

Sweden: The Wrong Way

Patrick E. Nieburg

The Myth of "National Income"

Lewis H. Haney

Other Articles and Reviews by James Burnham, Paul L. Poirot,
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THE Freeman

A Fortnightly
For
Individualists

Executive Director KURT LASSEN
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Among Ourselves

Most people are divided in their view of Social Security. As another tax added on to the many that must be paid, it is annoying. On the other hand, they argue, it is the guarantee of a little something for their old age, isn't it? PAUL L. POIROT, in his examination of the economics of the situation (p. 623), points out some of the pitfalls in this latter argument and in doing so reminds us of some forgotten truths about dependence and independence. Mr. Poirot, who formerly served as an economist with the Office of Price Administration, is a member of the staff of the Foundation for Economic Education.

Another much-debated aspect of the security question is hospital care. The high cost of hospitalization is a matter of genuine concern to the average person and inclines many who are otherwise opposed to the welfare state to favor some sort of government-sponsored scheme for such care. To these latter, particularly, ALBERT Q. MAISEL brings some news about *privately*-sponsored hospital care (p. 626) that will be heartening indeed. Mr. Maisel is well known for his books and his many articles on medicine and hospitals.

In his two previous Letters from Spain (issues of March 22 and April 19) JAMES BURNHAM has given us much of the rich color of that romantic country and its people. Now (p. 629) he shows us the other side of the coin—the inefficiency, waste, and confusion of Spain's state-regulated economy.

LEWIS H. HANEY combines two such seemingly incongruous professions as a highly popular newspaper columnist and professor of economics. To the important but technically complex subject of the Gross National Product (p. 631) he has brought his gift as a journalist and his expert knowledge as a scholar, setting forth the fallacies in the usual employment of this concept in clear, direct terms that will be revealing to all who have been so long taken in by it.

ROBERT BENSON is the pseudonym of a journalist who, because of his professional connection with the Newspaper Guild of which he writes (p. 633), prefers to remain anonymous.

Tourists come back from Sweden with glowing reports—it is so well-kept, life is so comfortable. This, as PATRICK E. NIEBURG shows in his discussion of Sweden's economy (p. 635), is a case where the silver lining diverts most observers from the grey cloud behind it—the almost complete socialization that has made of daily life itself a stagnant routine. Mr. Nieburg, author of *A Guide to the Economy of Eastern Europe*, has spent fifteen years in Europe as a foreign correspondent, four of them in Sweden.

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FROM OUR READERS

The Closed Shop

Your editorial "New York's Dock Strike" (April 19) has been read with much interest. The real underlying cause of this situation and many similar ones which are constantly appearing is to be found, in my judgment, in the closed shop. The contest between the two unions is merely a contest for the privilege of enjoying the spoils of closed shop monopoly. . . . I would like to recall to your attention the article by Donald Richberg which was published as a supplement to your magazine in July 1951.

The labor monopoly as now developing is, I believe, our country's most vital issue.

New York City WALTER DREW
On this subject may we call attention also to "The Right to Work" by James R. Morris in our May 17 issue. EDITORS

Non-Egghead Writers

Discussions of eggheads, or ovocaputs, are futile without understanding the causes of the rabbit-like multiplication of eggheads. Actually, there is no mystery about this fertility. It is merely a matter of organization, an activity in which the Communist Party is said to excel.

Ideas are transmitted by writers, and writers, particularly unestablished writers, who aren't eggheads and who have any serious interest in politics or literature, have been effectively excluded from markets for nearly twenty years. Usually they are so isolated they flounder in the dark a long time before realizing they belong to a minority with special problems.

I belong to a group—naturally, very small—who have been considering this problem for some time, and would be glad to hear from others interested. The organization of writers, except for business purposes, is never desirable, but it might be possible to develop some informal system of communication. . . . Because of lack of communication, the divergence of viewpoints among non-egghead writers is probably greater than they realize, and agreement must be developed, not taken for granted. The contemporary line of demarcation is between those who want change and those who don't. Eggheads still flourish because this is an age of intellectual bankruptcy—in politics, in literature, in entertainment, in everything else. The absurdity of the situation is that the liberals are old-fashioned and the Republicans don't know it.

Though most interested in writers,

we'd be glad to hear from those who have ideas about change in other fields. Cartoonists especially welcome. . . . We are not primarily interested in political writing. We think the association between literature and politics has become too close in this century. . .

ARTHUR GREGORY
P. O. Box 55, Village Station
New York City 14

Further Words about Bowles

As one who counts himself an "old hand" at the Indian scene, assuming this from forty years' acquaintance, I reply in protest to the letter by Mary Iglehart in your May 17 issue condemning James Burnham's review (March 8 issue) of Chester Bowles' *Ambassador's Report*.

Burnham's review is by far the best that I have seen of this travelogue. It is wholly justified, analyzing, measuring and judging the *Report* in penetrating and conclusive terms. It is indeed an extraordinary review. It says as much on Bowles' behalf as could be justly said, and cites in the keenest fashion "the failure of this book" in the fields of ideas and policy.

It is not humanly possible for a man to go, as Bowles did, to such an ancient, complex land as India, without previous acquaintance—except for a two weeks' introductory course—and with no linguistic equipment other than his own English tongue, and after fifteen months' residence, write an authoritative volume on the land, its peoples, and their institutions. I am prepared to contend that Bowles' book, except insofar as it is a travelogue, is, as Burnham has intimated, largely drawn from other hands when it describes the Indian scene with apparent penetration.

JOHN CLARK ARCHER
New Haven, Conn.

A Fact to Remember

In your well-rounded editorial appraisal of the McCarthy-Army hearings (May 17 issue) you conclude that "the distinguished Army officers in continual attendance at the sessions could be more profitably employed studying maps of Indio-China and southeast Asia." Would it be asking too much to suggest that they could also give some thought to freeing the hundreds of U.S. military personnel still in Communist hands? After all, whether or not Pvt. G. David Schine was unfairly treated, he has been in no danger of death from disease, from starvation, or from any of the other known forms of Communist torture and brutality.

KENNETH D. ROBERTSON, JR.
Boston, Mass.

England and Aggression

It will be news to anyone who is at all acquainted with history to hear that "for a century the Royal Navy has stood between the United States and any potential aggressor, thereby putting teeth in the Monroe Doctrine" (letter from Sir George Bull of London, April 19). This statement has no basis in fact. Quite to the contrary, in at least one instance in the century, England was the aggressor, in violation of the Monroe Doctrine.

I have a vivid recollection of how, in 1894, England attempted to encroach on the Venezuelan border. At that time we had a good American, Grover Cleveland, in the Executive Mansion, and it still amuses me to recall how President Cleveland . . . twisted the British lion's tail.

I have never known of England helping any other country, unless in doing so she served her own interests. Long ago Lord Palmerston said: "England has no eternal friends; England has no eternal enemies; she has only eternal interests." And to this day, England is taking care of her own interests, first, last, and all the time. . . .

Oak Park, Ill.

J. W. WHITE

Likes Argus' Humor

Let's have more Argus, please. In this deadly serious business of preserving our country, we need a lift occasionally, of humor—and this I get from Argus.

My thanks to you for your very wonderful magazine.

Indianapolis, Ind. MRS. MARCEL PETTET

Mr. Eastman on Modern Art

When I first glimpsed Picasso's futuristic lady on the inside back cover of the *FREEMAN* (May 3), I thought your editors must have gone temporarily berserk. Then I read the article "Non-Communicative Art" and perceived that the odd Picasso lady was serving a real purpose in illustrating Max Eastman's amusing and incisive exposé of the modern art cult.

Detroit, Mich.

EDITH GRANT

It is about time that someone like you debunked the so-called "modern art," which I have long ago observed constitutes what I call emotional and intellectual aberration in the graphic and musical arts, including sculpture and architecture. All these aberrations have a definite revolutionary purpose, which is to detach people from prior accepted concepts and sort of cast them adrift intellectually, so they may be then more readily buffeted about by propaganda storms.

Miami Beach, Fla.

E. L. WIEGAND

THE Freeman

MONDAY, MAY 31, 1954

The Fortnight

Whenever possible, Nehru's neutralist India has abused the aid and trust of this country. Recently, of course, this involved the refusal to let our planes cross India in the air lift of relief to the doomed fortress of Dienbienphu. Now U. S. technicians are being dropped from important engineering projects. And, as expected, India flatly refused to help in any effort to keep Soviet Russia out of Southeast Asia. Yet the Administration wants to pile more aid and trust onto this Ganges funeral pyre. Ambassador George V. Allen, speaking on behalf of the Administration's request for an additional \$104,500,000 for anti-American India, went so far as to call India "the most enormous experiment in democracy the world has ever seen"—a rather ungracious slight of the country he represents. Then Mr. Allen propounded a theory which is truly alarming. He suggested that the entire struggle in Asia will be decided by which country—India or Communist China—brings the greatest "spiritual and material benefits" to its people in the shortest time. That Mr. Allen is in Nehru's pocket he made obvious. Americans have a right to know who else has fallen in there with him. If his statements are official policy, our role in Asia becomes fantastic.

The difference between the Republican and Democratic views of the national economy seldom has been more strongly defined than during the third of Harry Truman's "philosophical" addresses. The well known Republican position, which Harry views with horror, is that production is the keystone of the economy. Now here's the position of Harry and the Democrats: "The great base of our economy is consumer buying. . ." Right now, the ex-President said, the government should start spending about \$3,000,000,000 more each year to increase buying power. Inasmuch as Harry's only real tussle with the business of making a living ended in bankruptcy, it is not difficult to understand why he still maintains a childlike faith in the power of printing press money.

The audience before which he made his little speech, however, was composed of people who *do*

have to work for a living, the members of a large labor union. But in their foot-stomping, cheering ovation, these workingmen and women showed too just how far from the concepts of real labor, industry, and enterprise we have drifted during the past two decades. Certainly, before that time, if a supposedly mature person had got up in public and maintained that the ability to buy is more basic than the ability to produce, he would have been laughed out of town—either that or he would have had the good grace to confine his remarks to a private circle of his own old friends.

Barring some unforeseen and unlikely change in sentiment, Congress has once more killed the latest attempt to amend the Taft-Hartley Act. Once again this much maligned and misrepresented statute has resisted the efforts of friend and foe to improve it. So it has been during both Democratic and Republican administrations since the law was passed over Mr. Truman's veto in 1947. The members of the coalition of Democrats and a few Republicans who this time voted to recommit the bill and thus end the chance of action in the present session of Congress have little in common. Some Democrats voted to retain Taft-Hartley without change because they wished to keep the issue of the "evils" of this law alive during the next political campaigns. Other Democratic senators were unwilling to become involved in a fresh debate over a proposed F.E.P. amendment, which is the contribution of New York's senators, one a Democrat and the other a Republican. Still others wanted the law strengthened, not weakened, and therefore voted to let the matter rest until the need for a stronger act is more generally accepted.

Although the Republicans on the whole backed the Administration's program of revision, most of them were lukewarm about the whole business. For this state of mind the President and his advisers are in the main responsible. From Mr. Durkin's famous nineteen amendments to the collection submitted to the present Congress, the President's office does not seem to have known what it wanted. The proposals it finally undertook to sponsor were directed to secure some imaginary balance of interests and to eradicate imaginary injustices. Their origin was political appeasement and not

genuine comprehension of the public interest. Consequently, until the President and Congress address themselves to the problem of furthering the public interest, it is best to let the law stand as it is.

The recent Soviet ratification of the U.N. convention outlawing genocide offers conclusive proof that this much ballyhooed document is nothing but a piece of pompous hypocrisy. For the Soviet government, from the first years of its existence until present times, has been guilty on many counts of committing this horrible crime: destroying whole groups of human beings without proof of individual guilt. Many ghosts could have risen to protest this Soviet pledge to abstain from genocide: victims of the notorious "Red terror," "kulaks" who were wiped out by one stroke of the Kremlin pen liquidating them "as a class," peasants who perished by the millions in the punitive man-made famine of 1932-33, Poles, Ukrainians, Letts, Lithuanians, Estonians, deported en masse to slave labor camps, citizens of five former Soviet republics and territories which were erased from the map by the end of the war. The United States government has acted wisely in not ratifying this convention, the phrasing of which endangers American constitutional rights. Soviet adhesion exposes the convention for what it is: the emptiest kind of a scrap of paper.

It was said that Macaulay's idea of hell was to have to listen to fiends misrepresenting history without being able to correct them. An equivalent of such torment is supplied in this world by Mr. Averell Harriman, with his frequent apologetics for Yalta, the latest delivered at the annual dinner of the Russian Institute of Columbia University. Harriman follows the well-worn line of other Yalta defenders like the Alsop brothers and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Yalta would have been a pretty good deal if that old devil Stalin had not "unexpectedly" defaulted on his promises. What all these apologists studiously ignore is that the original Yalta Agreement is crammed with crass violations of the Atlantic Charter and elementary principles of humanity and morality and with instances of gross neglect of American national interests. The Yalta record includes outrageous decisions mutilating the proper ethnic frontiers of Poland and Germany, authorizes the use of slave labor for reparations, provides for the handing back of Soviet political refugees, and sells out China's rights in Manchuria. It is a black record.

Young hoodlums and vandals last year wrecked public school property valued at half a million dollars and smashed 265,000 window panes. Whenever some remedial action like the fining of negligent and delinquent parents for the misdeeds of their offspring is proposed, an outcry of protest

goes up from do-gooders who maintain that the only way to deal with a bad and deteriorating situation is to rely on vague sentimentality and high-powered psychiatry. It is a safe prediction that appeasing homegrown vandals will be as futile and self-defeating as appeasing totalitarian dictators. Both can be made to desist from smashing window panes and smashing frontier barriers only by being shown that the way of the transgressor is hard.

The Federal Trade Commission has set a good example by decreeing that the cease and desist orders which it writes "should be so clear that respondents will have no doubt as to what is expected of them." This would seem to be a reasonable desire. What has been called the gobbledegook of official language is notorious; but bureaucrats are not the only offenders. The standard of English writing among college professors has perhaps never been so low. Take this from a book on alcoholism: "With the knowledge that there are levels of drinking behavior dominated by socio-cultural forces, other levels which can be manipulated by guidance and the tools of reason. . . it is possible. . . to develop techniques for a defined purpose." Or how about this twister from a book on the Soviet Union: "The fragmentation of authority at the periphery serves as a guaranty that the Kremlin's manipulatory monopoly will remain undisturbed." No one expects scholars to write in words of one syllable. But the affected, heavy, involved jargon of much academic writing serves no useful purpose and is an obstacle to the communication of thought.

There was appropriate symbolism when Aneurin Bevan, leftwing neutralist anti-American aspirant for the leadership of the British Labor Party, was fined twenty-five pounds and forbidden to drive for three months after he rammed his car into a bus and drove away from the scene of the accident. It is by just such hit-and-run methods that Bevan has been trying to steal the Labor Party leadership from the more cautious hands of Clement Attlee. He has been playing up to anti-American and fellow-traveler sentiment in the Labor ranks by opposing German rearmament in the E.D.C. and denouncing the idea of a pact to block Communist aggression in southeast Asia.

In its current issue *Look* Magazine has performed what may be a major journalistic disservice. In giving space to a convicted tax evader for a glowing account of his prison association with Alger Hiss, *Look* has set a rather dubious editorial standard. The article piously mouths all the propaganda that Hiss could want. It takes one whirling back to the doubtful days when Communism still was just a "cause" and not a conspiracy. Reading *Look* one must wonder just how far from those days we have really come.

Surrender by Installment

There was an ominous note in the bell that tolled for Dienbienphu. There was an all too familiar contrast between the brave men of various nationalities who held out to the last in a hopeless position and the futile, squabbling politicians in Paris. And it was an alarming confession of impotence that no serious effort to relieve Dienbienphu during its ordeal of two months was made, either by an overland expedition or by a massive air strike.

