Acheson must have acquired on his recent trip to Lisbon and Paris, the Administration's James P. Richards, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, threw this truly elegant bouquet: Acheson, said Mr. Richards, "took time by the forelock . . . and brought home the bacon." Lady Time, always fashionable, now wears the poodle cut, no doubt; but the last we heard, that bacon got French-fried in Paris.

As if to irritate American sensibilities beyond repair, recent events have added insult to doubt. A few weeks ago, the Lisbon conference of the NATO powers created a civilian top job, equivalent in authority to that of Eisenhower as military commander—the office of NATO's Secretary General. It was offered first to Sir Oliver Franks, the incumbent British Ambassador to the U.S., and then to Mr. Lester Pearson, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs. Both turned it down. Mr. Pearson thought he could serve his country and the world much better by working in the

Canadian Foreign Office. And Sir Oliver Franks thought a professorship at Oxford more important for the future of mankind than the top job in NATO. Being very reasonable men, Sir Oliver and Mr. Pearson may be entirely right. But if two such outstanding representatives of the British Commonwealth are selfish and wrong, no American can be expected to harbor greater apprehensions and love for the Old World than its indigenous patriots.

We have been keeping score in these pages, from time to time, on Mr. Truman's progress in arming America. It is the strangest kind of progress since that confused building job in Babel. Last October the Pentagon was placing armament orders at a monthly rate of five billion dollars. And what do you think was the placement rate in January 1952, after three more months of Truman progress? Less than three billions—a progress of 40 per cent downward. As to the value of military goods actually delivered, things got snafued somewhere along the line, because the January figure did not drop by a nickel: the same two billion monthly delivery as last September. This oversight, we trust, will soon be corrected by Mr. Truman's many "coordinators."

What confuses us more than anything else, however, is why Mr. Truman was satisfied with a defense budget of only \$85 billion if the annual rate of actual armament expenditures is currently down to \$34 billion. When the 1952 budget was introduced, 75 per cent (\$60 billion) was earmarked for military production. Now that actual procurement has dropped to 40 per cent (\$34 billion) of the defense budget, Mr. Truman, who abides by very special laws of arithmetic, could have been expected to raise his demands proportionately. He still might, for all we know. And if all this sounds peculiar to our readers, they will at least understand what Senator Taft had in mind when he professed a lack of confidence in our Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To our surprise and gratification, the House of Representatives *did* return the Universal Military Training bill to committee—and this despite our lugubrious prediction (see our issue of March 10) that the bill would probably pass. However, UMT might still become a reality if the Senate should decide to take it up again during this session of Congress. If the Senate so acts, we urge close scrutiny of the form of the bill upon our legislators. To begin with, there are valid pragmatic military objections to UMT or at least to many of the versions the bill has taken. *Human Events* quotes Major General John S. Wood (Ret.) as saying that the program "will cost enormous sums of money without providing any security whatever or in any way deterring possible aggressors." And Hanson Baldwin, in the *New York Times*, has pointed out that under UMT as projected "our

regular forces would not be strengthened but weakened, because of additional turnover and the necessity of providing training cadres. . . ."

Another reason for close scrutiny of any newly proposed UMT bill is that such legislation could give the Administration an opportunity to fasten a propagandistic grip on the minds of the young. Administration forces have already tried to put over a version of the bill that would provide for "the administration and discipline of the National Security Training Corps, and for other purposes." Other purposes? Such as proselytizing youth to accept the concept of the Fair Deal State? The "other purposes" might even be expanded to include the compulsory utilization of boys to do a Civilian Conservation Corps type of labor; or to cover the induction of girls or even cripples to do work established as necessary to war preparedness by a civilian commission. As we said in our issue of March 10, UMT, by any functional definition of its terms, means involuntary servitude. Maybe some involuntary servitude is justified in wartime. But as a permanent *peacetime* policy?

Slogan for election day: Let's make it Minkless Tuesday!

## The Freeman Seminar

On the back cover of our issue of January 28, the *Freeman* announced its sponsorship of a seminar on basic social problems to be conducted by Professor Ludwig von Mises from Monday, June 23, through Thursday, July 3, in San Francisco.

Five sessions will be devoted to a critical analysis of Marxian Dialectical Materialism. The other sessions will deal with the problems of saving, investment and the accumulation of capital; demand for capital and the alleged disadvantages of oversaving; and the economic, social and political aspects of foreign investment. The Seminar will meet every weekday, except Saturday, from 5:15 to 7:30 P. M. in the Board Room of the San Francisco Public Library.

Attendance will necessarily be limited, in order that each participant may have an opportunity to take an active part in the discussion. This is to remind our readers that applications must be made before April 1. Blanks for that purpose may be obtained from our editorial offices, 240 Madison Avenue, New York 16. No fees will be charged.

Twelve fellowships will be made available. Each fellow will receive \$100 in addition to his necessary expense for transportation and return if he lives outside the metropolitan area of San Francisco. Applications for fellowships should be made at the same time as applications for admission. In considering applications for fellowships, the editors will give preference to teachers, editors, journalists and graduate students in the social sciences.

# Protecting the Schools

WITH the 6-3 majority decision of the U. S. Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of New York State's Feinberg Law, which prohibits employment in the public schools of persons advocating overthrow of the government by force and violence, we are in full agreement. Since it should be obvious to any intelligent person that no State should be placed under compulsion to hire people who believe in dynamiting the State source of their jobs and income, we don't think we need to plead the correctness of Mr. Justice Minton's majority opinion. But Mr. Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion is something else again: gremlins lurk in the crevices of this document that might be overlooked by people in a hurry. Ostensibly reasonable, Mr. Douglas's utterance actually made little connection with the Feinberg Law itself; in fact, it seemed to us that it proceeded from an inner hysteria that we find particularly prevalent in two areas of American life, the New York-Washington domain of the "intellectuals," and the extension of that domain on certain American university campuses.

"The public school system," said Mr. Justice Douglas, "is in most respects the cradle of our democracy." Some people might want to contest the sweep of this statement, for the American family, with its give-and-take arrangements, is certainly a co-cradle of our democratic system. If we are to assume the truth of the Douglas dictum, however, the assumption must inevitably set up a train of logic that is completely opposite to Douglas's own chain of assertions. In pursuance of our own train of logic, let us say that your child is in the cradle. You, the child's parents, are by nature and tradition assigned the task of providing a responsible overseer of that cradle. You won't be doing your job if you hire somebody who is careless of cradles, or disposed to take money and demand tenure while secretly or openly upholding the right to kick over cradles.

True, you have no right to infringe upon any citizen's rights under the First Amendment. If he so chooses, the citizen is free to say that he despises cradles. He can say it in Union Square, he can say it in any newspaper or magazine that wants to print such sentiments, or he can say it in any private school or college that cares to hire him. But you, the taxpaying parent, have rights, too. As a taxpayer, you are not compelled by any law on the books to hire a hall, or a rostrum, or to rent newspaper space, for your enemy. It's your money that is being spent for cradle-tenders, and the First Amendment says nothing about endowing the State with the power to pick your pocket in order to subsidize people who may want to cut your throat.

As a justice, Mr. Douglas presumably knows

how to read plain words. But if he does, how can he stretch the words of the First Amendment to include a guarantee of tenure in a public job? Free speech is one thing; the conditions of public employment are another, and it is entirely within the domain of the taxpaying voters to set the terms of public employment in any manner they deem fit. To say the voter may not employ an agent on terms of competence that are mutually agreeable to the two parties concerned is to deny the very first principle of democracy.

Mr. Douglas goes on from his cradle metaphor to paint a picture of teachers terrified by the Feinberg legislation. But why should any teacher be terrified unless he has something to hide? If a teacher has made it a practice to join "innocent fronts" and Commie-dominated organizations, it certainly raises a question of his fitness to watch a cradle. Indeed, the prerequisite of a cradle-watcher is that he should be a responsible citizen, not a congenital dupe.

Mr. Douglas implies that under the Feinberg Law no teacher will dare praise Soviet progress in metallurgy in chemistry class, or call Spain's Franco a dictator, or freely discuss the plight of the Okies as depicted in John Steinbeck's "The Grapes of Wrath," or doubt the wisdom of the venture in Korea. Well, can he name one instance of a teacher being in trouble for doing any of these things? We ourselves, as editors, are convinced of Soviet progress in jet airplane production, we insist that Franco is a dictator, we think the Okies in "The Grapes of Wrath" (at least the way Steinbeck stacked the cards) had a poor shake, and we doubt very much the wisdom of the venture in Korea as it is now working out. None of these things could be twisted to prove that we, as editors, believe in the overthrow of the government by force and violence, for we are on record—both in words and by virtue of conduct and associations—as believing in orderly, democratic processes. Simply because we harbor no Marxian second-thoughts on revolution we fear no man from the FBI. And we are sure that New York State's teachers, provided they are all right on the fundamental issue of change by vote versus change by revolutionary violence, have no need to fear anybody, either.

Mr. Justice Douglas is seeing things under the bed. He is a victim, not of "McCarthyism," but of that peculiar penchant of the intellectuals for seeing hobgoblins lurking in any and every exercise of common sense.

While we are on the subject of the Supreme Court and education, we feel we must praise the Court for refusing to disturb the New Jersey laws requiring the reading of the Old Testament in public schools. The Bible, as we have said before,

is a most important part of the cultural heritage of Western man. Moreover, acquaintance with the King James version of the Bible is the proper foundation of any good English prose style. To deprive a child of knowledge of the Bible would be at least as negligent as to deprive him of the opportunity to read Shakespeare.

As libertarians and anti-Statists, the editors of the *Freeman* might be called to task for advocating any system of compulsory education, Feinberg Law or no Feinberg Law, mandatory Bible reading or no mandatory Bible reading. And we would be forced to concede the logical correctness of any such criticism that may be hurled in our direction. In this connection we wish to quote from a broadsheet called *Threefold*, issued by Ralph Courtney at 318 West 56th Street, New York City. Says Mr. Courtney: "If schools are to be free to educate as they may determine, it follows that citizens must also be free, in the name of their inalienable rights, to accept or reject the kind of education that any particular school offers. Thus, the ultimate answer to the educational problem, when all else has been tried, is the *Threefold* proposal that the money available per child for education be paid to the school, whether public or private, of the parents' choice." (Italics ours.)

Mr. Courtney's proposal impresses us as eminently reasonable. If tax money were to be released to the parents of children of school age to spend on the school of their choice, there would be a rapid diminution of all our quarrels over "released time for religious training," or "progressive" versus classical education, and so on. We hope Mr. Courtney can build up some steam behind his movement.

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## The Acheson Magic

UNDOUBTEDLY our greatest Secretary of State since George C. Marshall, Mr. Acheson seems to be afflicted with a negative Midas touch: the moment he concentrates his personal attention on a special area of the world, the place turns to mud. His maladroitness in hatching the Korean war is history. And 48 hours after his pompously triumphant return from Lisbon, the jinx was on again: the French Government (named, if we remember rightly, after one Monsieur Faure) fell over Mr. Acheson's Lisbon achievements, burying under its gossamer weight what he had just praised as a monumental edifice built for the ages.

In his report to the American people (which we saw him deliver on TV with all the sincerity and forthrightness of a Hollywood "dress extra"), the Secretary dwelt with particular pride on the historic progress he and his colleagues had made toward restoring France to her proper eminence in the defense of Europe. This was precisely the kind of boasting a man who suffers from the nega-

tive Midas touch should have avoided. For it was that very "progress" that threw France into her worst political turmoil since Mr. Acheson's French friends of the "third force" exiled General de Gaulle from power. But even if the latest government crisis were no more serious than the last twenty or thirty, an analytical glance at the French contortions seems appropriate.

France is indeed essential to the consolidation of Europe which this country so commendably professes to desire. Unless France is passionately resolved to fight for itself, the Continent can not be successfully held against a first sweep from the East—though perhaps in some dim future it could be "liberated" once more by an avalanche of U.S. invasion forces. In the kaleidoscope of General Eisenhower's Parisian SHAPE, the multi-colored army splinters of Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Portugal may form pretty pictures, but the military value of a coalition among such junior-sized countries is of course preposterously small. European defense forces will either form around the only two potentially strong continental nations, France and Germany, or there will be no European defense forces. And the emotional mortgage of the last war being what it is, there can be no rearmament of western Germany before France regains her national poise and her military resoluteness.

This, one would think, is elementary. And yet U.S. foreign policy under George C. Marshall and Dean Acheson has never grasped the ABC prerequisites to continental defense; or else it has knowingly neglected them for other objectives—"social reform," for instance. Since 1947 American economic and political aid to France has been thrown behind the one group that congenitally perpetuates the French malaise of "pacifistic" knee-weakness—the "third force." And the group that carries some promise of a national revival and military rebirth—General de Gaulle's "Rally of the French People"—has been consistently rejected and openly snubbed by the field representatives of our State Department.

Mr. Acheson's "third force" is in France an especially despicable aggregation of all that is feeble and foul about contemporary "progressivism." In its domestic policies, particularly in regard to the social reform it purports to advocate, the French "third force" was never anything but a mutual insurance conspiracy of incredibly selfish pressure groups bent on preserving an evil protectionism and proverbially corrupt tax practices. In its foreign policies, this "third force" (and especially its Socialist pillar) always tried to outdo the record of British Labor under Neville Chamberlain—a record of rare irresponsibility which was once aptly satirized with the apocryphal Party slogan "Resist Aggression and Stop Arming!"

General de Gaulle's "Rally," on the other side, has remained handicapped by the traditional pro-

vincialism of French nationalists. The sincerity of their desire to put France above the freemasonry of entrenched pressure groups is as unquestionable as their growing comprehension of the Communist peril. But, still nursing the studied humiliations Franklin D. Roosevelt so unnecessarily put upon him during the last war, de Gaulle has relapsed more and more dangerously into a primitive anti-Americanism as the U. S. Ambassador has more and more openly held hands with the "third-force" phonies. We do not argue that it was ever any business of the U. S. State Department to put de Gaulle into power. But it never was our business to aid and abet the very French politicians whose stock in trade is keeping France weak.

Though we have poured billions into the pit of its bankruptcy, the French "third force" evaporates in a puff of infamous irrelevancy; and we have pushed General de Gaulle into a deplorable attitude of provincialism and anti-American petulancy.

Nor are the appalling French results of Acheson's "third-force" policy confined to Europe. When the French Parliament was put to the lenient test of picking up the bill for a measly twelve divisions in NATO (about one-eighth of normal French army potential before 1939), the "third force" not only walked out on NATO but threatened to liquidate the French position in Indo-China. And it seems indeed quite possible that the collapse of Mr. Acheson's French intimates is to include their desertion of one of the last two or three remaining anti-Soviet bastions in Asia.

