

THE

Freeman

DECEMBER 14, 1953

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“McCarthyism”

Communism's New Semantic Weapon

An Editorial

A Solution for Trieste


Hal Lehrman

Articles and Book Reviews by Robert Montgomery, F. A. Harper,
Milton Friedman, Max Eastman, James Burnham,
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
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THE Freeman

A Fortnightly
For
Individualists

Editor HENRY HAZLITT
Managing Editor FLORENCE NORTON

Our Contributors

ROBERT MONTGOMERY is, of course, the distinguished and much loved stage and motion picture actor, who has recently won acclaim and new fame as a radio commentator and narrator of the popular television show, "Robert Montgomery Presents." Because we feel that his eloquent words on "The Essence of Freedom" should be read by every American, we are giving a blanket permission to newspapers everywhere to quote it in their pages with the usual credit to the FREEMAN and the author. To this end we urge our readers to call it to the attention of their local editors. Reprints are immediately available at the following rates: single copies, .10; 25 copies \$1.00; 100 copies \$3.00; 1,000 copies \$25.00. Address: Reprint Department, The FREEMAN, 240 Madison Avenue, New York 16.

HAL LEHRMAN has just spent a month in Trieste as observer and reporter and, even more, as a friend of that city's independent-spirited, freedom-loving people. In analyzing the dispute now raging there and proposing a policy to settle it, he gives consideration to the wishes of the Triestines themselves—a factor that has been generally disregarded in most accounts and high-level discussions.

HERBERT COREY began his long and impressive newspaper career, he writes us, "by getting out of a saddle on the Nowood River in Wyoming and becoming an assistant to the editor and owner of the *Bonanza Rustler*." Since then he has covered stories over much of America and a good deal of the rest of the world besides.

F. A. HARPER, economist, educator, and author, was formerly connected with the Federal Farm Board and the Farm Credit Administration. A professor at Cornell University until 1946, he is now on the staff of the Foundation for Economic Education at Irvington-on-Hudson.

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GEORGE B. RUSSELL has been a close student of the activities of the Chinese Communists since 1927. During the war he spent eighteen months in China with U.S. Air Intelligence. He is on the staff of a leading New York daily.

ALAN DEVOE, author and naturalist, is a contributor to many national magazines. His six books include *Our Animal Neighbors*, published this year.

Contents VOL. 4, NO. 6 DECEMBER 14, 1953

Editorials

The Fortnight	185
"McCarthyism"—Communism's New Weapon	187
Truman: Guilty as Charged	188
Total H-Bomb Defense	189

Articles

A Solution for Trieste	HAL LEHRMAN 191
TV and a Revolution	HERBERT COREY 194
The Essence of Freedom	ROBERT MONTGOMERY 196
Agriculture's Sacred Seventh	F. A. HARPER 197
Foreign Aid: A Vicious Circle	MARTIN EBON 199
Why the Dollar Shortage?	MILTON FRIEDMAN 201
Mao's Second Team	GEORGE B. RUSSELL 204

Books and the Arts

Inside the G.P.U.	MAX EASTMAN 206
Fossilized Popular Frontism	JAMES BURNHAM 207
Historian or Hoaxster?	LUCIUS WILMERDING, JR. 208
Evolution vs. Revolt	ASHER BRYNES 209
Biography of a Butcher	GUNTHER STUHLMANN 209
Urban Naturalist	ALAN DEVOE 210
Briefer Mention	210
A Party Every Night	SERGE FLIEGERS 212

This Is What They Said	190
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From Our Readers	213
------------------------	-----


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THE Freeman

MONDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1953

The Fortnight

Senator McCarthy in his TV-radio speech made a devastating reply to Harry Truman's feeble defense of his course with Harry Dexter White. But the first cries of protest against Mr. McCarthy's speech came not from left-wing Democrats but from unnamed "top White House staff members." According to a dispatch from James Reston in the *New York Times* of November 26, they were "hopping mad." Yet a careful analysis of their complaint forces the conclusion that President Eisenhower and his White House entourage had nobody to blame but themselves.

"They concede," wrote Mr. Reston, "that the Wisconsin Senator beat them to the draw in demanding time to answer Mr. Truman's blast at the Eisenhower Administration." Quite so. It is obvious that if the White House staff themselves had asked for that TV-radio time, either for President Eisenhower personally or for Attorney General Brownell, they could have got it. Why didn't they ask? Obviously they were following the same policy of silence and backaway that Mr. Eisenhower had followed at his press conference.

Their next complaint was that Senator McCarthy had misrepresented the President's stand on the issue. Did he? The Senator said: "A few days ago I read that President Eisenhower expressed the hope that by election time in 1954 the subject of Communism would be a dead and forgotten issue." What these top White House staff members say Mr. Eisenhower said, according to the Reston dispatch, is that "he hoped this problem would have been dealt with so effectively that it no longer would be an issue in the 1954 election campaign." This, we are afraid, represents what in retrospect they *wish* he had said. But here is the leading paragraph of James Reston's own dispatch on that interview in the *New York Times* of November 19: "President Eisenhower said today he hoped the Communists-in-government question would not be an issue in the 1954 Congressional campaign." And the *Times* text of the inter-

view said on the same day: "He [the President] hoped this whole thing would be a matter of history and of memory by the time the next election came around."

In brief, Senator McCarthy came a good deal nearer to presenting what Mr. Eisenhower said than his top staff members did. In any case, the President has had ample opportunity, and he still has ample opportunity, to make himself clear. He does not need to be ambiguous. He does not need to back away from his Attorney General's charges, which have in any case been proved to the hilt. And he shows bad moral as well as political judgment if he does not think that the record of criminal negligence of the Truman Administration in dealing with Communist infiltration should be not only a legitimate but a central issue against any Democratic candidate who would undertake to defend that record. On the other hand, of course, there is no reason why this should be an issue against any Democratic candidate who himself puts country above party, and publicly and courageously condemns and repudiates Mr. Truman's gross dereliction of duty.

This, we need hardly say, is not the course that Adlai Stevenson has chosen. Instead he has had the effrontery to speak of "the degrading assault on President Truman." It is not, according to the Stevenson moral code, the man who promotes a spy to high public office, after he has been informed by his own FBI that he is a spy, who is to be condemned, but the man who exposes the fact.

We publish a leading editorial in this issue discussing the attempt of the Communists to establish a new Popular Front with the doctrine "McCarthyism is the main danger." In view of this tactic, it seems a good time to remind all the semantic dupes once more that the term "McCarthyism" is a Communist invention with a definite date. It was first used by Owen Lattimore on May 4, 1950, in his testimony before the Tydings Committee. The following day, May 5, 1950, an article appeared in the *Daily Worker* by Adam Lapin, political editor, using "McCarthyism" in the headline and

text. Whether the *Daily Worker* got it from Lattimore or Lattimore from the *Daily Worker*, or whether both were suddenly and coincidentally inspired on the same day, we do not pretend to know. But if anyone can show us any earlier public use of the word from any other source, we should be glad to have the information. Meanwhile we suggest that mere dilettantes might be a little more cautious concerning whose line they pick up and parrot.

At the first news of Pakistan-United States military negotiations, Nehru went into an expected tantrum. India's attitude toward the development was one, he said, of "intense concern." Nehru has the knack of becoming invariably concerned over any move made by Washington to thwart Soviet aggression, while remaining invariably indifferent toward every move made by Moscow in furtherance of its aggressions. If he doesn't like a Pakistan-U. S. military agreement for the mutual protection of both parties, why hasn't he proposed an India-U. S. agreement?

On another front, Nehru, who never passes up an opportunity to lecture America on its alleged moral deficiencies, has cast doubt on his own standards of morality. He has put forward a proposal which, in its callous cruelty, might shock a tough old soldier. He has suggested that if the proposed political conference on Korea has not met by January 22, the date set for the liberation of the prisoners, they should be indefinitely detained. Fortunately, Mr. Dulles promptly stated that the United States is standing firmly by the position that these unfortunate men should be set free on the prescribed date, January 22. No doubt Mr. Nehru, very susceptible to Chinese Communist propaganda, shares the splenetic disappointment of his Peiping friends because so few of the prisoners have succumbed to the blandishments of Communist "persuaders." American honor and common humanity are deeply involved in this matter; and American public opinion should be alert to see that January 22 is the positively final terminal date of an ordeal to which these prisoners should never have been subjected.

News that rationing is on the way out in Great Britain and will almost certainly be wound up by May 1954, if not sooner, points to a constructive achievement of the Conservative government. Rationing was doubtless necessary in an overcrowded island under the semi-siege conditions of war. There was, however, no valid reason why this clumsy, cumbersome bureaucratic system could not have been liquidated much earlier, as it was in most of continental Europe. The demagogic Labor Party slogan, "Fair Shares," con-

vinced many Britons that the state owed them a guaranteed pittance of basic foodstuffs at artificially low prices, paid for out of the taxpayers' pockets. Among the many horrible outrages which state "bulk buying" and bureaucratic distribution inflicted on the consumer one of the last was the foisting on the British public of large quantities of inedible "ewe mutton" last summer. The restoration of the normal price-and-profit system will add appreciably to the comfort of British living.

Edward Hunter's *Brain-Washing in Red China* has just been brought out in a new edition. It was Hunter who first introduced the term "brain-washing" into English and first explained that dreadful process. According to custom, the truths about Communism that he had to tell were either disbelieved, derided, or neglected. The return of the prisoners from North Korea has now proved his literal accuracy. It also suggests how useful it would be for our soldiers and for all of us to learn something about our enemy in advance. Hunter's book, now enlarged with fresh material, retains its importance.

Is there an open season for treason, as there is for deer hunting and trout fishing? This question is posed by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. According to an A.P. dispatch from Seattle, she deplored the "furore" over the White case, as she once deplored the exposure of her friends, Alger Hiss and Lauchlin Currie. Mrs. Roosevelt is quoted as adding that a change has occurred in the nation's "moral climate," "placing the case of White in a different perspective from 1946." The vast majority of Americans, one suspects, would be inclined to paraphrase a saying of Calvin Coolidge in this connection. There is no right to commit treason and espionage, or to abuse governmental office to advance the interests of a foreign power, under any circumstances, in any year, at any time.

We well remember that Piltdown Man glowering up at us from photographs in our school books. He was a formidable ancestor, with his shaggy eyebrows, tough jutting jaw, and the huge club that the pictures always put in his hand. We bravely acknowledged him, though, in the name of Science, even if we never did get quite straight his relation to his Pekin and Pithecanthropus cousins. And now, after forty-two years, he turns out to be a hoax after all! It's like learning that Great Grandad really died of DT's instead of that bullet at Bunker Hill. Let's hope we find out who did it. The motive may have been personal fame, overdeveloped zeal for proving evolution—or pure fun. Certainly anyone who would devote that much talent to pure fun deserves honor in our century.

“McCarthyism” — Communism’s New Weapon

Ex-President Truman ended his broadcast of November 17 with a statement of what he evidently wishes to become the country’s basic political issue:

It is now evident that the present Administration has fully embraced, for political advantage, McCarthyism. I am not referring to the Senator from Wisconsin—he is only important in that his name has taken on a dictionary meaning in the world.

It is the corruption of truth. . . It is the abandonment of the “due process” of the law. It is the use of the big lie. . . It is the spread of fear and the destruction of faith. . .

This is not a partisan matter. This horrible cancer is eating at the vitals of America.

On November 18 the *Daily Worker* published a front page editorial under the head, YES, THE ENEMY IS MC CARTHYISM! This began:

Harry Truman’s speech excited millions of Americans because it struck back hard at the cancer of McCarthyism. . . Truman was speaking historically and accurately when he put his finger on McCarthyism as the great peril to the United States.

The same Truman statement that we have just given was quoted with an unmixed endorsement: “Thus, Truman spoke a truth which millions of Americans have begun to feel about the menace of McCarthyism.”

We want first to assure the touchy Missouri wildcat and his admirers that by citing the *Daily Worker’s* praise we are not suggesting that he is Communist, pro-Communist, or disloyal. We know that Harry Truman is not a Communist and that he is a loyal American. What we want to make clear is that when Mr. Truman, or anyone else, takes the political line expressed at the end of his broadcast, he has his finger on the trigger of a political A-bomb. He had better make certain who will get hurt if it goes off.

In our issues of September 21 and November 16, we have explained the current Communist tactic, the primary objective of which is the infiltration of the Democratic Party. The political or “ideological” foundation for this tactic is the doctrine that “*McCarthyism is the main danger*”—equivalent to the Truman doctrine as of November 17. Politics has its own laws, even if they are not as exact as the laws of physics. If you have the same working doctrine as the Communists, if you make the same choice of the *enemy*, then no matter what your private thoughts about Communism may be, you will find yourself in a *de facto* alliance with the Communists.

Mr. Truman is correct when he says that “McCarthyism” has little to do with the Senator from Wisconsin. You can be for or against the Senator, or for some things that he does and

against others, without in the least compromising your basic anti-Communism. But McCarthy is not McCarthyism. “*McCarthyism*” is an invention of the Communists. It is a new word for what the Communists called “fascism” during the 1930s and “collaborationism” during and just after the war.

In the vocabulary of the Communists and their semantic dupes, all of these words mean exactly the same thing: namely, whatever the Communists oppose and whatever is opposing the Communists. Similarly, a “fascist,” “collaborator,” or “McCarthyite” means simply a firm anti-Communist.

In its issue of September 24, the *Daily Worker* offered the following definition: “McCarthyism is the technique of the Big Lie—the Big Lie that Communism, at home and abroad, is the main danger.” More recently the *Daily Worker* has been developing the “theory” of McCarthyism and the plan of the “the struggle against McCarthyism.”

It turns out that McCarthyism means war, union-smashing, super-profits, police terror, racism and so on—and, just incidentally, means resistance to Moscow’s current international proposals, whatever they may be. It emerges that McCarthyism is “basically a fascist menace” (*D.W.*, Nov. 16). “The objective of McCarthyism is destroying democracy and imposing fascism” (*D.W.*, Nov. 12). The standard Marxian analysis of fascism is applied in accounting for McCarthyism as the dictatorship of “monopoly finance-capitalism.”

The struggle against McCarthyism is therefore identical in sociological content with “the struggle against fascism” of the 1930s. What the Communists aim at is a 1950s-style Popular Front, a re-creation of the League against War and Fascism as a League against War and McCarthyism, preferably operating under the label, “the Democratic Party.”