In the echo, almost, of the fall of the fortress there was another ominous note. It was sounded by John Foster Dulles when he hoisted his own flag of retreat from the position that Indo-China is vital to the defense of Southeast Asia. Now, he has declared, the loss of Indo-China would be serious but not fatal. Only shortly before the President himself had been warning that if Indo-China fell, neighboring nations would topple as surely as pushed "dominoes."

The Secretary's statement to the press permits no optimistic interpretation. For on the same date he asked that the President be permitted to divert military aid funds from Indo-China to other beneficiaries.

Certainly, one of the dominoes has been pushed.

The President's attempt to ease the shock of the statement by saying that all was not, in fact, lost in Indo-China was scant comfort in view of the fact that, at the same time, he indicated full support of the Dulles position.

The question left hanging in the world's troubled air is just what has changed? The situation? Or men's minds? The most easily reached answer will further the weakening of the free world.

Oddly enough for a situation so confused by backing and filling (not the least of which, of course, is on the part of our allies), the individual elements of the problem are perhaps better known than those of any similar political situation in history. The hope, for instance, that Ho Chi Minh and Chou En-Lai are, after all, agrarian reformers who may become Titos to Malenkov's Stalin has dispelled itself despite the desire of many to believe it. Above all, however, there is the grimly sure knowledge that the only way to avoid altogether the risk of war with Soviet Russia is to capitulate now and totally. Only when we pretend not to know these things do we veer as close to debacle as we have recently.

The loss of Dienbienphu may be charged partly to the strange illusion that seems to have obsessed mature and experienced statesmen in London and in Paris. This is that successful negotiation is possible with a victorious enemy. All history, including some very recent experiences, points the contrary lesson. The Senate of ancient Rome had a standing rule never to consider peace pro-

posals, however favorable, if the Roman armies had been defeated in the field. But the delusive belief in the possibility of negotiating effectively from weakness has been so strong that the British and French governments gave chilly and evasive responses to Secretary Dulles' recommendation of a Pacific pact, with a pooling of risks and responsibilities, as the only effective means of stopping the southward march of the Chinese Communists.

Now, in the consideration of a Far Eastern conference between this country, Australia, New Zealand, Britain, and France, we have seen a further burst of aggressive reluctance on the part of Britain. Thus, even the talks to establish some guarantee of a settlement in Indo-China, *if* such a course becomes possible, were tangled at the outset. At no point have we presented to the Communists at Geneva anything but a picture of cross-purposes and, tragically, defeat.

The Communists, on the other hand, have been negotiating from the sure-footing of agreed policies and objectives. The major objective, of course, is victory—an objective which can only be sought by those who decide that there actually is a conflict. Molotov's offers to "compromise" were an example. They agree in vague "principle" to neutral supervision of elections in Indo-China and to certain truce guarantees. They serve only the single real purpose, however, of turning Geneva into another Panmunjom.

A lesson that has apparently to be learned over and over again is that there is no promise of peace in appeasement. This lesson has been confirmed by the experience of weakness and indecision in dealing first with Hitler, then with Stalin and Malenkov. What an ominous parallel there is between the milestones of crumbling resistance to Hitler in the thirties and the same process with the Kremlin in the forties and fifties!

The deadly poison of appeasement is that every new retreat makes the enemy materially and psychologically stronger and the retreating side morally and militarily weaker. The end can only be total capitulation—or war under unfavorable conditions, with valuable advance positions lost.

Unless the dry rot of surrender on the installment plan is quickly and decisively stopped, the next Dienbienphu may take the form of American soldiers making a last-ditch defense against overwhelming hostile Communist strength in Korea, Okinawa, Japan, Formosa, or the Philippines. All these countries, to the defense of which we are legally or morally committed, are certainly noted down on the timetable of Chinese Communist conquest.

H.S.T. on the Constitution

A time-bomb which has been fizzing away since that historic day in March 1932 when Franklin Roosevelt assumed the Presidency of the United States, went off on May 8 at the Waldorf-Astoria. The *de facto* leader of the Democratic Party, an ex-President of the United States, quite genially, and without attracting much public attention, stood up before a distinguished audience and tore the Constitution of the United States to shreds.

Harry S. Truman opined on that occasion that the division of powers written into the Constitution was all very well for the horse-and-buggy days, but those early ideas have become "outmoded." We now know, he said, that what we need is not limitation of the powers of government, but "leadership." We need a "master." If the legislative branch makes any attempt to redress the balance of the last twenty years, "not only does the President cease to be master in his own house, but the whole house of government becomes one which has no master."

The Constitution delegates the formation of domestic policy—legislation—to the Congress and the formation of foreign policy to the President and the Senate jointly; the *execution* of policy, to the President; and vast residual powers to the states.

But according to Mr. Truman the Constitution is just a "written document." The "course of events," "the many demands that our complex society has made upon the government," have changed all that. While presumably the function of all the other Constitutional institutions has ossified, the Presidency has grown with the times. It rightfully has acquired powers greater than the Constitution envisaged for all branches of the federal government combined—indeed for all government, federal, state, and local. It has become the representative of that mystical "will of the people," with which the experience of other countries in this fearful century has made us all too familiar. The President

. . . became responsible to the whole people. Our whole people looked to him for leadership, and not confined within the limits of a written document. Every hope and every fear of his fellow citizens, almost every aspect of their welfare and activity, falls within the scope of his concern—indeed, within the scope of his duty.

This sacred institution, Mr. Truman fears, is being desecrated by "legislative encroachment." The very pillars of national existence are threatened. The investigatory powers of Congress—which are, in fact, the only defense the Legislature has in a period of vast and ramified administrative and bureaucratic power—must be sharply curtailed.

The last few weeks have seen a whole gaggle of columnists and commentators loudly cackling for President Eisenhower to act like Franklin Roose-

velt and put the Congress in its place. Mr. Truman has assumed the leadership of this chorus. But he has gone a long step farther. Their pressure, and his, upon President Eisenhower to interfere with the Constitutional prerogatives of the Congress in the particular circumstances of the moment are outrageous enough. There is danger, however, that amid these heated intensities, the deeper significance of this new Truman Doctrine will go unchallenged.

Mr. Truman has quite blatantly made it clear that as President, in place of his oath "to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States," he substituted a grandiose responsibility to "the people." It is upon "the people" and their "will" that every totalitarian demagogue has grounded his omnipotence.

Perhaps Harry Truman does not realize the full significance of what he said. For the safety of the Republic and as a salutary warning to any future occupant of the Presidency with his leanings, however, that doctrine must be kept in the light of day and impeached before all American citizens.

Farm Front Rumblings

The other day the Senate voted down 48 to 40 a rider calling for a one-year extension of 90 per cent rigid parity farm supports. Is this a good omen for alleviation of the farm problem? We think so. But the farm bloc is now girding for the next round in their fight for high supports. The battle is not yet over. To those faint-of-heart senators and congressmen who may be wavering in their desire to say No to further handouts from the public treasury to farmers, we commend the following Presidential messages to the Congress:

It should be the aim to assist the farmer to work out his own salvation, socially and economically. The main problem is one of dealing with surplus production. It is useless to propose a temporary expedient. Government price-fixing is known to be unsound and bound to result in disaster. Government subsidy would work out in the same way. It cannot be sound for all of the people to hire some of the people to produce a crop which neither the producers nor the rest of the people want. Price-fixing and subsidy will both increase the surplus instead of diminishing it.

Government price-fixing, once started, has alike no justice and no end. It is an economic folly from which this country has every right to be spared. . . There is no reason why other industries—copper, coal, lumber, textiles, and others—in every occasional difficulty should not receive the same treatment by the government. Such action would establish bureaucracy on such a scale as to dominate not only the economic life but the moral, social, and political future of our people.

What President presented these messages? Eisenhower, Truman, Roosevelt, Hoover? It was President Calvin Coolidge, who twice vetoed the McNary-Haugen Bills, forerunners of today's hodge-podge farm legislation. The Congress heeded those messages then. Later Congresses and Presidents ignored them, to the detriment of the country. The predictions in the messages have become too true. Surpluses, subsidies, bureaucracy. The messages are pertinent today. Maybe the Congress might read them again and heed them once more.

Financing Communism

If a normal American citizen were told that a portion of the taxes he pays is being used to finance European Communism, his response would doubtless swing between indignation and disbelief. Nevertheless, this is quite literally the case, and has been so for several years.

It happens in this way. Under the so-called "off-shore procurement program" we have been placing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of orders in European factories. These orders cover all kinds of armament, and other supplies to be used by our own forces stationed in Europe or by NATO contingents. But the labor force of many European factories, especially in France and Italy, is predominantly Communist, or under Communist control. In many factories Communist unions have closed shop contracts, a principal voice in handling social security and related benefits, and often a role in management through various schemes that developed just after the war. Indeed, there are not a few factories where the owners and managers are themselves well over on the Communist side.

Both directly and indirectly, American orders given to such Communist-tainted factories serve to strengthen the Communists. Part of the American money, in the form of union dues, illegal cuts, and industrial blackmail, goes right into the Communist treasuries, where it serves not merely to pay the local Communist officials but to help sustain the general Communist apparatus. The trade union position of the Communists is reinforced by their control of jobs in these factories that have plenty of work and good pay. Communist prestige rises through their known ability thus to exploit American aid in their own interests. The opportunities for careful sabotage or for adroit political pressures are multiplied.

This situation was fairly well understood at the outset of the mutual aid program. In the debates Congress made clear its conviction that no orders should be given to factories where the Communists were in control of either management or labor force. The State Department and the Pentagon seemed to be in agreement with this

Congressional intention. In practice, however, the intended restrictions have evaporated. The Pentagon has argued in practice that the orders must be placed without regard for politics, "where they can be filled most quickly." The State Department, bemused by the fallacy of its congenital belief that Communism can be cured by economic improvement, has allowed itself to be swayed by European diplomats who assure it that taking the orders away from Communist-dominated factories would "disrupt" the economies of France and Italy.

The Eisenhower Administration has been making a few tentative moves toward ending this anomaly whereby we finance the agents of our enemy. In Italy, for example, Ambassador Clare Luce has recently referred to the problem publicly, and has stated that changes must be made in the prevailing practice. For the Italian public, the implied reference was above all to the great Fiat works, now sweetened by large and profitable American financed orders, where the Communists are powerfully entrenched among the workers. For her frankness, Mrs. Luce was fiercely denounced in the Communist press and politely lectured in the non-Communist.

It may be granted that there are grave practical difficulties in the way of a 100 per cent rule that no orders shall go to any plants unless they can show a simon-pure non-Communist certificate. But the truth is that our off-shore procurement program, as it has so far been administered, has been helping West European Communism instead of weakening it. Surely we can do better than that. This would seem to us a subject eminently suited to a sober, responsible Congressional inquiry that would seek not to find culprits or jockey for headlines, but gather the facts, inform public opinion, and collaborate with the Administration in the solution of a puzzling, awkward, and very important problem.

Inescapable Dilemma

The latest international crisis—this time in Indo-China—again puts conservatives into the dilemma from which they have been trying to extricate themselves since the beginning of World War Two. For the indispensable elements of the conservative credo are a balanced governmental budget, the end of deficit financing, the reduction of taxes, the decentralization of public authority—in brief, a collection of policies calculated to contract the scope and spending power of the federal government. This credo has been the theme of numerous articles in these columns. It is fair to say that compromising these principles would cut away the very foundations of conservatism, which above all is a revolt against the accumulation and use of excessive organized power, public and private.

It is perhaps inevitable that many of these same conservatives, though they may differ as to the details of the foreign policies of this administration or its predecessors, hold in common with them the belief that the security of the United States requires the maintenance of a large and powerful military establishment and armed intervention by this country in those parts of the world which threaten to fall under Communist domination. This is the combination of beliefs which produces the dilemma that may prove incapable of resolution.

Whatever may be said of the profligacy of the welfare state, it is the maintenance and employment of large armed forces that are the principal sources of the stupendous expenditures to which we have become so recently accustomed. They are a major source of the growth of public power and functions. Unless they are curbed there is little prospect for economy in government or for the return of central government to the simple functions of peacetime. The history of our own and other countries confirms this conclusion. No amount of "new look" is likely to compensate for the mounting financial requirements of an army, navy, and air force ready to go to war at the drop of a hat in one or several of the many potential theaters of war throughout the world.

If this is correct it may well be that what requires "new look" is not only our military policy and strategy, but our foreign policy. It is not unlikely that conservatives, like many of their fellows in other political camps, have failed to observe that the citizens of a country whose external policies dominate its internal affairs must inevitably face the loss of many of the very rights and liberties their government is trying to secure.

Too Old a Lion

It is always pathetic to hear an old lion, hero of many hard fought jungle battles, reduced to a helpless mumble. That is the impression conveyed by Winston Churchill's amazing declaration to the Conservative Primrose League of England, just a few days before the fall of Dienbienphu marked another triumph of Communist aggression: "We should establish with Russia links which, in spite of all distractions and perils and contradictions, will convince the Russian people and the Soviet government that we wish them peace, happiness, and ever-increasing and ever-expanding prosperity and enrichment of life in their own mighty land and that we long to see them play a proud and splendid part in the guidance of the human race."

Imagine Churchill, the lion of the prewar and war years, addressing such a message to Nazi Germany just as Hitler was carrying out one of his more outrageous smash-and-grab maneuvers! If

Malenkov and Molotov possessed a sense of humor, they might acknowledge Churchill's good-will greeting with the observation that they are doing their best to increase the proportion of the human race that is under Moscow's guidance. This latest effusion is in line with the disastrous speech which the British Prime Minister delivered in Parliament in May 1953 suggesting that there had been a great change in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death and proposing a top-level secret meeting of Western statesmen with the Soviet leaders without preliminary conditions—a perfect formula for returning to the appeasement of Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam.

The appeasing Churchill of today is most effectively condemned out of the mouth of the unflinching Churchill of the past. One could not wish for a clearer statement of the issues in the cold war than he gave in Wales on October 9, 1948:

Let them [the Soviet rulers] release their grip upon the satellite states of Europe.

Let them retire to their own country, which is one sixth of the land surface of the globe.

Let them cease to oppress, torment, and exploit the immense part of Germany and Austria which is now in their hands.

Let them cease to distract Malaya and Indonesia.

Let them liberate the Communist-held portion of Korea.

The question is asked: What will happen when they get the atomic bomb themselves and have accumulated a large store? You can judge yourselves what will happen then by what is happening now. If these things are done in the green wood, what will be done in the dry?

Almost six years have passed since Churchill delivered this strong and prophetic speech. During that time the Soviet government has become more formidable through its acquisition of atomic weapons. It has given no sign of abandoning its grand design of world conquest through a combination of force and subversion. It has not fulfilled even one of the prerequisites of peace which Churchill laid down when his vision was clear and his spirit was unafraid. But now the aging British Prime Minister can talk of a threat that is bigger and nearer only in the helpless, hopeless accents of appeasement.

In the interest of his own reputation and his place in history Sir Winston should lay down a burden of office that has become too heavy for him. In the last volume of his incomparable memoirs of the Second World War Sir Winston paints a vivid picture of the tragic consequences of Franklin D. Roosevelt's breakdown in the last decisive months of the war. One political opportunity after another was missed because, in Churchill's words: "In this melancholy void one President could not act and the other could not know." It would indeed be a profound historical irony if Churchill, nine years later, would himself create a similar "melancholy void" in the cohesion and leadership of the free world.

The Price of Security

By PAUL L. POIROT

Social security benefits are not, as many assume, a form of old-age insurance but an ever-increasing levy on the future income and property of others.

Thirteen thousand United Mine Workers beneficiaries of the Anthracite Health and Welfare Fund were advised early in 1954 that future pension and death benefits would be cut to half their former rate. Miners of hard coal, who had retired expecting the fund to provide security and independence in their old age, thus found that insecurity may be the penalty for reliance on a poorly funded promise. The 50 per cent cut in anthracite fund pensions was said to be necessary because of a continuing decline in revenue resulting from a steady drop in hard coal production in recent years. But why should the anthracite industry experience a steady drop in production during a period of general industrial expansion?