In short, hardly had Mr. Acheson started flying his French balloon when the toy burst all over the place. If Dean Acheson ever feels tempted to follow the modish trend and pick a sonorous middle name, we suggest Sadim. It's Midas, appropriately spelled backwards.

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## **The Phantom Army**

*[The following editorial from the London Times of February 26 represents an authoritative European judgment of the results achieved at Lisbon.]*

**I**T IS difficult to understand either the meaning or the purpose of the communiqué published by the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty in Lisbon. This states in words which seem almost to have been chosen for their ambiguity—they have no other virtue—that the member nations will provide this year 'approximately fifty divisions in appropriate conditions of combat readiness.' Only the most ingenuous will suppose that General Eisenhower will in fact have fifty divisions ready and able to fight in Europe by the end of the year. The exact figures are rightly secret, but the present force is generally believed to be rather less than half that number. Since no

German divisions will be raised this year, since contributions from Greece and Turkey are not included in this total, and since France has been allowed to reduce her contribution from fourteen to twelve, it is not easy to see how this figure can be substantially increased. Certainly Britain is not going to send more divisions to Europe this year, and it would be surprising indeed if the United States were to fill the gap.

"The explanation probably is that the phrase 'in appropriate conditions of combat readiness' is meant to include not only divisions fully trained and equipped for war but other divisions half-trained and half-equipped, reserve divisions like our own Territorial units, and yet other divisions which so far exist only on paper. No doubt it is necessary to plan for such an expansion, but it is less obvious why it should be announced in this airy fashion.

"Presumably the announcement was meant to impress someone; but it will not impress the Russians, who know very well the true state of affairs and who have the sense to realize that any real plans for real divisions would be kept secret. Indeed this imaginative total, with the still more imaginative promise of 85 or 100 divisions in two years time, seems to contain the maximum amount of provocation with the minimum amount of deterrent effect. Perhaps it was meant to impress the European nations themselves, who will thus feel that something is being done on the grand scale to justify their effort and expense. Unfortunately it is more likely to have the directly opposite effect of creating a sense of false security and of glossing over weaknesses and omissions in the existing arrangements for defense. Even if it is meant only to impress the American Congress—and the whole communiqué has a very American ring—it may fail in its object for there is likely to be a sharp reaction when the American people realize that the fifty promised divisions do not really mean fifty divisions and that much money and effort will still be needed if Europe is to be made safe.

"Part of the trouble is no doubt caused by a mistaken attempt to combine military security with political propaganda. The Atlantic community, it is felt, should behave in an open democratic way. To be effective, however, military planning, as the Americans are well aware when dealing with such matters as atomic energy, requires a measure of secrecy. To escape from this dilemma the Atlantic Council has apparently hit on the device of a kind of mock publicity which pretends to tell everything while revealing nothing and boasts of divisions in nice round numbers of fifty or 100 without giving away any vital information. It is a bad device because it effectively hides both the real progress that has been made and the weakness that must be made good. It also suggests that the planners, who as recently as November were talking quite happily of forty divisions in 1952, and

who are now asking for fifty instead and for 85 or 100 in 1954, do not really know what they want or what they need. Such erratic reckoning bears no evident relation to the real and calculable danger which has to be faced in Europe."

## Sound and Fury

IN ITS issue of March 1 the *Saturday Evening Post* commented editorially on the furious resistance of the liberal intelligentsia to any exposure of Communist infiltration which at the same time exposes their own past gullibility. Three days after the editorial appeared, the *New York Times* neatly illustrated its point in an editorial attacking the McCarran Subcommittee on Internal Security and urging people to read the statement which Owen Lattimore had "finally managed to get into the committee record."

There are people well qualified to judge the committee's work who say that the five published volumes of its record constitute a remarkably fair and well-documented exposé of Communist influence on the shaping of our Far Eastern policy. The Committee has had before it such reliable and distinguished Americans as Harold E. Stassen, Eugene H. Dooman, Professor Kenneth C. Colegrove, Admiral Charles Maynard Cook and Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer—to name only a few. And even a cursory reading of their testimony is enough to convince any American of average intelligence that our disastrous Far Eastern policy has reflected something far more sinister than the mere stupidity of the men who made it. But what says the *New York Times*, which has strangely played down the anti-Communist witnesses? Why, that the Committee "has thus far given many people less an impression of wanting to uncover all the facts than of wanting to 'get' some individuals and organizations with whom it disagrees on Far Eastern affairs"; and that "what the investigation has apparently succeeded in doing has been to build up a corrosive atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion throughout the country and particularly within the Government of the United States."

The *Times* editors wouldn't want to be understood as suggesting that the conduct of our foreign policy should be immune from inquiry. Oh, dear, no! They only urge that "neither institutions nor individuals be pilloried." Yet they do not themselves hesitate to pillory the subcommittee and its chairman ("the frenetic efforts of Senator McCarran"), obviously without inquiry even into their own news columns, which on the day their editorial appeared revealed that Owen Lattimore had already admitted having three times testified falsely.

One has only to consider the record of the *Times* for that "fairness and objectivity" which it demands in the conduct of Congressional in-

quiries, to realize that the *Post* editorial might well have been written with its editors in mind. For years both Communists and "liberals" have outrageously smeared good Americans on the right of center without causing even a ripple of excitement in the *Times* editorial columns. For example, Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. a few months ago, as this paper pointed out, gratuitously smeared William Henry Chamberlin, John T. Flynn and former President Hoover. The *Times* did not see fit to remind Professor Schlesinger of the virtues of "fairness and objectivity," even though his smear of Mr. Hoover—and Lewis L. Strauss's answer proving that the Harvard historian had taken liberties with history—appeared in its own hospitable letter columns. While one such oversight might be condoned as just that, it is lamentably true that such oversights have become the rule in a paper which carries "fairness and objectivity" toward the left so far that it urged its readers to bear in mind that Alger Hiss had been convicted "only" of perjury, and ignored the fact that the perjury concerned espionage.

One need go no further, really, than Mr. Lattimore's statement which the *Times* commended to its readers, for an excellent illustration of this curious deafness to scurrility from the left. The document was peppered with epithets abusing people whom Mr. Lattimore does not like. Louis F. Budenz, for example, was "a glib liar" and "an immoral man" (this last grave accusation based on an unpublished document which Lattimore admitted he had never read). Harold E. Stassen was "a roadshow McCarthy" and McCarthy himself "the Wisconsin whimperer." And Lattimore, who did not hesitate to smear Mr. Budenz on hearsay evidence, accused the Committee itself of giving haven to "a nightmare of outrageous lies, shaky hearsay and undisguised personal spite." If such language had been applied to Mr. Lattimore by any of his critics, what term do you think the *Times* would have used in rebuke? You've guessed it: "McCarthyism."

The anti-anti-Communists, says the *Post*, "have smeared and sniped at anybody whose testimony has helped destroy the myth that there was no Communist conspiracy in this country and that if there was it didn't involve nice people." The *Times*, indicting the McCarran Committee, laments that "Reputations have been destroyed and careers have been ruined." We don't for a minute think the *Times* would put the protection of a Communist collaborator, however "nice," above the protection of the American people. Its editors just can't face the repeatedly demonstrated fact that "nice people" have been involved in the Communist conspiracy. Until they do, and until they admit that among those fighting that conspiracy are honest people who also have reputations and careers which can be—and have been—hurt, their demands for "fairness and objectivity" will signify nothing.



# Eisenhower vs. Taft—The Vital Issue

By LAWRENCE R. BROWN

*The most momentous issue that has ever confronted the American nation, says Mr. Brown, is that between internationalism and "isolationism" — or more properly, nationalism. He analyzes that issue, considers the Eisenhower and Taft candidacies in relation to it, and finds for Taft on the unorthodox ground that only a strong American nationalism can save the world from communism. In our issue of April 21 John Henshaw Crider will present the case for General Eisenhower.*

THE CAMPAIGN for the Republican Presidential nomination has narrowed to a choice between Eisenhower and Taft. While a deadlocked convention might turn to a third candidate, such a contingency is so unlikely in present-day politics that no one can wisely count upon it. In any event, the choice of a Republican candidate involves the same basic issues that are at stake between Taft and Eisenhower.

Despite the difficulty of arriving at a useable knowledge of Eisenhower the man as distinct from the military figure, we are still not foreclosed from establishing an intelligible basis of comparison between the two men. The mystery that surrounds Eisenhower does not extend to his supporters. The acknowledged ambiguity about his stand on domestic matters does not extend to his views on foreign affairs.

Eisenhower's main support comes from the international liberals. Indeed the only important reason offered for his candidacy is the statement of his supporters that he agrees with them on foreign affairs. They believe in international cooperation, in unifying the "free world" against Communist aggression. These, at least, are the slogans of the internationalists, and even though our foreign problems are more complex than they might lead one to suppose, we know the policies that go with the slogans. The internationalists, whose candidate Eisenhower is, clearly expect him as President not only to talk their slogans but to carry out their policies. We can do no less.

Since Eisenhower is the candidate of the internationalists, Taft becomes automatically the candidate of their opponents who, however they dislike the name, are known as the isolationists. The name is of course meaningless. The opponents of American internationalism have been tagged with it by the internationalists themselves. Like so many other epithets hurled in wrath or derision by political opponents, it has become in time merely a proper name, that is, only a non-committal label.

Taft, to be sure, is not the isolationists' first

choice, but they vastly prefer him to Eisenhower. The internationalists, on the other hand, hate him only less than they hate MacArthur. Thus an unmistakable difference in foreign policy is clearly revealed. The requirements of political debate may at times soften the precise expression of this issue, but that does not diminish the real differences in the foreign policies that each would try to carry out as President. Even Presidents are to a considerable extent the creatures of the political factions that raise them to office. The politician who says one thing in a campaign and does another after election is perhaps every politician. But the politician who betrays the fundamental political tenet of the group that brought him to power is almost unknown. No one is so strong that he stands alone. If nothing else, the right of access to the President, which only the winning faction really enjoys, insures that its side, and only its side, will be skilfully and persistently expressed to the chief.

In these things the political instinct of masses of people is perhaps a surer guide to a candidate's position than a lawyer's analysis of his campaign statements. This instinct has identified Eisenhower as the internationalist candidate and Taft, his chief opponent, as the isolationist candidate—a moderate isolationist if you like, but still, in contrast to Eisenhower, an isolationist.

## An Old Conflict Renewed

Whether we like it or not, therefore, the Taft-Eisenhower campaign and thus the election of '52 appears to renew the old conflict between the internationalists and the isolationists. It is a profound conflict involving more consequences for the future, or even the survival, of the United States than any other that could arise. To consider the desirability of either Taft or Eisenhower as President requires a reexamination of the isolationist-internationalist issue in order to gauge the practical consequences of conferring power on either faction in a world dominated by Soviet imperial ambition.

The isolationist-internationalist conflict has been going on in American politics for a generation, yet its present form is not too well understood. Possibly because it has become traditional, we accept its declared issue at face value in preference to exploring the meaning in the present-day world of each of these two approaches to American foreign policy.

The names alone are confusing. Taken at face value, they are absurd. The isolationists are supposed to be those who feel that the United

States has no serious foreign problems and can ignore the rest of the world. But if mere nomenclature were significant, it should then have been the internationalists who followed with growing concern the disasters consequent upon our Asiatic policy and who worried whether a powerful Soviet apparatus in our midst might be trying to influence our policy-makers. But it has not been such Senators as Lodge, Saltonstall, Morse, Duff, Tobey—that is, the Eisenhower camp—who have raised these problems. Quite the contrary, it has been the isolationists and Taft himself. Both factions, it seems, are equally interested in foreign relations, but not quite in the same relations. Yet something more than a difference of compass bearings must divide them.

### Some Necessary Reflections on the Past

American internationalism began as a political movement in the early years of the first World War. It has an unbroken tradition from that time. Its preconceptions about the nature of a world society, its proposed solutions to the international difficulties that it observes—it does not observe all of them—are still those with which it began. Like almost all human institutions, it is bound by the conditions that brought it into being.

It is easy to recall the political conditions surrounding the origin of this internationalism. The opening phase of the first World War, the phase of limited, concrete objectives, had ended in Anglo-French defeat. The problem was whether these powers could win a war of unlimited objectives—a war for world peace and democracy—which was the alternative to limited defeat, but involved the risk of unlimited defeat. It was manifest that complete Allied victory could be achieved only with full American support. It was equally manifest that the resulting world situation would be beyond the power of England and France to maintain. The United States could perhaps have tolerated a limited Allied defeat, but it could not wisely permit an unlimited defeat; and we were perhaps too unskilled to see any third possibility.

Hence the opening concrete program of American internationalism: unlimited support for belligerent England and France; and at the close of the war a League of Nations, to maintain by other means than the arms and wealth of those two powers a settlement satisfactory to them and to ourselves. Naturally, this proposition was not expressed with such immodest bluntness, but memory and reflection will reveal that this was in substance the internationalist program of the first World War.

Nor was the program without justification. We had always had two traditions: one of continental isolation, remote and apparently safe between our two oceans; the other, more subtle but perhaps more powerful, of economic and to some extent social integration into the nineteenth-cen-

tury British mercantile empire—an association in which we had grown great and strong. Our internationalists of 1916 simply carried the latter tradition an obvious step further. Our welfare having been tied to that of the British mercantile empire, when that empire was endangered our self-interest appeared to require our giving it unrestricted support.

This conviction, rarely so frankly put, has always been at the base of internationalist thought. True to its origin, American internationalism—the great body of Eisenhower's supporters, the men who would surround him as President—sees the international relations of the United States as though we faced today the same underlying world problems that had to be decided in 1916. It is our role to be, as then, the great *assistant* to others. In assisting them adequately we effect our own security. This view of the world is the foundation of loyal American internationalism. It is not the view of all the internationalists, for there are some to whom the existence of the United States is of no interest, or even objectionable; but it is the basic view of those internationalists who do treasure the survival of the United States.

Now it is true that Germany in 1914 and in 1939 could not politically or militarily bypass western Europe and attack us directly. Since this was impossible, and furthermore pointless because our defeat would not alone have given Germany world victory, it was entirely correct to consider this country secure so long as England and France were secure. To prevent their overthrow was to guarantee our own safety.

But today the Soviet Empire can bypass western Europe and strike at us directly. And such an attack would be intelligent, for our defeat would give the Kremlin world mastery. To reach us, it is no longer necessary to dispose of others first. To dispose of others, it is now sufficient to dispose of us first.