The Communists are encouraged at their progress, and rightly so. Mary Norris writes in *D. W.*, November 11: “An international front against fascism has emerged parallel with but related to the international peace front. . . Fresh attacks on McCarthyism are being voiced in Democratic Party circles. These are beginning to go beyond liberal, ADA, and ex-New Deal forces.” She shows how to build up widening support in labor, Negro, religious, youth, and even “some Republican” circles.

The Popular Front slogans of the 1930s are launched again: “The real issue is not McCarthyism versus Trumanism, nor the non-existent ‘Communist conspiracy’: it is McCarthyism versus Rooseveltism, fascism versus New Dealism, and this stands out conspicuously in the case of

Harry Dexter White.” (With an audacity beyond anything that they showed in the case of Alger Hiss, the Communists are testing out whether they can transform Harry Dexter White into a martyr of Popular Frontism with a sacrificial “record of devotion to the Rooseveltian ideals.”)

In such ways the Communists believe that they can again exploit the genuine anti-fascist sentiment that remains as a legacy of the thirties. It is a readily observable fact that whoever accepts the basic doctrine that “McCarthyism is the main danger” is soon compelled to draw the practical corollary that Communism, at home and abroad,

is not a very great danger. His political energy is channeled against “McCarthyites,” and the sword he turns against Communists is blunted—or reversed. His opposition to Soviet moves and policies becomes softened, episodic. And this of course is exactly the way the Communists have planned it.

If “progressive” Democrats adopt the political line of Harry Truman’s November 17 address, they will find themselves marching alongside the Communists no matter how loudly they may still proclaim their “anti-Communism.” You cannot oppose the Communists in practice if you accept their ideas, their policies, and their tactics.

Truman: Guilty as Charged

The case which Attorney General Brownell presented against former President Truman was not one of treason or conscious participation in Communist conspiracy. The charge was gross dereliction of duty, “blindness,” in Mr. Brownell’s word. And, in spite of or perhaps because of the frantic breastbeating in which the ex-President indulged during his half hour on the air, this charge has been fully sustained in the court of public opinion and the court of history.

Mr. Truman’s bumbling, stumbling, and often downright contradictory explanations of how he handled the White case suggest a small boy caught with tell-tale evidence of depredations in the jam closet. Mr. Truman’s first reaction to the statement that he had promoted a man whom he had good reason to believe was a Soviet spy consisted of two assertions which he would have been the first to characterize as lies if they had been made by anyone else. He knew nothing of any FBI report on White, he said. And, anyway, when he found that White was “wrong,” he fired him.

But it soon came out, with the corroborative evidence of former Secretary of State Byrnes, that Mr. Truman was thoroughly familiar with the FBI report on White and his partners in disloyalty. More than that, this report was considered important enough to be the subject of special consultation between Mr. Truman and two members of his Cabinet, Byrnes and Secretary of the Treasury Vinson. It seems incredible that the discovery of an enemy agent in a high government post should not have left a permanent imprint on the ex-President’s memory. One hopes that such an episode was not regarded as routine.

Reference to the record shows that White was never “fired.” His promotion from Assistant Secretary of the Treasury to executive director for the United States in the International Monetary Fund went through. And he resigned from the Fund on grounds of health more than a year

later, with no evidence that the resignation was requested, and to the accompaniment of an enthusiastically appreciative letter from . . . Harry S. Truman.

After starting out with the handicap of two easily proved misstatements Mr. Truman took to the air—with no better results. He screamed liar over and over again, and was perhaps only restrained by the FCC regulations from using the earthier language which characterized his famous letter addressed from the White House to a Washington music critic.

But at the same time he abandoned the only ground, assertion of ignorance about White’s record, on which he could have reasonably disputed Mr. Brownell’s allegation. He posed as a super-sleuth from Scotland Yard, allowing White to be promoted so as not to alert the “many other persons” who were under FBI investigation. The ex-President’s apologists tried to build up a picture of Mr. Truman as only trying to be helpful to the FBI.

But the testimony of J. Edgar Hoover before the Senate Internal Security Committee riddled this second-guessing attempt at defense from stem to stern. Mr. Hoover’s decisive words were as follows:

“At no time was the FBI a party to an agreement to promote Harry Dexter White and at no time did the FBI give its approval to such an agreement.”

Mr. Hoover went on to knock one brick after another out of the flimsy edifice of the former President’s defense. It was not easier but harder to watch White in his new job at the International Monetary Fund, because his office in that institution enjoyed U.N. extra-territorial status. If there was any plan to isolate White from further opportunity for mischief, it broke down rather badly, since Frank Coe, an associate of White under FBI surveillance, became Secretary of the Fund in June 1946 and was only dismissed in 1952, after he had refused to tell congressional

investigators whether he had been engaged in espionage against the United States.

Among his other valuable qualities as a Soviet secret agent White seems to have possessed a genius for smuggling individuals who have subsequently been pleading the "Fifth Column Amendment" into government service, the Treasury, and the Monetary Fund. Many if not most of these elusive persons seem to have belonged to Dr. White's seminar at one time or another.

The most intimate picture of White's extracurricular activities is to be found in Elizabeth Bentley's book *Out of Bondage*. Describing the services of what was called the Silvermaster group (Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, main cog in Soviet espionage, is still at liberty, insulting and abusing congressional committees and enjoying the shelter of the Fifth Amendment) Miss Bentley writes:

One of the most important members of the group was Harry Dexter White, [Assistant] Secretary of the United States Treasury and right-hand man of Secretary Morgenthau. He was in a position not only to give valuable information but also to influence United States policy in a pro-Soviet direction. . . . Harry had access to almost all the Treasury's top-secret material. In addition, because of Morgenthau's policy of exchanging information with other government agencies, we also received 'hush-hush' data from many other strategic departments. Harry was also one of our friends at court: he pulled strings to help any of our agents who were in difficulties.

As to Miss Bentley's reliability, J. Edgar Hoover told the Senate Internal Security Committee: "All information furnished by Miss Bentley, which has been susceptible to check, has been proved correct. She has been subjected to the most searching of cross-examinations; her testimony has been evaluated by juries and reviewed by the courts, and has been found to be accurate."

Besides puncturing Mr. Truman's "red herring" balloon (the ex-President's standards of veracity and responsibility may be judged by the fact that he continued to deny serious penetration of the government service by enemy agents long after he knew the reverse to be the truth), the airing of the White case illustrates our Achilles heel in the struggle against Communism. This is espionage and infiltration. The Communists have, in the main, failed in their schemes to set economic and ethnic groups against each other; they have almost never been able to elect an avowed Communist to an office as high as dogcatcher. But a few secret agents in strategic places can do a great deal of harm, as the records of Harry Dexter White and Alger Hiss show. A good follow-up on the White case would be a thorough congressional investigation of the Morgenthau Plan for wrecking the German economy. Had this scheme ever been put into full operation it would have handed Europe to Stalin on a silver platter. It seems to be no accident that White was one of its principal architects.

Total H-Bomb Defense

There are three dangers in the gloom-and-doom scare propaganda in which a well-known team of American commentators has been specializing about what the H-Bomb, or even the A-Bomb could do to American cities.

First, there is the danger that an undue proportion of American resources might be diverted to measures of direct defense which, in no case, could provide absolute security. It is self-evident that whatever can be done, within the limits of a balanced military and economic program, to ward off atomic attack should be done. This would include tightened radar screens, development of guided missile production and research, reasonable civilian defense measures. But concentration on such direct defensive steps to the exclusion of everything else would be calculated to produce anything but the desired aim of security.

Atomic bombs, formidable as they are, represent only one weapon in a struggle that is global and total. The atomic threat cannot be countered by any modernized version of the French Maginot Line. Our defense measures must be of a total character; they should not concentrate a disproportionate share of our financial, industrial, and human resources on one sector.

An advanced air base in Turkey may be more valuable as a deterrent to Soviet attack than some defensive measure in the United States. To get into such a panic over the threat of atomic attack that we would go in for "financial ruination," as one Congressman suggested, would be to create just the atmosphere of chaos and despair that would be most likely to invite Soviet attack. Money which might be spent on building up our own striking power with atomic weapons may well be a better investment in discouraging atomic adventure than the hasty adoption of fantastically expensive schemes of direct protection for our cities.

A second danger from atomic alarmism is that American public opinion might be influenced in the direction of one of two undesirable extremes: preventive war or appeasement. "Preventive war" is a contradiction in terms. A government operating under the restraint of free institutions could not pursue such a policy. Nor is there any reason to pay Soviet Communism the implied compliment of assuming that the balance of strength between the Communist and the free sections of the world will necessarily alter to our disadvantage in the future.

Appeasement, which could conceivably take the form of accepting the substance of Soviet demands for the domination of Europe and Asia in return for some paper scheme of disarmament, far from diminishing our danger, would greatly increase it. The dangerous mirage of any project that would

involve the laying down of our own weapons in the hope that the Soviet Union would do likewise should be ruled out firmly and irrevocably. By this time it should certainly be obvious that any agreement which depends for implementation on the good will and good faith of the Kremlin is not worth the paper on which it is written.

The third danger is the sowing of sheer panic, which would, of course, suit the purposes of the Kremlin admirably. As was evident from the recent clear, unsensational statement of President Eisenhower, the possibility of atomic attack is one of the dangers with which we will have to learn to live—at least until the Soviet regime is greatly weakened or overthrown or transformed beyond recognition from its present character. There is no quick, clear, simple, or easy way to eliminate this danger. One of the best defenses against demoralization from this danger is the stoical spirit in the face of actual or threatened air attack which many cities showed in the last war. And the necessity for a total defense, including the constant maintenance of the capacity for swift and overwhelming offense, should never be lost from view.

THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID

I never defended a disloyal person in my life.

HARRY S. TRUMAN in a press conference
September 2, 1948

It is a blunt fact from which there is no escape that, in the teeth of the November 8 [1945] warning from the FBI, the developing evidence indicated a substantial spy ring operating within the government and involving Harry Dexter White and the documented report delivered to the White House on December 4. Some six weeks later President Truman, on January 23, 1946, publicly announced his nomination of Harry Dexter White for appointment to the International Monetary Fund.

ATTORNEY GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL, JR.,
in his testimony before the Senate Internal
Security Committee, November 17, 1953

From November 8, 1945, until July 24, 1946, seven communications went to the White House bearing on espionage activities, wherein Harry Dexter White's name was specifically mentioned.

During that same period, two summaries on Soviet espionage activities went to the Treasury Department and six summaries went to the Attorney General on the same subject matter.

J. EDGAR HOOVER, Director of the FBI, in
his testimony before the Senate Internal
Security Committee, November 17, 1953

Our government is not endangered by Communist infiltration. It has preserved its integrity, and it will preserve its integrity as long as I'm President . . . there is not a single employee of the Federal government who is an admitted Communist.

The FBI check showed that the loyalty of 99.7 per cent of all Federal workers was not even questionable. Only in the case of about one in 6,000 Government employes has loyalty been found doubtful. That is an amazing record.

HARRY S. TRUMAN, in a speech in Oklahoma
City, September 28, 1948

Only 384 employees, or 9/1000 of 1 per cent of all those [government employes] checked had to be discharged on loyalty grounds. Think of that.

HARRY S. TRUMAN, in a speech before the
Civil Service League, May 3, 1952

Eight hundred and eighty-three [out of 6,344 investigated] Federal employees suspected of disloyalty have quit their jobs rather than face trial, a survey of the government's loyalty program showed today.

One case of suspected loyalty has been found in the executive office of the White House. It has been pending more than ninety days, and how serious it is could not be established tonight.

ANTHONY LEVIERO, in dispatch to the *New
York Times*, September 22, 1948

I charge that the Republicans have impeded and made more difficult our efforts to cope with Communism in this country.

I charge that they have hindered the efforts of the FBI, which has been doing a wonderful job in protecting the national security.

HARRY S. TRUMAN, in a speech in Oklahoma
City, September 28, 1948

The full story of the Soviet espionage conspiracy in the United States during World War Two cannot be told by the committee. It cannot be told because of the Presidential directive.

Report issued by the House Committee
on Un-American Activities, relating to
atomic espionage, September 27, 1948

We have taken action to protect the people and our free institutions. We have done it according to the law of the land, and not through hysterical headlines.

ATTORNEY GENERAL TOM C. CLARK, in his
Labor Day speech in Des Moines, Iowa,
September 6, 1948

People are very much wrought up about the "Communist bugaboo," but I am of the opinion that the country is perfectly safe so far as Communism is concerned. . .

HARRY S. TRUMAN, in a letter to Former
Governor Earle, February 26, 1947

A Solution for Trieste

By HAL LEHRMAN

An on-the-spot reporter points out the errors in the remedies proposed for this troubled city and offers a workable plan for reconciling all sides.

Athens

On the morning of last October 9, the children at the school for dependents of American personnel in Trieste were told that, the boiler having burst, they were to go straight home and stay home until notified. Under the circumstances, the reason given for the holiday was an inspiration of genius. The boiler had indeed burst the night before, but not in the school basement. It had exploded on the Trieste radio, in the form of an official announcement that the Anglo-American troops guarding Zone A of the Free Territory for the United States Security Council since 1947 were going to leave and that the Italians were coming in.

The citizens of Trieste were hardly better prepared for this proclamation, or more frankly informed about it, than the school children. In fact, only about a half-dozen persons even in the Allied Military Government, which administers Trieste, had any clue at all before noon of the very day. The decision to quit the territory—like the subsequent decision maybe not to—was brewed from the advice of experts located everywhere except the place most concerned—notably in Rome, Belgrade, London, and Washington. This manner of making high policy has persisted down to the moment of writing, so that a top AMG officer could look me piteously in the eye just before I left the other day and cry: "May the Lord strike me dead if I know what's going on!"

After a month no farther afield than Trieste and its miniature borders, I am certainly in no position to attempt heady revelations of what Messrs. Dulles and Eden will do next. But it is permissible to observe that their previous efforts can hardly be called a coup. Tito seems to have won the first three rounds on points: when last investigated, the Allied troops were still present; their Italian replacements were nowhere in sight; the next move seemed to be a conference to talk the whole thing over—exactly what Tito wanted. In that wonderful way the British have of underselling the case, one ranking official confided to me that the October 8 plan "seems not to be going entirely according to program."