The competitive economic arrangement allows individuals and even whole industries to fail—if and when capital, labor, and managerial resources are either pushed or pulled toward the more attractive employment opportunities which exist elsewhere. Unfortunately, there are no alternative employment opportunities for poorly funded pension rights. Labor, and management, and even invested capital to a certain extent, can move out of a failing business venture, as they have been moving out of anthracite mining operations. But the pension rights of retired hard coal miners are strictly dependent on the income from a declining industry. The inadequate pension fund is being depleted, with little chance of its being replenished.

Investment of savings in productive private enterprise is the traditional method of achieving retirement security in the United States. Successful generations of farmers have worked to build ownership equity in land, buildings, equipment, and livestock, finally to retire upon the income which younger farmers would offer for the rights to use that accumulated capital. Other persons have achieved old age security through ownership of rental housing, business facilities, productive private property of one kind or another, valuable because someone else has use for it. If the individual seeks help in arranging his personal security program, the managers of banks, insurance companies, trust funds, and other business enterprises stand ready to accept responsibility for the sound investment of savings.

It is true that ownership of property involves the risk of loss. The property may wear out, be destroyed, or otherwise lose its value, affording

less security than the owner might have anticipated. Yet the economic progress which has been so well demonstrated in America attests to the advantages of saving and building ownership equity in productive private property. Such property enhances personal productivity, which helps to satisfy human needs.

Possible gains from the use of more and better tools far outweigh the risks of possible loss of savings. Knowing this, most American citizens would stand in staunch defense of rights to private ownership and control of property if the issues were clearly drawn. Yet this deep-seated subconscious respect for property rights may be overridden at times by the highly humanitarian and emotional appeal of an illusion such as the social security idea.

Social Security Is Not Savings

Much of the popularity of the social security program, as it has been operating in the United States, rests upon the false premise that social security is a form of old age insurance with death benefits for survivors—just like annuities or life insurance policies sold by private insurance companies. Many employees who pay social security taxes apparently believe they are putting away a savings fund and that any promised retirement benefits will simply be a part of their own savings coming back to them. They seem to believe that the promise of a pension under the social security program is quite as secure and has as much value as the prospect of future income from personally owned and controlled private property. And the experience of some of the early beneficiaries of the social security program leaves the impression that here is a far less costly thing than private insurance coverage—almost like something for nothing.

Some persons, having paid social security taxes since they were first levied in 1937, therefore feel they have earned the right to any benefits allowed under the program. But the maximum tax any person could have paid over the first seventeen years of the program, from 1937 through 1953, was \$597. His employer would have matched that amount, bringing their combined total to \$1,194.

If that person had retired on January 1, 1954,

having reached the age of sixty-five, and if his wife had also passed her sixty-fifth birthday, they would be eligible for retirement benefits of \$127.50 a month. Thus, within ten months, that man and his wife would receive more in social security benefits than both he and his employer could possibly have paid as social security taxes for his account over the seventeen years since the program was initiated. But the life expectancy at sixty-five is more than ten months—about thirteen years, in fact. By what twist of logic or of morality does any person expect to get from ten to fifteen or even more times the benefits for which he has paid? At whose expense, and why?

The foregoing figures are based on the maximum taxes anyone could have paid through the first seventeen years of the program. Many of the millions of persons already receiving social security old age benefits established their legal eligibility with far less than the maximum tax payments of \$1,194. Is it any wonder that some persons look upon social security as a great insurance bargain?

No Real Insurance

The truth, however, is that social security is not insurance at all in the economic sense of the word. The value of *private* old age or life insurance protection stems from the insured person's ownership equity in productive property. But the payment of one's social security tax entitles him to no more ownership equity in property than does the payment of a gasoline tax, income tax, property tax, or any other kind of tax. The payment of social security taxes cannot endow the payers of that tax with special rights and privileges without denying the rights of other citizens to their income and property.

Unlike private insurance, the protection afforded by the social security program rests upon the willingness and *ability* of government officials to authorize future appropriations from future tax revenue. The so-called social security fund has not been invested in productive property. In place of the money which was collected to go into the fund, there are receipts saying in effect that the government used that money to meet current operating expenses of one kind or another. The government bonds which are said to constitute a social security fund can only be redeemed in valuable goods or services as any other government bonds are redeemed—by future levies against the private property and productive efforts of individuals.

A bond is a form of indebtedness or a liability on the part of the person who issues it. It is deemed to be the asset of the person who holds it for redemption. The distinction between an asset and a liability is important. The government bonds held in the social security fund may look exactly

like the government bonds held by individuals or by private insurance companies. The difference between such holdings has to do with the question of who owes what to whom.

If a private insurance company holds a government bond, that is an asset. It would be absurd for the company to issue and hold bonds of its own, claiming them as an asset, for they would also be a liability. The solvency of the social security fund is not affected, one way or the other, by its holding of bonds as evidence that the government is indebted to itself.

A governmental promise is a promise, whether backed by a bond, or by a social security account, or by a whole pyramid of promises, one upon another. To cancel or destroy the bonds held in the social security fund would not change anyone's equity in anything. The promise of a social security pension has value only because the government holds the power of taxation—not because it issues bonds or makes promises. The validity of social security claims against future taxpayers would not be changed if there were a thousand times as many bonds in the social security fund as at present—or if there were no bonds in the fund at all.

Inasmuch as the redemption values of all government bonds, social security benefits, and other governmental promises of future delivery are contingent upon the future collection of taxes, it must be seen that each added bond or promise tends to weaken the financial position of the government. There is a limit to the tax burden which future generations will be willing and able to bear.

It was a somewhat arbitrary decision that recently halved the returns to beneficiaries of the Anthracite Health and Welfare Fund. Likewise, when the day comes that American taxpayers will no longer tolerate a tax burden which robs them of incentive to produce and earn and save, an arbitrary decision will bear the sad news to social security beneficiaries: "*Lack of tax revenue precludes our fulfillment of the poorly funded promises of previous administrations.*" The most probable political solution will be to let inflation eat away the value of the promised pension dollars. In other words, the dollars may be paid as promised, but beneficiaries will find little security value in those weakened dollars.

Earnings Are Private Property

Persons who urge an expansion of the social security program seem to assume that American citizens are no longer interested in the preservation of private property—the protection of the human right to own and control the use of that which one has produced. This is not to suggest that the social security program is the only threat to private property in the United States. There are many others. But the social security threat is

somewhat unique in that it encourages the victim to believe that he still retains some kind of personal claim or right to repossess property the government has taxed away from him.

The payroll-withholding of the social security tax makes it difficult for the individual to recognize that it is his own property that is being taken from him. The deception is aggravated, of course, by the employee's impression that half of the cost of his social security is coming out of the pocket of his employer. But the employer is obliged to treat those matching contributions to the social security fund as just another current cost of labor. If that 2 per cent were not taxed out of his pocket, then competition would have drawn it out anyway, either in the form of higher current wage rates to employees or in the form of lower prices to consumers. So the net result is that *the employee, in reality, stands the burden of the full social security tax*, including the share he might have thought the employer was paying. It cannot truthfully be said of any part of the social security program that it is a method of soaking the rich to help the poor. Social security is a feature of the broad socialistic pattern—a special feature designed to get at the private property of the man who works for an hourly wage.

Far too many American citizens have taken the attitude that defending private property is the rich man's job; let him worry about his property rights! But such a shortsighted view misses the vital point that an individual's earning power is also a form of private property, particularly to be cherished and defended by any person who has failed to acquire property in other forms. To endorse a principle which allows the government to tax away ever-increasing proportions of privately owned property is to forfeit the only chance man has for independence. A government that can take a man's property, including his wages and other current earnings, can control that man's life. The person who desires freedom is obliged to limit the scope and power of his government.

When government was less expensive, it was possible to finance it through property taxes or levies against the income from property. But that is no longer true. Less than one-sixth of the national income of the United States is derived from the returns to capital; the other 85 per cent is in the form of current wages or their equivalent to the self-employed and to management. Even if there were no promises of social security benefits, barely half of the other costs of government could be met out of a total confiscation of the income from private property. The only thing left to tax is the current productivity of those who work for wages and salaries.

Let no one be persuaded that the social security program is the only reason why the government finds it necessary to tax wages. But also let no

one deceive himself that there is any way of financing the social security program and similar "benefits" from the welfare state except through proportionately heavy taxation of wages.

Mounting Tax Percentages

The social security tax was initiated in 1937 at the comparatively low level of 2 per cent of an employee's wages, the employer and the employee each to bear half of the amount. By January 1, 1954, the total tax had risen to 4 per cent, which is still low in contrast with some of the prevailing corporate and personal income tax rates. But a tax of 4 per cent of current payrolls barely begins to cover the potential claims accumulating under the social security program. Present plans call for successive future increases until the social security tax rate reaches an ultimate of 6.5 per cent by 1970. But will 6.5 per cent of payrolls provide comfortable retirement income for all those over sixty-five?

Amateurs who cannot follow all of the political turns in the 6.5 per cent path to security may find comfort in the knowledge that some of the professionals haven't solved the magic formula either. For instance, the compulsory social security program which Frenchmen have been trying to perfect for a good many years calls for a tax amounting to 16 per cent of payrolls. No doubt they also had hoped at one time that the tax need be no higher than 6.5 per cent. The social security features of the United States railroad retirement system were initiated in 1937 with a payroll tax of 5.5 per cent, but by 1952 that rate had climbed to 12.5 per cent. The anthracite fund pensions had to be cut from \$100 to \$50 a month, even though the tax-like contributions to the fund were said to be equivalent to more than 15 per cent of the wage bill of the industry.

Such experiences tend to arouse suspicion of either the motives or the basic intelligence of those who promise that by 1970 retirement security can be achieved at a cost of no more than 6.5 per cent of payrolls. If it cannot be achieved by small groups within a nation, and if it cannot be accomplished in other nations, then why should anyone believe that it can be done on a nationwide basis in the United States—in 1970 or at any other time?

For those who enjoy diversion, there is talk about putting the social security program on a straight pay-as-you-go basis. This is supposed to mean that current benefits would be paid entirely out of current revenue under the program, with no pretense at building a fund to cover outstanding commitments. Such discussion might have some significance, except that the program, in effect, has always been on a pay-as-you-go basis. The fact that annual tax revenue under the program so far has always exceeded the payouts to beneficiaries

doesn't mean that anything of value was ever stored away in a fund for future use. It may be true that not all of the money was used for retirement security for old folks, but it's gone!

A feeling of personal security depends upon something more than the legal guarantee of a handout in time of need. To be truly secure is to be without cause for anxiety, and that kind of security stems from the mind of an individual who knows that he has done his very best with what was properly his own. Such security is fed by one's respect for the rights of others to life and property, a respect upon which is based one's own claim to those rights.

There is no denying that social leveling has a strong emotional and humanitarian appeal. And few will deny the virtue of helping those who want and need assistance. But if any person would retain the freedom to determine his own needs in life, he must equally defend the freedom of every man to determine in his own way how to help others. The political or coercive route to security is not entirely a primrose path of something for nothing. What starts out as a popular pastime of soaking the rich turns into a program of taxing everyone who works for a living. And as socialism advances,

the weak and dependent find themselves competing with the youthful and strong who have also been driven by hunger to the public trough. Such competition in sheer desperation is far more ruthless than that which is sometimes frowned upon in the open market. When people lose respect for the rights of one another to life and to property, then the weak and dependent may expect to be early victims of murder and theft.

If the less productive members of a society truly seek security, let them rally to the defense of the freedom of choice and freedom of action of those who work for a living and who are personally productive. Let them voluntarily deal with one another in a market place kept free of compulsion. Such voluntary trading directs the instruments of production and the means of economic security into the hands of those most capable of serving all mankind. It promotes mutual respect for life and property. It stimulates every individual to develop his own talents to their maximum productivity. It encourages saving instead of squandering. The free market, and not its displacement by governmental controls, is the only route to the kind of personal security which makes for harmonious social relationships.

Cutting Hospital Costs

By ALBERT Q. MAISEL

By the use of ingenious new techniques and equipment, including self-service devices, doctors and laymen are coping successfully with the problem of better care for more patients at substantially lower costs.

Eight years ago the average hospital bill ran to about \$8.75 a day. Today it is \$19.50. In some big city hospitals the cost of routine care for a routine case—apart from doctors' fees and extras—may run as high as \$30 a day.

Yet hospitals everywhere have been struggling desperately to hold down their skyrocketing costs. They've eliminated frills, streamlined their purchasing, mechanized their kitchens, and used lower salaried attendants and aides to relieve nurses. But year after year, economies have been swallowed up by higher wages and higher prices for everything from anesthetics to X-ray plates, and harassed hospital directors have been forced to raise rates. As a result, even a short-term stay in a hospital is becoming prohibitively expensive for a large segment of the population.

But now, in a few hospitals, doctors and laymen have been attacking the high cost of hospitalization in a different way. Instead of seeking piecemeal economies, they have been working out new ways

to operate a hospital which have enabled them to slash their costs and their patients' bills, while giving better service at the same time. One such group of innovators is the staff of New Orleans' Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation.

In most of the fifty-four hospitals I have visited during the last year, each patient is assigned to a certain bed which he keeps from his admittance to his discharge. In wards and semi-private rooms—the best that 95 per cent of us can afford—acutely ill patients, tossing in pain, often disturb other patients, causing them to lose rest and sleep.

At the recently completed Ochsner Foundation Hospital, however, no one is trundled through the corridors as soon as the anesthesia has worn off. Instead, the patients are moved only thirty feet, to a cubicle in a specially designed Recovery Division, where they spend from a minimum of twelve hours to as much as a week. Here, as long as they are on the critical list, they receive the constant attention of specially trained "Recovery

Nurses," who perform no other hospital duties.

Once off the critical list, a patient is moved to a standard hospital room or ward. Here he receives the regular attention of floor nurses and resident doctors. They have more time to give him because they need not worry about critically ill post-operative cases.

The Hotel Atmosphere

Within a few days the patient makes a third move—out of the main building and into a "hotel-hospital" a few score yards away. Here treatment continues, but in a far more relaxed and unhospital-like atmosphere. During his convalescence the patient can enjoy unlimited visiting hours without disturbing other patients. He may sleep late and ignore other routines that must be enforced in the average hospital. His wife or a relative may share the room with him—a great saving in hotel bills for the many Ochsner Foundation patients who come from all over the Middle South.

Many patients even resume their business activities while staying in the convalescent quarters. A separate switchboard prevents the hospital phone lines from being clogged by these personal calls. A stenographic service is available. The patient gets every bit of care he needs, but he pays for none of the standby services he no longer requires.

Instead, his costs are cut along the line. No extra charge is made for the specialized care of the nurses in the Recovery Division. The concentration of critically sick patients in one place, in easily observed cubicles rather than separate rooms, holds expenses down.

During the mid-period of hospitalization the patient often gets a double saving. He seldom requires expensive special nursing, and he usually passes through this phase more rapidly, thanks to the specialized care he received immediately after his operation.

In the "hotel-hospital" his daily room and board cost drops by approximately 40 per cent. Few of the special appurtenances of standard hospitals are required here, so each bed represents a capital outlay of only \$6,000 instead of the \$25,000 per bed invested in the main hospital. Expenses are also far lower in the convalescent section because fewer nurses and attendants are required.

Can the Ochsner method be applied elsewhere?

Many hospital administrators have insisted to me that the Foundation Hospital represents a special case, because it has an unusually large proportion of patients requiring major surgery. The plan wouldn't work, they insist, in an ordinary hospital with the usual run of medical and surgical cases.

But the plan *has* worked successfully for the last three years at the Huntington Memorial Hospital in Pasadena, California, as typical a com-

munity hospital as you could find. There the equivalent of the "hotel-hospital" was conceived independently in 1950 by a layman, William B. Munro, Chairman of the Board of Trustees.