### The Roles Reversed

This is the changed world situation that has bankrupted American internationalism. Its traditions forbid its conceiving that the destruction of the United States could be the first and essential, not the second and incidental, goal of anyone's ambition. Since it can not conceive of this as a political reality, it can not grasp the strategic importance of any other world area than western Europe. It can not comprehend the evidence of Soviet actions which leave no doubt that the Soviet Empire in the pursuit of world dominion understands its first and only serious task to be the destruction of the United States.

Time and fate have thus deprived American internationalism of its one-time patriotic role. It once sought to protect the United States from the manifestly dangerous consequence of a sudden overthrow of the British Empire. Today such

a policy has no meaning, and its continued pursuit brings the day nearer and nearer when the Soviet Empire will be strong enough to annihilate the United States and then pick up the rest of the world unopposed. The internationalism that once sought to serve American welfare now quite unintentionally threatens our very existence.

Time has worked a parallel reversal with the isolationists; so much so that they would more properly be called nationalists if logic rather than custom determined the names of movements. True, to some they seem like men who from a false premise derive by unsound reasoning a correct answer. But their great asset in the present circumstances is that they have never been interested in defending anybody but the United States. They have never thought it necessary to do so, and though this may once have been an incorrect view, the vast political revolutions of the past forty years have made it true.

The necessity of keeping the Soviet Empire out of western Europe is as clear to the isolationists as to the internationalists. But where the internationalists see this as all that is needed to make the United States secure, the isolationists, as nationalists, see it as merely one, and not necessarily the most important, of several approaches by which the Soviet Empire seeks to attack us. Thus the internationalists, despite their name, have been almost indifferent to the Soviet conquests in Asia. These were not blows at western Europe—or at least the European governments were not disposed so to regard them—and hence to the internationalists they could not threaten the United States. To the isolationists, however, the Soviet advance in Asia is an advance toward Seattle, Chicago and Pittsburgh; therefore, it strikes at us and threatens our very life.

### **A Culture for Certain Germs**

One other grave matter is concealed within the isolationist-internationalist issue in the Taft-Eisenhower contest. Granting, as we certainly must, that there are in our midst unidentified members of the Soviet policy apparatus (the Soviet espionage apparatus does not concern us here), certain deductions can be drawn about their behavior. First, if they are to influence government policy—as their job requires—they can not be utterly obscure. They need not be widely known, but they must have access to important editors and government officials. Second, each of them must have an ostensible political view of his own. None can be admittedly a Soviet agent frankly following Kremlin policy. None can be such a political eunuch that he seems never to have any political views at all. Where in the various factions of American politics can the Soviet policy agent find a safe shelter?

A Soviet military spy might announce himself as an isolationist if he found it useful in obtaining the type of information he was charged to

get. To be sure, the Soviet spies thus far arrested have never done this, but it is at least conceivable. But it is not conceivable that a Soviet policy agent could so disguise himself. When Soviet plans called for the conquest of China, one of their American agents could not join the isolationist demand for greater support to the Nationalists. An agent obliged to take a stand in apparent opposition to Soviet interests would have had to argue that the defense of Europe was more important than that of Asia. He would have had to pose as an internationalist.

For other reasons also, internationalism has been the natural nesting ground for Soviet policy agents. Any weakening of the United States, any veto power over our freedom of action, any waste of our strength, was precisely what Soviet policy desired; and more than one internationalist project, whatever its aim, had no other effect. In this company, a Soviet agent seemed only another ardent internationalist, motivated like the rest by the verbal formulae of world idealism.

No one can doubt that the loyal internationalists despise these Soviet agents as much as the rest of the country. But they may fear them somewhat less. Also, there is no handy way to detect a Soviet policy agent among the sincere, misinformed, emotional international idealists. Both have the same short-run objective—the internationalization of the United States—though they seek it for different reasons. Unfortunately, by the time the emotional internationalist discovers that his ideal serves not his purpose but the Soviet Empire's, it may be too late to matter.

### **By Their Fruits . . .**

Such is the substance of the choice between Taft and Eisenhower. Is it wise for the United States to continue a foreign policy that no longer makes sense when we are the sole power whose destruction is prerequisite to the fulfillment of Soviet ambitions? Is it wise to continue a foreign policy to which Soviet policy agents can partly subscribe and behind which they can disguise their real activity?

Even if Eisenhower were not the candidate of the internationalists, his own record would occasion grave misgivings if analyzed in reference to these two questions. When our national life is threatened by the Soviet Empire, the whole political group that aided Soviet expansion becomes not, of course, suspect but of doubtful value in resisting the final triumph of the Empire they have done so much to strengthen. The convenient apology that the Soviet Empire just grew and that American policy in no way aided its expansion can not stand serious examination. Our China policy, our German policy, our policy toward the satellites; none of these was inevitable, though each was the flower of the internationalists' faith that the United States can never be directly menaced. The mere plea that nothing could have

been done to make the Soviet Empire less a menace is in itself a confession of incompetence. Human affairs are never so rigidly conditioned as that. Some steps could have been taken that would have left us today stronger and the Soviet Empire weaker. These steps were not taken. Either they were not seen, or they were not desired. In either case, the men who failed to take them should not be in charge of our present deadly struggle with the Soviet Empire.

It can not be denied that Eisenhower never questioned those men. How often—if at all—he made important political decisions is unknown. But we do know that the American policy-makers who assisted the rise of the Soviet Empire—whatever their motive or their degree of awareness of what they were doing—were the men who gave Eisenhower his commands. That they would have given such controlling commands to a man whose views on world policy—that is, at bottom, on Soviet-American relations—differed sharply from their own, is highly improbable. In any case, until Eisenhower can demonstrate otherwise we have a right to suppose that during the critical years of American-aided Soviet expansion he was one of those who believed this policy desirable. If he did not, he could begin by disavowing the views of Marshall's memorandum at the first Quebec conference that Russia ". . . must be given every assistance and every effort must be made to gain her friendship"—not to help defeat Germany, but as a permanent postwar policy.

When Eisenhower, with his record, comes forward as the candidate of the internationalists, we have every reason to doubt that he is the man best qualified to lead the United States in its life-and-death struggle with the Empire he and his superiors helped to make so powerful. Even were he and all his supporters to make humble public acknowledgment that their political calculations were totally and dangerously wrong—which they are not likely to do—that still would not make him a desirable President. He would still be a man who had been unable to see vital American interests through the emotional slogans of war and the plausible subtleties of Soviet sympathizers.

And if he does not make an acknowledgement of error, how can we suppose that he does not still subscribe to the "assist Russia" school of thought? How can we suppose his Administration would not continue the same fundamental policies that have turned central Europe and China over to the Soviet Empire, that tomorrow will turn over Japan, Indonesia and the Near East and the day after will end the existence of the United States?

For with the internationalists as the triumphant faction under Eisenhower as President it would be their interpretation of events—the interpretation today controlling the Truman Administration—that reached the President and guided his decisions. It would be the patriotism

of defending the United States at second remove—not because of any flaw of courage or honor but because the internationalists by their traditions, their habits of mind, their natural egos which make them continue to justify a long-held position, are geared only to defend others first.

From this dangerous pass we have only one escape: a President who is not the creature and candidate of the internationalists. By the present political odds, Taft appears to be that man. With Eisenhower we would place in power one of the key men of the group whose policies brought us where we are. We would continue to follow an internationalist policy that no longer makes sense since we alone are now the prime target of the Soviet Empire. We would also continue in power a group which, because it has no means of detecting Soviet enemies in its midst, has for years sheltered and nurtured the Soviet policy apparatus assigned to the task of destroying the United States.

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## It Was Mortifying

**P**OSSIBLY there is a clue, in similar bits of testimony of Owen Lattimore and E. C. Carter, to the psychological factors which led Alger Hiss to betray his country while in its service. Maybe he just got tired of being a wallflower.

From the Tydings Committee record:

DR. LATTIMORE: I met Alger Hiss very slightly during the late 1930s, when he was in the office of Dr. Stanley Hornbeck in the Department of State. I used to go in occasionally to see Dr. Hornbeck, and Mr. Hiss was sitting in the outer office.

From the McCarran Committee record:

MR. CARTER: . . . Hiss, as Hornbeck's secretary, sat in the outer office and made appointments for him. . . . Repeatedly when I wanted to discuss with Dr. Hornbeck something, I would go along to the State Department office and Hornbeck was behind on his schedule and the receptionist would say "Well, here is Mr. Hiss," and I would chat with him . . . and then go in and see Hornbeck . . . He [Hiss] was clearly nothing more than a stenographer.

Frederick Vanderbilt Field is another one of those who claim to have been running over to Dr. Hornbeck's office every once in a while and talking things over with him. "I recall very vividly knowing . . . Dr. Stanley Hornbeck," Field told the McCarran Committee. But he apparently paid no mind to the "stenographer" sitting in the "outer office," and said he never had met Alger Hiss.

It must have been galling—people forever wanting to see Dr. Hornbeck and nobody ever wanting to see the brilliant young man who had made a name for himself as special counsel in the Nye munitions probe. It was just Hornbeck, Hornbeck, all day long. Enough to sour any one named after Horatio Alger.

BURTON RASCOE

# Assault on American Sovereignty

By JOSEPH H. BALLEW

*The Constitutional rights and liberties of Americans are endangered by the UN Charter and Covenants which a Federal Court decision has held to be the supreme law of the land. Mr. Ballew advocates measures to defeat this threat.*

**T**HE WORLD'S most astounding phenomenon is not the fission of the atom, but the open and notorious effort of our national leaders to trick the American people into exchanging a proved formula for successful living for the worn-out, ineffective, and, in many instances, brutally criminal economic and political philosophies which have enslaved the peoples of Europe for more than a century. The means for accomplishing this enslavement are found in the United Nations Charter and the activities of its committees and organizations.

As time has gone by, and as the United States has been called upon to spend more and more of its blood and wealth in an effort to uphold this world peace organization, doubts have been engendered in our minds regarding both the effectiveness of the United Nations and its aims. It has become material that we discover, if possible, just what it is we have helped to create, and what obligations we have assumed in ratifying the UN Charter.

It is essential, first, that we look to the provisions of our Constitution relating to the making and ratifying of treaties, in order to determine just how binding the Charter is. Article VI of the Constitution provides:

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.

In Norton's "The Constitution of the United States, Its Sources and Its Application" we find that

the laws of the Congress are not the supreme law of the land unless they "shall be made in pursuance thereof"—of the Constitution. But the treaty is the supreme law of the land when made under the authority of the United States—that is, when negotiated by the President and ratified by the Senate.

Hence the repeated query: just how far have we obligated ourselves in ratifying the United Nations Charter? What rights, privileges and liberties have we surrendered, if any?

Some light can be obtained from a statement of the President, contained in "Our Foreign Policy" (a Department of State publication) to the

effect that "The status quo is not sacred, but we can not allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations . . ."

If this statement means anything, it is that however detrimental existing conditions may be to the interest—even the lives—of the American people, these conditions can not be remedied if the remedy is in violation of some provision of the UN Charter. Under this interpretation the Charter is a strait-jacket limiting the conduct of the American people.

In a publication of the United States Department of State (4298, August 1951) we are told that "the United Nations is not a world government. It is a democratic society of sovereign nations." This statement is followed by a list of purposes, beginning:

. . . to build the conditions that will favor peaceful and friendly relations among peoples; to raise the world standard of living; to fight cooperatively against hunger, illiteracy, and disease and to establish the rights and dignity of men. The UN agencies are already working on the problems of law, trade and technical development that must be solved for these purposes.

It is difficult to determine just what this interpretation means. The language used is general, and even if correct, still leaves us without information regarding the powers of the organization, or what limitation there may be to such powers.

Recently a member of the Congress stated that Section VI of the Constitution

never contemplated that in approving a treaty and recognizing it as the supreme law of the land, that any such treaty would go beyond the affairs between nations. It was never contemplated that any such treaty would reach down and control the affairs of states within the United States.

**T**HIS IS reassuring. However, in the case of *Sei Fujii vs. The State of California*, the U.S. District Court of Appeals held that the laws of California relating to the ownership of land by aliens were of no force and effect, because those laws were in conflict with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948. In plain words, the Court held that the UN Charter is the supreme law of the land.

Did the American people contemplate that their support of the UN Charter as a means for peace would annul every law, state or national, that might be in conflict with that Charter?

The opinion of the California Court goes further than merely declaring the UN Charter to be the supreme law of the land. It says, in effect,

that the Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations in December 1948, more than two years after the original charter received the Senate's approval, becomes a part of the original document and, consequently, the amendment is also the supreme law of the land. The Court said:

A perusal of the charter renders it manifest that restrictions contained in the alien land law are in direct conflict with the plain terms of the charter above quoted and with the purposes announced therein by its framers. It is incompatible with Article 17 of the Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims the right of every one to own property. . . . The alien land law must therefore yield to the treaty as the superior authority.

Article 108 of Chapter 18 of the UN Charter provides that amendments

shall come into force for all members of the organization when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

Simply stated, two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including two-thirds of the members of the Security Council, can adopt any provision they wish, and without regard to its effect on the Constitutional rights of the American or any other people. This throws considerable light on the statement of the President relative to changing the status quo, and also the opinion of the California Court.

**L**ET'S look at another section of the Constitution. Article I, Section 8, provides: "The Congress shall have power . . . to declare war . . . to raise and support armies . . . to provide and maintain a Navy . . ."

Notwithstanding this explicit provision, when the Government of North Korea committed an act of aggression against the Republic of South Korea, the President of the United States, on June 27, 1950, responded to the direction of the United Nations and committed United States troops to that conflict. According to a release of the Department of State for United Nations Day, 1951, "the Security Council . . . called upon member states to help repel the attack. The United States immediately ordered its forces into action."

From time immemorial it has been held that under the Constitutional provision Congress alone has power to declare war. The question is not whether we should have gone to the relief of Korea, but who had the authority to determine our entrance into that conflict?

Just how our government construes its obligations under the UN Charter is shown by a speech delivered by the Secretary of State before the United Nations General Assembly, September 20, 1950. Mr. Acheson said:

From the outset the United States has given its full support to the actions of this Assembly and of the Security Council. We shall continue to support the decisions of the United Nations as the future course of events unfolds. We shall do our full part to maintain the impressive unity which has thus far been demonstrated in Korea.

This statement is in keeping with the decision of the Court in the California case—the UN Charter is the supreme law of the land. The same construction was emphasized by Rep. John T. Wood of Idaho in a speech delivered before the U. S. Flag Committee on October 10, 1951. He said:

The Constitutional right of Congress to declare war has been completely transferred to the Military Committee of the United Nations, both in foreign countries, as well as those comprised in the Atlantic Pact. Articles 43 to 51, inclusive, leave little doubt of the fact that the United Nations now has the power to order us into war at any time, without the consent of Congress. What we have done in the acceptance of the United Nations is to take away from Congress the power to say when, where, and with whom, we may engage in war. In the name of the United Nations we may bring freedom to a foreign nation; but we shall have lost our own.