Since efforts outside Trieste have been less than brilliant, it should be of some interest to report on how things look in and to Trieste itself—if only because a fresh idea or two might emerge and because nobody outside has hitherto bothered

to inquire. A distillation of facts collected by talking to people and using one's own set of eyes and ears produces the following main elements:

1. Tito can march in here any time he wishes. Nobody can stop him and nothing can dislodge him, except a major Allied counter-offensive. But he will not march, because he doesn't dare. He is riding on nerve, bluster, and bluff.

2. The British and American forces (5,000 each at treaty strength and now stripped down to battle readiness) are not leaving. Not until a settlement is devised which has more chance of sticking than the October 8 plan merely to walk out and let the Italians in.

3. The settlement anticipated or hoped for by military observers here is, not surprisingly, a military one: NATO. Zone A and the Yugoslav-controlled Zone B would formally become a Western base under NATO direction. Rome's face would be saved by installing a modified version of Italian civilian administration in Zone A; Belgrade's face would be saved by giving the project an aura of regional security, adding troops of other nations to the garrison, and facilitating supply shipments to Yugoslavia. There are two objections to this arrangement: it would be stop-gap, and it wouldn't work.

4. It wouldn't work because of two-way irredentism. As long as Italians are ruling over Slavs in one half, and Slavs are ruling over Italians in the other, the air will be thick with accusation and the ground will be a forest of booby-traps.

5. There exists a possible solution on which everybody once agreed but which has never been tried: the Free Territory. This presents the seemingly insurmountable obstacle of having to persuade both the Italians and the Yugoslavs to yield. But the obstacle would melt away if Anglo-American diplomacy could muster two qualities thus far lacking in policy on Trieste—firmness and decision.

6. Triestines, even the fervent pro-Italians among them, do not want Italy to govern them. (This is the most sensational news in my bag, in view of the formidable myth to the contrary.) They certainly don't want Yugoslavia either, not even most of the Slavs among them, as long as it is a Tito Yugoslavia. It may be naive to think the will of a people worth taking account of in power politics. But in the long-range reckoning it is crucial—because on our respect for the will of

peoples, in so far as ascertainable, rests the ethic of our cause and the thing which makes us different from our adversary, the Soviets.

Let me now try to expand the points above, in consecutive order.

Tito: Immediately after October 8 the Yugoslavs broke out their sabers and made a ferocious din rattling them. The noise was equalled only by the rattle of Italian sabers. But the respective uproars were not intended to scare the other side. They were meant to scare the British and American diplomats.

Signor Pella undoubtedly knows that his much-advertised border troop concentrations could not stop Tito from grabbing a dominant position inside Zone A whenever he wanted it. For three years in World War One the Italians tried to drive the Austrians out of the Mount Ermada region—and failed. This Mount Ermada is 1,500 yards inside Zone A from where Yugoslav troops are clustered at the triple juncture of the Zonal, Italian, and Yugoslav frontiers. It would take the Yugoslavs about a half-hour to roll in. They would then control the Monfalcone-Duino bottleneck approach to the city of Trieste and hold all of Zone A by the throat.

Tito of course knows this. But he also knows that such action could provoke war with the United States and Britain. This disaster he cannot possibly invite—especially not with Soviet Europe on his back. His threats are therefore entirely without meaning, unless we believe them.

The marvel is that some of us do, as indicated by the consternation in Allied chancelleries. Even in Trieste, a few of the military were aghast when Tito bellowed that the entry into Zone A of one Italian boot would be met by force. We never dreamed he'd go that far out on a limb, they muttered, he must mean it. . . Said one high authority to me, bitterly: "We've built Tito up as the glamor boy of eastern Europe. It's gone to his head. Now he can bully us." Said another, taking a different tack: "He would never have gone so far without being forced. He's been compelled to do it by Cominform agents inciting the Yugoslav mobs to demonstrate. If we don't want Tito overthrown and something worse put in his place, we'll have to humor him and shore up his prestige at home."

The elementary fact escapes such experts that nothing of consequence occurs in Yugoslavia, no leaf stirs, unless Tito's dictatorship wishes it to. There may be pro-Russian agents in Yugoslavia, but they are too much in love with life to go about wearing labels and organizing street riots. We learn so slowly about dictators. Tito himself had to climb down—by a deadpan admission to the press that of course he wouldn't really fight our troops in order to kick the Italians out—before our side stopped trembling because he might be mad enough to try it.

Soldiers: On the night of October 8, when the

Anglo-American intention to depart was disclosed, Allied troops were confined to barracks. The idea was to keep them from contact with patriotic celebrants of "liberation." There were, however, no celebrants. And the disappearance of the troops from the streets caused panic instead of jubilee. Word spread that they were beginning to leave or had already left. The Allied Military Governor, British General Sir John Winterton, had to rush on the radio again and calm the populace with assurance that the G.I.'s and Tommies were *not* going as soon as that.

He could hardly say they were remaining indefinitely. A button having been pressed, the gears of the mass military mechanism had to be allowed to mesh and turn. Pots, pans, silver, china, furniture went into crates. The American PX offered a close-out sale. The service movie-houses closed. Desks, typewriters—all the paraphernalia of an army sitting on its backside—moved toward disposal. Wives and children began boarding boats and trains. The poker-faced "evacuation" looked so genuine that even the troops began glumly guessing about their next assignments in Alaska or Malaya.

Troops do not ordinarily read between the lines of diplomatic dispatches. No essential combat equipment was being shipped out. Despite its wastefulness, the bogus evacuation made sense. In the first place, to have halted the dismantling would have amounted to total collapse before Tito's rantings—after which there would have been no holding him, with much more wasteful and costly consequences. Secondly, the evacuation was military foresight. To the extent that a fighting force is cluttered with the junk of an occupation and hampered by the presence of dependents, it is not fully a fighting force. The more it becomes unencumbered, the readier it is for battle action. This, too, was a bargaining-point, which the Yugoslavs at any future conference table would have carefully to weigh.

NATO Control: The Fatal Flaw

NATO: Total elimination of Allied garrison would leave a vacuum. If only one Italian or Yugoslav soldier got hurt in any ensuing nastiness, the Allied could be blamed for having made it possible. At all cost, direct clash between the two antagonists had to be avoided. Mr. Dulles, early in the pandemonium after the October 8 proclamation, hinted clearly at the way out: by fitting the local situation into the larger frame of regional defense. In other words, by more Allied participation than ever. As interpreted hopefully and logically in military circles here, this could very well mean doing what the Soviets have long charged we have already done—frank conversion of the Trieste area into a NATO base.

Militarily, such a base would not have as much value as might be imagined. Italy's yearning for

Trieste (and also for Istria and the whole of Venezia Giulia ringed by the Carnic and Julian Alps) is supposed to be partly motivated by desire for control of the Ljubljana Gap, a traditional invasion gateway from the East. Actually, ultra-modern techniques of war make it highly unlikely that the Gap could be defended against a first-class power. As for Trieste harbor itself, NATO flat-tops would hardly risk exposure there with Soviet jets based no farther away than Budapest. The best that could be expected out of a NATO Trieste would be to slow down any break-through and hamper a Red onrush into the Po Valley.

Politically, the advantages would seem more tangible. Under a NATO roof Italy could be placated by the installation of Rome's civil authority in Zone A, balancing Belgrade's in B. Any Italian troop entry could be fobbed off, for Tito's sake, as a NATO reinforcement. (Deep down, Rome is singularly uneager to have Italian troops all alone in Zone A.) Representing the whole project as a regional affair, designed for European security, would make it easy for Yugoslavia to climb down, especially if she could be persuaded to become a full-fledged NATO member herself. An added inducement might be to increase the ante in arms and material for Yugoslavia, funneled to her with greater facility through the port of Trieste.

But this entire neat system could be sapped and sabotaged by the irredentist cancer.

Irredentism: Just above Trieste's border lies Gorizia, owned by Italy between the two wars, now divided with Yugoslavia. A frontier of barbed wire across an open square cuts the town off from its Monte Santo railway station in what is now called Nova Gorica. Barbed wire also separates Gorizia from one of its own cemeteries. As fast as they can save up the money, folks on the Italian side are digging up their relatives from Yugoslav soil and carting them across the line. This is a measure of the common sense and mutual trust prevailing between the two countries.

The cardinal point to underline, however, is that in Trieste itself the antagonisms are engendered from *outside*, not indigenously. In a territory of 86 square miles, the 238,000 persons of Italian origin and 59,000 of Slavic origin inhabiting Zone A are mostly afraid, not of each other, but of each other's "protector." Slovenes and Croats remember the Blackshirt persecutions, Italians remember the terrible "Forty Days" of Partisan occupation in 1945. They have no difficulty in living peaceably side by side—but they have a livid fear of being submerged in the other fellow's "fatherland." In the case of the Slavs this fear attains shocking extremes: many of them who detest Tito told me they would nevertheless fight for his Yugoslavia, even with the certainty of their own personal liquidation by the Partisans, if the only other choice were Italy. Roman rule in Zone A would automatically and gratuitously create a fifth column.

It is an equally shocking fact that the rival regimes want Trieste, not for any positive value inherent in Trieste, but rather to keep the other side from getting Trieste, and to keep their own peoples happy with foreign alarums. With each adversary holding an unsatisfactory half of the prize, both would be clutching for the available remainder, and weeping aloud over the "terror" against their "brethren" across the demarcation line.

The fatal flaw of the NATO "solution," then, is that Italy and Yugoslavia would be more absorbed in competitive political maneuvers, for improved position pending an ultimate showdown, than in joint military maneuvers. A NATO Trieste would be the weakest link in the NATO chain.

Most Likely to Succeed

Free Territory: If NATO won't do, and if the October 8 plan to let the Italians take control is a hot potato, what remains? The conference of interested parties which will probably have to be convened is likely to reopen the whole matter and inspect it from all angles. More and more, expert opinion in Trieste when I left was leaning toward the simplest method of all, the one which has been wistfully waiting all the time, the one which Italy and Yugoslavia once accepted along with no less than nineteen other states: an independent region under U.N. authority. This plan has never been implemented, solely because the U.S.S.R. blocked agreement on a Governor for the territory. Now even the Russians—in cynical opposition to the October 8 Anglo-American move—are on record as willing to accept one of the Western nominees.

It will be objected that, in the game of diplomatic face, Russia would win a tremendous victory if her lead were now to be followed. Not at all. We have merely to use the normal resources of plain language and point out that Russia has come over to our original view, which happens to be the fact.

It will be objected that public opinion in Italy is too dangerously aroused, and that Yugoslavia is too established in Zone B, for the one to calm down and the other to get out. This is the sort of nonsense which thrives in a vacuum of Allied policy. The Free Territory was part of the Italian Peace Treaty. Italy signed that treaty because she had been defeated in war. She is still obligated by her signature. So is Yugoslavia, which agreed to get out of Zone B as soon as a Governor was firmly installed. A Free Territory gives advantages to neither side, so neither can condemn it as unfair. It has the supreme advantage for the free world of dispensing with both troublemakers. In deciding at long last to be firm with them, the risk of an Italian government toppling or of a Yugoslav dictator sulking is as nothing compared with the risk of being weak and leaving the Trieste sore to fester.

Finally, it will be objected—and with most

weight—that Russia could make a football out of the Free Territory in the Security Council, to whom the Peace Treaty assigned jurisdiction. If so, an effective counter-measure would be to hand control over to the General Assembly, where the pernicious single veto does not rule.

It is ingenuous to say, however truthfully, that such a shift wouldn't be legal, or would provoke the Kremlin. Would a militarized Trieste under NATO flout Moscow less? Was there anything "legal" in the 1948 Anglo-American declaration that Italy, despite the Peace Treaty, should get the whole territory—or, for that matter, in the October 8 declaration of the two powers that they were arbitrarily yielding to Italy a mandate they had received from the U.N.? An independent Trieste responsible only to a democratic world parliament is as reasonable a facsimile of legality and justice as may be hoped for in this rampantly illegal hour of history.

What Do the People Want?

Triestines: Could a Free Territory survive? Nothing can be guaranteed in times when nobody's survival is certain. We have only a choice of chances—and this one looks relatively good. The Trieste statutes in the Treaty commit the U.N. to the maintenance of basic human rights, order, and security. These blessings have not hitherto been enjoyed by post-Hapsburg Trieste. If an impartial U. N. administration achieved them, neither Italy nor Yugoslavia would find it easy to make glib complaints and try obstructionism. Economically, the area has the geography, the industrial and commercial know-how, the equipment and the manpower to become the going concern which it ceased to be when it lost its membership in the benevolent Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War One. As for the Triestines themselves, they ask for nothing better than opportunity to prove they can get along without chauvinist entanglements.

To produce a pro-Italian riot in Trieste, it was necessary to import neo-fascists from Italy and to recruit local schoolboys. The great majority of the sober people who live in Trieste want riots no more than they want Tito—or Italian bureaucrats. Triestines of Italian origin may feel sentimental about Mother Italy. But when she leans over to embrace them—as she seemed about to do after October 8—the chief emotion they feel is alarm. Triestines proudly regard themselves first and last as Triestines, with a separate and superior tradition of efficiency. They remember resentfully the deluge of officials (mostly Sicilians and Neapolitans) who poured in during Mussolini's reign. Twice recently they have had occasion to note that Trieste goes into economic doldrums when she becomes a remote province of Rome: during the long fascist night and again in 1952, when AMG al-

lowed Italians to supervise its economic affairs. Very sensibly, the Triestines prefer bread to flags.

Though the majority would choose Pella if they had to, they do not see the necessity. The Italian Premier has made a great show of challenging Tito to a plebiscite. But he offers a choice only between Rome and Belgrade. His omission of another alternative—the Free Territory—is as prudent as it is revealing. In 1952 more than a third of Zone A's population voted for independence. It is no longer rash to predict that an honest referendum right now would give the U.N. a runaway victory. This is an astonishing fact which the diplomats and generals, when they have exhausted all other remedies, may find themselves at last compelled to ponder.

TV and a Revolution

By HERBERT COREY

I've been revisiting a little town where I once lived. It's a lovely place, clean, bright, and well-kept. It has many churches, the schools are excellent, and the policemen button their tunics even in the hot weather. Many of the lawns are shaded, and from the pavements the families seem happy. But not everyone is content.

"It used to be a good town," said Abe Bliss, who has been boss of the town for thirty years. That's not his real name, of course. Abe is a scrawny, taciturn, smiling little man who knows everyone. "No rough stuff. I wouldn't stand for it. Everybody satisfied, only maybe a few preachers. Now look at it. Dead."