At crowded Huntington Memorial, as in many older hospitals, new bed space was urgently needed. A bequest of \$200,000 was available for expansion, but a new wing of standard hospital construction would eat up this sum at the rate of \$18,000 a bed. "How on earth can we hope to relieve overcrowding," Chairman Munro asked himself, "if all we can add is only a dozen new beds?"

Munro found the answer when he became a patient in his own hospital. He was struck by the wastefulness of providing identical and equally expensive facilities and services for acutely ill and for convalescent patients. He proposed, instead, to use the money to erect a special one-story unit for those who no longer needed intensive nursing care. Thus the Jenks Convalescent Pavilion came into being, providing forty-eight beds in semi-private rooms. At a cost of less than \$5,000 a bed, the hospital's capacity was increased by nearly 20 per cent.

The new wing—patients and nurses alike refer to it as "the country club"—improved care and slashed patients' bills. The convalescents, requiring only one registered nurse per shift to meet their needs, receive semi-private accommodations at ward rates. The only fly in the ointment has been the fact that, in such pleasant surroundings, some patients hate to go home.

California's Mechanized Hospitals

A similar departure from traditional hospital practice has paid off equally well in the multi-story hospitals which the Kaiser Foundation has recently completed in both Los Angeles and San Francisco. Each of their regular hospital floors houses thirty-four semi-private beds. Yet without reducing the space allotted each patient, their top-floor "hotel" areas for convalescents provide fifty-eight semi-private beds.

In most hospitals, nurses must spend much of their time running errands. A recent study of the work of 578 nurses in ten New York City hospitals, for example, showed that only one fourth of their time was actually spent on nursing care; the other three quarters went to clerical work, rustling trays, chasing down supplies, and a host of other non-professional functions.

If a drink of water or a bedpan is needed, if a curtain must be drawn or a bed adjusted, the patient presses her call button and waits. The nurse sees a signal light and walks down the long hall from her central station to find out what is wanted. Then she walks again to get whatever is called for, while other lights go on and other patients wait.

At the highly mechanized Kaiser Hospitals much

of this wasteful trudging back and forth has been eliminated. No one wakes you in the early morning to wash your face. Instead, when you are ready to wash, you press a button and raise your bed electrically, and beside your bed you find a specially designed wash basin with hot and cold taps and even ice water. Within arm's reach is an automatic coffee maker and a toaster, to keep you from getting hungry before your breakfast is brought around.

If the rising sun shines in your eyes you press another button and automatically draw your curtains. Your lamp and over-bed table are designed so that you can adjust them without the nurse's aid. If you can manage a bedpan and prefer privacy you needn't call the nurse; it's in a small drawer in the wall beside the bed. Return it to its drawer and a light goes on in the corridor, notifying the nurse on duty.

If you really need the nurse you don't make her chase down the hall to see what you want. Instead, you press a button and speak to her over a soft-voiced electronic communications system.

Visitors reach the patients' rooms through outside corridors—open balconies in the warm Los Angeles sun, glassed-in balconies in cooler San Francisco. The central corridor is thus freed for the exclusive use of hospital personnel. In place of the conventional central nursing station, individual stations—one for every four rooms—are provided in this work corridor. Drugs and records come to the nurse by pneumatic chute. When she leaves her desk to enter one of her patients' rooms she presses a button that alerts adjacent nursing stations.

On the maternity floors every baby has a tiny individual room just behind the headboard of its mother's bed. When a mother wants to feed or fondle her infant she touches a handle set in the wall at bedside level, and a steel drawer emerges, bearing baby and fresh diapers in a transparent plastic bassinet. When mother wishes to rest she pushes the bassinet-drawer back into its place. A signal lights up at the nurse's station, telling her she is again in charge.

Does all this mechanization pay off? Tests have shown that nursing "mileage" has been cut to one seventh of what it has been in old-style Kaiser Hospitals, and nurses have eliminated an amazing average of three and a half hours a day of errand-boy work. The time they save can be devoted to more and better nursing. Moreover, the chronic shortage of registered nurses which plagues most hospitals has been largely solved in these new-type hospitals where only 100 nurses are needed to do the work that would ordinarily require 140.

The patients gain in two ways. They get better, speedier, more cheerful care from nurses who are not exhausted by non-professional duties, and the cost of their hospitalization is substantially lowered.

Other hospitals have found still another way

to combat rising costs: by providing an outlet for the desire of thousands of people to volunteer their services for the benefit of their communities. The Mountainside Hospital, of Montclair, New Jersey, a typical, medium-sized institution facing chronic deficits, has an army of about 1,000 women volunteers. Last year they gave their hospital some 50,000 hours of free service as nurses' assistants, pediatric aides, information clerks, mail distributors, supply room helpers, blood bank attendants, clinic clerks. Ninety are schoolgirls selected each year by the dean of the high school. Others are grandmothers. About 100 have been reporting for duty, week after week, for over ten years.

The Use of Volunteers

What evokes such continued devotion? "I remember the time I was in a hospital and had to eat cold food," one woman told me. "Some people kid me about tray-trotting, but I get a kick out of seeing the kids' faces light up when I bring their food in piping hot."

Many women relish the chance to do something besides raise or donate money. "I can't afford to write large charity checks," one explained, "but I can hold my own with anyone when it comes to giving of myself."

During World War Two about 1,000 hospitals did organize such volunteer groups and hundreds of thousands of women took part. With the end of war, however, more emphasis was placed on the fund-raising activities of women's auxiliaries. By 1951 the national total of volunteer workers in voluntary or community hospitals had dropped to 27,000.

The fault no doubt lies in the reluctance of busy hospital administrators to undertake the delicate personnel relations work that is required if volunteer resources are to be effectively coordinated with professional staff work.

But the recent experience of Pasadena's Huntington Hospital shows what happens when the men who run our hospitals take an opposite view. There, last fall, Administrator Gordon Gilbert took a good look at his institution's declining volunteer service effort. After consulting with members of the hospital's Women's Auxiliary and members of his board, he hired Mrs. Frances Kuhn as Director of Volunteer Activities. An experienced Red Cross worker, she knew how to attract volunteers and train them for serious work. As a registered nurse she had little difficulty in convincing once reluctant staff members of the advantages of using the aid of volunteer help. The result? In four months the hours of volunteer time contributed by the women of Pasadena were quadrupled.

And no hospital can afford to overlook these ways to reduce nursing and building costs if it seeks to wipe out deficits and halt the rise in patients' bills.

Bureaucracy in Spain

By JAMES BURNHAM

License forms with seventeen carbons, four officials to mail a letter, are some of the familiar patterns of government control to be found in Iberia today.

Madrid

In politics and philosophy, anti-Marxism is of the essence of the present Spanish regime. Nevertheless, by a paradox not uncommon in our day, the hand of Marxism rests heavy on the Spanish economy. Government ownership has spread, preempting some fields (rail and air transportation, telephone and telegraph), and functioning parallel to private enterprise in many others (power and light, housing, banking, medicine, shipping, hotels, mining). Bureaucratic controls enmesh all industry, professions, and personal business. Government intervention is greater than before Franco came to power. It was the present regime that took over a controlling share in the telephone system, a number of mines, and such major utilities as the Barcelona electric company.

The bureaucracy is huge, cumbersome, and corrupt. A business transaction beyond the scope of a village market cannot be carried out quickly. It took friends of ours three days to purchase airplane tickets to London. They were not allowed to pay in pesetas, but the air ticket office would not accept pounds or dollars, which had to be processed at a branch of the Bank of Spain, twelve kilometers distant. On their first visit to the bank, they did not have their passports; on the second, the windows closed while they were waiting in line; on the third they discovered that entirely different tickets, with different documents, were required for the Paris-London portion of the trip.

Dispatching letters from a village post office is a major undertaking. Three uniformed officials join, with a fourth superintending. One weighs the envelope to the fraction of a gram; another extracts the stamps, in the most unlikely combination of values, from a folder between the leaves of which they are carefully hidden; the third puts the stamps individually on the envelope with a pastebrush. Parcel post, registering, or a money order concentrates all hands on a quarter hour of documentation.

Applications for an import license must be filled out in seventeen copies. Each must be approved by one or another bureau, the officials of which can be seen during their two-hour working day only by appointments made weeks in advance. To get the license takes from six months to a year—by which time the product is probably no longer wanted, or has been bought on the black market.

It is almost impossible for the bureaucracy not to be corrupt. (A general, admiral, or civilian bureaucrat at a comparable level, is paid \$90 a month. An army private gets one peseta—two and a half cents a day.) Unless officials have a private fortune, they cannot live on their salaries. With the lower ranks, it is a question of a five or a fifty peseta note at the graceful moment. The higher orders are cut into contracts and financing, made consultants, advisers, or directors. All foreign-owned businesses have officials—or relatives of officials—somewhere on their payrolls.

What Causes Inefficiency

An authoritarian government always spawns dependent retainers. They buttress the regime. In part, however, the vast number of semi-idle or uselessly occupied government employees in Spain is a consequence of the fact that there are too many people relative to the present intensity of economic activity and development. Inefficiency, like grandiose and never quite finished public works, becomes a method for preventing unemployment. Everything takes three times as long as it would under what we would consider "rational" organization. Laws extend the principle into private business. A regulation here, as in Italy, prohibits an enterprise from discharging workers. There is therefore little economic motive for installing labor-saving machines or methods.

Industrial and administrative inefficiency is not a novelty introduced by the present regime. Spanish inefficiency is traditional, and no doubt related, as I suggested in my last Letter to Spanish romance and charm. I have heard it argued that most Spaniards (in this perhaps showing the Moorish side of their heritage) are lazy, industrially speaking. The profit motive is not enough to overcome their distaste for hard work. When you encounter an inefficient business, with effective organization and modern machines or methods, it usually turns out that non-Spaniards have, or until recently have had, a considerable hand in it: like the great *bodegas* of Domecq (French) and Gonzalez-Byass (British), the telephones (American), utilities (British and Belgian), steel (French), zinc (Belgian), and many of the best hotels and restaurants (including two top Madrid hotels, the Ritz and the Palace, which are Belgian-run, and the top res-

taurant, the Jockey, which is run by Germans).

The Catalonians are the hardest working people in Spain. A Catalonian mason gets 50 pesetas (\$1.25) a day; a mason in Andalusia gets about half that, but the cost of a Catalonian building is lower. It is, indeed, one of the Catalonian complaints that though they work harder, the government taxes them more, and otherwise discriminates against them. It is a fact that the regime, perhaps remembering its supply difficulties when the other side held Barcelona during the Civil War, is moving industries from the Barcelona region (Catalonia) to Madrid, where there are inferior transportation, fuel, power, and natural resources. Such seems always to be the way of a government with an economy. Several years ago the regime, with reservoirs full of water, decided to electrify the railroad from Irun (on the French border) to Madrid, and at the same time to dismantle many of the coal power stations as no longer needed. The first step in electrification was the purchase, with the scarce reserve of foreign exchange, of a batch of splendid electric locomotives. These have ever since been idly rusting. There was no money for the rest of the equipment, a drought set in, the reservoirs dried up, the surplus electricity vanished, and the scheme faded from public notice.

A High Cost Economy

With wages so almost Asiatically small, some outsiders imagine that the Spanish economy must be exceedingly low cost. Actually, as a result of the inefficiency, laziness, poor methods, and bureaucratic overhead, it is in its industrial sector one of the highest cost economies in the world. This can be summarily proved. Though Spain has industries, she is unable to export industrial products competitively. Her exports are confined to primary and handicraft products: oranges, wine, olive oil, pyrites, mercury, rugs, laces. Import duties up to several hundred per cent cannot "protect" her domestic factories from foreign competition. There is a 250 per cent duty on imported automobiles. The Italian firm, Fiat, has a Spanish auxiliary that manufactures cars domestically and thus avoids the tariff. Nevertheless, in spite of the 250 per cent duty and the infinite complications over getting foreign exchange, Italian-built Fiats compete for customers with the Spanish-built.

It is not solely, though, a matter of inefficiency, laziness, bureaucracy, and corruption. The Spaniards, or most Spaniards, are not "economic men." There is no Spanish Adam Smith, no Spanish analogue of a Manchester School. Few technical economic terms are to be found in the Spanish vocabulary. The businessman's idea that an appointment or contract should be met "on time" does not even exist in a Spanish mind, much less trouble a Spanish conscience. Conversation, which seems to be the chief occupation of most Spanish

males, has "business," I gather, near the bottom of its list of topics. American and North European tourists are constantly disturbed by projects and constructions that are "irrational"—i.e., uneconomic: great stone terraces where there are few to walk; vast changes in a road that brings no "improvement"; huge empty buildings standing quite alone; steps that lead nowhere. "Piggy banks" with a little slot into which to drop coins are sold throughout Spain. They are given to Spanish children, who duly drop their coins in. But an interest-bearing savings account is not the destiny of the little accumulation of capital, as our Calvinist morality decrees. The pig is smashed and the money quickly spent when the local fiesta comes round.

The concept of a Europe without Spain is an absurdity. Politically and morally, our accord with Spain is justified, and strategically it is close to a necessity. The chance for mutual good from this new partnership will only be increased if we keep our eyes rather more open than has been our habit in entanglements of the past decade or two. There are fine harbors in Spain, splendid locations for airfields, and almost perfect flying weather. Spain is and will be anti-Communist. Spaniards are very brave; when trained and equipped they are excellent soldiers; throughout their history they have made formidable guerrillas. But Spaniards will forget engagements, and may not fulfill delivery schedules. Plumbing and power will fail, documents will be lost, parts will be missing. Time and the "mutual aid" money may seem to be frittered smilingly away.

This Spanish affair will prove expensive. The scale of operations must in any case be large, in order to count at all. It would be foolish to suppose that a primary politico-military base in the world defense against Soviet imperial aggression could be built at a bargain price. But with Spain most particularly, if the expense is to yield durable results, we shall have to strive toward a rare combination of tact, understanding, and firmness.

The Host

His house is wide and deep and tall
And hushed beyond endeavor,
Where the most generous host of all
Lets you become, forever,
So intimate with his estate
That you shall need no eye
To see the change from soon to late
But stay as close with sky,
With day, with night, with fertile earth,
With river-laden sea
As with the quiet hidden birth
Of an anemone.

WITTER BYNNER

The Myth of "National Income"

By LEWIS H. HANEY

Behind the misleading but widely accepted Gross National Product figures lies a dangerous scheme to undermine private enterprise and give to the state the role of a monopolistic business firm.

The Gross National Product (GNP) purports to be the total value, at current market prices, of all "final goods" produced by a nation's "economy" without any allowance for fixed capital changes or indirect taxes.

In the decade 1936-46 both in this country and Great Britain there sprang up and grew the so-called "national income approach" to economics and statistics. The climax of this development is now found in a mass of figures that make up the so-called "Gross National Product," computed by the U.S. Department of Commerce and widely referred to by businessmen and economists, many of whom have little idea what the figures really mean.

I don't pretend to know how much of a part radicalism and a desire to subvert the American economic and political system have played in building up the Gross National Product scheme. I am sure, however, that research is desirable to find out what subversive infiltration there has been in this operation.

I will show something of the effects of the "national income approach" out of which the GNP concept arose and merely raise the question: Who is responsible for the revolution in the prevalent ideas about economics that began about 1937 in the semantic days of the TNEC (Temporary National Economic Committee)? This revolution now appears in the substitution of government-manipulated aggregates or totals for the realities of particular cases as presented in truly representative medians, modes, margins, and differentials. It consummates two great radical tendencies. One is to deny the productivity of both capital and enterprise, and to assert that only labor is productive. For example, the Department of Commerce now officially sanctions the recognition of "labor and property" as the only two claimants to income, instead of the four "factors of production"—labor, investment, enterprise, and land. The other tendency is to deny the existence of economics as a science that *explains* human action and to turn it into government policy for *controlling* human action.