The idea of the American people in supporting the United Nations Charter was the outlawing of war forever. We are not interested in a world government. We were not seeking to destroy the basic freedoms enjoyed by every American citizen, but were interested only in the right of every man to live his own life, according to his own wishes, and under such a government as he might establish. How far did this motive control in the organization of the United Nations?

The Charter of the United Nations was the handiwork of Alger Hiss, assisted by Molotov of Russia and by Harry Dexter White, cited before the Committee on Un-American Activities as a fellow-traveler who directly aided Communist espionage. Edward Stettinius was Secretary of State.

An examination of the whole Charter shows the predominating thought—to establish a "one-world" government. An examination of the Department of State publication, "The United Nations Today," shows the broad fields of world activity in which the United Nations exerts its powers.

In seeking to meet the criticism that the United Nations is attempting to attain and enforce world powers, its adherents point to Article 2 (7) which provides:

Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.

The trick words in this provision are "present charter." It can not be argued that this is a permanent prohibition against encroachment in state affairs; if so, many of the activities now carried on by the UN would be illegal. The only

sensible construction is that when once a matter becomes, in one way or another, a part of the charter, then the UN ceases to be bound by the restriction, at least to the extent of the newly adopted matter. This was, no doubt, the idea of the Court in the California case, else it would not have held that the Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations two years after the original charter was ratified by the Senate, was a part of the original instrument.

**N**OTWITHSTANDING the provision of the UN Charter regarding amendments, and the holding of the Court in the California case, the President has submitted to the Senate for ratification—with his approval—the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Assuming that the Senate still has the power to approve or reject the Declaration, it merits our study—particularly as it relates to the freedoms enunciated in our Bill of Rights.

The first article of the Bill of Rights provides:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

This is one of the most cherished liberties of the America people. Men have fought and died for its protection and preservation. It is interesting to note what the UN Covenant of Human Rights would do to this provision.

The Declaration, after first stating that every one has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, provides (Art. 13):

Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

What freedom of religious thought and practice would be left to us if this provision should be ratified by the Senate? There is no basis of comparison between the "shall not" of the Constitutional provision on religious freedom and the "shall . . . only" of the Declaration. A right that is subject to the whims and fancies of those in power as to what limitations shall be imposed on its exercise, is in no sense a right. It is a figment of the imagination—or a vicious attempt to deceive.

The Bill of Rights further forbids and prohibits the Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." The UN Declaration of Human Rights (Article 14, Par. 3 of the Covenant) provides:

The right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas carries with it special duties and responsibilities and may therefore be subject to certain penalties, liabilities and restrictions, but these shall be such only as are provided by law and are necessary for the protection of national security, public order, safety, health or morals or of the rights, freedom or reputations of others.

As an editorial in the Cincinnati *Enquirer* pointed out: "This is the end of freedom of speech and the press if the Senate ratifies it."

The Covenant of Human Rights is filled with provisions of this nature. It constitutes a "wolf in sheep's clothing" in so far as our liberties are concerned.

**T**HE EXTENT of the refusal of UN adherents to recognize the fundamental provisions of our Constitution is forcibly emphasized by the Convention for the prevention and punishment of genocide. The people of the United States have never condoned acts against human beings—either individuals, races or nations—that are contrary to the moral law and abhorrent to all who have a regard for decency; but this Convention, like all the UN proposals here discussed, must be considered in the light of our form of government. This is the position taken by an outstanding committee of the American Bar Association, which made a study of the Genocide Convention and pointed out the pertinent fact:

When it is borne in mind that the rights as embodied in the first ten amendments are a restraint on our Federal government—rights which every citizen inherently has against the United States and which it does not possess and can not give away—how can that government by treaty, or otherwise, delegate the punishment of a crime, which can become such only by act of Congress, to an international tribunal?

In the case of any crime which Congress has defined and for which it has prescribed the punishment, an American citizen is entitled in an American court to all the safeguards set forth in the Constitution.

But this would not be true if the Senate should ratify (provided that is necessary) the Genocide Convention.

The Convention states:

The Convention should make provision for effective measures compelling states to deliver to the international authority all persons guilty of acts of genocide, regardless of the personal status of such persons.

No wonder the American Bar Association's Committee recommended that the Genocide Convention "shall not be ratified by the United States." Such ratification would destroy the Constitutional provisions safeguarding the trial of persons charged with an offense against the public.

Mr. Frank E. Holman, an attorney with a worldwide reputation, and former President of the American Bar Association, has emphasized in these words the dangers we face because of our ratification of the UN Charter:

Every dictatorship could readily approve the abridgement of free speech and free press as now set forth in the Covenant on Human Rights. The present draft has been approved by the State Department. If ratified, the standards set by such a treaty will become international law for the conduct of nations and domestic law for the citizens of each American state. The State Department's only defense is that compromise is necessary to obtain international agreement. Haven't we had

enough compromise and appeasement at Yalta and elsewhere? Shall we now sacrifice fundamental principles of free speech and press for the sake of compromise?

If experience teaches any lesson it is that you can not "compromise" with evil.

Senator Bricker of Ohio has introduced a resolution (S.177) which, if adopted by the Senate, would advise the President of the United States that the Senate does not approve the Covenant of Human Rights, and which provides further that United States representatives at the United Nations should be instructed to withdraw from further negotiations looking toward its approval. This is a step in the right direction, but raises the

question: What effect would such action have in preventing a majority of the members of United Nations from approving the covenant and imposing it on us regardless?

I am convinced that what we need, and must have for the protection of our fundamental rights, is an amendment to Article VI of the Constitution, which would make treaties subordinate to the Constitution, and to the laws of the United States and the respective states. Better still, the Senate should take the necessary action to abrogate its ratification of the United Nations Charter. This might result in a new start, and the creation of an organization which would give the people of America an even break.

## The Menace of the Ruble Bloc

By FRANZ PICK

*How Russia has been extending economic as well as political domination over her satellites, and forcing them to link their currencies tightly with her own to form a huge "Ruble Empire."*

**A**FTER the peaceful conquest of Czechoslovakia in February 1948, Russia's dream of securing the domination of the famous *Aufmarschgebiete* (regions to be invaded) of the German Armies became a reality. The historic Russian regions were surrounded by a belt of countries with a total population of about 97 million. From the Baltic to the Black Sea, Mother Russia was protected by politically and economically "adjustable" regions. When, a year later, China with her 452 million inhabitants became Moscow's Eastern ally, Russia, with her own 200 million men and women, plus her European "democracies," headed an alliance of about 743 million people. Thirty-one per cent of the population of the world began to take orders from the Comintern!

The political domination of these populations—nearly three times as many as those over whom Hitler ruled at the peak of his conquest—was practically achieved at the end of 1951.

The economic coordination met many obstacles. The Soviets operated with their classic "plan" technique. Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria had such production plans before 1948. Czechoslovakia decided to accept Russian assistance to develop such a plan in 1948, as did eastern Germany. But the plans did not always work too well. There was still enough "capitalistic" spirit around. Even the new "national administrators" of large and medium-sized concerns which were returned to the people from "foreign or oppressor's ownership," often thought of Western ma-

chines, production methods and sales. They were eager to earn hard Western currencies in order to buy what they needed from their Western neighbors.

The Soviets, well informed about these facts but sure of their political domination, were not too anxious to remedy the situation. They seemed to have time. Early in 1950, after nearly two years of thorough study and preparation, they appeared ready to achieve their economic domination. Using the old techniques of Dr. Schacht, they planned to link the satellite currencies as tightly as possible to the ruble.

On March 1, 1950, Moscow, with a rather courageous measure, reduced the official value of the U. S. dollar from 5.30 rubles to only 4.00 rubles. This operation, which no other country in the world would have dared to perform, was considered a success even in the black markets. Moscow's propaganda line, particularly in the satellite countries, exploited this feat for many months and especially stressed the "capitalistic Sterling bankruptcy," which had occurred half a year earlier.

Six months after the up-valuation of the ruble—in October 1950—the Polish zloty underwent a devaluation. New paper money was issued, and 100 old zlotys became four new ones. One zloty equalled one ruble and most of the remaining bank deposits of private people and "capitalistic" circles became blocked accounts. The ruble became Warsaw's official foreign trade unit and Poland, Europe's major supplier of coal, began to bill her customers in Moscow's currency.

At the same time eastern Germany's currency, theoretically and practically equal to the ruble, increased the ruble power from Moscow to Berlin in tight geographical connection. The Ost-deutsche Notenbank, its issuing institute, admin-



istrated by former German Reichsbank employees—but directed by Soviet specialists—did a rather good job in smothering this ruble-link to Moscow. No attempt whatsoever was made to increase the ostmark value in westmarks.

Czechoslovakia, for unknown reasons, received no orders to adjust her currency to the Moscow standard. The elimination of all private capital was achieved in 1950, and the ruble became the official foreign trade currency. But no devaluation was decreed. The U. S. dollar is still officially worth 50 korunas, even if it commands more than ten times as much in black markets.

Since 1946 Hungary has been linked to the ruble at a parity of about three forints to one ruble. She has completely lost her currency freedom; the National Bank is no more than a branch of the Soviet's Gosbank.

Rumania, one of the countries offering a classic example of currency mismanagement, went into state bankruptcy in August 1947, four months before the Soviets had gained complete control of the country. But private profiteering gained in volume during 1951, and in January 1952 a new devaluation took place—the second in six years. One ruble was declared to be worth 2.2 lei. Savings deposits and paper money in circulation were completely blocked and practically wiped out.

Bulgaria's currency, economically of little importance, has remained under tight Russian control since the Soviets took over in 1946.

**T**HE EXISTING gold cover of all these currencies has long since become Russian-controlled, as are the stocks of all hard currencies in these countries. No monetary side-steps can be undertaken by Prague or Budapest or eastern Berlin. Today they are all part of Russia's famous "Valuta Plan." This is some sort of foreign exchange budget to which all satellite countries have to align. The Gosbank replaced the Reichsbank, which handled it from 1939 to 1944. History changes very little.

The Soviets manage these satellite currencies rather well. They have gained substantially from this monetary set-up. For all their imports, from Poland to Rumania, they credit the respective National Banks in rubles. Against these rubles, Russian goods can be bought—at the Soviets' price. It's as simple as that.

And from Vladivostok to Berlin, the world's largest trade territory has been "liberated" from currency regulations, tariffs, and foreign exchange quotas. This system appears to be working very well.

Since Mao came to power in September 1949, Russia's currency administration has been busy trying to get China into the ruble-bloc. These attempts would have succeeded if the Chinese were in every respect orthodox Communists. But the country, traditionally a gold, silver and dollar addict, has not yet learned to manage paper currency. Therefore, every attempt to link the yen

min piao (Communist dollar) with the ruble has so far been fruitless. The ruble is officially listed in Shanghai, although there is no trading in Russian currency. A few important commercial treaties have been concluded between Peiping and Moscow, but these are mostly barter deals at nominal ruble value. As China's inflation continues and Western (non-Communist) goods can not enter the country freely enough, her dependence on Soviet products has increased substantially.

Judging from Moscow's previous patterns, there is a good chance that her currency technicians—quite a number are reported to be in Peiping and Shanghai at this writing—will take every opportunity they get to tighten the Communist dollar to the ruble. Should they succeed—and they are artists in the manipulation of white and black currency markets—a rather impressive Ruble Empire will come into existence. Three times as many people will think in rubles as the two-hundred-odd million who think in dollars.

Unless unexpected major shifts in world politics take place, nothing seems likely to stop the clearly planned ruble expansion.

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## Thoughts for Our Time

It is heartening to discover, upon the arrest of Willie Sutton, that at least one plan for redistributing wealth is still illegal.

*Following the scientific methods of Roosevelt and Morgenthau in setting the gold content of the dollar by lucky numbers, we can safely predict that '52 will be an unusually good year because it adds up to seven.*

Let us all now stand for one tearful moment in silent meditation on the sorrowful plight of those poor, languishing liberals who are so cowed by the unkindly Senator McCarthy that they have lost their power to speak unaided by microphones and loudspeakers.

*The complaint of fellow-travelers testifying before the Senate Internal Security subcommittee seems to be that they are not getting the kind of ride they went along for.*

If Newton had been a government economist, we would have no law of gravitation. We would have a continuing study of falling apples with daily, weekly, monthly and yearly reports on the national applefall with graphs, charts, equations, tables, exhibits, and footnotes showing simple averages, and index numbers by day, week, month and year, demonstrating to everybody's satisfaction what a fellow can do with an electric calculator.

HARRY C. NORTH

# The Secret Strength of Communism

By TOWNER PHELAN

*The counterfeit liberalism of the Welfare State, says Mr. Phelan, has corrupted the Western world.*

**“THE DETERIORATION** of every government,” said Montesquieu, “begins with the decay of the principles on which it was founded.” The stench of corruption that emanates from Washington is sufficient evidence that Montesquieu was right. The Western world is sick; it is sick with moral corruption. This moral corruption is the direct consequence of the Western world’s abandonment of the liberal tradition for the counterfeit liberalism of today. This is the explanation of the mink coats, deep freezers, “five-percenters,” influence peddlers, income tax fixers and corruptionists who infest Washington and Federal offices all over the country.

Millions who sincerely believe in this counterfeit liberalism do not realize that its philosophic basis is an immoral totalitarianism that worships naked power and believes that the end justifies the means. The counterfeit liberalism of the Welfare State is diametrically opposed to the authentic liberal tradition which is the tradition of the American people. The Welfare-State concept is Germanic in origin and based on the philosophy of Hegel and of Karl Marx. It is closely akin to the philosophy of Hitler. Its high priest in the United States is Professor John Dewey of Columbia University. Its saint is the late Mr. Justice Holmes.

Holmes was reared in the American tradition and lived according to it. But intellectually he repudiated it for a philosophy that is totalitarian. Holmes said: “I believe that force, mitigated so far as may be by good manners, is the ultima ratio. . . . Truth is the majority vote of that nation that can lick all the others.” This philosophy differs from that of Hitler and Stalin only in that Holmes wanted force to be “mitigated by good manners.”

Holmes said: “I don’t believe that it is an absolute principle or even a human ultimate that man always is an end in himself — that his dignity must be respected, etc.” Hitler said the same thing in these words: “To the Christian doctrine of infinite significance of the individual human soul I oppose with icy clarity the saving doctrine of the nothingness and insignificance of the human being.” Karl Marx put it in these words: “The democratic concept of man is false because it is Christian. Democracy holds that each man is a sovereign being. This is the illusion and dream of Christianity.” What Holmes, Hitler and Marx said in slightly different language is an ex-

pression of the authoritarian philosophy that man is subordinate to the State. It is totalitarian in concept.