"Reformers get you, Abe?"

"I could always handle them. Something just went wrong. Maybe it was television. The TV people got to showing a few spots around town—every town has 'em—and the voters got stirred up. I never got wise until it was too late."

Everyone had always known what was going on and no one really seemed to care. A clergyman would speak up now and then, but his comments were apt to be adverse to sin in general rather than its manifestations in our little town. Abe kept it fairly clean. The horse parlor was up a flight of stairs and the roulette and stud assembly up another; the five-and-ten trade got its numbers at the kitchen doors. The saloons turned out their street lights at midnight, and thirsty visitors rattled at the alley doors. A grocery clerk defaulted occasionally, or a girl left town, but the newspaper ignored such happenings. It had not maintained its solvency for 115 years by peddling scandal. There was graft, of course, but no one mentioned it.

But after thirty years of indifference the voters stood Abe Bliss and his organization on their several ears. Abe thinks that television did it. He

may be right. The same kind of thing has happened in other small cities. Television may be providing a substitute for the old-fashioned town meetings which kept the New England villages reasonably pure, through a combination of conscience and bastinado.

The Federal Communications Commission deals with these modern marvels. Paul A. Walker, its chairman, thinks TV will bring about a revolution in our political life. Mr. Walker notes that in 1948 there were only 108 TV stations in the country. The sale of TV sets was just beginning to attract attention. People were reluctant to invest in costly entertainment devices that seemed to rely mostly on Hopalong Cassidy. At the most optimistic estimate (and the industry seems to be made up mostly of optimists) there were not more than 6,000,000 viewers. In the four years that followed, climaxed by the national television conventions of 1952, it established itself as an active feature of our national life. Walker claims that in another year there will be 2,000 TV stations on the air with perhaps 100,000,000 viewers.

The television networks are up against an impossible set of facts, of course. If all the TV humorists were locked up in the Hollywood Bowl not fifty fresh jokes would be produced in a year. But some 2,000 new outlets will be in the market for material. For this there is only one dependable source. If humor and fantasy and tragedy cannot be produced in sufficient quantity, the local stations must rely on news, both world-wide and local.

The owner of a TV set in Winnetoesaukee gets fed up on what goes on in Teheran or Washington or London. But if the TV station offers him the facts of daily life in his home town, he sits up and takes notice. The story of what the Board of Commissioners refused to do and the pictures of the dog show may not be of importance as compared to the atomic-powered submarine, but they offer material for conversation.

The old-time town meeting gave the listener a chance to talk back, but this is offset by the fact that TV's larger audience gives the local patriot more people to talk to. More and more the officials of towns are making weekly reports of their goings-on—and profiting by them, if their consciences are clear. The demand for information on taxes, schools, road conditions, and the like is certain to increase. Economists agree that when defense spending begins to taper off, a huge backlog of local needs will be thrown on the fire. The four big networks will nourish some of the public's appetite, but the major need will be met by the local stations.

It wasn't a Republican vs. Democrat contest that tripped Abe Bliss in my town. The voters learned for the first time what had been going on. "There are spots in every town," as Abe said. It is only when they become visible that the voters mark the ballots. Visibility is stepped up when people

talk about them. A parent-teacher association recently put on a series about one old school building. People had been talking about it for years, but when the TV set owners began to see as well as to hear about its decrepitude, the County Commissioners and the School Board began to make plans. A Negro and white slum area had festered for years. The first TV series on conditions there stirred unmistakable public interest.

The late Dr. Charles A. Beard, one of the wisest of our political commentators, observed that it has been difficult for the individual to act. The Abe Blisses of our cities have been able to maintain control through the inertia of the voting population. A voter who does not vote may have an acute sense of personal responsibility. But if he has to go through a set of complicated maneuvers to make the weight of his vote felt, often he will not vote. Dr. Beard wrote:

The large number of elective offices makes it impossible for the mass of the people to take an active part in nominating candidates and running the political machinery. Wherever elective officers are provided for, machinery for making nominations inevitably follows, with its long train of primaries, caucuses, conventions, and committees. Each new elective office adds to the weight, strength, complexity, and immobility of the machine. Party business of necessity falls into the hands of professional workers experienced in the art of managing primaries and elections.

There is nothing wrong with the system. Every voter in my old town had an equal chance to express himself on all the officers and ordinances, yet not more than 40 per cent of the voters did express themselves. The slates were made up by the leaders of the two major parties and no voter was urged to turn out unless it was known that he was "loyal." The loyal voters "got the word" and voted loyally for the candidates that had been decided on. The doubtful voters rarely knew what was going on, unless some newspaperman had printed something about it. The voters who might wish to protest found themselves without an organization. Only the regulars knew their way around. And the spoils were divided behind closed doors. Abe Bliss could brag that he ran a good town.

The TV showings that upset Abe were not animated by political motives. The "good people" of the town were not instrumental in originating them. It merely happened that there are two TV stations in the area, and they used local news and views because they found it paid. Nothing particularly high-minded about that. Just common sense. If the people had not been interested, they would have stopped showing.

The Oklahoma Legislature is permitting the operation of its legislature to be televised. The legislators concluded that people want to know what is going on, and why, and how. Paul Walker may have something when he says TV will start a revolution.

The Essence of Freedom

By ROBERT MONTGOMERY

When the news of young America's novel design for living in freedom reached it, the Old World shook its head with profound skepticism. It would never work, they said. The idea was too "revolutionary," too "progressive," too "radical," and certainly too "liberal." The prevailing sentiment was that this new-fangled system would promptly fall apart, that the Americans were too immature for self-government, and that political anarchy and social chaos would soon engulf them.

Yet today, though we are still youthful as a nation, we have one of the oldest continuous governments in existence. In spite of this conspicuous success it seems to have been a disappointment to some of our modern critics and skeptics. It seems to have fallen short of what they believe it should have accomplished. One of the most baffling of historical mysteries is how the reactionary of 1787—the man who said it couldn't be done, the advocate of all-powerful government, the believer in absolutism—could now be the "liberal" of 1953.

The latter-day "liberal" is actually the direct opposite of the true liberal as that term was originally understood. One of these self-styled modern liberals recently defined himself in the following language: "A liberal is one who believes in utilizing the full force of government for the advancement of social, political, and economic justice at the municipal, state, national, and international levels."

Everyone is thoroughly in favor of advancing social, political, and economic justice at all levels, just as everyone is thoroughly against sin at all levels. But the crux of the matter revolves around the ways and means by which we are to promote this admittedly most worthy end. And, according to the "liberal" approach just mentioned, the answer lies in "utilizing the full force of government" as the most appropriate means for attainment of the end. According to this view, the end justifies the means. But mark those words the "full force of government." What kind of government would that be? What kind of government would it lead to? "Full force" suggests a government without limitations or restraints, a government of boundless authority. What would prevent such a government from invading any and all spheres of political, economic, and social activity under the pretext of advancing justice and promoting the general welfare? What countervailing force would there be to resist its successive encroachments on our constitutional guarantees? What, in short, would prevent such a policy in the conduct of our affairs, disguised as liberalism, from ultimately emerging as undisguised totalitarianism?

The people who clamor noisily for more and more

government, for government by full force and of everything, assert that those in authority would always act with prudence and restraint, curbing their own powers and preserving the basic liberties of the people. This, however, would be a practical impossibility, first, because it belies human nature and, second, because government intervention by its very nature leads inevitably to more intervention. Government financing, for example, implies government control, and government control may lead very easily to government ownership.

The special pleaders for statism constantly insist that while all-powerful government might be inherently bad under a despot or dictator it can be a perfectly wholesome thing under democratic auspices where the principle of majority rule prevails. This ignores the fact that even under self-government the people must be protected against themselves. It makes the dangerous assumption that the majority is infallible and can do no wrong. It forgets that a broad franchise and free political institutions might produce a popular tyranny with an even greater potential for evil than that of royal absolutism or aristocratic privilege. It is blind to the historical record of governments that evolved from democracies into tyrannies. If men use their liberty in such a way as to surrender it, are they thereafter any the less slaves? If we should elect a tyrant to rule over us, would we remain free because the tyranny was our own creation?

The professed liberals of today do not really march under the banners of genuine liberalism or progressivism but, on the contrary, represent the worst type of reaction. For the reactionary is the person who insists that the key to progress lies in more and more government. He is enveloped in a dusty ideology of the past, the past in which Americans once lived under an all-knowing and all-powerful government and paid with blood for deliverance from it.

True, there are some reactionaries of this type whose loyalty need not be questioned, whose motives cannot be impeached—honest and sincere men, inspired with humanitarian zeal to eliminate poverty, to alleviate suffering, to create an ever more abundant life and to secure for all a wider diffusion of the blessings of liberty. In championing benevolent government as they do I believe them to be rendering a monumental disservice to the objects of their solicitude. But we will derive no social gain by attacking their motives, by excoriating them as enemy agents and creatures of evil. Let us simply say a prayer for them and hope that further study and reflection may bring them safely to port—to recognition of the truth that the blessings of liberty they would diffuse have been diffused in this land of ours to an unsurpassed degree, not because of government intervention but only because it was here that the torch of individual freedom was kindled and borne aloft.

Agriculture's Sacred Seventh

By F. A. HARPER

Must farmers get one-seventh of the national income in order to "maintain a well-balanced economy"? An economist points out the fallacies in the doctrine.

The American farmer has long been considered the most likely guardian of the last bastion of freedom. But under the spell of some political "economists" and farm leaders who believe in mystic numbers and other such forms of superstition, he is more and more surrendering any claim to that honor.

In the recent vote of farmers on whether the government should dictate how much wheat each of them should be allowed to grow, it is true that many voted "No." They upheld vigorously their individual rights to manage their own farms as they alone deem wise. But under the concept that the might of the majority makes right, the beliefs of this opposing minority are now to be disregarded. They were outvoted by the 87 per cent who apparently lack confidence in their own ability or that of their fellow farmers to manage their own farms, who rely, instead, on political farm management. Instances like this are ample documentation that a revolutionary change has occurred among American farmers.

The beginning of the major change seems to have started with the collapse of farm prices following World War One. It was then that a class-consciousness began to appear conspicuously among farmers, and they began to clamor to get into the political saddle under the slogan "equality for agriculture." The move gained adherents but with little outward signs of victory until the late twenties, when the Federal Farm Board was established under a Republican Administration. This became the forerunner of the "New Deal" and "Fair Deal" agricultural programs, and has since been supported by Republicans and Democrats alike.

It seems to me that symptomatic of the thought disease causing this change among farmers is belief in *the sacred seventh* of agricultural incomes. In simple terms, this is the idea: By some miraculous fixity, the national income is presumed to be tied to agricultural income in the ratio of 7 to 1. By this concept agricultural income is the cause and national income is the consequence, rather than the other way around. The distinction is important in understanding how this concept has come to dominate the politics of agricultural policy.

Faith in this doctrine, now so widely held, is reflected in the words of one of its most effective proponents, who speaks of it as one of "the eternal verities," as one of the "unalterable laws of exchange" whereby it is easily possible to "not only

protect the income of agriculture but also protect the income of other groups in direct proportion" by these "most profitable investments." He speaks of this automatic "seven-fold turn of the initial dollar" as a "key factor in our economy and [one that] assumes fantastic importance." It does indeed assume great importance, because if true it should be followed and if untrue it becomes a serious danger.

Government-Planted Dollars

Let us first presume it to be true. To follow it would then greatly simplify the problem of attaining a continuing national prosperity for all of us. By its miraculous power, we could have any national income we want. All that would be needed would be to scatter amply the seeds of income (money) among farmers, and these dollars would thereafter return home to all of us, each dragging six additional dollars behind it.

In carrying out this scheme, there is the political problem, of course, of how and where to scatter the income seed among the five million farms of the United States. Various ways of doing it have been devised and are now in effect. They are familiar to all of us under the various and sundry names by which federal checks are being sent to essentially every farmer in the land, directly or indirectly, ostensibly in return for something he has done.

The source of the money to serve as seed for the seven-fold national income presents another political problem, but it is one which its proponents resolve easily in terms of the concept itself. If the rest of the nation is predestined to share in the harvest, it is obviously their responsibility to share in the cost of the seed. So the cost is declared to be a proper use of funds collected under the compulsion of taxation. Were anyone to be allowed to shirk his share of the cost of the seed, he would then become a free-riding beneficiary. Therein lies the rationale for the source of funds to operate the scheme.

What, if anything, is wrong with the idea of turning the national income into this gigantic numbers game? In the first place, the fixed ratio of 7 to 1 has no basis in fact. Over the period from 1929 to date, with its ups and downs, the ratio of gross farm income to gross national income has

varied rather widely, and has averaged $8\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 instead of 7 to 1. It is easy to see why the latter ratio can't be so. In the early days of the nation, essentially everyone was a pioneer farmer, close to self-sufficiency. Even in 1790 farmers still made up 96 per cent of population. The ratio then had to be near 1 to 1—farmer incomes, that is, were nearly all of the national income, rather than only one-seventh of it. And over the years, as the non-farm part of our economy expanded more than the farm part did, the ratio had to increase. It couldn't have remained fixed. And there is no reason whatever to assume that it will remain where it is at any given moment. Sometime in the future, it is conceivable that farmers may be prosperous with only 1 per cent of the national income.

Another thing wrong with the seven-to-one idea is that it assumes a causal sequence which the facts do not bear out. Causation is a pulling force like that of a tugboat hitched to an ocean liner—the one out in front pulls the other one along behind it. If changes in farm incomes were the cause of changes in national income, as claimed, one would expect over the years to find changes in farm incomes preceding changes in national income. No such sequence is evident in a study of the changes in incomes over the years. Farm and non-farm incomes tend to change direction together, indicating that their changes are usually induced by a common cause.

The total trade of a nation, out of which alone a "national income" is derived, is composed of innumerable individual trades between persons or their duly delegated agents. If we look at integral parts, any miracle of prosperity by anything like the theory of the sacred seventh becomes clearly an illusion. Neither side of a trade is its sole cause. It requires the approval of both sides. Both are necessary to the trade, one as much as the other, whether it be a farmer or a bootblack. To endow any one occupation with such presumed economic generative power is to fail to understand the nature of trade itself.