Presidential adviser A. F. Burns has said (before his advisership) that there is a "dangerous illusion" that Keynes explained how employment is determined and that we now know enough to

enable the state to maintain high employment and income levels *while still keeping our traditional economic system* (26 Rep't., National Bureau of Economic Research, p. 5). This dangerous illusion is largely expressed in the national income approach, with its false show of complete "over-all coverage" of what is called "the economy" and the various "sectors" and "segments" of its regimented whole.

Fantastic Errors

I have three main criticisms of those who have set up the GNP:

1. They are trying to do the impossible, as proved by their own fumbling and admissions. As stated in the Department of Commerce's 1951 edition of *National Income* they admit that they cannot in practice carry out the attempt to distinguish "final" products from intermediary products. They admit that they cannot "impute" incomes objectively. They admit that they cannot cover net capital produced and acquired, over and above replacement, and that they cannot get data on the original cost and the life of capital goods. The basic trouble is that they can't take their "national accounting" approach without treating government as business, and turning economics into a mere accountancy—the "Political Arithmetic" of the Mercantilists. All these facts lead to subterfuge.

Why the attempt?

2. They are not doing well the job of summing up production and income for the nation. Because of bad economics, accounting, and statistics they make bad guesses and misleading analyses. The regularity and size of their errors are fantastic. The cost is large.

Why have they been allowed to continue the attempt year after year?

3. The answer to these questions seems to me to be found *in part* in an ideological slant that is distinctly subversive of well-established American ideals and institutions, both political and economic. The large errors in their estimates and forecasts are covered up by a constantly shifting and growing set of government controls. Is that what they desire? One can be a mathematical economist and reject marginal utility—one can

even be a follower of Keynes, perhaps—without being collectivist or attacking private enterprise and the competitive process. Therefore, I infer that something has been added. Let me illustrate what the ideas underlying GNP and National Income are doing to us.

If consumer spending (including government spending) is to be accepted as the source of “personal income,” it becomes necessary to make people spend. This conclusion rests on the kinematic notion that you *spend* in order to give me *income* which I must *spend* in order to give you the *income* that you *spend* to give me *income*. (No beginning and no end.) Accordingly, we find a much-publicized Harvard economics professor, Sumner H. Schlichter, asserting in the *New York Times* recently that in order to increase spending the government has the “right” to prevent individuals from saving. He says that no government has the right to let consumers pay off their short-term debts in times of unemployment. Since the GNP addicts have to define “saving” so as to include payments on consumer debt, Professor Schlichter virtually tells us that the individual has no right to pay his debts, or, in other words, that the creditor has no right to collect his past-due debts. No government, it seems, has a right to let some citizens reduce their short debts, if other citizens (or they themselves) are unemployed. It follows from this logic that the state has a right to make people spend, because spending is called production, and is assumed to be the source of employment and income.

The “Total Value” Fallacy

Recently two graduate students in my class in Value and Distribution put these questions to me: “Does the proportion of the GNP representing producers’ goods equal the proportion representing consumers’ goods? Aren’t national income statistics a reasonable approximation of the total value [*sic*] produced by our economic system?”

My answers were:

1. The GNP represents nothing but the spending of paper dollars, partly for consumer goods and partly for producer goods, and partly for neither. The figures depend on prices, changes in which cannot possibly be allowed for. The two kinds of spending are never synchronous. By goods, or products, the government statisticians mean anything *purchased* that is *not for resale*; so all sorts of confusion and overlapping are found in the figures. The whole mass of consumer housing is treated as producer goods.

2. There can be no such thing as a “total value.” (To say there is, is exactly like Karl Marx’s attempt to save face for his labor-cost theory of value by saying that he didn’t mean the value of anything in particular!) Economic value is purely relative and cannot be totalized. Anyhow, it is not “our

economic system” that produces; it is our producers. Finally, production in any period could not possibly equal the income in that period. This is true for several reasons, one of which is that considerable “spending” is of “money” that is not earned by production.

The foregoing cases merely illustrate what the GNP, or the “national income approach,” has done to economics.

Government Policy Economics

Students now study “macro-economics” which, ignoring individual choices, deals with *aggregates* as wholes, putting the whole (the nation) before the parts (you and me). This allows no place for individual motives or choices. It deprives us of equilibrium analysis and scientific cause-and-effect reasoning based on an understanding of individual motivation. Students and professors now have “feelings” about totals, instead of thoughts about the parts. The significance of divergences between different but interrelated industries, and between conditions of demand and supply, is lost. The aggregate conceals the meaning of the parts. Two aggregates may be the same, but all the parts may be different (some higher and some lower) and with very different economic effects.

All is in *monetary terms*, with the typically nationalistic assumption that money is a mere credit or claim on “the economy”: no standard of value, nothing but managed currency, necessarily leading to a managed economy. I will add that it is impossible and inconceivable that any index of prices can be used to “deflate” such a conglomerate mass as the GNP so as to make it represent “1939 dollars” or any homogeneity in real goods.

Spending is put in the place of production as the primary economic phenomenon and the starting point in the circle of economic life. The definition of production so as to make it equivalent to sales or spending is consciously or unconsciously calculated to make spending seem to cause and generate income. No place is allowed for voluntary saving except as the mere negative of spending. Such real costs of production as investment risks and business hazards are not considered. Any consideration of business recessions is in terms of underspending (mostly for consumer goods) to be remedied by pump-priming.

Important differences in *time* are ignored or covered up. We are given either a timeless “dynamics” based on Keynes, or an unreal “period analysis” (that assumes a fixed relation between the present and either the past or the future) based perhaps on Hicks. One indication is seen in the fact that the “income” figure used is not the true current income of the given period; it does not include accrued claims on the future or debts of the past, both of which affect the net present position of the income receiver. It allows in-

ventory changes (for unincorporated businesses) not based on prices actually paid, but on hypothetical current prices. The unreality of the national income figures appears in the treatment of fixed capital charges and government taxes on property and sales as "non-income charges" against "value of production."

Accordingly, our students are being taught that *capital*, rather than being the result of saving and investment, is any kind of "property" used to acquire income. In the last analysis, they are fed the idea that capital is an inherited fund of values entirely dependent upon property rights—a "social heritage." It is assumed to be permanent and self-replacing, so that neither costs of saving and reinvestment nor interest is necessary. Of course, since time and the time costs of saving and waiting are ignored, there is no distinction between fixed and circulating capital. (This is the same flaw that destroyed the labor-cost theories of Ricardo and Marx.)

In addition to "contributions" of labor and property made by individuals, government bodies "supply capital resources." So government contributions of food and clothes to individuals in the armed forces, whether at home or abroad, are included both in production and income. This goes with the illogical cross-classification of the parts of the economy into four "sectors": business, consumers, government, and "foreign."

Public Enterprise Glorified

The GNP figures do not undertake to show profits of enterprise as a distinct share, and treat it only as a miscellaneous catch-all of income from all sorts of "property." Accordingly, in the prevalent economics, private *enterprise* is criticized and undermined. Public enterprise is glorified. The function of the enterpriser is stated to be unnecessary or undesirable, and its reward in the form of profits explained away as being the result of luck, monopoly, or predation. Then the state is assumed to solve all problems of organization, direction, allocation of resources, and pricing by means of GNP formulae. This is the essence of collectivism. Certainly it is entirely consistent with Communism.

The whole national income approach is an application of the notion that the state is like a single individual organism, and that government is like a monopolistic business firm. The total or aggregate spending is regarded as the outgo of "the national economy." Since there is assumed to be only the one entity, this spending outgo, called production, is or must be made to be identical with the total income of the economy.

But what about the differences in time between the spending and the consumption?

What about the different effects of spending or income in one "sector" rather than another

(e.g., laborers, farmers, investors, high income taxpayers, or non-income-taxpayers)?

What will be used for "money," say, to settle balances between one time period and another as in the case of debt, saving, and investment?

What will motivate the maximum output of real consumer goods, to say nothing of producer goods?

Where is the all-wise and all-powerful social planner?

Labor's Oppressed Press

By ROBERT BENSON

In the record book of labor's wrangles with management, a tidy slice of disputes is credited to the small (28,000 members) but outspoken American Newspaper Guild. As you run through the history of the union (it is twenty-one this year), you find such head-butting as the violent three-months' strike in 1936 against Hearst's *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, the 1946 stoppage at the *Philadelphia Record* which eventually led to the paper's dissolution, and the steamy, ten-week-long strike of 1950 against the *New York World-Telegram and Sun*. Patently, the Guild learned long before attaining manhood the secrets of being militant in the most combative trade union tradition.

For this reason, the Guild's dealings over the past fifteen years with another type of "management" are paradoxical, to say the least. Even union members themselves find it puzzling that the customarily bare-fisted Newspaper Guild has used the softest of kid gloves in discussing with other unions the working conditions of "labor press" Guildsmen. These men are the editors, reporters, photographers, and others who put out the bi-weekly or monthly papers published by most international unions and many of the larger locals.

The fact of the matter is that these Guild-union talks have been anything but productive in the way unionists understand. The Guild has contracts with just four labor organizations. These agreements are with the United Automobile Workers (C.I.O.), the *C.I.O. News*, the Cleveland and Buffalo C.I.O. Councils.

In addition, the Guild has "policy statements" (much like contracts, their drawback being that they are unilateral statements by "management" which could conceivably be withdrawn at any time) with the Minnesota C.I.O. Council and the Wisconsin C.I.O. Council. Add to this list the "memoranda of understanding" between the Guild's huge New York local and the Seafarers International Union (A.F.L.), Transport Workers Union (C.I.O.), and Local 6 of the Hotel and Club Employees Union (A.F.L.) and you get the complete picture of the extent of formal Guild protection for members of the labor press.

In terms of commercial newspaper standards, many labor press men are clearly underpaid, due to lack of fixed agreement with their "employer." The labor press reporter holds a job that is at best precarious. If he has no contract to give him a measure of job protection, he serves strictly at the whim of elected union officials, and a change in officialdom will almost automatically mean that the new brass will show him the door. To top it off, the labor press field is so specialized that if a reporter is tossed out, he's going to walk a long way before he finds another union newspaper job.

Double Standard of Union Management

All of this seems doubly strange in view of the fact that most unions respect an organization paper as a vital means of communicating between the union front office and a membership that is often sprawling and loosely jointed. And they are quite prepared to pump sizable sums into their publishing operation. One international, for example, budgets 25 per cent of its income for a paper. The 430,000-member International Ladies Garment Workers Union doled out \$346,862.80 during 1952 to keep its three publications running. Other organizations spend a dollar a year per member for a newspaper. But, in the main, their largesse stops just short of providing for the paper's staff the way commercial newsmen in the neighborhood are provided for.

Behind this rather blatant double standard in the union household, there are some revealing glimpses of union mentality.

For one thing, when the Guild goes before a union management to negotiate a contract for labor press employees, it generally faces a barrage of table pounding and rough talk that would do credit to a union caricature of "management."

In several negotiations it has been claimed, by union spokesmen, that newspapermen are *not* labor units, that their role and function is not coverable by union organization, and that they are "idea" workers whose functions cannot be neatly tabulated in a contract as can the duties and remunerations of, say, garment cutters. If any commercial newspaper management made exactly those points, there would be a picket line stretching from here to there, around his plant, in no time.

In fact, newspapermen themselves have made the point that the Guild cannot operate like a union of pipe-fitters—and they have been slapped down. When another union contends the same and makes it stick—for less pay!—that apparently is all right.

Unions have refused to let the Guild have the close glance at the books that contract negotiators often want. This is all right, too. It has caused no strikes nor even very harsh words. If a commercial publisher, of course, desires to maintain such privacy—and with private, as opposed to

union, funds at that—the Guild often has acted sternly and quickly.

Above all this, however, there is an obvious cynicism which has repelled many Guild members. In their idealism, perhaps, they might have felt that unions are, as their pamphlets say, dedicated solely to the betterment of the lot of the worker. The notion that the unions might be, so to speak, simply "in business for themselves" is viewed as a "management" canard.

Yet, by firsthand knowledge, hundreds of Guildsmen all over the nation know that many unions are deliberately forcing substandard conditions in the labor press. The solidarity of the unions and all the other shibboleths sound flat when spoken over that fact. The question is why the Guildsmen, supposedly the best trained observers, the most articulate members of the labor family, have not so far seen fit to do a reporter's real job in letting that fact be known. *Quod licet Dubinski non licet Hearsti*—or in today's idiom, what Dubinsky can get away with is forbidden to Hearst.

THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID

At present we give up certain economic liberties only reluctantly, and consoling ourselves with the pretense that we shall get them back again. It would be better to realize that most of these liberties. . . are, in plain fact, socially pernicious: we have long been actually in danger of elevating the crimes committed against humanity by industrial capitalism into the elements of a social system.

EDWARD HYAMS, *Prophecy of Famine, A Warning and Remedy*, London, 1953

I don't think Harry Dexter White has been convicted; he is dead now and he cannot speak for himself.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, "Meet the Press" television program, April 11, 1954

Faintly Whispered Protest

The informer is infiltrating American life at the national, state, and local level. He invades the privacy of the home, reports on classroom discussion and library accessions, and summons his colleagues to challenge the sanctity of the church. He is a man of the shadows, born of fear and contributing to it. . . the whisper has entered American life for the first time. A people unafraid, heretofore ready to speak its mind boldly, a proud people is becoming a silent people. The American is holding his tongue.

BISHOP G. BROMLEY OXNAM, Foreword to his book *I Protest*, 1954

Sweden: The *Wrong* Way

By PATRICK E. NIEBURG

Thirty years of socialization have given the Swedes a welfare state. The result—increasing emigration, economic passivity, and no hope for the future.

With its thirty years of almost uninterrupted Social Democratic control, Sweden is heralded by many of our public opinion makers as the perfect example of the virtues of state paternalism. Sweden, they claim, has one of the highest standards of living in the world. Which is true. Sweden, they sigh, did it all with social benefits and state control. Which also is true.

What they fail to say or notice is that Sweden today is a country without a future. As a social experiment it may be an example of beehive excellence unequalled anywhere. As a place to live it is a failure—for anyone interested, that is, in anything more than beehive security. It is a country without incentive, without hope, and without initiative. Its own social statistics, so praised by the Marquis Childses and others here, prove all these points.

For one thing, a rising stream of emigrants, numbering 15,000 in 1952, shows that enterprising people demand more than economic security. They want opportunity. They cannot get it in Sweden today.

An astute mid-Western congressman, recently returned from Scandinavia, summed up his impressions on Sweden when he said with a shrug of his shoulder, "It is well kept." This is a perfect summary. Sweden simply is uninspiring. It is politically and intellectually passive, economically inactive. Sometimes these factors play against each other, sometimes they join forces. The outcome, however, seems to remain the same. It is the maintenance of a political status quo that is expressed in a domestic policy of Social Democracy, a foreign policy of neutrality. An equivalent economic status quo is kept up by the government's preoccupation with the volume of the national product, which must be large enough to support a social welfare program (and its administration) that consumes 30 per cent of the national budget.

Sweden's traditional neutrality, which represents a deep-rooted national sentiment, is a good example of its political passiveness. A high-ranking Swedish diplomat once explained it in these words: "We do not make foreign policy. We let others make it and then try to stay out of trouble."

It is hard to deny the underlying realism of this statement, which recognizes the fact that we live in a time of big-power politics. However, the motive behind such reasoning is revealing. It appears in

the reasons Swedes give for why their country should not join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This is their argument: it is not worth Sweden's while to jeopardize her neutrality and possibly her trade for the sake of some military aid. The responsibilities would outweigh the advantages. Should Sweden be attacked, NATO must come to her assistance anyway because it cannot afford to leave its northern flank exposed.

Neutrality for Economic Gains

Neutrality, therefore, is Sweden's way to attain security without assuming responsibility. It is the "business as usual" attitude in Sweden's conduct of foreign affairs which is also demonstrated in her national budget. For the 1953-54 calendar year it provides over two hundred million crowns (close to forty million dollars) more for social welfare than for defense. Neutrality in Sweden is not really a political conviction, but a diplomatic means for economic gains that help to finance the welfare state.