Harold R. McKinnon in “The Secret of Mr. Justice Holmes,” said that Holmes is “among the greatest men of our time” but that his philosophy is “fundamentally indistinguishable from the amoral realism of those regimes of force that are the scandal of the century.” Mortimer J. Adler, Professor of Philosophy of Law, Chicago University, said: “McKinnon’s diagnosis is deadly accurate.”

Professor Dewey frankly admits that what is called liberalism today is the direct opposite of what liberalism has meant for some 300 years. In his book “Liberalism and Social Action,” he says that the liberal individualistic philosophy expressed in the Constitution was derived principally from John Locke. He calls this the “older liberalism or Lockian political philosophy” to distinguish it from what he now regards as liberalism. He says that Locke’s philosophy is “individualistic in the sense in which individualism is opposed to organized social action” and that under Locke’s philosophy “the great enemy of individual liberty was thought to be the government.” He calls upon liberals “to concentrate upon the task of securing socialized economy” to give man “*actual*” liberty as distinct from “*legal*” liberty.

## The Dewey-Lenin Definition of Liberty

The same distinction was made by Henry Wallace, by Communists and by Fascists. Wallace termed “the old kind of liberty [the liberty of the Bill of Rights] . . . license for the few and economic serfdom for the many.” Molotov, Lenin and Oswald Mosley, the British Fascist, are in close agreement with this view. Molotov, in an attack upon Bernard M. Baruch at the General Assembly said:

[Baruch] would like to see all people satisfied with freedom under which only the lucky ones can enjoy the benefits of life.

Lenin wrote: “No amount of political freedom will satisfy the hungry masses.” Mosley wrote: “Real freedom means good wages, short hours, security in employment, good homes, leisure and recreation with family and friends.” This coincides with the Rooseveltian Socialist Welfare-State definition.

The late Thomas W. Woodlock says that according to Dewey’s philosophy, “God as a Being does not exist . . . There is no enduring moral law of

fixed principles. Morals are purely social." The Communist Manifesto says the same thing in these words: "Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion and all morality." The mink coats and moral corruption of the age are direct consequences of the view that "morals are purely social."

Joseph Stalin shares the philosophy of Dewey and Holmes in these words: "There can be no 'immutable' social systems, no 'eternal principles.'"

Whittaker Chambers says:

The Communist vision . . . is the vision of man's mind displacing God as the creative intelligence of the world. It is the vision of man's liberated mind . . . redirecting man's destiny and reorganizing man's life and the world. . . . The vision is shared by millions who are not Communists and they are part of communism's secret strength.

### The Totalitarian Philosophy

The "vision is shared" by Dewey. It was shared by Holmes. It is the vision of the counterfeit liberalism of the socialist Welfare State. The millions who share it are "part of communism's secret strength."

The moral corruption of today is the direct consequence of the totalitarian philosophy expressed in these beliefs. If, as Dewey believes, the individual is nothing more than a set of conditioned reflexes in a living organism, organized by environmental influence, then there can be no morality.

One of the mysteries of our age is that so many left-wing clergymen are blind to the fact that Welfare-State socialism is directly opposed to the Christian ethic. For example, the Federation for Social Action of the Methodist Church in its *Social Questions Bulletin* said:

We reject the profit motive and seek to replace it with economic planning and to develop a class without any privileges. . . . We say the Christian story means not the improvement of the present social order, but the revolutionary abolition and replacement by a new economic order.

The Christian ethic is based on belief in individual morality and the importance of the individual soul. It assumes freedom of choice. A man who is put in a strait-jacket may be incapable of doing wrong, but he is not a moral person because he has no choice. And precisely to the degree that the State substitutes the compulsion of authoritarian control for free, voluntary choice does it violate the Christian ethic and break down moral law.

But notwithstanding the irreconcilable conflict between Christianity and socialism, the World Council of Churches adopted this statement damning communism and capitalism equally:

The Christian Church should reject the ideologies of both communism and capitalism and should seek to draw men away from the false assumption

that these are the only alternatives. Each has made promises which it could not redeem.

This statement is profoundly immoral because morality must be based on freedom of choice, and only under capitalism is there full scope for freedom of choice. Capitalism is, by definition, private ownership and control of business. Its only alternative is State ownership and control, under which man can not be free. As Ludwig von Mises says in his great book, "Human Action,"

A man is free as far as he can live and get on without being at the mercy of arbitrary decisions on the part of other people. . . . As soon as the economic freedom which the market economy grants to its members, is removed, all political liberties and bills of rights become humbug.

Basically, the differences between communism, fascism, British socialism, and the counterfeit liberalism of the socialist Welfare State are differences not of kind, but of degree. What difference is there, except in degree, between the slave labor camps of the Soviet Union and the union shop under which men must join a union and submit to the dictates of a labor czar, or be deprived of their jobs and their living? In neither case is man free.

The socialist Welfare-State viewpoint that modern industrialization requires government control of every human activity clearly is derived from the Marxian doctrine of economic determinism. It assumes that the degree of economic development of our society determines what liberty, if any, the individual should retain and what authoritarian power the government should have to direct his activities.

### Mr. Roosevelt's Mentors

The traditional liberal does not believe that the rights of man depend upon economics. He regards human freedom, individual liberty, and the relation of man to the state as being primarily moral problems, not economic problems. He regards liberty, not as a byproduct of the "horse and buggy age," but as unalienable human rights. History, according to Marxian communism, is a "class struggle" based on economics. In this class struggle, the workers are exploited by "monopoly capitalism," government is an instrument of oppression by which the dominant social class exploits other classes, and salvation can come only through a revolution which will transfer power to the working class. Acting upon the Marxian view of history as a class struggle and government as an instrument by which "financial and industrial groups" oppress other classes and exploit the workers, Mr. Roosevelt undertook to transfer power to the "working class," which he did not regard as predatory. This policy was implemented by legislation bestowing special privileges upon organized labor and imposing restrictions upon ordinary citizens to deprive them of rights once considered unalienable.

The Welfare State is totalitarian in concept. It was invented, not by Franklin D. Roosevelt, but by Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor of Germany. Bismarck was a totalitarian. He had a contempt for democracy and freedom. He was the father of social security, unemployment compensation, old age pensions, and the basic ideas of the Welfare State. Before our Civil War, the Negro slaves in the South had social security. They had no worries about their livelihood or their old age, but they were slaves. A convict serving a life term has perfect social security—the State will take care of him—but he is not free. Social security and slavery are natural bedfellows. The Welfare State can be achieved only at the expense of individual liberty.

The Welfare-State philosophy which has corrupted our society is spread primarily by those who regard themselves as the “intelligentsia.” They are the dominant left-wing majority among the thousands of university professors, teachers, writers, book publishers, book critics, newspaper editors, columnists, radio commentators, lecturers, clergymen and Hollywood script writers. They create public opinion. They in turn are influenced by new books, book reviews, and such left-wing periodicals as the *Nation*, *New Republic*, *New Leader* and *Progressive*. It is a sad commentary that in our great country the *Freeman* is the only important journal of opinion upholding the American tradition.

### Successful Communist Propaganda

To our eternal shame, a handful of Communists, fellow-travelers and their counterfeit liberal “camp followers” in strategic positions in publishing houses, book reviewing and left-wing journals of opinion largely dominate the media which so greatly influence the thinking of those who make public opinion. The *Saturday Review of Literature*, the book review sections of the *New York Times* and *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Nation* and the *New Republic* largely control what book publishers will publish. They do so because whether a book will sell depends to a considerable extent on what the leading book reviews say about it. The great influence of book reviews is indicated by these facts: between 1943 and 1949 (the critical years in shaping our disastrous China policy) 30 books on the general political situation in China were published. Twenty-three of them were pro-Communist and seven were anti-Communist. The pro-Communist books included “New Frontiers in Asia” by Philip Jaffe, who was convicted in the *Amerasia* spy case, “Battle Hymn of China,” by the notorious Communist Agnes Smedley, and “The Chinese Conquer China” by the Soviet apologist Anna Louise Strong. According to John T. Flynn, “every one of the 23 pro-Communist books . . . received glowing approval . . . in the *New York Times*, the *Herald Tribune*, the *Nation*, the *New Republic*, and the *Saturday*

*Review of Literature*. And every one of the anti-Communist books was either roundly condemned or ignored in these same reviews.” It is significant that 13 of these books were reviewed by Owen Lattimore or his wife; ten of them by Edgar Snow or his wife; six of them by Agnes Smedley; and three of them by Mark Gayn who was arrested in the *Amerasia* case. The *New York Times*, the *Herald Tribune* and the *Saturday Evening Post* are not radical left-wing publications; yet the book reviews of the two former undoubtedly promoted the communist cause, and the *Saturday Evening Post* had as its associate editor Edgar Snow, whose books and articles strongly favored communism.

In education, American youth is being indoctrinated against the American tradition and in favor of totalitarian socialism. The American Association of School Administrators, a department of the National Education Association, in its 25th Yearbook, tells us that the unavoidable choice in education is “between the primacy of the individual and the society of which he is a part.” It finds the primacy of the individual bad and the primacy of the State good.

Will the American tradition survive? It will survive only if there is a rebirth of belief in freedom. This requires two things: first, that business and professional men study and understand the philosophy of freedom. It requires, second, a reorientation of the philosophy of those who mould public opinion—the university professors, the book reviewers, the book publishers, editors, newspapermen, columnists, clergymen and lecturers—the majority of whom are committed to the philosophy of the totalitarian Welfare State.

If the majority of these shapers of opinion turn away from worship of Welfare-State socialism and embrace the philosophy of freedom, and if business and professional men take the time to inform themselves about the philosophy of freedom, the American tradition will survive. But if they do not do so, it is only a question of time until the creeping socialism of today creates the totalitarian state of tomorrow, and man’s last hope of freedom is gone.

Whittaker Chambers says: “Communists are that part of mankind which has recovered the power to live or die—to bear witness—for its faith.” Unless we recover “the power to live or die—to bear witness” for our one-time faith in freedom, communism will conquer the world and man will be enslaved.

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### The Greater Evil

Though I admit an A-bomb  
Is terrifically effectual;  
What frightens me much more is  
A Gulliberal Intellectual.

ANN OMINOUS

# From Our Readers

## "Real Literature"

Two of the articles in your issue of February 25, in differing ways, seem to me to transcend mere journalism and to become real literature. I refer to "Our Enemy, the State," by Cecil Palmer, and "How to Defend Free Enterprise," by Walter Sulzbach.

Mr. Palmer's is the quality of eloquence that really moves men to action, while Mr. Sulzbach analyzes with rare ability a subject which could be made deadily dull at the hands of many writers. What a pity that Mr. Palmer had to die when men of his caliber are now so sorely needed!

*Naples, New York*

ROSCOE PEACOCK

## Mr. Markel Protests

To Mr. Chamberlain's charges in your issue of December 31 [p. 218] there are three answers:

First, I was not "taken in" as Mr. Chamberlain was. I appreciate his proffer of some of his white-wash, but inasmuch as I never implied that Marxism was the wave of the future, as he did (when in "Farewell to Reform" [1932] he wrote: "The present situation [in the United States] begs for a 'demand' politics along Socialist lines"), I do not share his urgent need for it.

Second, I should think that a magazine calling itself the *Freeman* would believe almost religiously in freedom of expression. There was a difference of opinion in 1945 and the years immediately following as to what should have been done about China. There were some who advocated exclusive support for Chiang Kai-shek, there were others who urged a coalition; which course was right we shall never know, because neither was tried. The only important point is that there was an honest difference of opinion. Any persons who attack others because of this honest difference of opinion would seem to be disqualified for the title of "freemen."

Third, as for the charges about the [*New York Times*] *Book Review*, its policy then, as it has always been and as it is now, was to publish competent reviews. This policy applied to books on China as well as to other books. . . . Most of the experts believed that the only hope for China was a coalition—and General MacArthur himself favored an effort for coalition at that time. There was no conspiracy, no heinous offense, only the candid expression of a viewpoint which is now questioned.

LESTER MARKEL, Sunday Editor

*New York City*

*The New York Times*

[The mistake I made about the Communists was to think, for a brief period in the early thirties, that they could be relied upon to take an honest part in popular front movements. It was precisely the sort of mistake that many reviewers in the *Times*

made about the possibility of a coalition between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung. That is why I think Mr. Markel's *culpa* is on all fours with my own *culpa*. As to his statement that we shall never know which course was right in China because neither course was tried, we certainly know from plenty of evidence what happens when the Communists are invited into any coalition. They either have to be thrown out of the coalition or they take over, *vide* Poland, Czechoslovakia, wartime Yugoslavia or the Newspaper Guild.

JOHN CHAMBERLAIN]

## Professor Towster Objects

My attention was called today to a most irresponsible reference to my book by a Mr. Oliver Carlson in the January 14 issue of your magazine. I protest most emphatically against it. It is difficult to believe that the *Freeman* would lend its pages to such a purpose. My book has won the widest acclaim from scholars of international repute and the highest integrity as a thorough work of scholarship. The slant is entirely in Mr. Carlson's eye.

*Berkeley, California*

JULIAN TOWSTER

## Mr. Carlson Replies

Professor Towster's indignation at having his book "Political Power in the USSR" listed as "slanted" in my *Freeman* article, caused me to reread his book very carefully. May I suggest he do the same?

In his 412-page book—bristling with footnotes and lengthy references from Soviet laws, decrees, books, newspapers and statements by Stalin and other Soviet leaders—Dr. Towster analyzes and explains Soviet power. But he explains it, not in terms of its actualities, its brutalities and its deliberate falsifications, but in terms of the published words of the Soviet oligarchy. The Soviet version of Russian history, both Tsarist and Bolshevik, is accepted by Dr. Towster, while the host of non-Bolshevik authorities are either bypassed completely, or emerge, as did David Dallin, in two minor footnotes.

I sought in vain for more than a passing reference to the slave-labor camps of the USSR; for any reference whatever to the uprooting and mass deportation of the entire populations of two "republics" of the USSR; to the way both natural and social sciences are perverted or destroyed to meet the demands of the Soviet high command; to the flourishing anti-Semitism, officially sponsored; to the continuous enlargement of the "Big Lie" both at home and abroad; to the systematic violation of solemn treaties with neighboring states; to the ruthless plundering, exploitation and enslavement of the peoples of the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, etc. Yet these, most assuredly, are an intrinsic part of the picture of Soviet power.