For the nation as a whole the "key to national prosperity"—the only source of betterment, economically—is more production, because that alone is the substance of which prosperity is composed. No amount of added purchasing power can empower anybody to buy something that has not been produced. Whatever is produced is available to consume, no more and no less by whatever magic formula. As with a cake of any size, there is no way to cut it so that the sum of the parts will exceed the size of the whole. Nor can an artificial increase in the size (in dollars) of the sacred seventh of agriculture perform any like miracle for the welfare of the nation as a whole.

In the history of farm programs both here and abroad is written clearly the portent of national disaster. The government first supports an industry above its merit as judged by consumers in a

free market. The less efficient producers are kept in business and continue competing with the best. The market refuses to take the output at this supported price; there is "overproduction." The government buys the surplus. The attempt to dispose of it makes enemies, and so it is decided to impose birth control on production. The license to produce then becomes valuable. The license itself becomes a black market commodity, and perpetuates official graft. Producers—in this instance, of one crop—turn to producing other crops which are, in turn, put through the same cycle, one after another. Other industries follow, one by one. The dead end of this new brand of "justice" is the abandonment of competitive private enterprise.

The certainty of authoritarian control following in the wake of subsidies is already backed by our own Supreme Court, which logically proclaimed that the government may properly regulate that which it subsidizes.

Equal Property Rights

If we acknowledge the rights of free men, it requires, above all else in economic affairs, that each person have what he produces. He then has the right to use it himself, or to give it away, or to trade it for something he prefers instead. And when free men trade, the same rights must prevail equally on both sides. There is no justice in robbing either side of a trade in order to give the other side more purchasing power.

Take, for instance, the recent vote for political control of wheat production. This process goes under the euphemism "letting the farmers work out their own salvation by democratic methods." The right to vote on this question, however, is completely out of gear with the property rights of free men. Wheat farmers were first given a subsidy on their wheat, and then acreage control was demanded by the government, under threat of discontinuing the subsidy. So when the farmers voted on production control, they were really voting, as they saw it, on whether or not they wanted to continue to receive the subsidy.

Why were just the wheat farmers allowed to vote on this question? Why not also allow other farmers and consumers, who buy wheat, to vote on it?

Why not go back to the basic tenet of free men—the rigorous protection of the rights of individual persons to what each has produced, as his private property? Why not renounce this new divine right of majorities, and deny that majority vote makes a thing either morally right or economically sound? Such, as I see it, is the only sound and permanent solution to "the farm problem." And the same solution applies to all the other class problems which have grown up to plague us, as we have advanced farther and farther into socialism in America.

Foreign Aid: A Vicious Circle

By MARTIN EBON

Our costly relief efforts abroad are defeating their purpose by increasing overpopulation in countries already afflicted with this grave and basic problem.

Since the end of World War Two, every man, woman and child in the United States has contributed \$256 to foreign aid. That is the startling total of our efforts to combat the spread of "stomach" Communism in Europe and Asia.

What, in the long run, has all this money accomplished? Is Italy today less threatened by Communism than five years ago? Has Japan been able to create a stable economy? Is India, or Indonesia, immune to Communist infiltration and agitation? The answer is that the spread of Communism has neither been stopped nor seriously impaired. Because of the patchwork fashion of our foreign aid program most of these economic efforts have canceled each other out. An almost totally neglected reason behind this failure is the basic problem of overpopulation.

We have exported food and farm tools to the starving millions in Europe and the Far East. Yet at the same time we have introduced modern welfare methods which have tremendously increased the number of hungry mouths to be fed. In a tragically shortsighted and wasteful manner we have created a vicious circle, a situation which reminds one of those chi-chi Hollywood sitting rooms; a charming log fire is burning while the air conditioner goes full blast.

The very countries that need our aid most are often those that have too many people in relation to their available resources. Poor nutrition makes for sickness. Hunger leads to political unrest. Sickness and hunger together contribute to the growth of the Communist virus (though by no means the only contributing factor). The remedy sounds simple: give them food, medicine, and the facilities to grow more food and fight disease.

Since World War Two that is exactly what America has been doing. After extensive wartime lend-lease to our Allies, including Soviet Russia, there came United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation—financed mostly with U. S. funds. When our armies marched into Germany and Italy, they brought with them aid from the United States.

During the years of the Marshall Plan—now Harold Stassen's Foreign Operations Administration—we provided foreign aid of all sorts. In addition, "Point Four" projects of "technical aid for underdeveloped territories" mushroomed in the Near and Far East. The armed forces have always engaged in little-publicized welfare efforts of their

own. And, through the United Nations technical aid program, additional millions of taxpayers' money have been going into remote Asian villages and other "target areas."

Nobody really knows just what has been done by all these overlapping programs, agencies, and projects. The phrase "technical aid" sounds sufficiently solid to cloak the helter-skelter creations of global bureaucracies. Results were what might be expected. The U.N.'s Economic and Social Council admitted last year, in a 400-page survey, that postwar world food production increased "significantly less" than the globe's population.

If foreign aid had been successful in long-range terms, food production might have increased more rapidly than population. The exact opposite has happened. Obviously, the best will in the world, and the biggest dollar appropriations, are no substitute for a properly thought-out program.

Subsidizing Overpopulation

Anyone who wants to make the world a better place must keep in mind that each night another 60,000 people sit down at the dinner table. He must remember that world population has increased nearly four-fold during the last three centuries. Most of that increase took place during the past hundred years. World population now exceeds 2,400,000,000; it was less than 730,000,000 when the American colonies declared their independence.

Since then two things have happened. The industrial revolution has brought hygiene and medical care to most parts of the globe. European colonies in Asia and the Americas have become independent nations and closed their doors to overseas settlement. Europe's empires brought sanitation methods to the far corners of the earth. As a result, for instance, the population of the Indonesian island of Java grew from 4,500,000 in 1820 to 45,000,000 today. A ten-fold increase like that is bound to tax even a food-rich region.

These trends were already established when American foreign aid came on the scene after the last war. At the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1952, the United States had given about \$40,000,000,000 in grants and loans to foreign nations. Much of this was military aid. But over half went for outright gifts of economic help alone—not including accounts in which military and economic

aid were mixed. And 1953 aid amounted to \$7,030,000,000—the biggest since the war!

Just how, in subsidizing overpopulation, American aid has managed to defeat its own ends, can be observed in the case of Japan. The Japanese nation was plagued by excess population well before the last war. In fact, its militaristic adventures were undertaken with the claim that Japan needed room. Adolf Hitler advanced the same demand for German *lebensraum* when he began his series of invasions. And Fascist Italy made the identical claim when it invaded Ethiopia.

When the peace treaty turned Japan back to the Japanese in 1952, United States aid to the defeated enemy during six years of occupation amounted to \$2,187,255,000. This subsidy had bought the biggest excess population growth in Japan's whole history. It had helped to push Japan's population above 84,000,000—more than half that of the whole United States, on a territory no bigger than California.

During the American occupation, the number of people in Japan increased by more than ten million, partly because of repatriation of overseas Japanese. Right now, the country's births exceed its deaths by one million each year. At this rate, Japan's population would hit the one hundred million mark in sixteen years.

One Japanese population authority, Dr. Kageyas W. Amano, said during a recent visit to the United States that his country's overpopulation creates "the threat of lowered standards of living and culture, growing social unrest, and increasing infiltration of Communism."

When Mr. Joseph M. Dodge, then economic adviser to the Supreme Allied Headquarters, left Japan, he put the country's dilemma in a nutshell: "Too many people, too high a birth rate, too little land, too few natural resources." Mr. Dodge, now U. S. Budget Bureau director, warned that Japan for the past six years had been "receiving the benefits of billions of dollars of goods and materials not paid for by its own exports."

To feed its excess population Japan must export—if it can pry open the markets, and if it can lay its hand on raw materials from which to manufacture finished goods. Now that the United States is restricted to military bases on Japanese islands, our huge subsidies have stopped. The Japanese are on their own—and saddled with several million more people than they had before the occupation.

Two billion of U. S. taxpayers' dollars bought no more than an economic breathing spell; they pushed consumption and population to a peak from which the country cannot but fall, and fall hard. Japan's precarious position leaves it wide open to tempting barter offers from Communist China. The Peiping Reds are offering the Japanese rice, and they want industrial goods in return.

The pattern of Japan is repeated, in one way or another, in nearly all Asian nations that receive American aid. In Europe, no example is more strik-

ing than that of Italy. While American aid may well have helped to stem the Communist tide there for a little while, it did not succeed in countering the enormous pressure of the country's population. Today the United States has restricted the yearly number of quota immigrants from Italy to 5,000; under the McCarran-Walter Act another 15,000 will be granted special refugee visas. However, the country's population increases at an average of 400,000 each year. Only about half that number manage to live abroad, and nearly 50,000 Italians return home from abroad annually.

The American taxpayer, through the European Recovery Program, paid out some \$1,300,000,000 of Marshall Plan money to Italy. He paid for raw materials and finished goods, for machinery and vehicles, for food, feed, and fertilizer, for fuel and medicines. He helped to finance an anti-mosquito drive that eradicated malaria. Yet American aid bought only an illusion of stability. It subsidized Italy's growing population.

Britain's Dilemma

Italy is third among the nations receiving American aid. France is second, Great Britain first. And it is in Britain that the population problem is only now being realized in all its importance. Britain's population did not follow the growth pattern of colonial or overwhelmingly agricultural nations increasing to the limit of subsistence. It was built upon the solid foundation of prosperity, international trade, an empire, and investments abroad. World War Two, however, kicked much of this foundation from under Britain's economy. Investments in Asia and Latin America were liquidated to pay for the war. India, Pakistan, and Burma gained their independence. The Communist regime in China wiped out British investments of about one billion dollars.

Meanwhile, Britain's population reached the all-time high of 50,000,000. This dilemma—vastly reduced resources versus a relatively large population—is behind such economic problems as "food scarcity," "unfavorable foreign trade balance," and so forth. The plain truth is that the British Isles cannot feed their inhabitants, because there are simply too many of them. If Britain weren't subsidized by American aid, it would have to become another Switzerland, importing raw materials and exporting manufactured goods. Yet the markets for such goods are becoming increasingly competitive.

Japan, Italy, and Great Britain illustrate varying types of population problems which American aid has, so far, largely camouflaged. The danger of all this lies mainly in the lack of public understanding of exactly what is going on, of precisely what American money is buying abroad. Americans are generally unaware that much of their foreign aid is nullified by its stimulus to overpopulation problems.

What is to be done, then? Mr. Alan Valentine,

when president of the Committee for a Free Asia, said the United States "could quite properly and logically insist upon some understanding with overseas people in overpopulated countries." He thinks Americans should tell these countries that "as a condition of further economic aid from us, they shall put into effect some program to keep population within bounds of economic capacity."

It would seem difficult for the United States government to ask other governments to tell their citizens how many babies they should have. However, a realistic, integrated foreign aid program must certainly consider that stable populations are necessary to achieve lasting economic benefits. This has been noted by the Committee for Economic Development, which seeks to define policies for possible adoption by the government. The committee has said that our "aid to underdeveloped countries must overcome its erratic growth," that "an integrated policy is needed to assure carefully thought-out development." It specifically asks: "Can we help the underdeveloped areas to control the growth of their populations?"

The United States has been tinkering with the world for the better part of a decade. It has achieved some positive results. For instance, its military-economic aid stopped the Communist civil war in Greece. But, quite typically, Greek popula-

tion pressure increased under the impact of American aid. So it now looks as if Greece will permanently be America's ward. Is that what the American taxpayers want? Is that, in fact, what the people of Greece and other proudly self-reliant nations really desire?

The Eisenhower Administration must further rethink and replan America's foreign aid program. A change in attitude is needed first. Until now, talk has always been about shortages—of food, land, medical facilities, dollars, tools, and so on. It has rarely been admitted that in some places there are simply too many people for all the other things to go around—and that the United States can't supply all that is considered lacking.

Population policies have not kept up with scientific and industrial advances. Today's developments demand a maximum of goods and services, of educational and cultural facilities for each human being—not just the creation of a maximum number of human beings. American aid, to be fully effective, must be so applied that it encourages the well-being of individuals rather than the growth of a faceless, ever-increasing mass. Otherwise individual dignity, the great democratic ideal of this age, stands in danger of being swamped by subsidized, constantly mounting, and inevitably underprivileged populations.

Why the Dollar Shortage?

By MILTON FRIEDMAN

It would disappear overnight, says an economist, if exchange rates were freed from state controls to find their own levels in a free market economy.

The so-called "dollar shortage" that has plagued the world since the end of World War Two is a striking example of the far-ranging consequences that can flow from the neglect of simple economic truths. The "dollar shortage" is said to result from "fundamental structural maladjustments" and to require extensive American aid to foreign countries. It has led to the proliferation of complicated systems of direct controls over transactions involving foreign exchange in one country after another; yet these controls have been powerless to prevent the frequent recurrence of the difficulties that led to their imposition. So far, 1953 is the first odd postwar year that Great Britain, the one-time international banker of the world, has not experienced a dramatic foreign exchange crisis. International conference has followed international conference, and yet the "dollar" problem persists.

This certainly appears a complicated and intractable problem. Yet its fundamental cause and cure

are alike simple: the dollar shortage is a result of governmentally controlled and rigid exchange rates; if exchange rates were freed from control and allowed to find their own levels in a free market, as the Canadian dollar now does, the dollar shortage would evaporate overnight. The need to conserve dollars would no longer serve as an excuse for exchange controls, import and export quotas, and the rest of that complicated paraphernalia of modern mercantilism. On the other hand, so long as exchange rates continue to be determined by governmental fiat, and to be held rigid except for occasional devaluations or appreciations, there is almost no hope for the successful elimination of direct controls over international trade. Future attempts at liberalization of trade, however numerous and high-sounding the international agreements which they produce, will be doomed to the resounding failure that has marked the noble experiments of recent years.

But surely, you will say, the situation cannot be as simple as that. If it were, the able men who help determine national and international policy would long since have recognized the cause and put the cure into effect. And so they would have, if they did not regard the cure as worse than the disease. The real puzzle is not the cause and cure of the dollar shortage *per se*, but the stubborn and widespread reluctance to accept this particular cure. In part, this is simply another version of the general puzzle why there has been such a loss of faith in the price system in the modern era. But it also has rather special features of its own, since some of the most stubborn opposition has come from people who are firm believers in the price system in other connections.