Since foreign policy in Sweden is actually more an instrument with which to promote the domestic social welfare program than a means of conducting international relations, the stress on economics is hardly surprising. The interrelationship between these two factors was amply demonstrated shortly after the war in what even Social Democrats today consider a major blunder, the five-year credit and trade agreement with the Soviet Union.

In the fall of 1946 when the postwar world was still depleted of consumers' goods but was slowly reconverting to peacetime production, Sweden got its first competition jitters. Counting on stiff foreign competition, propelled by what Swedes considered "cheap labor," the Social Democratic government was deeply disturbed about the future. What would happen to full employment, support of the social welfare program, and high wages? It took but little prodding by the U.S.S.R. to convince worried Social Democratic economists that the vast Soviet market was the answer to their prayers. Eager for Swedish products, the Soviet Union could by its trade guarantee Swedish workers full employment for years to come.

There was, however, one hitch—the war-damaged U.S.S.R. was unable to pay. Sweden removed this obstacle by granting the Soviet Union a billion

crowns credit, at favorable terms. No interest for the first three years, and 3 per cent for the remaining two years. The volume of this credit can be properly appreciated only if it is compared, for example, with the 1953-54 budget, which amounts to 8.2 billion crowns. It is worth mentioning that this agreement was signed at a time when traditional, many of them hard currency markets were offering substantial opportunities to Swedish manufacturers and traders.

The continued presence of the Soviet Ambassador during the parliamentary debate preceding ratification of the agreement may have expedited the actual signing of the accord. The driving force, however, was the powerful Lands Organization (federation of trade unions) without whose consent the government does not enact any legislation nor sign treaties which may affect their members. Management, too, was on the whole favorably disposed to the accord, joining in what can only be described as economic opportunism. With the government financing and guaranteeing Soviet orders, many of management's credit worries were eliminated and its risks reduced. Besides, the Soviet trade required a minimum of sales effort and expense. Probably the determining factor was the government's tight control over foreign exchange. Swedish corporations had little incentive to sell in foreign markets when the foreign exchange they earned could neither be used for imports directly beneficial to their company nor for reinvestment.

Imports Are Essential

Though the Swedo-Soviet agreement has expired, and currency regulations are somewhat liberalized, the problem of creating an atmosphere stimulating to exports has not been solved. This is borne out by the fact that the percentage of exports of the gross national product shows a downward trend although the monetary value has increased. As a result, Sweden's domestic market today is better supplied, and prices are fairly stable. Since domestic consumption continues to increase steadily, Sweden seems like the perfect picture of a prosperous, contented country. Unfortunately, it is not self-sufficient. It depends upon imports of such vital raw materials as coal, oil, and nonferrous metals. This does not take into consideration the import of semi-luxury and luxury goods which a Socialist government considers quasi-essential for the maintenance of a high standard of living. This situation is reflected in Sweden's foreign trade balance, which since 1938 only once showed a surplus, in 1951 when exports amounted to 24 per cent of the gross national product.

The attitude of Swedish business, which seems to give preference to short-term gains at the expense of long-term losses, is not due to recklessness or shortsightedness. In fact, most Swedish businessmen, though they still prefer high unit

profits to turnover profits, are quite conservative. Their attitude today can be traced to a business climate essentially unfavorable to initiative and expansion. Thus, despite the difficulties imposed by the government against capital formation, their primary concern is for consolidation of profits. "Take it while you can; the future is uncertain."

To back up their argument Swedish businessmen point out that individual income is taxed up to 80 per cent, while the average taxation on corporate profits amounts to 47 per cent. In addition, Swedish tax laws do not favor corporations in their calculation of net profits. Deductions for operating expenses and depreciation on plant and equipment are some of the hottest points of debate between government and business.

Taxation Destroys Incentive

"Double taxation," at the individual stockholder level (as income) and at the corporate level, further reduce incentives and accentuate the need for consolidation of profits. With taxation at a high rate, the profit incentive is small, and risk capital short in supply. Many corporations therefore have to finance modernization or replacements (not expansion) out of profits.

To "beat" taxes is not only the problem of the businessman. Wage-earners as well are constantly looking for ways and means to ease their tax burden. There is little they can do about automatic tax deductions. One thing is certain—the number of workers willing to work overtime is constantly dwindling, because the government would tax about half of the extra pay they would receive.

Sweden's system of social benefits plays an even more important part in reducing individual initiative. The government provides the average citizen with a lavish "minimum" that makes him practically emergency-proof. His children's education is paid for. Health insurance not only takes care of all of his medical expenses but also provides him with a per diem compensation in proportion to his earnings. Little wonder there is a high percentage of absenteeism. Some workers actually make more by spending a week at the hospital than by working. Unemployment and old-age benefits take care of other contingencies.

There are, in fact, few benefits the paternalistic government has not thought of, or does not try to improve on. Duplication of effort is not infrequently the result. The compulsory health insurance introduced fairly recently is typical. The majority of Swedes already belonged to a government-subsidized insurance plan based on voluntary participation. The new insurance did nothing further for them except remove the voluntary aspect.

The majority of Swedes seem well satisfied with these many benefits. On the other hand, there are few people who do not complain about the excessively high cost of this social welfare which

is financed by deductions from their pay checks.

Quickly diminishing returns on extra effort and initiative not only tend to reduce personal, but also corporate activity and competition. For example, in every Swedish city a certain number of pharmacies keep open nights and holidays. Like most good pharmacies they carry extensive lines of medical supplies, toilet articles, and household goods. However, they are forbidden by law to sell anything but emergency prescriptions after 6:00 P.M., to avoid unfair competition. Many trade and professional associations in Sweden favor this kind of law. Though their members are unwilling to exert extra effort to expand their businesses (it would not pay), they do not want to lose a sale to a competitor. The government is in complete accord with this attitude and will grant only as many business licenses as a community can comfortably support without creating serious competition. The government's interest in this is obviously in taxes. Revenues from one prosperous business frequently exceed those of several operating on a narrow margin of profit. The result of this policy is the creation of local, regional, or industry-wide monopolies. There is little room and less opportunity for enterprise when the government itself not only operates monopolies (tobacco and liquor) but encourages them in private trade and industry.

The Plight of Small Business

Caught especially in the squeeze of government favoritism and the high cost of the social security program is the small or medium-sized private company. The owner of a small machine shop in southern Stockholm complained, for example, that while his company barely met expenses during the last year, he still had to pay his company's share to various social funds. To meet these high costs and operate on a profit, he would need credits to modernize his shop. However, the current Swedish bank regulations create almost insurmountable obstacles for a small business trying to obtain credits. The alternative is ultimate liquidation of the business.

The Swedish government does not bemoan the plight of small business which for lack of risk capital is dependent upon government credits. It prefers to grant financial aid to the large, more profitable corporations it can control through its credit and investment policy. Though official statistics admit only to 5 per cent public (government) ownership of industrial securities, this figure is quite misleading. In many cases the government owns controlling interests in important "private" corporations. In the iron mining industry, for instance, the government has a 38 per cent interest, though this figure may be substantially higher for individual corporations.

Should the time come when the Social Democratic

government decides to live up to the letter of its political doctrine and nationalize the "tools of production," it could easily do so simply by calling in all outstanding industrial obligations in its possession. This would put the government in the favorable position of having to operate only a limited number of highly efficient, large enterprises instead of a multitude of small ones. It would also be a death blow to private enterprise and mean the destruction of economic democracy. Though the government is unlikely to go to this extreme in the near future, Swedes are kept mindful of this threat by increasing paternalistic encroachment on their individual liberties.

Successful Swedes realize their country is living on borrowed time. This explains the stream of emigrants and the many attempts to take capital out of the country. They know that their country is tied down by a state welfare system which offers prosperity today, but no hope for a brighter tomorrow. That is why Sweden is Europe's poor little rich girl. It has achieved a standard of living, for the moment, that many other countries dream of, but it has lost the greatest stimulus for future progress: opportunity.

Eastward, Ho!

Sir Winston Churchill has suggested the establishment of links with the Soviet Union through which the Russians and their government would be convinced that England wishes them happiness and prosperity. Sir Winston ought to know by this time that the greater the happiness and prosperity of the Soviet government, the greater the misery and poverty of the Russian people. Nothing would please the Russian people more than a complete break with the Kremlin dictators.

We are surprised that Jawaharlal Nehru has not yet offered India's good offices to settle the McCarthy-Stevens war.

England and France have turned down our proposals for united action against Communist aggression in southeastern Asia, in order to save their tottering colonial empires. They think that the United States can go it alone and, to judge by America's experiences in the Korean war and elsewhere, they are right.

The famous question of who is taking care of the caretaker's daughter while the caretaker is busy taking care is not an academic one in the Soviet Union. With so many officers of the secret police defecting to the West, the Soviet government was compelled to organize a new ministry to watch over the secret police that watches over those who watch the people.

ARGUS

A Second Look

By EUGENE LYONS

The Oppenheimer Tragedy

A panel of honorable men is at this writing examining the case of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. Whatever its verdict we shall be no closer to a satisfying answer to the mystery at the core of this sad affair. The panel, I mean, cannot read the riddle of our troubled times: why so many intelligent and sensitive men have been so easily taken in by the lies and trickeries of the gory gang in the Kremlin.

The most disturbing fact has already been established. It has been spelled out by Oppenheimer himself. I refer to the fact that a faraway despotism, ruthless and cunning and utterly alien to American life and thought, was able to reach across half the globe to entrap the heart and befuddle the mind of a good and brilliant young American.

Whether technically cleared or not, Oppenheimer remains a figure of pathos, arousing the fellow-feeling of unvindictive men. His genius has been sullied, his very common sense opened to doubt, by an aberration to which intellectuals in all non-Soviet lands have been subject for two or three decades. The pathos is raised to tragedy by the knowledge that he was led astray through his better rather than his worse nature—by a sudden passion for justice that blinded him to the systematized injustice of Communism in practice.

It is necessary, of course, to assess the degree of an Oppenheimer's Red entanglements, to ascertain how far his addiction to Moscow causes and associations carried him. It must be determined whether his admitted failure to grasp the nature of the evil with which he trafficked made him an accomplice—unwittingly, trustingly, perhaps—of the Soviet agents assigned to prey on projects with which he was connected. This must be done for the safety of our community. But the impulse to punish and avenge does not, or at least should not, enter into such an assessment.

In a deeper sense, as he seems aware, Oppenheimer has been the victim, one of myriad victims, of a monumental fraud perpetrated by the Kremlin through its stooges in our midst. Our country suffers a vital loss every time another Oppenheimer, for whatever reasons, succumbs to Communist deceptions.

The most intriguing documents thus far produced in the Oppenheimer case are the two letters written in June 1949 by Dr. Edward U. Condon, then director of the U.S. Bureau of Standards and himself widely regarded as a security risk. One was

addressed to his wife, the other, a few days later, to Oppenheimer.

Though written in guarded language, they reflect intense agitation and fear. Mrs. Condon is instructed to "conceal" the letter "very carefully" to keep it from falling into the hands of the FBI. Condon had just learned that Oppenheimer gave testimony at a closed session of the House Un-American Activities Committee about the atomic scientist Dr. Bernard Peters, whom he identified as a Communist, and about others. The news had him thoroughly alarmed.


There is a conspiratorial aura about the letters. They convey that one of a close-knit clique has talked out of school; that Condon is profoundly worried by what this "informer" had already disclosed, terrified by what he might yet disclose.

Has he gone crazy, Condon asks Oppenheimer. To his wife he is more explicit: "I am convinced that Robert Oppenheimer is losing his mind. . . . It appears he is trying to buy personal immunity by turning informer . . . against his close personal friends and even his own brother. . . . If he cracks up it will certainly be a great tragedy. I only hope he does not drag down many others with him."

The implications of this hysteria are startling. Here is one trusted American official frantic because another seems to be cooperating with the government in matters affecting the survival of the nation. Such cooperation, in Condon's view, makes the culprit an "informer," an insane informer. What group assumption, if not actual agreement, has Oppenheimer violated? Clearly Condon thinks or knows that "Oppie" knows things deeply damaging to his friends, so much so that his "crack-up" (a transparent euphemism for defection from some common loyalty) may "drag down many others." That all of them have plenty to "inform" upon if they turn "informer" is implicit in every line of those letters. Oppenheimer exclaimed to Peters, according to Condon: "God guided their questions"—the reference is to Congressional interrogators—"so that I did not say anything derogatory." Again the implication that he possessed damaging information about his friends and associates, but was providentially spared the need to disclose it!

The letter to Mrs. Condon especially has all the earmarks of skulduggery. She is ordered to show the letter immediately to "Martin and Izzy" (Martin Agronsky and I. F. Stone, according to Walter Winchell) but to no other radio or news men. And at the end there is a cryptic caution: "Let me know by wire if you have not received this letter by Sunday"—a statement so senseless that it must presumably mean something quite different from what it says.

Only Dr. Condon himself can throw light on these strange, guilt-conscious missives. He should be required to do so quickly under oath.



Showing Up Semantics

By MAX EASTMAN

Stuart Chase has written another of those glib and facile books about "semantics"—a subject that needs deflation rather than ballyhoo (*Power of Words*, by Stuart Chase in collaboration with Marian Tyler Chase, 308 pp., Harcourt, Brace and Company, \$3.95). It has been said that every great historic event occurs twice, once as serious drama and once again as farce. Karl Marx quoted it in comparing the regime of Louis Napoleon with that of Napoleon Bonaparte. It applies even more exactly to this modern fad of "semantics" as compared to the introduction by Socrates of the art of general definition, and its hundred-year development culminating in Aristotle's formulation of the laws of logic.

We owe the fad mainly to a certain Count Korzybski, a Polish aristocrat, who arrived in New York thirty-odd years ago with the news that he was a great mathematician and revolutionary deep thinker who had solved the problem of man and his place in the universe with a book called *The Manhood of Humanity*. I was editing a radical magazine at the time, and he thought I was a natural first step toward putting himself over on the Greenwich Village intelligentsia. Accordingly he came down with an introduction from Professor Kayser of Columbia, a brilliant teacher of mathematics, but more imaginative than judicious in matters unrelated to number. We had dinner and spent an evening together. He was an elderly count with a minute fringe of white hair on a polished bald head, a kindly eye, and so genial and affable a way of explaining that his was the greatest mind since Aristotle that you listened patiently for quite a while. I did suspect before the evening was over that he was either a charlatan or an overgrown schoolboy with a swelled head. But it was not until I read the book he left with me that I was convinced of it.

His book—still a classic to the devotees of "general semantics"—pretends to apply the methods of engineering to the problems of human welfare, but really applies the methods of medieval theology. It labors, in the manner of the most admirable of scholastics, to define "the essence of man," and from that deduce the whole science and art of life and politics. The essence of man—as opposed to the plant, whose "essence" is to transform solar energy into organic chemical energy, and the animal whose "essence" is to "move about in space"—the "essence" of man is that he is able to remember

and record his past experiences. Man is, in short, "in the universal tongue of mathematics and mechanics" a "time-binder."

There is, of course, no "essence of man," and has not been since the days of Francis Bacon, but that phrase and that antique conception is about all there is to *The Mankind of Humanity* except such pompous grandiosities as this:

It must be obvious to anyone that time-binding is the only natural criterion and standard for the time-binding class of life. This mighty term—time-binding—when comprehended, will be found to embrace the whole of the natural laws, the natural economics, the natural governance, to be brought into the education of time-binders; then really peaceful and progressive civilization, without periodical collapses and violent readjustments, will commence; not before.

That a man of Stuart Chase's nimble intelligence should speak respectfully of such a line of talk is to me simply astounding. But I am still more astounded at his falling for the "refutation" of Aristotle's logic to be found in Korzybski's second book called *Science and Sanity*. It took Korzybski "ten years of intensive work" to write this "magnum opus," Stuart tells us, and it took Stuart Chase "two years of reasonably steady application" to read it. I think it will take the reader about two minutes of steady application to see how phoney it is.