In his last chapter, Dr. Towster evaluates past and prospective trends "in terms of liberty and authority, political control, administrative efficiency, and capacity for change." In discussing "The Essence of Individual Liberty" he says:

The chief difference between the USSR and the Western Democracies in the province of liberty is not that the former has quashed the freedoms altogether, *but that it has endowed them with different meanings or emphasis* [My italics] (p. 381) . . .

In the Bill of Rights of the new constitution, the Soviet Union has followed the Western Democracies with regard to negative freedoms, *while it has pioneered in the introduction of a number of positive freedoms.* (p. 382) . . .

As far as goals are concerned, "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" are as much aims of the Soviet Union as they are of the Western Democracies . . . Yet it is probably true that the majority of the Soviet citizens are not laboring under any undue sense of deprivation of freedom . . . there is nothing to suggest that they are at present conscious of lacking the freedoms prevailing in the West (p. 386) . . .

It seems obvious that the USSR has unlocked tremendous talent in its vast masses through education and access to cultural opportunities. For the moment, in fact, the essence of individual liberty in the USSR consists chiefly in the citizen's chance to grow—in his freedom and opportunity to develop himself and to gain social recognition in the process (p. 387) . . .

The highly progressive character of the Soviet Constitution is attested by the fact that:

Unlike the United States, the Soviet Federation possesses the confederative feature of a constitutional right of secession vested in each of the Union republics (p. 388) . . .

Neither in theory nor in practice is the idea of a single dictator, who irrevocably concentrates all authority exclusively in his own person, accepted in the Soviet dictatorship (p. 391) . . .

Though Stalin's influence is great, all the members of the Politbureau take part in the consideration of questions before it, and their votes are of equal value. Differences of opinion can and do develop, and Stalin has been outvoted on occasion (p. 392) . . .

After 400 pages, Dr. Towster sums up:

The worst features of government in the USSR are not personal corruption or selfish rule on the part of the leaders . . . but they are widespread bureaucracy and inefficiency, with red tape and delay hampering the execution of administrative and managerial tasks (p. 402).

Having reread Dr. Towster's book, I do not wonder that it was given high praise by pro-Communists and fellow-travelers and that it rated a recommendation from Miss Haines.

I am glad to know that Dr. Towster is anti-Communist. For his own sake and that of untold thousands who may be influenced by his book to view Soviet communism as a system which offers many attractive features not a part of our way of life, I suggest that Dr. Towster face the unvarnished facts of Soviet slavery and rewrite his book accordingly.

Los Angeles, California

OLIVER CARLSON



I HAVE almost become a pessimist in the job which has been given to me. It seems that when public funds are to be expended no one has any interest in what happens to them, no matter what his responsibilities may be under his oath of office. I dislike to make such a statement, but unless this body and the House of Representatives exercise their prerogatives in connection with the purse strings of the government, much of the money appropriated will be thrown away for no good purpose whatever. It will not help the war effort. We can not obstruct this appropriation, because we know that it will be said that we are obstructing the war effort.

HARRY S. TRUMAN, when a Senator,  
*Congressional Record*, June 29, 1943

. . . the Soviet Union has not the slightest interest in annexing any territory whatever. Neither is it interested in dictating in any way, shape or form the constitution of the Chinese Government.

EARL BROWDER, at a meeting of the Shanghai Tiffin Club, New York, March 13, 1945

Joe Davies demonstrated how simple the job of cooperation with the Russians is; it is a tragedy that our own government has not seen fit to assign more men like Davies to the critical job of representing us in the Soviet Union.

ELLIOTT ROOSEVELT, "As He Saw It," 1946

. . . there was much discussion as to the conditions under which Asians would accept United States dollars to solve their pressing needs.

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS meeting at Lucknow, India, as reported in the *New York Times*, October 15, 1950

The truth is he is a very likeable person [concerning Stalin].

JAMES F. BYRNES, "Speaking Frankly," 1947

### Ordeal by Rumor

There is a rumor that she used to be the girl friend of the former Chinese Ambassador.

OWEN LATTIMORE, when Director of Pacific Operations, OWI, explaining why he had dismissed an OWI employee. From a U.S. Civil Service Commission Report of Investigation, August 9, 1943.

The Freeman invites contributions to this column, and will pay \$2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They can not be returned or acknowledged. THE EDITORS



# Manners, Arts and Morals

*Notes on the Entertainment Industries*

By WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM



A TRULY momentous poll of the year, it seems to me, has already been published: up to February 1952, seventeen million American families had bought TV sets. This public vote of confidence, cast to the tune of more than four billion purchase dollars, went to entrepreneurs who, only five years ago, were not taken seriously even by themselves. Today they dictate the cultural diet of every other American family, and tomorrow that of the entire nation. Politicians, I presume, will for some time continue to view the Presidency as the locus of greatest social power; but after a while even politicians will realize that the standards of American behavior are being set by a few score of impresarios who move these eerie shadows on the all-American television screen.

Though I am second to none in my desire to see a man of Senator Taft's size and sanity elected President, I can not help contemplating the ominous fact that the character and the cultural acumen of a TV-network president may determine the American destiny more decisively than will the virtues of our next Chief Executive. And I have no idea what can be done about this dreadful shift of social impact from a civic to a show-business aristocracy—except, of course, that I still would rather see it split among a few score of second-rate "entertainment" officers than monopolized by one first-rate Dr. Goebbels in Washington. But even that prejudice in favor of competitive mischiefs which, let us hope, will occasionally neutralize one another, yields but meager consolation. There remains the appalling fact that the intelligence, the conscience and the taste of a few "showmen," whom the fluke of a rapid technological development has lifted to positions of the utmost cultural influence, will sculpture the American character.

I can think of few inquiries more urgent than a continuous investigation of that fluke: that a tool, so clearly destined to shape the face of a century, was developed by the "entertainment industry." It is as if the circus people, certainly an ancient and lovable craft, had first hit upon the idea of transforming heat into electricity and, thanks to some fantastic distribution of social power, had secured such unmitigated control over development and use of the new tool that it was forever to fit the vistas of the circus. I shall not deny that voltage exclusively confined to arena effects might have been more amusing than the industrial revolution which actually took place; but there is surely no doubt that the world would

look totally different if the combustion motor had been developed, and its use permanently controlled, by Phineas T. Barnum.

Now television, on second thought, was "entertainment's" baby for scarcely avoidable reasons. Technologically as well as historically the electronic tube could not fail to arrest the attention of the established radio industry ahead, and to the exclusion, of anybody else. But the question of legitimacy has little to do with the fatal misunderstanding which, it seems to me, grew from such extraction: the assumption, by now axiomatically granted, that television is a medium of "entertainment." In truth (at least as it appears to me), television is the proper instrument of *journalism*. And this, I propose to show, is much more than a matter of semantical classification.

THE IMPRESARIOS of "entertainment," it seems to me, even though they may have legitimately fathered the child, are not qualified to bring it up. This, I hasten to add, is not said to disparage the worth and talents of our "entertainment" managers, which will always be needed on TV. Nor do I advocate TV's adoption by our managers of journalism with the fallacious idea that any superior moral standards or even comparatively nobler motives could be claimed for contemporary journalistic practices. But the point is precisely that, regardless of intents and motives, the journalist is conditioned by one approach and the impresario by another; and that, in television, the journalist's approach would produce smaller lesions in our collective soul than the impresario's. To clarify this, I had better define what I mean by "journalism" and what by "entertainment."

Both journalists and entertainers get hold of life's raw material and present it, selectively, to an audience. The essential difference lies in the role assigned to that audience. To the entertainer, it consists of demanding consumers whose predictable appetites must be satisfied with established techniques of arousing predictable responses. To the journalist, the audience consists of more or less accidental bystanders for whom he has to amplify the details and implications of an event. The entertainer *caters* to his audience; the journalist, whose allegiance (at least ideally) is not to the audience at all but to the event, reports to whom it may concern. And paradoxically, television's more hopeful promises can be realized only if its audience is *not* being catered to—if, in other words, it is treated not as an audience but as a group of witnesses.

This paradox is merely the reflection of another which sits right at the core of the machine itself: potentially a new organ of man for perceiving greater depths of his world (an ubiquitous eye), the electronic tube appears in the home as a screen which, almost unavoidably, turns the living room into a miniature theater. For all its technical capacities, the instrument can be used either as a sort of telescope with which to reach into the infiniteness of life; or as a sort of stereopticon into which a "showman" shoves posed pictures. If journalists, even inadequate journalists, were to operate television, we would be looking through a telescope into the incessantly unexpected flow of life around us; so long as impresarios, even the most accomplished ones, operate television, we shall continue seeing redundantly staged shows in a stereopticon.

**T**HIS CHOICE between the spontaneous and the studied is far more than just a matter of taste. If television enabled man to leap over the fences of his pathetically limited private world and to partake, as a witness, in the unlimited magnificence of reality, the new machine would stimulate man's growth. But if it goes on to feed him the pap of predigested "fiction," and practically nothing else, man must atrophy. The impresario's control of television is evil, not because he is bad, but because it is his nature to turn everything into a "production." The journalist's influence on television is good, not because he is noble, but because he is fascinated by reality.

In actual operation, of course, journalists often apply techniques of "entertainment" and entertainers techniques of journalism: to catch and hold the public's attention, journalists know they must be entertaining; and showmen know they must "connect" with topical preoccupations. But this should confuse no one. When the two seem to be doing the same thing, they remain a world apart. "Entertainment," even when "realistic," is always about thrills; journalism, even when "thrilling," is always about reality.

There rages currently a battle over the distribution of some still unassigned TV channels between "commercial" and "educational" operators. To me, this looks like the worst defined dilemma since the Wars of the Roses. If we are to judge by the sweetish smell of pap that permeates some of our most "progressive" schools, our educators are badly bitten by the show-business bug and, if they get a chance, might easily outdo the professional impresarios of phoniness. On the other hand, some of the most authentic journalists were, and are, "commercial" to the bone—set afire by nothing so much as an incurable itch for money. What matters in television, as suggested before, is neither intent nor motive but approach: a "showman"-educator will drown the audience in syrup, and a "commercial" journalist might make it swim the genuine rapids of life.

Unless I have completely misread the portents,

the really urgent job in TV is to encourage its invasion by journalism. Some years ago the New Dealers of the Federal Communications Commission thought up and successfully peddled the legend that newspaper publishers must be kept out of radio if public opinion was to be saved from Ol' Devil "monopoly." No FCC philosopher has ever stopped to explain why, of all people, newspaper publishers, who by vocation and experience know the punitive impact of public protest better than most anybody else, should defy the public's right to free speech more boldly than brewers, hatters and sock manufacturers, whom the FCC has always considered perfectly safe trustees of our radio channels. But then, Federal Administrators are independent of argument.

And so the FCC might carry into television its habitual resistance to journalistic entrepreneurs. Now far be it from me to contend that the salvation of TV lies in its delivery to the subtle taste of our popular press. In fact, even if all our TV were operated by journalists, it still could lead our civilization straight to the pit. For the quality of TV, as that of every other cultural enterprise, at best equals the quality of minds put to it—which makes TV a poor prospect in any case. But of all the possible bets (and none of them is safe) I would support the one on the journalist, whose first allegiance belongs to the event. His taste is not guaranteed to be less atrocious than the impresario's; but he is less likely to anesthetize the audience with the vapors of vulgar fantasies.

## Great Workings Have No Sound

*(For a Statesman)*

True constructions are quiet things  
 And great workings have no sound.  
 When the sun rises the strutting cock crows  
 And thinks, as he shrieks, that so the sun goes.  
 But no one hears the oak as it grows,  
 Or the air which feeds us, until it blows.

Music is after silent doing.  
 It is the done.  
 Noise is failure.  
 As the clash of gears in ill machines  
 Or good ends clashing with foulest means.

True constructions are quiet things  
 And great workings have no sound.  
 Beware of clamor and the cocks of fame,  
 Be unbribed by the cash of praise  
 And be undismayed by the duns of blame.  
 Make no noise, build silently in your high realm  
 Higher than the weak-lunged horizon of your time,  
 Build higher than the restraining rail of breath  
 Where airless, no noise is  
 And unsounds death.

EDWARD MURRAY CASE



# A REVIEWER'S NOTEBOOK

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

Every time I come into New York City (which is on the average of three days a week) I feel myself entering an unreal atmosphere. New York is the capital of the "intellectuals." Lacking the wit or the common sense of any good small-town grain dealer or plumber, these "intellectuals" believe in the strangest things. They still think you can win a nomination with a man whose "glamour" is hidden away in a foreign capital 3000 miles from home. They still think a political rally can be improved if it is left to the devices of Broadway characters. They still believe in the malevolence of a verbal hippogriff called "McCarthyism." They still think that anti-communism is not a local political issue (which means they have never listened to a Polish-American on the subject of Yalta, or to an Irish Catholic on the topic of Marxist materialism). They still think that people like to pay taxes, and that businessmen will take chances for peanuts. They still think that the way to redeem a man's character is to feed him without requiring any payment in work, or that the way to get enthusiastic cooperation out of an individual is to compel him to do your bidding by invoking the club of the omnipotent State.

In short, the "intellectuals" don't need to import any gurus from Tibet or Shangri-la, for each one carries a guru around in his own head. The days of the guru, however, are happily numbered. What the "intellectuals" don't know is that an avalanche is about to hit them. Any good philosophical weather prophet should know what it portends when the *Saturday Evening Post* can increase its newsstand sales some 400,000 in a single week by the publication of Whittaker Chambers's "I Was the Witness." The insulated academics of the land (who take their cues from the guru-logic of Park Avenue) may deride the criticisms of a William F. Buckley, Jr., but five years from now Buckley will have had a very ponderable impact on practically every economics faculty this side of Cambridge, Mass. As every guru knows, Bob Taft can't win votes, but every time Bob Taft paddles the bottom of a Tex McCrary in public a dozen hitherto unconvinced taxicab drivers and Scarsdale matrons go over to his camp. It's naughty in guru-town to think ill of Owen (*toujours de l'audace*) Lattimore, but when a Maryland Republican says he doesn't like Lattimorism he suddenly finds himself elevated to the U.S. Senate or to the governor's chair in the border-state capital of Annapolis. To use the immortal lan-

guage of Harry Serwer, the American people have at last begun to wake up to the fact that when a State Welfarist comes to your rescue he invariably gives you a sliver from a slice off your own hide. If the awakening goes far enough and fast enough, there will be another major political overturn next November.