An exchange rate is a price like any other price. At the present official rate of exchange, it costs \$2.80 to buy one pound sterling; or, stated the other way, .357 of a pound (7 shillings, 1 5/7 pence) to buy one dollar. It is clear that the lower the price of an ordinary commodity, say, shoes, the larger will be the number of pairs consumers want to buy and the smaller will be the number that suppliers want to sell. In the same way, the lower the price of a dollar in terms of the pound sterling, the larger will be the number of dollars that Britons and others want to buy, and the smaller will be the number of dollars that Americans (and others) want to sell. A dollar shortage in Britain means that, *at the existing price of the dollar in shillings and pence*, the number of dollars people want to buy is larger than the number others want to sell.

At the official rate of exchange between the pound sterling and the dollar, the dollar has been artificially cheap during most of the postwar period. In consequence there has been a dollar shortage. Unwilling to see this dollar shortage eliminated by a change in the price of the pound (except when driven to periodical devaluations by unbearable pressure), or by other devices we shall consider below, the British government has employed direct controls over imports, exports, and other exchange transactions to eliminate the gap between the number of dollars demanded at the official price and the number supplied. And we have of course aided them to eliminate the gap by making dollars available through Marshall and other aid. Had the price of the pound been free to fluctuate, the gap would have been eliminated automatically by the operation of the free market—but then so also would the apparent necessity for dollar aid and for direct controls, which suggests one set of reasons why this cure has not been regarded with favor.

It may seem like belaboring the obvious to emphasize at such length that "dollar shortage" is a strictly meaningless phrase unless the price of the dollar in terms of foreign currencies is prevented by some means from responding to market forces; that there cannot be a "shortage" except at some fixed price. Yet the neglect of this elementary

economic truism is a major source of the floods of nonsense that have been written about the dollar shortage.

Even so eminent and sophisticated a journal as the London *Economist*, in a special supplement on "Living with the Dollar" published in November 1952, discusses in detail the causes of the "dollar gap" in the past and its prospects for the future without even mentioning the exchange rate assumed in making the calculations, much less giving it any role at all as a cause of the dollar gap.

If I am right that the dollar shortage is a manifestation of fixed rates of exchange between different currencies, why has it appeared in such virulent form only in recent years? For decades prior to World War One and for some of the time between the two world wars, many exchange rates, in particular the rate between the pound sterling and the dollar, were rigidly fixed under the then prevailing gold standard. Yet no dollar shortage in the modern sense emerged.

Real vs. Nominal Prices

The answer to this apparent paradox is to be found in a closer examination of the market for foreign exchange. Generally, people want to buy pounds with dollars in order to buy British goods and services. How many pounds they want to buy depends not only on the number of dollars they have to pay for a pound but also on the price of British goods in terms of pounds. To the purchaser of a British motor car, for example, a 10 per cent decline in the dollar price of the pound, with no change in the British price of the car, is identical with a 10 per cent decline in the British price of the car with no change in the dollar price of the pound. In either case, he can buy the British car with 10 per cent fewer dollars and so is more likely to do so than he otherwise would. The "real" price of foreign exchange can therefore alter even though its nominal price does not.

And this is precisely what tended to happen under the gold standard. If at any time Britain was tending to buy more from the United States than it was selling—that is, was tending to run a deficit—it would pay for some of the deficit by shipping gold. Since gold was the basis for the domestic supply of money, this would tend to produce deflationary conditions at home, which the Bank of England would frequently reinforce by other measures. Prices and incomes within Britain would therefore tend to fall. Conversely, the gold receipts of the United States would increase the money stock and produce rising prices. Together, these changes in internal prices produced a decline in the real price of the pound in terms of dollars.

Under an operating gold standard, then, it is only the nominal price of foreign exchange that is rigid. The real price varies with the internal prices in the various countries. And internal prices them-

selves are determined by external conditions: they must be whatever prices are required to equate the demand and supply of foreign exchange at the nominally rigid rate. Whether a country is inflating or deflating depends on the state of its balance of payments, and cannot at the same time be determined by domestic considerations.

The domination of internal monetary policy by external forces in this way is good insofar as it inhibits irresponsible governmental tinkering with money, but bad insofar as it makes one nation suffer from the irresponsible tinkering of others. But whether good or bad in the abstract, it is clear that few nations are now willing to allow their internal monetary policies to be dominated by external forces. The emergence of full employment as a predominant goal of domestic policy spelled the end to a system in which the changes in the real price of foreign exchange required to equate demand and supply were brought about by automatic changes in internal prices. With rigid nominal exchange rates, foreign exchange shortages were inevitable—though only the particular rates chosen and the particular internal price levels explain why it was a dollar shortage rather than a pound shortage.

It is little wonder that direct controls over foreign trade have burgeoned in the postwar period despite strong pressures and the sincere desire, at least in some quarters, to eliminate them by international agreement. The price system has not been permitted to operate in the foreign exchange market. As in other markets, the only alternative is direct control of transactions by the state.

If the countries of the world would follow Canada's example, they could remove at one blow all import restrictions and export subsidies, all restrictions on capital flows, all discriminatory measures, without fear that a dollar shortage would arise. Freedom of foreign trade from restrictions would promote greater freedom of internal trade as well, and the one would reinforce the other in increasing the efficiency and productivity of the world as a whole and each nation separately. Experiments in this direction promise dividends every bit as rich and remarkable as have been produced in various countries—notably Germany—by experiments in freeing domestic economies.

Flexible exchange rates have been opposed in part because of simple misunderstanding; particularly, the belief that they necessarily imply unstable exchange rates. This by no means need be so. If, indeed, flexible exchange rates were unstable, it would be because of underlying instability in the economic conditions affecting international trade, and, in particular, in the internal monetary policy of the various countries. Pegging the exchange rate does nothing in itself to reduce this instability; it simply diverts its expression into other channels—exchange crises, direct controls, and the like. The ultimate ideal is a world in which exchange

rates, while free to vary, are in fact highly stable because of real stability in the internal policies of the various countries. This result is far more likely to be achieved if each country bears the major burden of its own monetary instability—as it does under a system of flexible rates—than if monetary instability in any one country is transmitted directly to its trading partners—as it is under rigid exchange rates.

A Left-Right Coalition

The strength of the opposition to flexible exchange rates is in larger measure, however, to be explained by the remarkable coalition that has opposed it; a coalition of the central planners and the central bankers of the world—the extreme left and the extreme right of the political spectrum. The central planners of the world have no faith in a free price system; they prefer to rely on the control of economic activity by state officials. They therefore favor direct controls over imports and exports for their own sake and would do so regardless of the method of fixing exchange rates. Fixed exchange rates have, however, the enormous political virtue, from their point of view, that they make such controls seem like an inescapable necessity enforced by balance of payments difficulties. Many people are for this reason led to favor direct controls, or at least tolerate them, who would otherwise oppose them vigorously. And once direct controls are accepted over international transactions, they strongly foster and facilitate the imposition of internal controls as well.

The central bankers of the world and numerous other proponents of a fully operative gold standard are fervent defenders of the price system in most other manifestations. Yet they oppose its application to exchange rates because they cling to the shadow of rigid rates in the hope of getting the substance of external restraints on domestic monetary policy. The result has been support for a system which makes the worst of both worlds. The postwar system of exchange rates, temporarily rigid but subject to change from time to time by governmental action, can provide neither the certainty about exchange rates and the freedom from irresponsible governmental action of a fully operative gold standard, nor the independence of each country from the monetary vagaries of other countries, nor the freedom of each country to pursue internal monetary stability in its own way that are provided by truly flexible exchange rates. This postwar system sacrifices the simultaneous achievement of the two major objectives of vigorous multilateral trade and independence of internal monetary policy on the altar of the essentially minor objective of a rigid exchange rate. Belief in economic internationalism has in this way been a major factor contributing to the tragic growth of economic nationalism in the postwar era.

Mao's Second Team

By **GEORGE B. RUSSELL**

Communist China has a seasoned combat troop of English-speaking propagandists ready to start verbal battles in the United Nations.

Those appeasement-minded diplomats who think that a seat for Red China in the United Nations would promote peace don't realize what they would be up against if the Peiping delegation moved into the glass house on New York's East River. An Oriental propaganda siege more subtle than Vishinsky's tirades would continually delay, harass, and perhaps defeat them. Mao Tse-tung has his top young talent trained and ready to move into the international arena as soon as Moscow wins its U.N. objective. There are five second-string Chinese Communists, in particular, who would do a formidable job in the General Assembly. Their specialty is psychological warfare, and all five are past masters at molding Western opinion.

Considering their ability and influence, astonishingly little has been written about this quintet. The oversight might be due to the fact that a lot of our government people and journalists spent more time in their company between 1942 and 1948 than it would be politic to admit in 1953. The five served their apprenticeship in convincing Americans in China that a coalition government of Chiang Kai-shek with the Communist "agrarian reformers" was the sensible, and liberal, thing for China. All of them played a telling part in Communism's march to power in their country.

Pollster with a Purpose

We can begin with Pu Shou-shan, or Pu Shan, as he now prefers to call himself. His father, a Wuhan banker, sent three sons to the United States for an education. Pu Shan, the youngest, got his Harvard Ph.D. in 1948.

One phase of his Harvard days needs special attention. Early in 1948 Pu Shan's M.I.T.-Harvard clique started a left-wing magazine called *Chinese Student Opinion*, published under the sheltering auspices of the Chinese Students' Christian Association in North America. Today copies are exceedingly hard to find. Soon after its launching, this magazine conducted a poll of Chinese students in America, with the announced purpose "to inquire into and make public their thought." It was a remarkably thorough project. Questions ranged from home address, details on relatives, family finances, course of study being pursued, and career ambitions to religion and opinions on agrarian reform, the recent legislative elections in China,

U.S. "meddling" with China's internal affairs, and the conduct of U.S. military personnel in China.

Consider the value of such a dossier to the Communists in Peiping. What a powerful persuader to push the reluctant student into returning home where the Reds could use him or re-educate him! Not counting the replies of students born in the United States, the pollsters admitted that they had received 714 answers, an excellent percentage when one considers the reluctance of most Chinese to discuss their personal affairs in such detail. Highly significant, therefore, is the fact that this figure of 714 matches almost exactly the number of Chinese students who, the State Department says, "voluntarily" returned to their homeland in 1949-50.

After Pu Shan left Harvard, he taught for a short time at one of our better western colleges. But at the end of the year he was ordered back to China. In November 1950 he returned to America briefly as secretary to General Wu Hsiu-chian when Wu came to Lake Success as spokesman for a nine-man delegation charging the United States with aggression in Formosa. When General Wu had exhausted his store of insulting adjectives, the delegation flew home in a huff.

Pu Shan's next major assignment was Panmunjom. There his knowledge of American psychology made him a valued and expert needler. He is still there, and it's Colonel Pu Shan these days.

Another of the five, Huang Hua, I used to see daily at the Peiping Truce Headquarters. He was my Communist opposite when I was press relations officer in that strange three-ring circus. In his latest role, Huang Hua has headed the Red team confronting U.S. Envoy Arthur H. Dean at Panmunjom.

Huang Hua, born Wang Ju-mei, was the cleverest and toughest young Red at Yenching University between 1933 and 1937. An able agitator, he engineered the student strikes and recruited talent to the Communist ranks. During the final war years Huang acted as Yen-an's chief greeter. And he saw to it that the Red capital resembled a Chautauqua rather than an armed camp of conspirators. It was he who classified the visitors and briefed Chairman Mao Tse-tung as to each one's value to the cause.

Huang conducted the tours to the cooperative workshops where the contented were observed at

their toil. When the occasion demanded he would arrange a concert or a workers' tableau. Special guests would be allowed a Lambeth-Walk-type dance or two with one of the English-speaking ladies of the court. It was all very inspiring.

By the war's end, Huang Hua had become secret police chief and kept an eagle eye on the top Communist Commissioner at the truce headquarters. This was General Yeh Chien-ying, who was inclined to be too talkative after a fourth Martini. Though Huang was supposed to be the Communist press officer at Peiping, he usually delegated that job to Miss Kung Peng—of whom we shall hear later. That left him free to pursue his police duties.

Number Three on the list is Chu Chi-ping, who also has been busy at Panmunjom. By training he is a journalist, and I see that they have him down as a correspondent for the Communist paper *Ta Kung Pao*. But Chu is far bigger fish than that. One notes that he and Allan Winnington of the London *Daily Worker* were the first to leak the suggestion that the truce talks go "off the record." We rose to the bait.

Chu is one of Peiping's shrewdest propagandists. At Yenching University he was a brilliant pre-medical student. Later, when activity in Huang Hua's Communist cell started to take up too much of his time, he switched to journalism. For a year or two he was at the U.N. as a correspondent for *Ta Kung Pao* when it was supposedly reputable. Through that paper's prestige he was able to befuddle scores of writers into parroting the anti-Chiang line. Chu saw to it that his American friends had access to scoops, to *inside news*—which in reality were mere Communist handouts. The Communists finally took over *Ta Kung Pao* outright. Chu, of course, had no difficulty in making the transition. The recent newsreels of our Air officers making their false confessions show Chu Chi-ping smirking as he translates the forced confession of Lieutenant Paul Kniss.

The "Chinese Madonna"

The High Priestess of the Communist handout in Chungking during the war years is Number Four in our lineup—that prepossessing young lady known as Kung Peng. How the Red China lovers rhapsodized over her! One New York correspondent actually dubbed her "the Chinese Madonna." She has charm, one must admit. And she started turning it on the minute she was graduated from St. Mary's Hall in Shanghai.

Kung Peng came to Yenching University in 1936, a year after the arrival of her older sister, Kung Pu-sheng—who is Number Five on our list. Both girls were active for a year or two in the Christian Fellowship movement on the campus. However, Huang Hua had little difficulty in luring the younger sister into his Communist cell. Big sister continued her hymn-singing for a while.

By the time the Americans started pouring into Chungking, the accomplished Kung Peng was on hand for duty. On the surface she acted as a reporter for the Communist newspaper *Sin Hua*. Actually, her chore was buttering up American correspondents. And soon she became a sort of liaison officer for party members eager to meet fellow-travelers, and vice versa. Occasionally Kung Peng's boss, wily old Tung Pi-wu, would dream up some new censorship difficulty—leave great blanks in his paper, or leak word of new threats of suppression by the Chinese government. Western correspondents would eat this up and rally to Miss Kung's support, especially when the brave little girl came rattling over to their hotel in Tung's old Chevrolet, delivering her precious papers in person.