Aristotle's logic is an exposition of the forms of rational discourse, and it rests at bottom on three laws:

The law of identity: A is A.

The law of the excluded middle: Everything is either A or not A.

The law of contradiction: Nothing is both A and not A.

For these obvious but important principles of rationality Korzybski—and Stuart Chase—propose to substitute a "multivalued logic" according to which A can be both A and not A. And they base this proposal on a misunderstanding of what the three laws mean that would get them a "D" in a Freshman logic class, and send them back over the subject for another year.

"The law of identity works all right with words in our heads," says Chase, "but for events outside our heads like Korzybski's apple, it does not work without extensive qualifications." Korzybski having demonstrated the profound and revolutionary

truth that one apple is not the same as another, this is supposed to give poor Aristotle the *coup de grace*. "Apple₁ is not the same as apple₂," say Stuart and Marian Chase, and *exit* Aristotle!

Now it happens that Aristotle's logic has to do exclusively with words in our heads, and how they must behave if our discourse is to be rational. It has not a thing to say about events outside our heads. Aristotle was as well aware as Chase or Korzybski that no two apples are the same. But he was also aware of what seems to have escaped them, that if you are going to use the word *apple* in an argument, it must not change into *not-apple* while you are talking. This is so obvious that we may wonder—until we see how much it entails—why Aristotle saw fit to mention it at all. But that it is irrefutably and unescapably true, no sound mind, understanding it, can deny.

Having completely failed to understand this, Chase tosses out the remark that "Aristotle's second and third laws are full of mantraps. Take, for instance, the distinction between plants and animals—A and not-A."

Now when you are teaching a class in logic, one of the tricks you pull to see if your pupils have any idea at all what logic is about is to get them to identify Aristotle's terms, A and not-A, with the distinction between two contrasted classes of things such as "plants and animals," "salt and pepper," "men and women." Applied to the term *plant*, Aristotle's distinction would not be between *plant* and *animal*, but between "plant" and everything in the world or out of it that is "not plant." After explaining this to your class, you tell them to take their books home tonight and see if they can find out by tomorrow what formal logic is about.

Having made this second egregious boner, Chase proceeds to illustrate his "multivalued logic" by reminding us of "a little organism called euglena, which in abundant sunlight behaves like a 'plant,'" but "when the sunlight disappears . . . digests carbohydrate like an 'animal.'" "Euglena is thus either a 'plant' or an animal, depending on the time of day," he says. And he further illustrates Aristotle's out-of-dateness with the fact that "in 1953 the newspapers made much of an attractive young woman who was recently a man. The person has been both a 'man' and a 'woman,' thus refuting the law of contradiction."

It happens that Aristotle was more keenly concerned than Chase or Korzybski about the fact that one thing changes into another. Indeed this fact, and the question *how* it can happen, was the principal preoccupation of all the early Greek philosophers, and of Aristotle, the biologist, more even than the earlier ones. But Aristotle was also aware—and the reader will be, if he gives a moment's attention to the matter—that you cannot make the remark that one thing changes into

another, unless the terms in which you make it, including the term "change," retain their identities throughout. Try to say that euglena is "either a plant or an animal" and mean anything by it, when according to your logic the term *plant* means plant-or-animal and the term *animal* means animal-or-plant. Try to say that anything changes into something else, when by the word *changes* you also mean *does not change*. You will see how phoney is this "refutation" of Aristotle's logic, and I am sure it will not take you two minutes of "rather steady application" to do it.

All this is so elementary that I am embarrassed to have to teach it to Stuart Chase, an esteemed friend who, besides frequently beating me at tennis, has done some lucid and excellent writing in his own field of social science. But the simple and very important fact is that his book is full of hooley, and that he is talking about a subject about which he does not know enough to talk. His two years of "rather steady application to Korzybski" have muddled him up to the point where he scrambles together in one omelet Ogden and Richards' stridently intellectualistic account of scientific truth in *The Meaning of Meaning* with Bridgman's "operational logic," which stands at the opposite pole of the epistemological horizon.

There is, alas, an even more painful criticism to make of *The Power of Words*. One admirable thing about most semantickers is the earnest and genuine effort they make to escape from prejudiced emotionalism and learn to use words with regard only to their objective reference. The rules for doing this which the Chases profess to have discovered in Korzybski seem to me, I must say, childishly obvious. No one seriously in search of the truth would, except through inadvertence, ignore them. But one expects the authors to illustrate them with some instructive examples of resistance to prejudice, some exercise in the nonemotive employment of the Power of Words. Instead, we find the very idea of this supposedly new form of mental self-discipline employed to put over on the reader as recklessly prejudiced a line of political talk about contemporary problems as could be dug up from the trashiest partisan newspaper columns.

In a chapter called "Guilt by Association," the notion of this "semantic" discipline becomes a weapon with which to slander and misrepresent all congressional committees investigating the Communist conspiracy in a manner that could not be outdone by the Communists themselves. Here are a few examples:

U. S. congressional committees have been pasting the label "Communist Sympathizer" on many loyal Americans. . . Korzybski would have us tear off the labels and look at the real person.

The charges. . . by legislative committees could *usually* (italics added) be reduced to a simple but fallacious syllogism. . . thus:

Adam, believes in free public schools.

American Communists quote the Communist Manifesto, which demands free public schools.

Therefore Adam, is a Communist.

In another gross semantic distortion, the modern inquisitors [he is still talking about all congressional investigators] are careful not to date their accusations, but assume "once a subversive, always a subversive."

The investigating committees take off in a kind of daisy chain of guilt by association. . . The investigators attack: (1) Any member of the Communist Party today. . . (2) Any former member of the Party. . . (3) Any fellow traveler at any time. . . (4) Any Marxist at any time. . . (5) Any Socialist. . . (6) Any New Dealer. . . (7) Any liberal or any reformer. . . (8) Any advocate of racial and religious tolerance. . . (9) Any supporter of the United Nations. . . (10) Anyone with reservations about the omniscience. . . of Chiang Kai-shek . . . (11) Any American rash enough to have ideas—about education, crime, slums, diet, housing, health. He is probably guilty of "Communist type thinking."

This, mind you, in a book advocating the meticulously controlled and objectively valid employment of the Power of Words. In my judgment the power of words has rarely been employed more amateurishly, more confusingly, or with more irresponsible prejudice than in this book. It may serve, at least, as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the sophomoric pretenses of "general semantics."

Friend, Then Foe

The Myth of the Good and Bad Nations, by René Wormser. 180 pp. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. \$3.00

One of the reconstruction jobs that has to be done after every great war is to clear away the thick debris of propagandist myths. We had our full share of these after the First World War. By the time we had dug ourselves out of these, with the help of patient scholars like Professor Sidney B. Fay and satirical journalists like Walter Millis, a new crop developed with a new war.

What may be called the master myth is that there are intrinsically good and bad nations, that any people which may be allied with us for the time being is an angel of light and any country with which we are at war is a demon of darkness. Americans are more susceptible to this primitive and oversimplified point of view, because they lack Europeans' long experience of shifting alliances, in which the ally of today is the enemy of tomorrow, and vice versa.

To be sure, the American experience since we entered the great game of international politics by taking sides in the First World War has been fairly extensive and should have been instructive. The Japanese and Italians, our associates in the First World War, were our enemies in the Second. Russia's role, from America's standpoint, was

bewildering in both wars. Tsarist Russia was supposed to be one of the forces of light in the First World War; and the ideological situation seemed to be clearer when a democratic regime succeeded Tsarism in March 1917. But then came the Bolshevik Revolution, followed by the withdrawal of Russia from the war and the declaration of an implacable revolutionary class war throughout the world by its new rulers.

The Soviet Union was successively a conniving accomplice of Hitler in the partition of Poland and eastern Europe, an associate in the Second World War, and a formidable enemy in the cold war.

Germany was an enemy in both wars. But the Federal Republic of Germany today is potentially the strongest and most reliable anti-Communist power on the continent of Europe. Great Britain and France were counted on our side in two wars. But Great Britain has not been going our way in the Far East. And there is little harmony in American and French views about the necessity of German rearmament.

Still the myth of good and bad nations persists, and Mr. Wormser's demolition job is as needed as it is vigorous and logical. His thesis is stated as follows:

There are evil governments and evil leaders. There are no evil peoples, no evil nations. Nor can we afford to be led astray by the concept that any government has the essential and changeless quality of goodness.

The author cuts through a jungle of myth, cliché, prejudice, and misrepresentation to get at some forgotten historical facts. He recalls, and this would probably be news to nine out of ten educated Americans, that France declared war on Prussia in 1870, not the other way around. He reminds us that, as regards the outbreak of the First World War, no government was either altogether guilty or altogether guiltless.

He puts the Treaty of Versailles under a searching microscope and exposes it for what it was: a piece of cruelty, hypocrisy, and vindictiveness. This treaty set a disastrous precedent, carried still farther after the Second World War, of confiscating the private property of enemy nations. That America fell in with this practice, especially after the Second World War, was stupid as well as immoral. For of all countries the United States, with its far-flung foreign investments, has a strong interest in maintaining the long established principle of inviolability of private property.

This is a small book in size, unencumbered by footnotes and the apparatus of technical scholarship. But the author's grasp of facts is sure; and he possesses the gift of expressing a good deal in a few words.

Not content with criticizing myths, the author proposes some positive steps in foreign policy. He would make Germany an armed ally and com-

mit the United States to use all means short of war to bring about the restoration of ethnic German territory that has been seized. He would follow a similar policy in regard to Japan and restore Trieste and its hinterland to Italy. He would arm the Chinese Nationalists and give them every opportunity "to promote uprisings and revolutionary movements on the mainland."

He is skeptical about the United Nations, "a millstone around our neck," and, in line with his view that there are no inherently "good" or "bad" nations, he takes the position that allies are as allies do. These ideas are calculated to excite flutters of indignation among our genteel anti-anti-Communists. And the following blunt formulation of America's present situation will no doubt send shivers down the backs of Acheson holdovers in the State Department:

World Communism is intent on our destruction. Whoever doubts that wears blinders. Let us then focus our attention on the destruction of world Communism.

But to many Americans who have been confused and frustrated about our lackadaisical methods of fighting the cold war, Mr. Wormser's strategy is apt to have a considerable appeal.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

Hurried History

The Founding Fathers, by Nathan Schachner. 630 pp. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. \$6.00

This volume, by the distinguished biographer of Aaron Burr, Alexander Hamilton, and Thomas Jefferson, is a political and diplomatic history of the United States during the administrations of George Washington and John Adams. It is also a tract for the times. Today, more than ever, Mr. Schachner tells us, the Federalist period merits study and understanding: "For once again the United States is groping its way in hitherto uncharted seas, and amazing parallels may be traced between the two eras."

Successful in many ways, this book fails in one important point. It is not written, so to speak, "from the inside." The author gives no impression of knowing the Founding Fathers. He treats them, rather, as if they were modern politicians born out of time. And, slightly misunderstanding the men of whom he writes, he has slightly misunderstood the institutions they created or developed.

The lack of intimacy between this historian and his characters may be attributed to a number of causes. First, in collecting the ideas of the speakers in Congress, he has made no sifting examination of the reports of the several shorthand writers and note-takers who attended the debates. Instead, he has blindly relied on the

accuracy of the *Annals of Congress*, a wretchedly edited selection of debates compiled from defective and desultory materials in the middle of the nineteenth century by editors of no great critical acumen.

Second, he has completely misunderstood the nature of the debates which took place in the House of Representatives when that body was resolved into a Committee of the Whole. Imagining that upon these occasions the doors of the House were closed and the proceedings conducted in secret, he concludes that the members spoke more freely then than at other times. But in point of fact the Committee of the Whole sat with open doors; its proceedings and debates were reported in the press; the members spoke for the galleries and the public papers just as much as in the House itself.

Third, Mr. Schachner has written his book in a hurry. Many of his inferences are grounded upon a miscomprehension of the facts. For example, he suggests that Jay upon one occasion forgot "in his wrath" that the Constitution has given the Senate a check upon the President's appointive power; however, the question to which Jay was addressing himself was not the Senate's right to reject a nomination but its right to forbid a diplomatic mission. Again, he puts Madison in a false light by telling us how in 1801 he proposed "that Jefferson and Burr issue a joint proclamation calling the newly elected Congress into session and have it decide the election instead of the old Congress." Madison, however, was recommending a course of action to be followed, not immediately, but only if the old Congress were to expire on March 4 without coming to a choice.

Carelessness, indeed, is the leading defect of this book. We are told, for example, that in 1800 Burr proposed that the New York and New Jersey election laws be changed "so as to have the presidential electors chosen by the joint vote of the forthcoming legislature and not, as previously, by the ballots of the people." In neither State had the electors ever been chosen by the people. In discussing the refusal of the judges to execute the Pension Act of 1792, Mr. Schachner has mistaken the representation of the Pennsylvania Circuit Court to the President for a decision of the Supreme Court, which in turn he has confused with the New York Circuit Court. By making Abraham Baldwin a representative from Connecticut instead of Georgia, he has completely misunderstood one of his speeches on the slave trade. He has even—by mistake—aspersed the character of a woman. Confusing Madame de Villette, "the beautiful and good," with her mother-in-law, a lady of irregular habits, he refers to her as the reputed mistress of Voltaire. A careful writer, in this last case, might have caught his error by reflecting that Voltaire was sixty-three years old when Madame de Villette was born.

We must conclude, then, that this book is something of a potboiler. A modern reader may enjoy it; a scholar may learn much from it; but no one should delude himself with the notion that here is the last word on that period of our history which lies between the years 1789 and 1801.

LUCIUS WILMERDING, JR.

The Enslaving Sixteenth

The Income Tax: Root of All Evil, by Frank Chodorov. 116 pp. New York: Devin-Adair Company. \$2.00

In the disorderly debates about a score of mortal wounds from which our society suffers we seem to have lost all interest in certain fundamental ideas. This Republic is organized around a great fundamental idea—that the sole aim of government is to protect the citizen in his right to freedom. This protection can be defined and enforced only by an apparatus of power called government. But government must be entrusted by the citizens to their agents, known as the Administration. And the great concern of the constitution-maker must be to control the Administration. The greater the power entrusted to the Administration, the greater the danger that the Administration will use that power not to protect the liberties of the people, but to exploit and ultimately abuse and enslave them.

That problem was solved in America by a Constitution which broke up the apparatus of government power into a number of separate engines, each entrusted to a different set of officials. This was the federal system, with its forty-eight state governments and a central government equipped with greatly limited power.

The great and tragic betrayal of our time is to be found in two crimes against the people. One was the Sixteenth Amendment, which gave the federal government total power over the income of the people. The other was the packing of the Supreme Court to alter the Constitution by what George Washington called judicial usurpation, to give Congress almost total power over the lives and fortunes of the people. These betrayals constitute the revolution of our time. Will it be possible to effect a counter-revolution? This great task must be accomplished by a repudiation of the lawless Supreme Court and by the repeal of the Sixteenth Amendment.

Now Frank Chodorov, in that clear and limpid prose which he can use so well, has provided us with a powerful document on one of these evils—the income tax. His small volume (only a little over 100 pages) provides a reasoned and powerful brief for the repeal of the Sixteenth Amendment—the amendment which put into the hands of the politicians in Washington the means of financing that

fantastic travesty on free government that has disgraced this nation for the last twenty-two years. Much of the book will astonish some of our younger students, most of whom, these last two decades, have been told very little about the great American experiment and who, for that matter, have never lived in the Republic as planned and constructed by our fathers. Mr. Chodorov's thesis is that the task of reconstructing the Republic ought to begin with the repeal of the Sixteenth Amendment and that this can be achieved if the governors of the states, as the champions of their own sovereignties, will take the leadership.

JOHN T. FLYNN

A Proud Past

The Real Americans, by A. Hyatt Verrill. 309 pp. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. \$5.00

In the rush of our schools to teach young people the glory of Rome, the pomp of Europe, and the incursions of the Tatar tribes, there has been a marked and regrettable inattention to this country's own outstanding claim to an early history: the *civilization* of the American Indian.