All of which brings me to Raymond Moley, who has just written a first-rate political and economic guide for the awakening American. It is called "How to Keep Our Liberty: A Program for Political Action" (Knopf, \$4.). Mr. Moley is the man who bet right on Franklin D. Roosevelt's "availability" in 1932, but who bet wrong on the Rooseveltian character. I would differ with Mr. Moley about the soundness of what he calls the First New Deal (which was built, after all, on the fascistic or corporative-state gimmick of the NRA), but Mr. Moley has certainly worked his way through to an all-encompassing philosophy of liberty. He knows that liberty depends on a free enterprise system operating under a dispensation that diffuses the political power and fosters the well-being of the "middle interests" of society. He also knows that it is disastrous to base any political or economic program on what just ain't so, which sets him apart from other characters who write books in guru-town.

Mr. Moley makes no fetish of anti-Statism. He believes that government must do such things as take censuses, build streets, maintain traffic lights, issue stamps, eradicate yellow fever, conserve the forests, provide playgrounds and register security issues. He believes that monopolies should be restrained. He believes that the State—or, preferably, the states—should come to the aid of the helpless and the unfortunate. But Mr. Moley is anti-Statist enough to believe that government should not inject its will into matters that are within the realm of business judgment. Regulation, as he puts it, should have as its objective the preservation of free competition. Beyond that, the regulator should not use his power to further his own notions of what the nature of economic institutions should be. The State should not use the tax power to change the nature of economic relationships, or to channel the flow of investment, or to distribute the national income. Taxation should be for the exclusive purpose of raising revenue—and the revenue should not be spent on doing things which people, by use of

the principles of voluntary association and mutual underwriting, can do for themselves.

Mr. Moley's book is heartening for the simple reason that it is not built on negations. The author does not despair of the American people, nor does he think the trend toward socialism is "inevitable." He has discovered that a substantial majority of American family units have annual incomes ranging from \$2000 to \$5000 a year. Ownership of our industrial plant has been moving from the hands of the rich and well-to-do to those in the lower income ranges. Farmers, despite the Brannan clique, are still tied into the "middle interests." Moreover, it is distinctly not true that a "third of the nation" is ill-housed or ill-clothed. Mr. Moley's most surprising statistic shows that fifty per cent of the people in the lowest income group—"under \$1000"—own their own home. The fallacy that the "under \$1000" group is in dire need derives, says Mr. Moley, from failure to recognize that many people in this category are retired and living on self-made means of security.

The fact that the American people are fairly well-to-do is, of course, no argument against adding to the sum total of their welfare. But the Welfare State does not do anything for people that they couldn't do better for themselves. In the first place, every time the State undertakes to do anything it inevitably transforms a potential producer into a sterile bureaucrat. (State administration costs vital energy and produces no goods.)

And secondly, the costs of welfare involve a progressive inflation and/or a rate of taxation that prevents capital formation and hence strangles industries before they are born.

Mr. Moley shows us how we can have social security within the limits of solvency. He has ideas about bringing voluntary medical cooperatives within reach of all the people. He tells us how taxation can be reformed and how the state can recover sources of tax income that are now being channeled into Washington. He has theories about interstate compacts for handling such problems as flood and irrigation control and the use of water power. He has a program for getting the farmer off the city man's back and for keeping him prosperous at the same time. And, finally, he has a viable program for local political action, complete with ideas for tapping potential leadership. He has learned a lot from watching the Taft-Ferguson senatorial election in Ohio in 1950, and from his studies of the operations of the Texas Regulars and of various successful citizens' movements in New Orleans and elsewhere.

Mr. Moley's book is about crucial matters in a crucial election year. It is also a book about principles that are as old as John Locke, Burke, Jefferson and James Madison. It won't sell as well as Whittaker Chambers's story, but it is part of the same movement that is about to rescue us from domination by the State-worshipping "intellectuals" and restore us to decentralized rule by the intelligent man.

## "UNTIMELY PAPERS": A RE-REVIEW

By EDWARD DAHLBERG

Some publisher more avid for fame than for perishable, protean dollars, would do himself great honor by republishing Randolph Bourne's "Untimely Papers," originally done under the cavalier imprint of B. W. Huebsch. "Untimely Papers" is a legend and a part of our buried culture.

There is less cult and American geography in Bourne, the hunchback from Bloomfield, New Jersey, than in any other of our good writers. Bourne died at thirty-two in 1918 and did not have time to feel the vast, wild weight of American place. An ardent admirer of rebel thinkers, Thoreau, Whitman, Kropotkin and Henry George, Bourne feared that our most pernicious mare's nest would be politics, or what he called the new orthodoxies of propaganda. This anti-political fear was political wisdom of the highest order.

A closer look at Bourne's broken body, which had so much will and character in it, is important. Waldo Frank, Bourne's friend in the days of the *Seven Arts* magazine, writes that as an infant

he had been dropped. Bourne was five feet tall and had the spindle legs of Pope, another gnome, who used to wrap three pairs of stockings around his calves. Bourne was such a cripple that peasant women in the Italian hill towns crossed themselves when he passed. He wore a black cape to hide his fate, but also because he was a sensual gypsy Leporello with women. This marvelous little figure had enough animal health in him to charge a whole generation of men—Dos Passos, Mumford, Waldo Frank, James Oppenheim; and by his unseasonable death he seems to have taken from them the forces they so needed.

Bourne regarded himself as an impossibilist and made the most implacable exactions upon fate. His name, Bourne, suggestive of ends, was ample declaration of his nature and his motives, for he insisted that the path toward the goal is the vision itself, and if the means be evil, the ideal will be a beast. Upon the rock of impossibilism this angry elf stood, flogging the winds

and the stars, and hurling his words like Homeric stones at the philosophers of expediency—in particular at his celebrated friend and teacher, John Dewey. He made the accusation that pragmatism is a philosophy for action and not for the waiting contemplative faculty which does not try prematurely to hurry history.

We are confronted today with two dilemmas: one, a possible war with Russia, and two, the perplexing question about the effect of even a righteous war, which is answered in Randolph Bourne's "Untimely Papers." With that wonderful prescience of his, Bourne understood that the State can win a war abroad while its own people are defeated at home. What he required was that the American be vigilant with all his nature, lest the State, like that fabled vulture that tormented Prometheus, win the war and eat its own social organs. An anti-Hamiltonian, Bourne wrote that the Constitution was a *coup d'etat* against the people; he argued that the separate states, far from suffering from the lack of central State mysticism, had actually flourished under the Articles of Confederation. Bourne's unfinished essay on the State, an institution he distrusted as thoroughly as did Albert Jay Nock or Franz Oppenheimer, is the most radical piece of writing ever done in America. It does not differ in anger from Thoreau's "Civil Disobedience"; Thoreau always regarded the State, whether in Massachusetts or Washington, as the pickpocket of society. And Henry Adams, coming after Thoreau, had the greatest uneasiness about the influence of the Federalist Alexander Hamilton, whom he called an "adventurer."

In his own day Bourne was almost alone. Dreiser was of his mind, as were the *Seven Arts* people with the exception of Van Wyck Brooks, who detested Bourne's ideas.

Now, in wartime there are two miserable hazards an intellectual has to take. Either he finds himself succumbing to the sort of patriotism which Samuel Johnson rightly said was the last refuge of the scoundrel, or he becomes a solitary dissident. It is as hard in modern times to be a solitary figure as it was for the ancient Greeks, who considered ostracism the cruelest punishment. We know that Socrates, who did not have to take the hemlock and who could have escaped from his cell, would not consider going into exile. Randolph Bourne was a banished man, and the one organ he had in which to articulate his ideas, the *Seven Arts*, was discontinued because of Bourne's essays, "Twilight of Idols" (the attack on John Dewey's war-welcoming pragmatism) and "Below the Battle," both of which can be found in "Untimely Papers."

The Department of Justice had confiscated a trunkful of Bourne's manuscripts. Government agents, examining some of his verse with the gigantic stupor of a Cyclops, thought idiotically

that it was secret code and espionage. Freedom is the shibboleth, not the true concern, of a State at war. Wilson, the President, was an impeccable State-man. His treatment of conscientious objectors, ranging from Eugene Debs to the Quakers and other religious pacifists, should be recalled now; the story can be found in Norman Thomas's book, "The Conscientious Objector." What made it almost unendurable for Bourne was that the intellectual classes were more implacable toward him than was the government. The *New Republic* shut its book columns to him because of his attitude toward a "democratic, antiseptic war." The war writers of his day were what Bismarck called "ink beasts"; those who did not succumb were few. But the wartime epistles of Romain Rolland, for example, which are without cannon-ball courage, will last longer than Rolland's other books.

As Bourne wrote, the craft of the State is war. But the art of a nation is weaving, a Shaker chair—or Whitman's cottage in Camden, New Jersey. The destruction of American peace arts, progressive since 1917, has made us vulnerable cowards at home and invincible abroad. Our danger is that conquering Americans will return to their land from a cycle of wars worse paupers than the Greeks after sacking Troy. We will be conspicuously poor in human learning; two wars have already made us a land of people who cheat and waste each other. Our strength for war enfeebles our arts, without which we are man-eaters, devouring each other more than our foes. We are in danger of growing a corrosive war-nerve culture, and not an era of love and human communion. Indeed, the war arsenal city exhausts and stupifies the multitude. "War is the health of the state," wrote the Greek philosopher, Heraclitus—and Bourne uses this as his ironic theme in "The State." "The State is always latently at war," asserted Bourne. Our vast wild production is the invidious battle material with which we defeat the oppressor abroad and yoke the people at home.

All our wars, while they are being fought, are "just" wars. But the "rough, rude currents of health" which come from war actually enervate all classes: any war is a fierce animal wound that stings the populace into madness. No intellectual can whip a people into battle without impairing his own faculties; for the war mind, as Bourne wrote, is the herd intellect—and if there be any doubt about this, look at the war writings of Henry James, Thorsten Veblen or John Dewey. The American, no political genius, returns home to sack the peace with as much fury as Achilles wasted cities. War is the American's most conspicuous waste!

Three sages, Tolstoi, Thoreau and Bourne, are knit together by their State-fear—and the astonishing thing is that Randolph Bourne, dead at thirty-two, was as State-wise as Leo Tolstoi became after a long life and in the fullness of his venerable years.

## EYE-POPPING TEXAS CITY

**Houston: Land of the Big Rich, by George Fuermann.** *New York: Doubleday. \$3.50*

There's an old Texas story about the fellow with the dirty shirt who was denied admittance to a fashionable hotel: He got mad and built a more ornate hotel across the street, paying cash for it. There's a great deal of this sort of thing in Mr. Fuermann's book about Houston, Texas.

In writing his revealing story of the amazing city and the antics of its fabulous millionaires, George Fuermann had to anticipate change. He must have taken a cue from one of the main personages in the story, Oveta Culp Hobby, wartime commander of the WAACS and a policy-maker on the *Houston Post*. "I am sure I will like Houston," Mrs. Hobby once said, "if they ever get it finished."

Houston is growing so rapidly, due to oil, shipping, chemicals and other booms, that anything a person might write today could be has-been stuff tomorrow. In his chapter on Glenn McCarthy, the most spectacular of the city's glittering stars, Fuermann hedges against change (and the unpredictable McCarthy impulse) by pointing out that everything he is reporting is "as of middle 1951."

This is a wise technique. For as the book came off the press McCarthy was in Europe and Egypt trading with whole nations. He had just persuaded the Egyptian Parliament to change an old law so that the Egyptian nation could make an oil deal with the one-time painter of oil tank bottoms.

With a metropolitan population of 800,000, Houston is the largest city in the South, passing New Orleans in the 1950 census. But Houston's fabulous dollars, not population statistics, are Mr. Fuermann's leading theme. Houston has the highest per capita wealth in the world. It is perhaps the only place where a person with only five million dollars is not pointed out as one of the wealthy. To be "somebody" in the money world of Houston, a man has to have at least 25 million dollars. And in recent years—since the time Hugh Roy Cullen, the city's wealthiest individual, got into the philanthropy business in a multi-million-dollar way—a man has to give to worthy causes 40 to 50 million dollars before he creates too much excitement.

Mr. Fuermann's book presents a fine accounting of what may happen to a poor boy when he makes his first 50 million. He may, as one man did, send a new Cadillac to Europe for the installation of a \$5000 custom body, the instructions to the custom people being to "throw the old body away." He may, as Glenn McCarthy did, build a \$21,000,000 hotel and paint it 62 shades of green. He may, like Marion West, who has a particular dislike for Dallas, fling out 50 to 100 silver dollars to porters and cab drivers upon his arrival at the Dallas airport.

Houston is 115 years old, but, culturally, it is new and raw. Its vast wealth has come in comparatively recent years, and some of its well-heeled citizens find themselves suddenly disposed to have an inher-

ent liking for etchings. The behavior of the money-burdened, and how they got the cash, makes an interesting piece of reading.

However, there is more to Houston than the torrent of easy money. Long ago, before there were dollars to burn, the inland city made itself the second largest Atlantic port (on the basis of tonnage) by converting a murky bayou into a deep-water ship channel. And all the wealth and developments have not come from oil wells.

Almost any Texan would agree with Fuermann in his designation of the ten main rulers of Houston—Jesse H. Jones, James A. Elkins, Sr., Glenn McCarthy, Oscar Holcombe (the mayor off and on for thirty years), Hugh Roy Cullen, William L. Clayton, George and Herman Brown and William P. and Oveta Culp Hobby. Of this group of the great, only Cullen and McCarthy are important because of oil. Jones, long chairman of the RFC and Secretary of Commerce in the Roosevelt Cabinet, Clayton, a world-wide cotton merchant, and Mrs. Hobby, are international figures, while the other Houston greats are powers mainly at home.

In one respect, the book is astonishing: it contains an amazing amount of interesting minutiae of ordinary souls. This must have come from years of doing a miscellaneous daily column (the author is a columnist on the *Houston Post*). Mr. Fuermann has called the names of the rich, the zany, the madams, the harlots, and some folks who had a Christmas tree for five cats, but he can probably go on living in Houston, and perhaps autographing his book, for he has been offensive to no one. He has the knack of reporting enough detail and then quitting. The book is outlined like a series of newspaper articles and written in an almost nippy journalistic style. Fuermann has done pieces for *Time* and *Life*, and some of *Time's* curtness has rubbed off on him.

LEWIS NORDYKE

## HUMORIST IN COMMONS

**Independent Member, by A. P. Herbert.** *New York: Doubleday. \$5.00*

As poet, humorist and M. P., Mr. Herbert has written his memoirs with backstage knowledge of the theater and inside information as member of Parliament. An independent member for Oxford, he battled for intelligent divorce and betting laws and against a tax on books. He lost out finally in an effort to keep the university seats. Historically, as a university member, he followed in the illustrious steps of Bacon, Newton, Pitt, Peel and Gladstone. These seats Labor abolished, shrewdly fearing their balance of power in a close vote. While an M.P., Herbert also served in the Navy, patrolling the Thames during the blitz. His recollections are full of interesting stories of the great and near great. He is anything but partisan in the gallantry of his reminiscences. A thoroughly delightful book.