Kung Peng's list of American admirers grew; so did her storehouse of information. By January 1946 she was in Peiping busily playing her familiar role. Spring found her mysteriously off to Hong Kong where she and her husband, Chiao Kwan-hua, started a Red propaganda mill. Now back in Peiping, Kung Peng is doing the work they really groomed her for. As Director of Intelligence in the Foreign Ministry she fills a post that surprises few of us who were wise to her in 1945.

Big sister Kung Pu-sheng—the mousy sort with little of Kung Peng's charm—now heads the U.N. desk in Peiping. Incidentally, she left the United States with ten packing cases full of books on physics and atomic energy, radio sets, and enough nylons, furs, and undies to outfit the current heart-throb of everyone in the Red cabinet.


After leaving Yenching University Kung Pu-sheng landed a job with the Y.W.C.A. and used that connection to ease herself into the United States in the early 1940s. Once in New York, she did graduate work at Columbia. Later she found employment with the U.N. Secretariat, on the Human Rights Commission. It would be interesting to discover who recommended her. When the time was ripe she returned to China, where she married Chang Han-fu, one of Premier Chou's top deputies.

This, then, is Peiping's second team—at least its most Westernized segment. Letting this raffish crew into the U.N. as responsible representatives of China would be worse than folly.

Eastward, Ho!

Moscow did not have to invent a hydrogen bomb. All it had to do was to invent a system of getting the information from us.

Stores in Soviet Russia do not sell goods on credit. All stores belong to the state, but the Soviet government apparently considers its citizens a poor credit risk: here today and gone tomorrow. ARGUS



Inside the G. P. U.

By MAX EASTMAN

The official report that at least 6,113 United States prisoners were "murdered, tortured, starved, or subjected to other forms of bestial treatment" by the Communists in Korea, makes a timely backdrop for Alexander Orlov's very important book (*The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes*, 366 pp., Random House, \$4.50). It provides an emotional setting in which our too sophisticated intellectuals may perhaps condescend to believe the nightmarish facts about the great purge of 1935 to 1939. The facts are revealed in this book with inside knowledge, with unimpeachable authority, and with scrupulous restraint. I happen by good fortune to know Alexander Orlov and can add the assurance derived from searching conversations to the irrefutable evidences in the book itself of its authenticity—the purity of the truth-telling motive with which it was composed.

All the major disasters peculiar to our times—for wars are not peculiar—began with the seizure of power by Lenin's Bolshevik Party in October 1917. It was an audacious effort, based on a theory of history, and entered into with alert intellect and inflexible will, to achieve that free and equal cooperative utopia about which idealists throughout history have vainly dreamed. Resisting external efforts to destroy it, Lenin's experiment developed in comparative safety and bore its natural fruit. That fruit was the bloodiest and most cruel and horrible counter-revolution in history. But this fact has up to now been obscured, or blurred, in some of our ablest minds by the almost unbelievable determination and skill with which Stalin concealed it. Stalin executed every loyal disciple of Lenin. Then he executed every person who participated in those executions. Then he executed every person in a position to know the truth about those executions. That was the great purge. It was the end of Lenin's party, and the outstanding result of his experiment in organizing for the millennium.

To us who had come close enough to the Bolshevik movement to know the truth about the Moscow trials and guess at the technique by which the fantastic "confessions" of the old Bolsheviks were extorted, it seemed improbable that any single person would survive who might be capable of confirming our appraisal, crossing it off where it was wrong, and filling in the gruesome details where it was right. For my part, I had grown accustomed in the last fourteen years to supposing

that the mystery of the Moscow trials might remain a subject of debate throughout future time. Stalin had so astutely and patiently picked out for destruction every honest man in a position to know and state the facts.

During those fourteen years, however, an escaped top officer of the N.K.V.D. had been living incognito in this country, biding his time until the moment should come for publishing the whole story—the moment, to be exact, when his mother and his wife's mother should have passed beyond the reach of the dictator's vengeance.

So much light is thrown by this book on the innumerable questions that have tormented those whose friends, or whose ideal hopes, died in the great purge, that it is hard to select any single item for illustration. The mystery of Kirov's murder; the adroit trickery of Karl Radek; how Piatakov was fooled into thinking his humiliation had saved the lives of his wife and child; the fate and behavior of Bukharin; Krestinsky's cry of recantation—it was planned by Stalin and rehearsed by the G.P.U.; "the execution of the Red Army generals"; "Yagoda in his prison cell"; Zinoviev and Kamenev bargaining for their lives with Stalin in the Kremlin; Molotov's close call; how the mistake about a rendezvous in a non-existent "Hotel Bristol" in Copenhagen came to be made; why Yezhov replaced Yagoda; the role of Vishinsky and how much did he know; the "medical assassinations"; Stalin's sexual inclinations; his wife shot through the heart with a pistol; his boy-friend bodyguard turned over to the N.K.V.D. to be murdered as a German spy. I mention but a few points of interest in this journey into the interior of Stalin's counter-revolution. Nothing similar to what you will find there has happened in history since Caligula—and Caligula did not put himself over on the leading statesmen of his time as a benign champion of peace, freedom, and human brotherhood. No Joseph E. Davies described his eyes as "exceedingly gentle and kind," or exclaimed that "a child would like to sit in his lap and a dog would side up to him." He did not hoodwink any Winston Churchill into describing him as "truly great," "profound," "wise," "honorable," "trustworthy," "the father of his country," "that great and good man."

The sentimental fog in which Churchill and Roosevelt went around believing what they wanted to believe about Stalin will be, when men look

back, next to Stalin's butcheries, the chief political wonder of this age.

An attempt I made—in my book, *Stalin's Russia and the Crisis in Socialism* (1940)—to divine the manner in which the old Bolsheviks were pushed and pulled into making their fabulous "confessions" was, according to Orlov, wrong in one particular. And Koestler, in his *Darkness at Noon*, made the same mistake. We thought they were still "pulled" very strongly by loyalty to the party's commands. We did not realize how well most of them knew they were the victims of a counter-revolution. My guess was not wrong, however, that the dominant force "pushing" them was the threat to the lives of their children. Orlov casts a new light on the monstrous decree of April 7, 1935, extending the death penalty to boys and girls from the age of twelve. Stalin had already solved the problem of the hordes of "homeless children," he tells us, by secret shootings without any decree. The main function of the published decree was to convince the imprisoned Bolsheviks that he meant business when he threatened to torture and destroy their children. He gave orders to every inquisitor to have a copy of that decree on his desk when "examining" Bolsheviks.

How little a child's life was worth when bought with one of these self-incriminating confessions, Orlov makes heartbreakingly clear. The example he relates is too long for reproduction here. Suffice it to say that had Stalin's victims known the dimensions of his vindictiveness, they would have bargained for the quick death, not the prolonged lives, of their children.

As Walter Krivitsky told us long ago, for every Bolshevik who made a public "confession," a hundred were shot in private without trial. Orlov gives us the full story of one of these "unknown heroes," Zorokh Friedmann. Even his inquisitor, Boris Berman, would boast of this man's force and courage. When others were talking about some particularly stubborn prisoner, Berman would exclaim with a strange kind of pride: "That's nothing! My Zorokh—he outdid all of them!" It is a relief, amid this sickeningly long record of enforced self-degradation, to read the story of how he outdid them—or as Orlov puts it, "how a young revolutionary behaved when he knew that the clutches of the inquisition were not at the throats of those dear to him. His wife whom he loved so deeply that the mere mention of her brought tears to his eyes, and all his closest relatives lived in Latvia, then beyond reach of the N.K.V.D."

Another hero of whom I was glad to hear the last word was my friend Budu Mdivani, whom I met at the Genoa Conference in 1922. I call him my friend only because I admired him so much. "A big, broad-shouldered, powerful, jovial, prodigiously laughing, veritable dynamo of a man, one of the georgeous people of the earth, a 'prince'

if there ever was one." That is how I described him in recollection. His "classic remark," when the inquisitors tried to persuade him to testify against himself and his colleagues, makes a fitting climax to Orlov's story of refined cruelty and systematic wholesale murder: "You are telling me that Stalin has promised to spare the lives of the old Bolsheviks! I have known Stalin for thirty years. Stalin won't rest until he has butchered every one of us, beginning with the blind great-grandmother and ending with the unweaned babe."

However, it is not the character of Stalin that one's mind rests on after reading this book. Its lesson is political, not moral. That such characters exist, that all kinds of characters exist, and that ideal measures, whether of reform or revolution, which rest upon the unconscious assumption that ideal people are going to administer them, constitute a major threat to civilization—that is the main thing to learn. Russia's advance to barbarism under Stalin has been re-enacted in seven other countries; the horror continues unabated, as the news from Korea reminds us. Let us make sure that we at home are not making in milder form the same mistake—building, to realize our ideals, a monumental power-station, and assuming, without saying so, that men devoted to our ideals will be in permanent control of it. The old Sunday-School-class assumption that just about now, or maybe the day after tomorrow, everybody is going to start in "being good," makes America peculiarly susceptible to this kind of blindness.

Fossilized Popular Frontism

The Age of Suspicion, by James A. Wechsler.
333 pp. New York: Random House. \$3.75

Understandably enough, the editor of the *New York Post* is trying to cash in on the publicity that Senator McCarthy mistakenly gave him last spring. This book is "a political autobiography," an example of the literary form that is our age's analogue of the previous century's religious apologetics. Mr. Wechsler carries his story from the days of youthful radicalism on the Columbia campus to what he takes to be his life's climax, or at any rate his book's, in the hearing before the Subcommittee on Investigations.

The *Nation* and the *New Republic* introduced a rhetoric of self-righteous bellyaching that seems to infect permanently most of those who have been editors or regular contributors for those two journalistic waxworks. James Wechsler, in his years at the *Nation*, seems to have caught the virus. In this present book he alternates regularly between pats on his own back and headshakes over the dire doings of "reactionaries." In the final section (on the hearing) he almost weeps in public as he writes of St. George—Sir Galahad Wechsler

swinging the Sword of Truth against the big bad Wisconsin dragon. "Despite all I have written," he sadly observes at the end, "it is not quite possible to communicate the quiet horror of examination by McCarthy." Quiet perhaps, but evidently not wordless.

It seems to be Mr. Wechsler's intention to tell us the story of "another kind" of ex-Communist: the decent, exuberant, liberal kind, for whom Communism was just a passing youthful indiscretion (himself and his friends, that is to say), as distinguished from the vicious, depraved kind for whom Communism was a profound and ineradicable experience (Louis Budenz, Elizabeth Bentley, Paul Crouch, and so on). Now it is true that there are several varieties of ex-Communist, and it

the originator of Nazi Germany's infamous concentration camps, and the man in whose name millions of people were marched to the gas chambers. The brashly jovial Goering, the glibly sinister Dr. Goebbels, the drunken Robert Ley, and even Julius Streicher, the master of anti-Semitic pornography, to name but a few—all these characters afforded a view that could be explained in terms of human psychology, of idiosyncracies, of baseness and illiteracy. But what kind of a man hid behind the pasty, slightly mongolian face, the tiny mustache and the pince-nez—curiously reminiscent of N.K.V.D. boss Lavrentia Beria—of the late *Reichsfuehrer* of the S.S.? A cold-blooded monster? A cynical "Aryan" *Herrenmensch*? Willi Frischauer, in this searching and worthwhile biography, comes to a different conclusion. Based on the reluctant testimony of former S.S. leaders, on the sentimental reminiscences of Himmler's older brother, of his widow, and scores of other informants, Mr. Frischauer has pieced together a novel and perhaps truer picture of Germany's greatest butcher.

In his biography, which also traces the history of the S.S. in voluminous, if sometimes polemic and not quite accurate detail, Himmler emerges as a pained, insecure, and lonely man. A Roman Catholic by birth, physically weak, unpopular in school, a bookworm with a second-rate intellect (plagued, later on, by doubts over his own "Aryan" heritage), a "filing-cabinet" mind, unable to reach decisions yet a scrupulous organizer, a dabbler in history and the breeding of plants, and, finally, the propounder (together with Alfred Rosenberg and Walter Darré) of a spurious Germanic "racism"—all that was Heinrich Himmler. Yet what made him the coldblooded murderer who died, ingloriously, in 1945, by swallowing cyanide? Mr. Frischauer implies that it was his fanatical, blind belief in his mission to create a new, Nordic race that would rule Germany and Europe, and ultimately the whole "Indo-Germanic" orbit, for thousands of years to come. And that, perhaps, is the only feasible explanation. But that such a

gam comprising, and politically dominated by, the Communists. The only real complaint of Wechsler and the other non-Communist Popular Fronters against the Communists is that by their "intransigence" and "blindness to their own best interests" the Communists make the complete Front difficult to attain in practice. It is the fascists and "reactionaries" who are *the enemy*. The Communists are misguided friends—"with the same ideals," as the saying goes—who with patience will some day see the light.

And therefore the Wechslers remain not the comrades but the dupes of the Communists—who, unlike the Wechslers, are serious about politics.

JAMES BURNHAM

ficial," "cultured," "intellectual." They may yield to a ululating primitivism, and chant instinct, the body, the blood. Remarkably mild men, if devoted enough to "Nature," can have in them the seed of a terrible know-nothingism and anti-intellectuality. It was one of England's gentlest contemporary celebrators of sylvan glades and sunny meadows, after all, who so hated what he called "pavement thinking" that he wound up dedicating his books to Hitler.

Joseph Wood Krutch is in no danger of being carried by his sensitive fondness for the natural world into any such horrors of anti-thought. He sees lucidly—what is too seldom remarked—that real love of nature can scarcely be cultivated except as the enthusiast cultivates precisely the learnings, insights, and general cultural apparatus particularly provided by urbanity. Nature-lovers may sometimes like, for their reasons, to pretend to be bumpkins and savages. Actually, of course, it is only sophisticated intelligence that can perceive the treasure of simplicity. It is the untutored rustic who moves blind through Arcadia, and only the country-weekending es- sayist who can see him as Noble Savage.

The two worlds—of nature and of city-cultured awareness of it—make the theme of Mr. Krutch's brief and graceful book. It is allusive, literary, and charming. There is some thoughtful and suggestive meditating about human personality and animal personality, their likeness and difference. There are pleasant ponderings on caterpillars, cats, beetles, frogs, the weather. It is all served forth with garnishes of Thurber, Pope, Boswell, Landor, Freud, Whistler, Lewis Carroll to double-clinch Mr. Krutch's thought that the book of earth is best read with the aid of many others.