These "savages" it was who were able to evolve some of the most precise and honest language forms ever known; whose societies were notable for balance, individual justice, and freedom; whose arts, although practiced only sectionally, still are broadly attractive; whose fierce determination to resist the conquest of their lands led to intertribal diplomatic maneuverings and decisions of genuine and memorable stature; whose warfare even included the concept of communicating trenches, and one whose members could accomplish, as did George Gist, the astounding intellectual feat of creating an original alphabet where none had existed before.

Now, in this book, there is a good beginning toward remedying, with fact, the years of neglect upon which this subject has fallen. Verrill, a sound anthropological observer who previously has written of other early civilizations in this hemisphere, knows North American Indian ways and history, in part, from having lived with them. He knows the rest by earnest study. His book is a pleasant, not profound, combination. For every cheapjack, inaccurate Hollywood presentation of "the Real Americans," it earnestly is to be hoped that many copies of this book will be read.

There is an abiding danger, however, in this sort of a popular study. Some readers may be inclined to view the Indians of today romantically as mere shadow projections of the Indians of the past. The attitude of "aren't they quaint?" is one particularly suited to killing the pride, hope, and future of today's Indian citizens.

Equally inexcusable, however, is the attitude of ignorance so widespread in our country as to the Indian past. Verrill's book, which wisely does not attempt to be a mere popularization of such recent scientific work as Swanton's massive tribal listing, is just the sort of general introduction needed to that past. It is a fine step forward in removing the proud light of Indian history from the academic bushel under which so much of the vibrant American past seems to be hidden.

KARL HESS

Another Trollope Trip

The Indomitable Mrs. Trollope, by Eileen Bigland. 255 pp. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company. \$3.50

Fanny Trollope was a trial to live with but is amusing to read about. We've heard so much about her three rough years in this country and the irresponsible book she wrote about us that we forget she had had a busy life as a wife and mother before she came here. A poor rector's daughter, a little thing burning with impatience and ambition, Fanny had married the scholarly Mr. Trollope, got sick and tired of poverty, and set out for America in 1828 to free the slaves and establish a socialist state. With remarkable nonchalance she left behind her husband and two of her children, including Anthony.

The biggest part of her career came after she had left America in disgust. Her book about America made her famous, and she followed it up with about fifty varied books and pamphlets and got to know all the famous people. Her handsome son, Adolphus, had no talent; she spent years trying to make him a writer. Her younger son, Anthony, she detested; she ignored his career; she was jealous of his talent. When she died at eighty she could not remember who he was.

Fanny was witty and a good talker, but she was a center-of-the-stage girl, ruthless and often foolish.

There have been good books and articles about Fanny; she wrote plenty herself. This is not one of the best. Though true to fact, it makes free with Fanny's thoughts and talk. It is lightly told and skillfully written, but why fictionize such a lively story? Perhaps because Miss Bigland is a novelist and her mind just works that way.

HELEN WOODWARD

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THE BOOKMAILER, Box 101, New York 16

Keynesian Currency

The Dollar, by Roy Harrod. 156 pp. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. \$3.50

Problem Number One facing the Dollar, according to Mr. Harrod, biographer and most brilliant follower of the late Lord Keynes, is not any longer a Depression. (He still holds the totally discredited theory that ours is a "mature economy," but believes it can be periodically rejuvenated.) The problem of the Dollar is how to beat other people's dollar shortage. Sick currencies cannot be rehabilitated—such things as improving incentives and enhancing productivity apparently are taboo—because, he argues, they "necessitate" exchange controls which in turn perpetuate the dollar gap. The vicious circle must be cut by surgery, by raising the U. S. statutory price of gold to \$70 per ounce. Gold production would be boosted by \$2 to \$3 billions annually, to be sold to the United States, thereby killing two birds: the alleged global gold scarcity (that is bound to lead to the complete demonetization of gold, he threatens), and the actual dollar famine of the soft money nations. Concerted devaluation is, of course, an old item in the Keynesian bag of patent medicines. To make it look respectable, Harrod suggests the simultaneous return to gold coinage, while clamoring vehemently for world-wide discrimination against American exports and ridiculing Cordell Hull's "theological" reciprocity program.

But the most interesting implications of dollar devaluation Mr. Harrod leaves untold. One is the bonanza it would bestow on French hoarders and on the Soviets, whose huge gold holdings would be doubled in dollar value. As the discussion on devaluation gets under way, foreign owners of dollar balances (\$12 billions) would withdraw them in gold, plunging the money market into virtual anarchy, in order to return with the gold after the event and cash in on the 100 per cent profit. And what about the inflationary consequences of a fantastic enlargement of our monetary base by writing up the gold reserve and attracting ever more of the yellow metal? Nothing simpler, says he, than to offset them: all the Federal Reserve has to do is to liquidate its entire bond portfolio. If that should cause a panic with incalculable repercussions, it would be a small price for eliminating the dollar shortage and ending American aid. (Buying gold in not "needed" quantities is aid, too, he admits, but of a more "subtle" sort.)

So much about the "position" of the dollar. Its history is presented briefly in a very entertaining—very Keynesian—fashion as an unrelenting struggle between monetary "disciplinarians" and "expansionists." Harrod's major sympathies are with the latter, of course.

The little book exuberates with historical fabrications (believe it or not, it was Britain that

maintained the dollar on gold in the late 1930's!) to say nothing of naive self-contradictions. But it offers a cleverly concocted and most instructive lesson in Keynesianism. By roundabout mental processes, it preaches the sweet doctrine of perpetual but well-regimented inflation, directed in an authoritarian fashion by "cooperating" central banks. Their qualification for wielding undiluted power is taken for granted—provided they follow the lead of the British Treasury (in turn, presumably, under Keynesian leadership).

MELCHIOR PALYI

Testament to Beauty

Chinese Art, by Judith and Arthur Hart Burling.
384 pp., 248 plates, 11 in full color. New York: Studio-Crowell. \$8.50

In the great museums of the world, in Europe and America, and in private collections everywhere, are magnificent treasures of a hitherto unbroken tradition of 4,000 years of true Chinese art. These are the paintings and ivories, the ceramics and porcelains and enamels, the jades and bronzes, the silks and embroideries, and all the other exquisite examples of the creative genius and taste of a great people. The art now outside of China may well be the last of its kind the world will ever see, for the Chinese Communists are the executioners of their own people's great culture.

Besides the many beautiful and perfect objects which do exist, this book by the Burlings records the whole fascinating history and explanation of the evolution of the arts of China from prehistoric times to the present: The book is a veritable testament to beauty. It is a work distinguished for its sound scholarship and taste. In addition, it is a book a lay reader can enjoy as much as the art student and connoisseur.

The husband and wife author-team have spent the greater part of their lives in China studying Chinese art at first hand.

They tell us that the Chinese in all their arts, as in the rest of their living, maintain perfect balance in form and structure, and in the relationship between beauty and use. Art in China, they say, is not just something dedicated to private enjoyment but was created to fulfill a utilitarian need both in a practical and a ritual sense. While the Emperor had his paintings and jades, his simple subjects had rice bowls and teapots just as right in design and decoration.

This innate "sense of rightness" is implicit in all Chinese art and craftsmanship and, indeed, is an integral part of Chinese life and philosophy. It is this philosophy which gives meaning and hope to the belief that China's tragedy will pass. Until it does, this book will help keep the great past alive.

IRENE CORBALLY KUHN

THEATER

Eliot's Livable Wasteland

By JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

When T. S. Eliot's first popular play was produced the more earnest of his admirers "interpreted" it with desperate ingenuity. It was seriously suggested that the three principal characters represented the Holy Trinity and that, for instance, Aunt Julia was certainly the Holy Ghost, since her habit of always turning up everywhere was obviously intended to suggest "omnipresence." *The Confidential Clerk* (159 pp., Harcourt, Brace and Company, \$3.00) will be a harder nut to crack—if you insist upon assuming an esoteric kernel. To those of us who do not it is evidence of an astounding fact. After thirty-five years Mr. Eliot has given up the struggle to be always utterly serious. Cheerfulness is breaking through.

Perhaps, and for longer than we know, he had been getting a little tired of the role in which he found himself cast. Certainly anyone who had ever had an hour's intimate conversation with him was aware that, as a private person, he produced a very different impression from that produced by his literary work. Obviously the dogmatic arrogance of his critical essays was a manner assumed for purely literary purposes. No less obviously his royalism and his religious orthodoxy were, though sincere enough, only part of his whole self. He *had* humor, a measure of worldly wisdom, and a sense of fun all of which were rigorously excluded from everything he had written since the early days when he was still under the influence of Jules Laforgue, the original begetter of that grotesque style which Eliot and the early Huxley took over. It is almost as though the two plays were an attempt to say to his disciples: "After all, I'm not quite as solemn as you are." And unless they succeed in explaining this declaration away, the disciples won't like it.

Mr. Eliot is going back on the saddest of the sad young men.

Just how interesting one finds *The Cocktail Party* and *The Confidential Clerk* will depend largely upon the extent to which one is interested in their relation to the whole work of a man who has, after all, exercised an enormous influence upon the intellectuals of our generation. Had they been anonymous they would perhaps be no more than odd, entertaining enough in a queer way but failing somehow to come off. Seen or read as attempts on the part of a very gifted man to extricate himself from an unhappy position into which he had succeeded in talking himself, they take on a new kind of interest. And the second play follows logically after the first.

Mr. Eliot, it must be remembered, appeared upon the literary scene during the notorious post-World War One years. He was an astonishing phenomenon just because he began, in an age of cynicism, to talk like a saint. That does not mean that he called himself holy but it does mean he assumed without argument that holiness was the only thing worth talking about, and that all the scorn he poured upon the world of today was based on the charge that in holiness it had no interest whatsoever. The mere astonishment of his contemporaries accounted for a good deal of the first attention he attracted and he stuck stubbornly to the role he had chosen. He grew more and more solemn, more and more melancholy, more and more religious. Or at least so it seemed. But if *The Cocktail Party* said anything clearly, it was simply this: Though sainthood is the one wholly admirable thing in the world, saints are few. For most human beings life is not a road to Calvary but a cocktail party. The way of the world is not the best way, but it is the only one most people can follow and it is not to be condemned.

Whether this is to be taken to mean that Mr. Eliot himself has decided that he is not a saint after all is an open question. But the new play certainly takes up from there. All the characters in it are "worldly" and all are likable enough. They and their predicaments are absurd but they are not despicable. The wasteland has turned out to be a very habitable place after all.

By way of a plot Mr. Eliot has concocted something which obviously suggests both *The Importance of Being Earnest* and a libretto by Gilbert. Of the five principal characters three are illegitimate children now grown up and the other two, now man and wife, are the parents of one or another of the children. But nobody knows who is who, and the denouement suggests Bernard Shaw's account of the last act of *A Winter's Tale* where "the characters are all showing one another birthmarks and explaining why they are not dead." The fun—and there is quite a little—comes from the fact that all these personages are very "correct" people calmly reconciling themselves to an intricately incorrect situation. That is doubtless intended to suggest that the world is inescapably absurd and that worldings can never achieve the dignity toward which they aspire. But the ridicule is kindly and the author, who has been crying "Woe!" for more than a generation, seems to have decided to try smiling instead.

There are not, as in *The Cocktail Party*, any saints to furnish a reproachful contrast. Indeed, one of the most interesting things about the new play from the standpoint of its relation to Mr. Eliot's decreasing austerity is the fact that all its themes, though clearly themes which he has used before, are curiously stepped down in intensity and tend toward a sort of moderation which is giving place to the fanaticism toward which he

formerly seemed to struggle. When the successful financier who gave up his odd ambition to be a potter when he discovered that he could never be a first-rate one, asks himself if anyone could really have a vocation,

To be, at best,
A competent copier, possessed by the craving
To create, when one is wholly uncreative?

the theme is obviously related to that of one of Eliot's most famous literary essays in which he denounced "interpretive" criticism as the consequence, not of a genuine impulse toward criticism, but of a "weak creative impulse." In so far as the "two worlds" of *The Cocktail Party* reappear, they reappear not as the way of worldliness and the way of the saint but as the world of ordinary activity and the "secret garden" of devotion to some dream of music or pottery into which, at moments, the individual retires. In other words, Art here takes the place of God as the thing with which the worldly cannot really achieve an identification, and "the secret garden" is thus obviously a sort of secular equivalent of "the rose garden" in Mr. Eliot's most solemn poem, "Four Quartets."

The empty years.
Oh, I'm terribly sorry to be saying this;
But it goes to explain what I said just now
About rebelling against the terms
That life has imposed.

Could Mr. Eliot possibly be confessing that he regrets the years during which he so persistently refused to accept the limitations which living in the twentieth instead of the seventeenth century imposed upon him? Probably not. But *The Confidential Clerk* does, nevertheless, remain a defense of those who are more worldly than he was formerly able to forgive men for being.


The Roots of Time

Nothing except the old is ever new—
The old, old earth; the old, old skies; the old
Spring that blows trees like bubbles made of gold;
And man's old heart grown young with love's
deep clue.

Our clouds today are the kites that March winds
flew

Over the prairies where the Sioux were bold;
Apache eyes watched sunsets manifold
Before day's bursting grape had stained our blue.
Soft Maltese kittens without purr or claw,
The pussywillows of our novelty,
Have frolicked a million Aprils in the sun;
And the young moon whose silver leash can draw
Our tides like shaggy dogs of the ancient sea
Shone before earth conceived the mastodon.

E. MERRILL ROOT



PHOTOGRAPH BY RICHARD BEATTIE

What we still don't know about cancer

—and one of the reasons why

IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, our knowledge of the nature of cancer, and how to treat it, has grown encouragingly. Patients, who would have been considered hopeless cases even five years ago, today are being completely cured. And even those who apply for treatment too late can usually live longer—and less painfully—because of modern palliative treatment.

All the same, there have been defeats as well as victories. We do not know—to take a single example—why so many more men are now dying from cancer of the lung. In 1933—just twenty years ago—lung cancer killed 2,252 men; in 1953, some 18,500. That's a great increase—which even our expanded population, and other known factors, can't possibly account for in full.

Well, why haven't we found more of the answers to cancer?

Not only because cancer is an im-

mensely complex problem: difficult to diagnose, and difficult to treat; challenging to the best research minds.

All that is true enough. But there is another reason: *we do not* have enough money.

Last year your gifts to the American Cancer Society were more generous than ever before. But they were not enough.


You gave the Society almost twenty millions to fight a disease that—at present death rates—will kill twenty-three million living Americans.

Less than one dollar for each American destined to die from cancer. Much more is needed for research, for education, for clinics. Won't you please do *your* part . . . now?

American Cancer Society

Cancer
Man's cruelest
enemy
strike back

Give



GENTLEMEN:

- Please send me free information on cancer.
- Enclosed is my contribution of \$ to the cancer crusade.

Name

Address


City State

Simply address the envelope:
CANCER c/o Postmaster, Name of Your Town

Sudden blowouts can mean sudden death on today's crowded highways!




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drop can swerve your car out of control, off the road, or head-on into on-coming traffic!

You'll be lucky to escape with nothing more serious than a repair bill.



But with double chamber LifeGuards in your tires, you have a life-saving reserve of air in the *inner* chamber! Instead of dropping as much as 6 inches, your wheel drops only a couple of inches; you have plenty of time to come to a safe, straight-line stop!

Protect yourself and the ones you love from possible injury or death.

Cost less because they're re-usable!

You continue to enjoy blowout-safe driving on your LifeGuard Safety Tubes through three or more sets of tires, for 100,000 or more miles. Because they last longer, they cost much less per mile. New LifeGuards are available with puncture-sealant, too.

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See TV's Great Dramatic Show, "The Goodyear TV Playhouse," Alternate Sunday Evenings, NBC-TV.

GOODYEAR

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