EDWIN CLARK

# TOWARD MUTUAL AID

*The Conduct of Life*, by Lewis Mumford, *New York; Harcourt, Brace. \$5.00*

With "The Conduct of Life" Lewis Mumford completes his tetralogy of philosophic studies of human society. In 1934 he launched this series with "Technics and Civilization," followed in 1938 by "The Culture of Cities." The third volume, "The Condition of Man," appeared in 1944. The present volume is hailed as "the culmination of Lewis Mumford's life work."

"The Conduct of Life" is indubitably a book of comfort and reassurance—even of hope. Mr. Mumford leads his reader up craggy paths of criticism to elevations of faith from which to view man's perplexing world with calm, and to glimpse in the misty distance the radiance of a new and happier life.

In Chapter VII, "The Fulfillment of Man," Mr. Mumford gives us this thought on the future:

Now that mankind, to guarantee its survival and go further with its development, must create a universal society, capable of embracing all men as brothers, it must have as its dominant persona a mask that will fit every face, and a goal that promises to bring together, at a common point, every particular mode of life. With the ideal balance dominant, we shall offset weaknesses, correct partialities, and lay a basis for mutual aid and reciprocal understanding.

Mr. Mumford's choice of words—"it must have as its dominant persona a mask that will fit every face"—borrowed from the vocabulary of psychoanalysis, would seem to indicate a hangover from an ideology of regimentation. Mr. Mumford has in the past established quite a record of hopeful tolerance for a communistic brand of un-freedoms. It is refreshing now to find a change in his judgment in the ascendent. On page 225 he castigates Marxism:

... above all, it [Marxism] has no place for freedom, that essential attribute of personality; for Marx limited freedom, in so many words, to "the conscious recognition of necessity." Hence Marxism has no theory to account for its own corruption, though the stench of that corruption in Soviet Russia is the most signal manifestation of Marxism today.

In his criticism of the Marxian concepts of life, Mr. Mumford stresses again and again the need for mutual aid—"a positive concept of justice and mutual aid." In his final chapter, "The Way of Life," he writes:

Our present civilization lacks the capacity for self-direction because it has committed itself to mass organizations and has built-up structures from the top down on the principles of all dictatorships and absolutisms, rather than from the bottom up; it is efficient in giving orders and compelling obedience and providing one-way communications;—but it is in the main still inept in everything that involves reciprocity, mutual aid, two-way communications, give-and-take.

While I do not find myself in complete agreement with Mr. Mumford's analysis, I am deeply and personally interested in it, for from far back in my memory comes an echo of a similar criticism of our social structure. My father, Peter Kropotkin, author of "Mutual Aid," used to voice that criticism. In the bibliography of Mr. Mumford's "Conduct of Life," I find this note on "Peter Kropotkin and his book, 'Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution,' (published first in London in 1902)":

... Kropotkin established himself as one of the great seminal thinkers of our time; perhaps capable of counteracting Marx's sinister emphasis on authority, mechanism, and violence.

My father would have liked that short summary, for his profound understanding of the innate dangers in the Marxian theories was far ahead of his time. There is an increasing renewal of attention to his theories of mutual aid as a fundamental and integral factor in human development and over-all human relationships. Stuart Cloete devoted a chapter to these theories of Kropotkin in "The Third Way," published in 1947. Ashley Montagu, Professor of Anthropology at Rutgers University, has carried on extensive experiments with animals, along lines of mutual aid.

"The Conduct of Life" is a book to be read by everyone who takes an intelligent (and a disturbed) interest in the world in which we live. To those readers who may not have the time or the concentration to read the entire book, I recommend the last chapter, which has the great merit of leaving the reader with a feeling of restored balance and tidier thinking.

ALEXANDRA KROPOTKIN

## THE PASSIVE KING

*A King's Story: The Memoirs of The Duke of Windsor.* *New York: Putnam's. \$4.50*

There is nothing to criticize in the writing of this majestic autobiography. The sonorous balanced sentences of the prose suggest the era of an earlier Edward. No doubt Mr. Charles J. V. Murphy, who assisted Edward, deserves the highest praise for the book's literary merits; his prose has a certain sceptered quality as befits the style of royal kings. My criticism of the book concerns only its philosophy, and assumes that most people already have read and enjoyed its prose. The revelation of what happened after the King met Wallis disenchanted one of my fondest boyhood illusions. For I had always thought of Edward as being one of the most romantic figures of our time. Though forced from the Throne, he would not give up the woman he loved. He gave up power and luxury for the sake of an idea, a very romantic idea. But this was not the case. Edward illustrates better than anybody living, the tragedy of a man of action without

ideas. Such ideas as he professed he betrayed. He gives the impression of a speedy, graceful, sailing yacht, always eager for a hearty race, but rudderless, subject to the whim of any forceful wind.

Here are a couple of Edward's ideas and their betrayals: 1. *He believed in the Gold Standard.* But when the government announced that Great Britain had gone off the Gold Standard, he said: "For a dreadful moment one had the feeling that the foundations of British power were being swept away. Fortunately the country rallied unshaken from these tribulations." This optimistic purblind sentence was composed after England had further debased her currency, and had just consumed six billions from America. British Power certainly was swept away at the exact moment Britain went off the Gold Standard—and England has never rallied.

2. *He believed in private enterprise and a balanced budget.* But he also believed that it was the government's duty to intervene in the economic system whenever the failure of the free market brought distress to the working classes. The latter belief, carried to its logical confusion by the Socialists, utterly destroyed the former; the Socialists were in power when he was writing, but he couldn't see the contradiction.

Why did Edward acquiesce so easily? As he himself puts it, "*I am something of a fatalist. I believe that man is seldom master of his own fate.*" (What an easy doctrine!) "*When great issues are invoked forces are let loose that are beyond the limited powers of personal decision.*" (But who invokes the great issues? Aren't they ever invoked by personal decisions?) Among other excuses for his helplessness he gives this one: "*The King is a prisoner of the past.*" (All italics mine.) But this was not true of past kings. Not true even of his grandfather Edward VII, who charged like a hussar on a stallion into the quiet vicarage that was Victorian England.

The traditions which Edward VIII thought weighed so heavily against him were largely Tudor traditions. Now there is good reason why Tudor dress and ceremonies, though redolent of mothballs, have lasted to this day, while customs of subsequent dynasties have not. Look at the kings who established these sacred traditions. In 1529 Henry VIII divorced Catherine of Aragon and began the Reformation. In 1534 he separated from Rome, and established the Anglican Church with himself as head. The Church, which opposed Wallis Simpson on grounds of divorce, was itself begun with a divorce infinitely more shocking than Mrs. Simpson's. The first Tudor king, Henry VII, had far less claim to the throne than our Edward; but Henry fought for it much harder, won it by civil war—yet this war did not leave the nation riven (as Edward says such wars always must) for from the time of this war and the reign of a rebel bastard who had the courage of his claim, began the glorious Golden Age of England. The Tudors stand

among the greatest rebels against tradition; winning their throne by rebellion, their church by rebellion, their right of divorce by rebellion, they produced the greatest monarch of all time in the person of Elizabeth, in whose reign the British Empire was established, as well as the sacred traditions of pomp and ceremony our Edward feared to affront. Elizabeth founded the Empire by putting England on the Gold Standard, and by relaxing restraints on private enterprise; she did not do so by fear of Parliamentary crises, nor fear of civil war. When she reformed the Prayer book and all her bishops refused to give consent, she didn't bow; she swept them out. The point here is not to admire the Tudors; they were bloody tyrants. The point is that great kings are makers of manners. There is no reason why those manners should be perpetuated by kings of opposite persuasion. For new manners, a new rebel was needed.

Edward had more alternatives than his narrow fatalistic attitude admits. He might have accepted the resignation of Stanley Baldwin. He might have formed a new government, and the world five years sooner would have felt the impact of Winston Churchill. He might have reformed the Church of England, separating church from state. He might have overhauled the outmoded ceremonies surrounding the Throne. He might have, had such been his belief, abolished the monarchy altogether. But above all, he might have kept his crown and his woman, too. He might have forced her acceptance down his subjects' throats, or patiently persuaded them to listen to reason; he might have kept her as morganatic wife, mistress, or created her duchess and married her as Queen. Edward might today rule England, Wallis at his side, and his first minister the man who refused to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. All this was in his power. He might have gone down in history as a true man of action, by which I mean a man with enough faith in his ideas to stand and do battle. Any of this he might have achieved, had he had an ounce of belief in free will.

THADDEUS ASHBY

## CHARLEMAGNE'S CLERIC

Alcuin, Friend of Charlemagne, by Eleanor Shipley Duckett. *New York: Macmillan. \$5.00*

Alcuin, the learned and conscientious cleric who played such a large part in what is known as "the Carolingian Renaissance," is, from one point of view at least, very worthy of the thorough biographical treatment that Miss Duckett gives us in these pages. For he lived at a time of singular importance for the future of Christendom and his own role in that time was an important one. Yet it must be confessed that his placid life, devoid, as far as we know, of personal conflicts and marked by few vicissitudes, makes for rather unexciting reading. Miss Duckett has enthusiasm for her sub-

ject and knowledge to equal her enthusiasm; she has done her best to build up the personality of her protagonist by frequent quotations from his letters and by a wealth of detailed information about the Carolingian period. She could hardly have done more. But the book, though valuable for historians of culture, will hardly have great appeal for the general reader.

THOMAS G. BERGIN

## FABULOUS BUT REAL

*Cabin Road*, by John Faulkner. *New York: Gold Medal Books. 25 cents*

To my prejudiced mind there were many strikes against "Cabin Road." It was the usual, maligned, two-bit variety of paper-bound book. I had picked it up in a drug store to while away three confined hours on a plane. It was an original instead of a reprint; and so I assumed it had been written specifically for the riff raff. The author was apparently riding on the name-tail of the great William Faulkner—and perhaps not even remotely related. Its title was a swipe from "Tobacco Road." Obviously, I thought, looking at the sexy dame on the cover, this is for truck drivers who hang up pictures of nude pin-ups.

After reading ten pages my prejudice urged me to throw the book out of the plane. The sentences were short and choppy. Pronouns were seemingly dispensed with; and in their place an endless repetition of proper nouns. I felt as if I had been dragged back to McGuffey's First Reader: "See the Man. See the dog. Does the Man love the dog? The dog is wagging his tail. Is the dog happy?" Then I thought of Dunsany's "Gods of the Mountains," wherein the chief beggar plots to pass off his dirty gang as the gods and warns them to wear their rags *over* silk raiment. It was possible, I argued in a fleeting moment of fairness, that John Faulkner was doing the same thing. So I read on; and I thank my star of Beelzebub for having finished "Cabin Road."

The characters are fantastically naive and honest rustics living on the back roads of Mississippi. They function through an indigenous morality. It will surprise and anger our present crop of Northern "liberals" to learn that some sort of sublime equality exists between the whites and blacks depicted in this story—and in Mississippi!

The story is as simple, charming and naive as the characters. The Government Man calls on Jones Peabody and mires his car in a welter of back-road mud. He comes to bring a check for Jones's land, which happens to be on a government reservation. Jones is illiterate and assumes—as nearly all the characters assume—the "W P and A" is back in business, if only because the check is blue and perforated. The Government Man has never seen such people. He wishes to go on about his business; but Jones is not in a hurry. He can't sign the receipt, and there are no witnesses available who can write

and attest to his X. The Government Man can't get his car turned around because the only available mule is blown up with the colic.

So they go looking for a horse or mule to rescue the car. Along go Negro twin adults—Equator and Ex-Senator—both named after a senator who had once taken a trip across the Equator. There is a preacher who is sporadically mentioned, but never actually appears in the book. He is forever seducing the wives of Jones, Equator and Ex-Senator. The husbands are forever chasing him, but always too late. Each husband knows his wife has been seduced by the smell of tutti-frutti gum which is the pay-off for each favor granted.

Jones, the Negroes, and the Government Man go to the general store, which bootlegs hootch. The owners, two mean hombres, plunge through the walls when they hear that the stranger is a government official and assume he is a revenue agent. They come back on the assurance that he is an all-right guy. But they can't change the Government Man's big bill.

The whole gang, including the tough hombres, repair to Uncle Good who runs a brothel with his two daughters as inmates. Uncle Good is an honest man. He insists on keeping the girls in their own rooms because he wouldn't want them carrying on in his room. When Jones says, "Well, hit's right handy-like, hit is," Uncle Good says, "Air you insinuating I'd incest one of my own daughters?" That is indigenous morality. Since he can't change the Government Man's bill either, he opens a charge account for Jones.

Eventually they all go off—including the "girls"—to get something to eat. The bill again makes trouble; and a second charge account is opened for Jones. Why? Because all these people—despite the Government Man's protestation that the check for Jones is payment for his property—know that it is really a "W P and A" check and that soon hundreds of these will be around and prosperity will be back.

Despite its seeming simplicity and deliberately complete absence of a profound thought, it is a fabulous story about fabulous characters who must be real in that isolated terrain. When this country is laid low, and the archaeologists of the future rummage about the Mississippi ruins and come upon "Cabin Road," like "The Theogony" it will be more than a mere clue to a part of our civilization.

Why was "Cabin Road" published as a two-bit original? John Faulkner, who, by the way, is William's younger brother, writes: "They [his regular publishers] said it had no point to it and that it was too much like 'Tobacco Road' to ever be taken seriously. Gold Medal likes it well enough to ask for another one about the same people, they [the people] being too wonderful to ever let die."

Comparing "Cabin Road" to "Tobacco Road" is like comparing Bach to Tin Pan Alley. Incidentally, 350,000 copies have already been sold since September, and another 200,000 are on the press. This without any reviews, except a few in Mississippi!

HARRY SERWER

# the FREEMAN

announces with great pleasure

its sponsorship of a seminar on essential problems of the social sciences, to be conducted by Professor Ludwig von Mises from Monday, June 23, through Thursday, July 3, in San Francisco, California.

Five sessions will be devoted to a critical analysis of Marxian Dialectical Materialism. The other sessions will deal with the problems of capital: saving, investment and the accumulation of capital; demand for capital and the alleged disadvantages of oversaving; the economic, social and political aspects of foreign investment.

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## ATTENDANCE LIMITED

Attendance will be limited, in order that each participant may have the opportunity to take an active part in the discussions. Applications should be made before April 1, and blanks for that purpose may be had from the editorial offices of this magazine, 240 Madison Avenue, New York 16. No fees will be charged.

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