ALAN DEVOR

Briefer Mention

Formosa Beachhead, by Geraldine Fitch. 267 pp.
Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. \$3.50

many of them were taken in by the advance guard of liars who precede a Communist invasion.

Besides thus deepening and adding color to *The China Story*, as Freda Utley first brilliantly told it, she carries it across one hundred miles of water to the island of Formosa, where the hope of Freedom for Asia now survives. Here too her special knowledge adds human warmth, and a charm almost as of neighborly gossip, to the economic and political facts. She has been for twenty-five years a close friend of the Chiang Kai-sheks and, besides an intimate characterization, she gives an hour-to-hour account of this man's daily life. Her testimony will add much to the growing conviction that when (or if) the fogs of slander generated by the Communists and their intellectual lackeys are lifted away, Chiang Kai-shek will stand in history as one of the great men of our age.

The Hive, by Camilo José Cela. Translated from the Spanish by J. M. Cohen. 257 pp. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young. \$3.50

Arturo Barea, in his introduction to this noteworthy panoramic novel of life in Madrid, in 1943, calls Cela "the only eminent writer to emerge within Spain after the Civil War." He bases his claim not only on Señor Cela's deft and poetic writing, but elaborates on the significance of *The Hive* as a "social document," as an act of rebellion against the "poultices of conformism" that pervade the Spanish literary scene. At a first glance it seems difficult to endorse fully this tribute by a Spanish emigré writer, who fought against Franco, to a fellow-countryman who today belongs to the ruling class of the Franco regime (but, significantly enough, could not publish this book in his own country). For the nostalgic and somewhat resigned observation that sets the mood for Señor Cela's "slice-of-life" exposition of the stale and hungry world that drifts through Dona Rosa's cafe—the focal point of this novel—sounds anything but rebellious: "A kind of sorrow floats in the air and sinks into men's hearts. Hearts do not ache, and so they can suffer one hour after the other, for a whole lifetime, while we none of us ever understand with full clarity what it is that happens to us." Yet after following Señor Cela's countless characters through the maze of short, almost cinematic scenes, after breathing the odor of decay, of poverty and spiritual sterility that muffles every expression of life in the hive of Señor Cela's Madrid, the character of his rebellion becomes quite obvious. It is, to be sure, not based on any political ideas. It is the revolt of an active, Western mind against the oriental, corroding, and corrupting elements in the Spanish character which have separated this country from the rest of Europe. And it is, thus, in the end a futile revolt. For neither Señor Cela, nor anyone else, can ultimately change this

character. But by showing in a ruthlessly truthful, and painfully naturalistic manner the extent of Spain's corrosion, Señor Cela has at least smashed a window through which some fresh air may flow. Aside from the literary merits of this book, this is no mean accomplishment.

Until Victory: Horace Mann and Mary Peabody, by Louise Hall Tharp. 367 pp. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. \$5.00

Perhaps nowhere at any time in history has there been such a period of genuine reform with lasting success as in nineteenth-century America. Perhaps nowhere also has there been in a single place at the same time so impressive a group of truly dedicated, high-minded, and noble-living reformers. Among them Horace Mann unquestionably stood in the top rank, as this able biography of his adult life and public service illustrates. His enormous contribution to education is known, and where not known felt, by teachers and children all over the United States. People are generally less familiar with his earlier years as a member of the Massachusetts State Legislature and the revolution he fought for and largely effected in the care of the insane. Of his personal life, too, his association, by marriage to one of them, with the remarkable Peabody sisters (themselves reformers in the best sense) has been much publicized. Little has been said of his brief idyllic first marriage to Charlotte Messer—a love story as moving as it was flawless. Mrs. Tharp's discovery of their letters and her dexterity in weaving them into her book have enriched and deepened the picture she gives of a man who can justly be described as one of America's heroes.

Leaving Home, by Elizabeth Janeway. 315 pp. New York: Doubleday and Company. \$3.95

Mrs. Janeway has written a modern novel of manners with a good deal of the polite reserve and literary polish usual in this fiction-form. It concerns the three Bishops—Nina, Kermit, and Marion—who have been brought up by their gentle and genteel widowed mother in their uncle's Gothic house in Brooklyn. They all are endowed with good looks and intelligence; are comfortably situated without being ostentatiously rich; have suffered no major privations and do not in this book. Nothing momentous happens to them except that their uncle dies and the Gothic house in Brooklyn is sold. This, added to the natural process of growing older, sets them free to pursue quite unrelated lives. As we leave them, there is no indication that these lives will be different from those of the majority of persons of their background and position. Mrs. Janeway is particularly adept in handling conversation, of which there is an abundance. Only one might wish that her people had something more substantial to say.



A Party Every Night

By SERGE FLIEGERS



In recent days, Harry S. Truman, who has styled himself "Mr. Citizen," accomplished two things utterly beyond the scope of any average citizen. He engaged in high-spirited snollygostering with Attorney General Brownell and others (a series of incidents discussed at greater length in the editorial pages of this issue). He also managed to get orchestra seats for himself, Mrs. Truman, and Margaret to *Teahouse of the August Moon* on a few hours' notice. Since *Teahouse* is a roaring hit, and average theatergoers have to wait as long as four months for a couple of tickets in the balcony, this latter accomplishment was quite a *coup* by the Truman clan.

Upon closer investigation we discovered that Margaret, herself an aspirant in the field of drama, had swung the deal by calling Maurice Evans, the producer of the show. Graciously, Mr. Evans had turned over his producer's seats for the evening's performance. We do not begrudge Mr. Truman the pleasant evening he must have spent watching this light satire on America's predilection for "blueprintism." (Indeed, Vern Sneider's story of the victory of frail humanity over the high-flown plans of stateside bureaucrats on U.S.-occupied Okinawa should have struck a responsive chord in Mr. Truman's breast.) And we are sure that Mr. Evans would have acted with similar hospitality had President Eisenhower or Herbert Hoover called him for two seats on the aisle. The point of this incident is not Mr. Evans' obliging nature but the fact that today it takes a President or an ex-President of the United States to get tickets on short notice for a Broadway hit.

Mr. A (for Average) Theatergoer stands little chance if he has the misfortune to pick a popular play. From curt theater cashiers and saddened ticket brokers, he gets the same reply: "If it's a hit, we have no tickets. Call us again in a month, or two, or three." If Mr. Theatergoer lives in New York, he follows that advice and usually keeps

getting the same reply month after month. We know of one patient soul who thus waited two years for a front row balcony seat to *Mr. Roberts*. Should Mr. Theatergoer have the added handicap of being from out of town, his chances usually decrease in direct ratio to his distance from Broadway. Both local and out-of-town drama lovers can purchase their tickets by mail when a show is first advertised but at that time they know neither the contents nor the quality of the play, and moreover they are likely to wind up sitting behind a pillar or sharing a rafter seat with the bats.

In order to find out what happens to all the good theater tickets, we called Sol Jacobson, energetic publicist for *Teahouse of the August Moon*. Like other publicity men for current hits, Mr. Jacobson begins his conversations with: "Sorry, fellow, but we have no tickets. . . ." We said that's what we were calling about. Why weren't there any tickets? Mr. Jacobson sighed: "We got a party on every night!" The gentleman was not, as it might seem, discussing his social life with us. He was referring to the fact that ever since *Teahouse* opened on October 15, 1953, theater parties have bought up every seat for almost every performance.

The way we think of them, theater parties are a charming institution, involving a few ladies who get together, buy a block of tickets, invite their friends, and spend a delightful evening at the theater. But like taxes and government bureaus, theater parties have grown beyond all recognition since the war. According to Lenore Tobin, *doyenne* of the business, theater parties organized by charities and other associations have grossed an annual average of \$2,500,000 during recent years, and are expected to reach an even higher figure this season. Miss Tobin, representative of the dozen or so ladies who function as theater party agents, explained this unique and little-known operation. Almost

as soon as a playwright whips his last page out of the typewriter, the party bookers move in to find out the contents of the script. They keep au courant of the casting, sometimes suggest a leading man, and finally help to determine the opening date. In the meantime, they are in constant touch with the dramatic appetites of their client organizations. Social register and suburban groups, for example, prefer romantic comedies with one or two name stars, such as the current Charles Boyer-Mary Martin partnership in *Kind Sir*. Professional groups go in for heavier stuff, and the American Academy of Poets has already made a firm bid for T. S. Eliot's forthcoming *The Confidential Clerk*.

We conducted an informal poll among selected agents, producers, and actors, asking them: "Are theater parties good or bad for the theater?" The reply was a guarded and unanimous, "Yes and No." Miss Tobin summed up one side by declaring: "Parties are a painless form of charity, making a profit of \$2 to \$20 per ticket. They also form a reliable type of insurance for the producer. If he books a certain number of parties, he knows he can keep his show alive despite lukewarm criticism or other adverse factors. Actors react differently to such planned theatergoing. One member of the *Teahouse* cast put it bluntly: "We hate the average theater party. They come in with the attitude: 'We paid thirty dollars a seat. Go ahead and amuse us—thirty dollars worth!'"

Thus we were not surprised to hear some adverse comment from a member of a theater party in front of us. Speaking of David Wayne, who as Sakini the interpreter performs the functions of a *conférencier* and an Aristophanian chorus in the delightful fracas over the question whether Tobiki village should get a teahouse or a pentagon-shaped school building, our neighbor remarked: "He's not just a ham. Wayne's a whole delicatessen."

However, this was only the opinion of a theater party visitor—and by now *Teahouse* doesn't need theater parties any more. It has canceled them after December 31, for meanwhile it has become a solid hit that can stand on its own feet. Maybe you should put in your reservation for next fall.

FROM OUR READERS

Suspicion vs. Good Will

I disagree with your condemnation of the methods of overcoming obstacles in the path toward desirable and righteous objectives. As pointed out by India's Vice President, Jawahar Lal Nehru (Radhakrishnan), as quoted in your editorial column of November 16. Mr. Radhakrishnan said, "We must meet abuse by courtesy, obstruction by reasonableness, suspicion and hatred by good will." These words describe accurately the methods I have used successfully in over forty years as a trouble shooter in various fields of human relations.

Too many writers have been so well schooled in errors that they have failed to educate themselves to discover fundamental truths and how to implement them.

Grosse Ile, Mich. WARREN S. BLAUVELT

American Retreat?

You say in your editorial section of November 16 ("No Time for Myths") that "it is time for Western statesmen to get out of the dream world in which some of them seem to have been living and to face the fact that the Soviet government has no visible intention of giving up one square inch of its conquests or of engaging in any serious peace talks." And you add that "one effective means of modifying the negative Soviet attitude would be to stop talking in accents pleading appeasement."

At the same time we read reports,

naturally not prominently displayed, that, for instance, we have already pulled out 50,000 American soldiers from the NATO command in Europe, that the United States Information Agency is going to avoid "going violently anti-Soviet," that our defense budget will be cut etc.

All this seems to point to a repetition of the sad experience we had in the 1930s with regard to Hitler. And the arguments brought forth sound suspiciously like those expressed, for example, by Mr. Clement Attlee in 1935: "From the danger of war one cannot protect oneself by weapons, one can achieve this only by moving forward into a new world of law. . . . Armaments cannot be fought by piling up armaments; that would be like getting Beelzebub to drive out the Devil."

We all know what this thinking led to in 1939. Are we never going to learn anything from history?

Los Angeles, Cal. PETER C. GLASER

Social Reform and Communism


I would like to congratulate your Peter Schmid for some pertinent observations on the Italian scene ["Battle for Italy," November 16]. Mr. Schmid says that "Communism in Italy is a psychological rather than a social problem." He shows that the various efforts of the De Gasperi government to better the social situation, especially in the Mezzogiorno, did not prevent the people who derived direct benefits from these efforts from voting Communist. And he adds that the success of the Communists in Asia as well as in Italy may be partly explained by the fact that "whoever tries to ease a deplorable social situation by a number of careful reforms pulls the bottom from under the entire social structure and everything comes tumbling down."

I think this is an observation which should deserve a lot of attention from all those who advocate that by simply giving everybody enough to eat, by simply sending food and money overseas we can stop the spreading of Communism. It takes more than a Santa-Claus bag to combat an active political conspiracy.

On the other hand, however, I do not think that we should abandon the idea of gradual social reform altogether, as Mr. Schmid seems to imply. It seems to me we should rather combine the gradual easing of economic and social tensions (as our aid tries to do) with a strong effort on the political and psychological level. This, naturally would necessitate a reorientation of our thinking about an active American foreign policy. I hope it is not too late for this.

New York City WILBUR H. THOMPSON

(Continued on next page)



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FROM OUR READERS

(Continued from p. 213)

"An Uncertain Trumpet"

the public November 2, written by Dr. John A. Mackay, moderator of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., and adopted by the General Council of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. . . .

After giving a series of things that this Presbyterian letter "could have" done, you state: "What a pity that the Presbyterian leadership chose to play a trumpet with an uncertain sound and many false quavering notes of appeasement and anti-anti-Communism." Though I laud your editorial . . . I would like to direct your attention to another "Presbyterian leadership" represented by my personal friend and co-worker, Dr. Carl McIntire's group of "Bible Presbyterians." This little group . . . still within the pale of "Presbyterian leadership," though separated organically from the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., has been for the past several decades lifting its voice of protest to the leftist tendencies and connections of some of the "Presbyterian leadership" behind the letter in question. . . .

DONALD ALLEN WHITE
Chairman, Departments of
Greek and Speech,
Cedarville Baptist College
Cedarville, Ohio

As a Presbyterian layman over a long lifetime, I wish to express appreciation of your critical article, "An Uncertain Trumpet." I hope you will make available reprints of this discussion, which seems to me a most necessary and constructive contribution to clear thinking.

Mt. Pleasant, Ohio S. C. MC CONAHEY


The White Case

In your issue of November 30, you have devoted considerable space to the Harry Dexter White affair. As much as I agree with your position, and as much as I deplore the "criminal negligence" of Harry Truman and his friends, I think you, as so many other people, have failed to put the whole thing into the proper perspective. After all, we are not fighting the Communists in 1946, 1947, or even 1948, but we have to face them here and now. Isn't Malenkov a greater threat?

New York City WILLIAM BEECHURST

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


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


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
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